Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp. v. Susquehanna Valley All., 449 U.S. 1096 (1981). · Go Syfert
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Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp. v. Susquehanna Valley All., 449 U.S. 1096 (1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
251 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 39 distinct courts.
Negative lean: 8th  ·  Positive lean: 3rd, 9th, 7th, 10th, 2nd
Strongest positive: In Re Pacific Gas & Electric Company (canb, 2003-05-15) · Strongest negative: Simmons v. Arkansas Power & Light Co. (ca8, 1981-07-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#16 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 cited 2× in this case · 186 total citations of statute #13 42 U.S.C. § 2271 cited 1× in this case · 35 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Simmons v. Arkansas Power & Light Co. (2×)
8th Cir. · 1981 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see General Public Utilities Corp. v. Susquehanna Valley Alliance, 449 U.S. 1096, 1097-1101 , 101 S.Ct. 893, 894-96 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial of writ of certiorari in the above case). .
discussed Cited "but see" Simmons v. Arkansas Power & Light Co (2×)
8th Cir. · 1981 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see General Public Utilities Corp. v. Susquehanna Valley Alliance, 449 U.S. 1096, 1097-1101 , 101 S.Ct. 893, 894-96 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial of writ of certiorari in the above case). 5 Our resolution of this issue makes an examination of the exhaustion question unnecessary.
discussed Cited "see" In Re Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Bankr. N.D. Cal. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 892 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981), reh. denied, 450 U.S. 960 , 101 S.Ct. 1421 , 67 L.Ed.2d 385 . 28 Objectors point out that this doctrine protects advocacy, not anticompetitive behavior.
discussed Cited "see" Lesser v. City of Cape May (2×)
D.N.J. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 240 (3rd Cir.1980), ce rt. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" Mathis v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2×)
9th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 245 (3rd Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" Nuclear Reg. Rep. P 20,495 (2×)
9th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 245 (3rd Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" City of Malden v. Union Electric Co.
8th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1107-08 (reaffirming holding in Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 , 984-85 (7th Cir.1980), ce rt. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 892 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981)).
discussed Cited "see" City of Malden, Missouri v. Union Electric Company and Missouri Utilities Company, City of Malden, Missouri v. Union Electric Company and Missouri Utilities Company
8th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1107-08 (reaffirming holding in Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 , 984-85 (7th Cir.1980),cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 892 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981)). 38 We question whether specific intent should be required in a civil monopolization case where the conduct at issue has neither been approved by nor subject to regulatory agency review. 7 We need not decide whether the court's specific intent instruction constituted error, however, because any such error must be viewed as harmless in light of the jury's finding that defendants did not possess mo…
discussed Cited "see" Airco Industrial Gases, Inc. v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1988 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 244 (3d Cir.1980) ("Certainly a complaint alleging a cause of action for private relief implied from the provisions of the United States Constitution states a claim within the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court_ The legal sufficiency of that clEtim is a separate matter_’’), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981); Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 32-33 (3d Cir.1980) ("Dismissal on jurisdictional grounds and for failure to state a claim are analytically distinct,…
discussed Cited "see" Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. County of Suffolk (2×)
E.D.N.Y · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island, 619 F.2d 231 , 238 (3d Cir.1980), (“ ‘no action’ language in 42 U.S.C. § 2271 (c) is not couched in jurisdictional terms”), cert. denied, sub nom, General Public Utilities Corp. v. Susquehanna Valley Alliance, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
cited Cited "see" Ray v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.
N.D. Ind. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co., 465 F.Supp. 1320 (N.D.Ind.1979), aff'd., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 892 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" MCI Communications Corporation and MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company (2×)
7th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co., Inc., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 892 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981), in which this court noted that the “legal and practical maze” that often accompanies regulatory proceedings cannot be allowed to conceal an “illegal opportunity with a legitimate gloss.” Id. at 983-84.
discussed Cited "see" Grason Electric Co. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility District
E.D. Cal. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co., 465 F.Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D.Ind.1979), aff’d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 892 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 ; reh’g denied, 450 U.S. 960 , 101 S.Ct. 1421 , 67 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981) ; United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F.Supp. 54, 58 (D.Minn.1971), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 410 U.S. 366 , 93 S.Ct. 1022 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359 , reh’g denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973), aff’d, 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 2…
discussed Cited "see" Hempstead County & Nevada County Project v. United States Environmental Protection Agency (2×)
