green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 11×
37.8 score
G Cite
cited 24× by 23 distinct cases, 1998–2025 · 4 courts ·
…the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
at p. 1109
⚠ not in text
cited 19× by 19 distinct cases, 1999–2026 · 5 courts ·
…so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
at p. 1109
⚠ not in text
Topic ↗
cited 13× by 13 distinct cases, 2001–2025 · 6 courts ·
…not merely that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
at p. 1109
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
SCOTT v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
MULLEN v. NORTHAMPTON TOWNSHIP
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken ....
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Straka v. Comcast Cable
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
as another court of appeals has put it, 'federal courts are not arbitral boards ruling on the strength of 'cause' for discharge. the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Minetola v. Commonwealth Telephone Co.
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Hicks v. Tech Industries
the plaintiff must show, not merely 351 that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Marione v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
the question is not whether the employer made the best or even a sound business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Richard J. Kautz v. Met-Pro Corporation
(2×)
the question is not whether the employer made the best or even a sound business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Kautz v. Met Pro Corp
the question is not whether the employer made the best or even a sound business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Fasold v. Justice
(8×)
also: Cited "see"
he must show, not merely that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Fasold v. Justice
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
he must show, not merely that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Thakur v. R.W. Johnson Pharmaceutical Research Institute
(2×)
evidence that a plaintiff was not criticized may take on significance if the plaintiff can show that other comparable employees regularly received express evaluations of their work.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert L. Ganoe, Sr. v. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
In the alternative, to establish pretext based on the argument that a discriminatory reason was “more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause,” a plaintiff must present evidence “with sufficient probative force” to allow a factfinder to “conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a motivating or determinative factor.” See Simpson, 142 F.3d at 644-45 (citing Keller, 130 F.3d at 1111).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Christopher Butler v. FedEx Supply Chain, Inc.
In the alternative, to establish pretext based on the argument that a discriminatory reason was “more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause,” a plaintiff must present evidence “with sufficient probative force” to allow a factfinder to “conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that [race or sex] was a motivating or determinative factor.” See Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644–45 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Keller, 130 F.3d at 1111); see also Jones, 198 F.3d at 413 (applying Simpson to a Title VII and Section 1981 race discrimination clai…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
OTERO v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
(2×)
Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MOBELY v. MERAKEY ALLEGHENY VALLEY SCHOOL
The question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination/retaliation].’” Id. (quoting Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109 (additional internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DEWALT v. ALLIANCE PHARMA INC.
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
If a plaintiff wishes to establish pretext under the second prong of the Fuentes pretext analysis, she must cite evidence proving discrimination “based solely on the natural probative force of the evidence.” Keller, 130 F.3d at 1111.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Alastair Crosbie v. Highmark Inc
Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109 (internal quo- tation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
CONNELL v. PENN AUTO TEAM
DISCUSSION Courts apply the McDonnell Douglas three-part burden- shifting framework to evaluate discrimination claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the PHRA.27 Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case for discrimination.28 To do so in the Title VII context, a plaintiff must show that 1) he was qualified for the position; 2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 3) the evidence is adequate to create an inference that the adverse employment action was based on a trait protected by Title VII.29 A modified 24 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
SEIPLE v. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC.
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Patti Kopko v. Lehigh Valley Health Network I
In other words, the “question is not whether [Kopko] made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination].” Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Roger Knight v. Slippery Rock University
Inc. 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Melvin Britton v. Oil City School District
Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Szostek v. Drexel University
Instead, he must “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, in-coherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.” Id. at 1108-1109 (internal quotations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dececco v. UPMC
(2×)
The Keller decision, which specifically addressed a comment made by a decision-maker is illustrative of this premise. 5 In Keller , the plaintiff alleging age discrimination offered evidence that his immediate superior, who ultimately made the decision to terminate Keller, remarked to him: “If you are getting too old for the job, maybe you should hire one or two young bankers.” Id. at 1111 (emphasis in original).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Scott v. Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP
“The question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination].” Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lewis v. GENESIS HEALTHCARE CORP.
E.g., Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108 (recognizing that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to ADEA disparate treatment claims).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Naber v. Dover Healthcare Associates, Inc.
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hides, 509 U.S. 502 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109 ("The question is not whether the employer made the best or even a sound business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.”); Braithwaite v. Accupac, Inc., No. 00-5405, 2002 WL 31928434 , at *6 (E.D.Pa.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Atkinson v. Lafayette College
Primarily, the Third Circuit has recognized that “[ejmployers who are dissatisfied with the performance of their employees sometimes voice express criticism to those employees, but employers do not always do so.” Keller, 130 F.3d at 1111 (3d Cir.1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cisco Hunter v. Rowan Univ
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109 (explaining that a plaintiff alleging unlawful age discrimination “cannot survive summary judgment ... simply by pointing to evidence that could convince a reasonable factfinder that [she] did as well as [she] could under the circumstances.”) Hunter’s second argument also fails.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shontz v. RITE AID OF PENNSYLVANIA INC.
(2×)
The Keller decision, which specifically addressed a comment made by a decision-maker with respect to the second prong of the Fuentes test, is illustrative of this premise. 2 In Keller , the plaintiff alleging age discrimination offered evidence that his immediate superior, who ultimately made the decision to terminate Keller, remarked to him: “If you are getting too old for the job, maybe you should hire one or two young bankers.” Id. at 1111 (emphasis in original).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fitzpatrick v. National Mobile Television
Therefore, Plaintiffs explanations for his accidents are irrelevant unless “a factfinder could reasonably infer that the plaintiff satisfied the criterion identified by the employer or that the employer did not actually rely upon *494 the stated criterion.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 767 . “[T]he relevant question is not whether [the plaintiff] could have done better; instead, [it] is whether the evidence shows that it was so clear that [the plaintiff] could not have done better that [the employer] could not have believed otherwise.” Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109 (emphasis added).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Rose v. Woolworth Corp.
