United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“3583(a) allows the district court to include su- pervised release as 'part of the sentence,' not as part of the impris- onment.”
14 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Shalonda Faison (ca11, 2026-06-23)
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) cited 1× in this case · 2 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Shalonda Faison
11th Cir. · 2026 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
3583(a) allows the district court to include su- pervised release as 'part of the sentence,' not as part of the impris- onment.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Chavez
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
courts can order supervised release in addition to the maximum term of imprisonment available by statute
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Reed
Colo. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Seq eg., §18-1.83-401(1)(a)(V)(A) (felony sentences include a mandatory period of parole); United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that supervised release is part of the sentence, even though it is not included in the term of imprisonment).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Comartie
11th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Because Comartie did not raise that issue in the district court, we review only for plain error, and we will not reverse “unless there is: (1) error, (2) that is plain, ... (3) that affects substantial rights ... [and] (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291,1298 (11th Cir.2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (a)(2), which governs revocation of probation, provides that: If the defendant violates a condition of probation at any time prior to the expiration ...…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michele Renee Cenna
11th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
See id. at § 3583(a); United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Candalario
3rd Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Proctor
11th Cir. · 1997 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir.1995) (‘We hold that the district court did not err in ordering supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (a) in addition to the maximum *1314 term of imprisonment available by statute.”); United States v. West, 898 F.2d 1493, 1504 (11th Cir.1990) (“We conclude that Congress intended a defendant’s term of supervised release to be ‘a separate part’ of, or in addition to, his term of imprisonment.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 , 111 S.Ct. 685 , 112 L.Ed.2d 676 (1991).
cited Cited "see" United States v. LaShawn Porcher
11th Cir. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir. 1995).
cited Cited "see" Kirksey v. Samuels
3rd Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. George Sepero
3rd Cir. · 2015 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir.1995) (upholding a sentence ordering supervised release in addition to the maximum term of imprisonment); United States v. Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373 (D.C.Cir.1991) (interpreting the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (a), as authorizing imposition of supervised release “in addition to any authorized term of imprisonment, not by conversion of a portion thereof’).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bryant v. Samuels
3rd Cir. · 2007 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir.1995) (upholding a sentence ordering supervised release in addition to the maximum term of imprisonment, noting that the Senate Committee Report for section 3583(a) indicates that the term of supervised release is a separate part of the defendant’s sentence and is not the end of the term of imprisonment); United States v. Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373 (D.C.Cir.1991) (holding that Congress provided in section 3583(a) that supervised release is to be imposed “in addition to any authorized term of imprisonment, not by conversion o…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Chavez
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir.1995) (“courts can order supervised release in addition to the maximum term of imprisonment available by statute”); United States v. West, 898 F.2d 1493, 1504 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Congress intended a defendant’s term of supervised release to be ‘a separate part’ of, or in addition to, his term of imprisonment”); United States v. LaValley, 957 F.2d 1309, 1312 (6th Cir.1992) (offense carrying maximum incarceration of six months, a maximum fíne of $5,000 and a five year term of supervised release is petty).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Carlton JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant
18-11728.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jan 24, 1995.
42 F.3d 1370
Rise Weathersby, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for appellant., Janet F. King, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, GA, for appellee.
Kravttch, Anderson, Carnes.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Carlton Jenkins pled guilty to obstruction of a Deputy United States Marshal, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1501. [1] He was sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment, twelve months, and an additional twelve months of supervised release. Jenkins appeals his sentence, arguing that a district court cannot impose a period of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) after already imposing the maximum term of impris.onment. [2]

Our reasoning in United States v. West, 898 F.2d 1493, 1504 (11th Cir.1990), suggests[*1371] that a term of imprisonment and a term of supervised release must be evaluated separately to determine if a maximum sentence has been violated. In West, we held that a defendant’s term of supervised release was an addition to his term of imprisonment and was not limited to the time of a defendant’s prison sentence which remained unserved after an early release. We relied on the Senate Committee Report for 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), which states that “[t]he term of supervised release would be a separate part of the defendant’s sentence, rather than being the end of the term of imprisonment.” S.Rep. No. 98-225 at 123-24, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 3182, 3306-07.

The circuits which have decided this issue directly have held that courts can order supervised release in addition to the maximum term of imprisonment .available by statute, noting that § 3583(a) allows the district court to include supervised release as “part of the sentence,” not as part of the imprisonment. United States v. Watkins, 14 F.3d 414, 415 (8th Cir.1994) (“a term of supervised release is to be imposed in addition to any incarceration authorized by a particular substantive criminal statute”); United States v. Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) authorize^] a period of supervised release to be imposed in addition to a maximum term of imprisonment”); United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F.2d 425, 432-33 (9th Cir.1990) (Section 3583(a) gives “a sentencing court the option to tack a period of supervised release onto any term of imprisonment authorized by a substantive criminal statute, even a term near or at the maximum”); United States v. Butler, 895 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir.1989) (“The addition of a period of supervised release ... cannot create a violation of the maximum prison sentence allowed by statute”). Other circuits have supported this result in cases upholding terms of imprisonment for violation of supervised release which caused a defendant’s total term of imprisonment to exceed the maximum for the underlying offense. United States v. Wright, 2 F.3d 175, 179 (6th Cir.1993) (“18 U.S.C. § 3583 authorizes imposition of a term of supervised release in addition to the maximum term of imprisonment provided for ... the underlying offense”); United States v. Dillard, 910 F.2d 461, 466 (7th Cir.1990) (“the length of supervised release term does not bear a direct relation to the initial sentence nor to the maximum possible initial sentence”).

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court did not err in ordering supervised release under 18 U.S.C. 3583(a) in addition to the maximum term of imprisonment available by statute. Therefore, we AFFIRM.

1

. 18 U.S.C. § 1501 reads, in pertinent part,

Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs ... any officer of the United States ...; or Whoever assaults, beats, or wounds any officer ... Shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be fined not more than $300 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
2

. The supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), provides that,

a court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.