8th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. The Three-Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 241 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" Hempstead County And Nevada County Project: Landfill Committee v. United States Environmental Protection Agency (2×)
8th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. The Three-Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 241 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" Spray-Rite Service Corporation, an Iowa Corporation v. Monsanto Company, a Delaware Corporation
7th Cir. · 1982 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Mishawaka, Indiana v. American Electric Power Co., Inc., 616 F.2d 976, 986 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 892 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 reh. denied, 450 U.S. 960 , 101 S.Ct. 1421 , 67 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981).
cited Cited "see" Lukens Steel Co. v. Donovan
E.D. Pa. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island, 619 F.2d 231 , 245 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." City of Jersey City v. Hodel (2×)
D.N.J. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 241 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, General Public Utilities Corp. v. Susquehanna Valley Alliance, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. v. Newvector Communications, Inc.
D. Ariz. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
The Seventh Circuit found that “the state commissions have in no way placed a badge of approval on the defendant’s dual rate structure.” Mishawaka 1560 F.2d at 1320; see also City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 892 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981) {Mishawaka II).
examined Cited "see, e.g." People v. Rivera (4×)
Cal. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
He relies on In re Gregory S. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 764, 773 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 540 ], which held that “even absent a [minor’s] request [to see his parents], if parents are available and wish to speak to a minor in custody, police are under a duty to advise the minor of his right to see them before interrogation can take place.” (Italics in original; see also In re Patrick W. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 615, 617 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 848 ], cert. den. (1981) 449 U.S. 1096 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 824 , 101 S.Ct. 893 ].) However, we have never indicated that such an extension of Miranda is controlling.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In the Matter of Establish Inspection of the Metal Bank of America, Inc. Appeal of the Metal Bank of America (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
Exhaustion is thus not required as “the prescribed administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable injury,” Babcock & Wilcox, 610 F.2d at 1138 (quoting Barnes v. Chatterton, 515 F.2d 916, 920 (3d Cir.1975) (quoting American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local 1004 v. Resor, 442 F.2d 993, 994-95 (3d Cir.1971))); see also Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 245 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Chiplin Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lebanon (2×)
1st Cir. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
Carr v. Learner, 547 F.2d 135,137 (1st Cir.1976) (affirming, on the ground of failure to state a claim, dismissal under 12(b)(1)); see also Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 239 (3d Cir.1980) (dismissal affirmed because remand “for the entry of a dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), rather than under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), would be a futile exercise”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981); Sacks v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C.Cir.1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." County Of Rockland v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2×)
2d Cir. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Gage v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 479 F.2d at 1216 ("We hold that petitioners have come to the wrong forum with an inappropriate claim in search of an unavailable remedy."); see also Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 238-39 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981). 2.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." County of Rockland v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2×)
2d Cir. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Gage v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 479 F.2d at 1216 (“We hold that petitioners have come to the wrong forum with an inappropriate claim in search of an unavailable remedy.”); see also Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 , 238—39 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981). 2.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Compensation Department of District Five v. Marshall (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1981 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 239-42 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding statutory scheme of review in court of appeals of Nuclear Regulatory Commission action to be inadequate in certain circumstances, and holding that district court has subject matter jurisdiction), ce rt. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 893 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981), with City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 935-39 (D.C.Cir.1979) (finding statutory scheme of review in court of appeals of FAA decision adequate to address claimed violations of statute, and thus holding that th…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Klockner, Inc. v. Federal Wire Mill Corp.
7th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 979-80 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 , 101 S.Ct. 892 , 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
General Public Utilities Corp. Et Al.
v.
Susquehanna Valley Alliance Et Al.
80-382.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 12, 1981.
449 U.S. 1096
Rehnquist, Powell.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice POWELL join, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Rehnquist, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Powell join,

