In Re Ub, 540 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · Go Syfert
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In Re Ub, 540 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
57 citation events (55 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: In the Interest of D. H., Children (Father) (gactapp, 2025-07-02)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of D. H., Children (Father)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
D. -- those appeals were decided under the former version of the Juvenile Code and under a completely different statutory provision.2 Because the evidence fails to establish that Mother has a medically verified mental illness and because the majority opinion has failed to address or consider persuasive precedent, I respectfully dissent. 2 Specifically, those cases involved OCGA § 15-11-2 (8) (A) (2007), which concerned whether a child “[i]s without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child’s physical, menta…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of K. G., a Child (Mother)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
B., 274 Ga. App. at 20 (we do not weigh the evidence but instead defer to the juvenile court’s factfinding). 11 “In light of the foregoing, the juvenile court, as factfinder, could have found clear and convincing evidence which showed reunification not to be in the best interests of the [child] for the likelihood that it would only prolong [her dependency].” In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. 328, 331 (2) ( 540 SE2d 278 ) (2000) (involving termination of parental rights under former Juvenile Code). 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest Of: J. T., a Child (Mother)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
OCGA § 15-11-58 provides that there shall be a presumption that reunification services should not be provided if the juvenile court finds the existence of any of the four factors outlined in OCGA § 15-11-58 (h) (1) - (4) by clear and convincing evidence.1 The trial court articulated that it was granting DFCS’ motion for nonreunification under subsection (3) of OCGA § 15-11-58 (h), which states that there is a presumption that reunification services should not be provided if “[a]ny of the grounds for terminating parental rights exist, as set forth in 1 The existence of any one of these c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of J. T.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
The existence of any one of these criteria “is sufficient to support a presumption that further reunification efforts should not be provided.” (Citation omitted.) In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. 328, 331 (2) ( 540 SE2d 278 ) (2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Clz
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
She saw no bruises on C.L.Z. [7] If the counselor made a written report, it is not contained in the record. [8] Compare In the Interest of D.L.W., 264 Ga.App. 168, 170 (1), 590 S.E.2d 183 (2003) (evidence of mother's severe mental disorder was clear and convincing evidence of deprivation); In the Interest of U.B., 246 Ga.App. 328, 328-329 (1), 540 S.E.2d 278 (2000) (children were properly found to be deprived based on father's history of abusive behavior toward them and their mother). [9] See In the Interest of J.P., 280 Ga.App. 100, 105 (2), 633 S.E.2d 442 (2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re C. L. Z.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
W, 264 Ga. App. 168, 170 (1) ( 590 SE2d 183 ) (2003) (evidence of mother’s severe mental disorder was clear and convincing evidence of deprivation); In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. 328, 328-329 (1) ( 540 SE2d 278 ) (2000) (children were properly found to he deprived based on father’s history of abusive behavior toward them and their mother).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Jb
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
See generally In the Interest of D.L.W., 264 Ga.App. 168, 171 (2), 590 S.E.2d 183 (2003); In the Interest of U.B., 246 Ga.App. 328, 331 (2), 540 S.E.2d 278 (2000); In the Interest of C.N., 231 Ga.App. 639, 641 (2), 500 S.E.2d 400 (1998). 2.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of J. B.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
W., 264 Ga. App. 168, 171 (2) ( 590 SE2d 183 ) (2003); In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. 328, 331 (2) ( 540 SE2d 278 ) (2000); In the Interest of C.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Rathel (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
W, 262 Ga. App. 744, 746-748 (1) ( 586 SE2d 423 ) (2003); In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. at 329-330 (1).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of J. W.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. 328, 330 (1) ( 540 SE2d 278 ) (2000) (deprivation order affirmed where clear and convincing evidence showed retarded and emotionally disturbed father was unable to care for his child). 2 See OCGA§§ 15-11-58 (h) (3); 15-11-94 (b) (4) (B) (i) (where the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there exists a “medically verifiable deficiency of the parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to provide adequately for the physical, mental, emotional, or moral condition and needs of th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Jw
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
In the Interest of U.B., 246 Ga.App. 328, 330 (1), 540 S.E.2d 278 (2000) (deprivation order affirmed where clear and convincing evidence showed retarded and emotionally disturbed father was unable to care for his child). [2] See OCGA §§ 15-11-58(h)(3); 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(i) (where the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there exists a "medically verifiable deficiency of the parent's physical, mental, or emotional health of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to provide adequately for the physical, mental, emotional, or moral condition and needs of the child[,]…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re DLW
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] In the Interest of J.P., 253 Ga.App. 732 , 560 S.E.2d 318 (2002). [2] (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of J.P., 267 Ga. 492 , 480 S.E.2d 8 (1997). [3] In the Interest of C.C., 249 Ga.App. 101 , 103, 547 S.E.2d 738 (2001). [4] OCGA § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(i). [5] See In the Interest of M.L., 259 Ga.App. 534, 536 (1)(b), 578 S.E.2d 190 (2003) (mother had mental health deficiencies that rendered her incapable of providing adequately for her children). [6] (Emphasis supplied.) [7] In the Interest of K.M., 240 Ga.App. 67, 68 , 522 S.E.2d 667 (1999); OCGA § 15-11-94(b)(4)(…
discussed Cited "see" In the Interest of D. L. W. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See In the Interest of U B., 246 Ga. App. 328, 331 (2) ( 540 SE2d 278 ) (2000) (nonreunification supported by evidence of deficiencies in the father’s mental and emotional health).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cooper v. Coulter (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Gildar v. Gildar, 309 Ga. App. 730, 731 ( 710 SE2d 913 ) (2011) (“If reasonable evidence exists in the record to support the trial court’s decision to change visitation rights, then the decision of that court will stand.”) (punctuation omitted). 8 Wang v. Liu, 292 Ga. 568, 572 (1) ( 740 SE2d 136 ) (2013) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 9 See Ansell v. Ansell, 328 Ga. App. 586, 592 (3) ( 759 SE2d 916 ) (2014) (“The essence of civil contempt is willful disobedience of a prior court order.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 10 See In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. 3…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re D. S. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: compare · confidence low
Z., supra; compare In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. 328 , 328-330 (1) ( 540 SE2d 278 ) (2000).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In the Interest of E. M. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: compare · confidence low
See In re Suggs, 249 Ga. 365, 366 (2) ( 291 SE2d 233 ) (1982); compare In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. 328 (1) ( 540 SE2d 278 ) (2000).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Em (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: compare · confidence low
NOTES [1] In the Interest of C.N., 231 Ga.App. 639, 640 (1), 500 S.E.2d 400 (1998). [2] (Footnote and emphasis omitted.) In the Interest of J.P., 267 Ga. 492 , 480 S.E.2d 8 (1997). [3] See id. [4] In the Interest of S.S., 232 Ga.App. 287, 289 , 501 S.E.2d 618 (1998). [5] In the Interest of K.C.H., 257 Ga.App. 529 , 530, 571 S.E.2d 515 (2002). [6] In re M.M.A., 166 Ga.App. 620, 622 (1), 305 S.E.2d 139 (1983) (physical precedent only). [7] (Footnote omitted.) In the Interest of M.L.C., 249 Ga.App. 435, 436 (2), 548 S.E.2d 137 (2001). [8] See In re Suggs, 249 Ga. 365, 366 (2), 291 S.E.2d 233 (198…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In the Interest of M. H. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. 328, 331 (2) ( 540 SE2d 278 ) (2000) (father’s treating mental health counselor did not recommend return of children to father, whose mental health problems had harmed the children).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Interest of U.B. et al., children.
A00A2185.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Oct 6, 2000.
540 S.E.2d 278
Eldridge.
Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 50%

