Dunbar v. Heath, 42 F.3d 1385 (4th Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
Dunbar v. Heath, 42 F.3d 1385 (4th Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
38 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Turner v. McCray-Bey (mdd, 2023-08-03)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Turner v. McCray-Bey
D. Maryland · 2023 · confidence medium
Generally, the rule provides that “one who feloniously and intentionally causes the death of another may not profit by taking any portion of the victim's estate or the proceeds of the victim's life insurance policy.” Clark v. Clark, 42 F.3d 1385 at *3 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 392 (Md.1986)).
cited Cited "see" Delma C. Gentry, Individually and on Behalf of Herself and Others Similarly Situated v. Ashland Oil, Inc., a Kentucky Corporation
4th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gentry v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 42 F.3d 1385 (4th Cir.1994) (unpublished table decision) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see" Gentry v. Ashland Oil, Inc.
4th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gentry v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 42 F.3d 1385 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) (per curiam).
William A. Dunbar, III
v.
Carrol Heath, Aiken County Sheriff, in His Individual and Official Capacities David Neens, Investigator, Aiken County Sheriff's Department, in His Individual and Official Capacities Becky Edmonds, Investigator, Aiken County Sheriff's Department, in Her Individual and Official Capacities Lonnie McCartney Jail Administrator, Aiken County Detention Center, in His Individual and Official Capacities, and Virginia Harris, Aiken County Public Defender, in Her Individual and Official Capacities Bill Hart, Investigator, Aiken County Public Defender's Office, in His Individual and Official Capacities
94-6603.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Dec 7, 1994.
42 F.3d 1385
Unpublished

42 F.3d 1385

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.
William A. DUNBAR, III, Plaintiff Appellant,
v.
Carrol HEATH, Aiken County Sheriff, in his individual and
official capacities; David Neens, Investigator, Aiken
County Sheriff's Department, in his individual and official
capacities; Becky Edmonds, Investigator, Aiken County
Sheriff's Department, in her individual and official
capacities; Lonnie Mccartney, Jail Administrator, Aiken
County Detention Center, in his individual and official
capacities, Defendants Appellees,
and
Virginia Harris, Aiken County Public Defender, in her
individual and official capacities; Bill Hart,
Investigator, Aiken County Public Defender's Office, in his
individual and official capacities, Defendants.

No. 94-6603.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 17, 1994.
Decided: Dec. 7, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., District Judge. (CA-93-153-3-OBD)

William A. Dunbar, III, Appellant Pro Se. John Gregg McMaster, Jr., TOMPKINS & MCMASTER, Columbia, SC; Robert Eric Petersen, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Columbia, SC, for Appellees.

D.S.C.

DISMISSED.

Before RUSSELL and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

1

Appellant appeals the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This Court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1988), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292 (1988); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.

2

We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

3

DISMISSED.