dissenting.

In this case the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a private party seeking to compel agency compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq., need not exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in Federal District Court. Because I believe that a long series of our cases heretofore regarded as settled law require such exhaustion, e. g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938), I dissent from the denial of the petition for certiorari and would set the case for argument.

The case arises out of the effort of the Nuclear Regulatory[*1097] Commission and petitioners, the owners and operators of Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, to treat and eventually dispose of radioactive wastewater resulting from the accident occurring at Three Mile Island in March 1979. In May 1979, respondents commenced this action against the Commission and petitioners, alleging that the Commission had approved petitioners’ construction and operation of a facility to decontaminate the radioactive wastewater, known as EPICOR II, and planned to allow the processed water to be discharged in the Susquehanna River. Specifically, respondents alleged that the Commission had failed to prepare an environmental impact statement for the EPICOR II system, in violation of NEPA, 42 U. S. C. § 4332, and had failed to require petitioners to secure a license or construction permit for the system, in violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq. The complaint also charged that the possible discharge of “high-level radioactive” water into the river would violate both the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), § 301 (f), 86 Stat. 846, 33 U. S. C. § 1311 (f), and a federal constitutional right to “be born and to live mentally and physically unimpaired.”

The District Court found that respondents had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Atomic Energy Act and dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It noted that the administrative remedy available under the Act, 10 CFR §2.206 (1980),[1] “allows[*1098] plaintiffs to ask the [Commission] for all the relief sought in this court.” It further noted that the Act makes any final decision of the Commission reviewable exclusively in the courts of appeals. 42 U. S. C. § 2239 (b) and 28 U. S. C. § 2342.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Although it affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of claims arising under the Atomic Energy Act on the grounds that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over licensing actions, 42 U. S. C. § 2239 (b), and that private parties may not judicially enforce the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2271 (c), it nonetheless found that the District Court had jurisdiction to compel Commission compliance with NEPA. It reasoned that where the Commission “fragments” its environmental review of projects, as is allegedly the case here, the district courts could prohibit such fragmentation. The court went on to hold that the District Court had jurisdiction over respondents’ FWPCA and constitutional claims, reasoning that respondents had satisfied the conditions of the FWPCA’s citizen-suit provision, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), and that the District Court was the “appropriate” forum to consider the constitutional claims.

Petitioners contend, correctly in my view, that the decision below ignored the “long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., supra, at 50-51; McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193, 195 (1969). Even the Solicitor General, who does not seek certiorari in this case, “agrees with petitioners that the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals erred in a number of its rulings and that its decision is contrary to the prior decisions of this Court.” Memorandum for United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1.

[*1099] The gist of petitioners’ argument is that Congress has placed with the Commission the authority to regulate its licensees’ handling of radioactive materials and has limited judicial review of the Commission’s decisions to the courts of appeals. This Court has recognized that the adequacy of Commission compliance with NEPA, not just with the Atomic Energy Act, is reviewable solely in the courts of appeals pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 2239 (b) and 28 U. S. C. § 2342. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U. S. 519, 526-527 (1978). Indeed, the decision below is in direct conflict with a decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which held that where a statutory review procedure assigns to the courts of appeals exclusive review responsibility over agency action — as does the Atomic Energy Act — a district court may not exercise concurrent jurisdiction to resolve allegations of agency noncompliance with NEPA. City of Rochester v. Bond, 195 U. S. App. D. C. 345, 354-355, 603 F. 2d 927, 936-937 (1979).

The “fragmentation” of judicial review in this case results not from the action of the Commission, but from the decision below which splinters judicial review of claims that arise essentially out of the same factual setting. It is anomalous to hold, as did the court below, that the Atomic Energy Act claims are reviewable exclusively in the Court of Appeals, while claims arising under NEPA, FWPCA, and the Constitution are reviewable originally in the District Court.[2] The[*1100] decision below means that the District Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Commission will all exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the same claims at the same time. Such a trifurcated review procedure is not only inefficient, duplicating judicial and administrative effort, but more importantly, it leads to premature interference with agency processes, contrary to the policy underlying direct review statutes.[3]

Although the Solicitor General concedes that the decision below was wrong, he asserts that the case is not worthy of this Court’s attention because the decision will be regarded merely as an “anomaly that cannot be reconciled with this Court’s settled teaching on exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Memorandum for United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5. I am not so sanguine. I fear that unless accorded plenary review here the decision below will spawn[*1101] others like it allowing circumvention of agency review and pursuit of NEPA claims directly in the district courts. Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of the petition for certiorari.

1

Title 10 CFR §2.206 (1980) provides in relevant part:

“(a) Any person may file a request for the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ... to institute a proceeding ... to modify, suspend or revoke a license, or for such other action as may be proper. . . .
“(b) Within a reasonable time after a request pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section has been received, the Director . . . shall either institute the requested proceeding in accordance with the subpart or shall advise the person who made the request in writing that no proceeding will be[*1098] instituted in whole or in part, with respect to his request, and the reasons therefor.”
2

Although it is clear that the court below erred with respect to the NEPA claim, I suggest that it is on no firmer footing with respect to the FWPCA and constitutional claims. It appears, for example, that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the discharge of the type of radioactive water involved in this case, see Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1976). In any event, all of the claimed violations arise out of the very activities which are subject to Commission regulatory control, and considerations of judicial economy require that all of the claims be resolved in the first instance by the Commission.

3

The problems of segregated review are amply illustrated by the facts of this case. On May 25, 1979, the same day suit was filed in this case, the Commission issued a statement prohibiting the treatment or discharge of contaminated water until it had completed an environmental assessment. During the next several months, the Commission staff prepared an environmental assessment on the proposed operation of EPICOR II. The Commission eventually published a draft Environmental Impact Statement, 45 Fed. Reg. 54495 (1980), and issued an opinion on October 16, 1980, permitting the processing of radioactive wastewater by EPICOR II, but specifically prohibiting any discharge of the processed water pending further study. Respondents subsequently filed a petition for review of that order in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §2239. That case raises the same NEPA issues presented in this ease. Thus, the District Court, the Court of the Appeals for the Third Circuit, and the Commission are presently exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the same issues. This sort of procedural chaos is invited by the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case.

What may well be the better course both legally and practically is suggested by a recent case in the District Court for the District of Columbia which raised virtually the same issues presented here. City of Lancaster v. NRC, No. 79-1368. There the court dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs’ suit on the basis, inter alia, of the Commission’s adherence to its May 25, 1979, statement.