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
May 28, 1999) (same, citing Ezold)-, see also Keller, 130 F.3d at 1111-12 (supervisor’s ageist comment that was unrelated to termination, unsupported by other evidence, and made months before plaintiffs discharge was insufficient to show pretext).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fatzinger v. Lehigh Valley Hospital
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
If Plaintiff is to meet her burden under this prong, she must “point to evidence that proves [retaliation] in the same way that critical facts are generally proved — based solely on the natural probative force of the evidence.” Keller, 130 F.3d at 1111 (stating standard in context of age discrimination case).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Fulvio Stanziale v. Lester Jargowsky, Public Health Coordinator County of Monmouth Monmouth County Board of Health
Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Donald Showalter v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
When the plaintiff alleges unlawful discharge based on age, the prima facie case requires proof that (i) the plaintiff was a member of the protected class, i.e., was 40 years of age or older (see 29 U.S.C. § 631 (a)), (ii) that the plaintiff was discharged, (iii) that the plaintiff was qualified for the job, and (iv) that the plaintiff was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to create an inference of age discrimination. 130 F.3d at 1108 (citations omitted).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Showalter v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Consequently, had Eror compared Showalter to both Montefiore and Presbyterian security supervisors, Showalter would not have been terminated. 3 The Magistrate Judge granted UPMC's motion for summary judgment for two reasons: first, he held that Showalter failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); and second, he held that even if Showalter had established a prima facie case of age discrimination, Showalter did not submit evidence" `from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articula…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kennedy v. Chubb Group of Ins. Companies
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
See Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1071 ; Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir.1996) (“If there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the [nonmoving party’s] favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment.”); Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731; cf. Keller, 130 F.3d at 1111 (court affirmed summary judgment for employer, finding that employer had particularly strong legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharge, namely his failure to meet financing goal that plaintiff himself set for the company, and it w…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Narin v. Lower Merion School District
A plaintiff must present evidence that demonstrates "weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions" in defendant's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the proffered reason is not "worthy of credence." Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108 (en banc )(quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 ).
discussed
Cited "see"
Donna Jussen v. Atlantic Health System et al.
See Keller, 130 F.3d at 1112 (finding a “comment [that] occurred four or five months prior to the time when [employer] decided that [Plaintiff] should be discharged” did not demonstrate animus); Rymas v. Princeton Healthcare Sys.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States of America v. MEDTRONIC, INC.
See generally Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 895 , 907 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[T]he failure to provide argument on a point at issue constitutes abandonment of the issue ... which provides an independent basis for dismissal.”), aff’d, 130 F.3d 1101 (2d Cir. 1997). assuming arguendo that they caused the submission of false claims, Defendants assert that the SAC fails to allege that (iv) the practice of reusing Serters in providing patient care was material to government payment decisions or (v) Defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard.
discussed
Cited "see"
Martinez v. Upmc Susquehanna
Cir. 1996) (alterations in original) (quoting McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992)); accord Keller, 130 F.3d at 1110 (stating that “the relevant question is not whether [the employee] could have done better; instead, the relevant question is whether the evidence shows that it was so clear that [the employee] could not have done better that [the employer] could not have believed otherwise”). 133 See Operating Journal, Doc. 36-17. 134 See Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that discrimination plaintiffs must “present…
discussed
Cited "see"
CrossBorder Solutions, Inc. n/k/a Exactera Inc. v. Macias, Gini, & OConnell, LLP
See Anti-Monopoly, Inc., v. Hasbro, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 895 , 907 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[T]he failure to provide argument on a point at issue constitutes abandonment of the issue.”), aff'd, 130 F.3d 1101 (2d Cir. 1997). 5 MGO’s wording on this argument is unclear.
discussed
Cited "see"
Brown v. Automattic
See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 895 , 907 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 130 F.3d 1101 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Jones v. Cuomo, No. 20 Civ. 4898 (KPF), 2021 WL 2269551 , at *5 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed
Cited "see"
Nicholson v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc.
(2×)
See Keller, 130 F.3d at 1112 .
cited
Cited "see"
Warmin v. New York City Department of Education
See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 895 , 907 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 130 F.3d 1101 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam); cf. Jackson v. Fed.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Inc. And K-Mart Corporation"
Dec 2, 1997.
Kearse, Cardamone, Leisure.
Published | Carl E. Person, New York City, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Gary L. Reback, Palo Alto, CA (David J. Berger, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Palo Alto, CA, Neal R. Stoll, Peter S. Julian, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, New York City, on the brief), for Defendant-Ap-pellee.
Citer courts: E.D. Pennsylvania (2) · W.D. Pennsylvania (1)
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Anti-Monopoly, Inc., appeals from a final judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Lawrence M. McKenna, Judge, dismissing its antitrust complaint against defendant Hasbro, Inc. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings dismissing so much of the complaint as asserted a secondary-line violation of the Robinson-Pat-man Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13, on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing to assert such claims. The court granted summary judgment dismissing the remainder of the complaint, which principally asserted- claims under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18, on the grounds, inter alia, that plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to infer that plaintiff suffered “antitrust injury.”
We have considered all of plaintiffs challenges to the district court’s rulings and have found in them no basis for reversal. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated in Judge McKenna’s Memorandum and Order, reported at 958 F.Supp. 895 (1997).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.