[*279] Lloyd D. Murray & Associates, Carol B. Miller, for appellant.

Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Dennis R. Dunn, Deputy Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Shalen S. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General, Sherri P. McDonald, for appellee.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

Appellant, the natural father of U.B. and V.B., appeals from the order of the Evans County Juvenile Court finding that the children, then approximately ages five and two-and-a-half, were deprived, relieving him and his former wife[1] and the natural mother of the children, of the custody of the children, placing them in the temporary custody of the Department of Family & Children Services ("DFCS"), and accepting DFCS's recommendation that reunification services not be provided. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. Held:

1. On appeal, the children's father argues the insufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that the children were deprived "without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for [their] physical, mental, or emotional health or morals." OCGA § 15-11-2(8)(A). "A parent may lose custody where the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the child is deprived and will likely be harmed by such deprivation. OCGA §§ [15-11-56(b)(1)]; 15-11-34(a)(2)." In the Interest of C.N., 231 Ga.App. 639, 640(1), 500 S.E.2d 400 (1998); In re Suggs, 249 Ga. 365, 366(2), 291 S.E.2d 233 (1982); In re R.R.M.R., 169 Ga.App. 373, 374(1), 312 S.E.2d 832 (1983). Deprivation is established by showing parental unfitness upon "either intentional or unintentional misconduct resulting in the abuse or neglect of the child or by what is tantamount to physical or mental incapability to care for the child. [Cits.]" In re D.H., 178 Ga.App. 119, 124, 342 S.E.2d 367 (1986).

[*280] Herein the State offered evidence that U.B. and V.B., then approximately five and two and a half years old, respectively, were "deprived" children who lacked appropriate parental care and control to ensure that their physical, mental, emotional, and moral needs were met because of exposure to domestic violence and mental incapacity in the mother and the father. At the termination hearing conducted in January 2000, the mother, who had a history of mental illness, admitted she had a problem with her temper; that she verbally abused the children in front of neighbors by yelling obscenities at them; that she had been required to leave a Hinesville shelter for battered women upon the shelter's claim she abused the children in the manner she spanked them; and that she was incapable of caring for the children. The mother testified that the father had beaten her throughout their marriage in the presence of the children; that the father was incapable of caring for the children because of his inability to control anger; that she feared the father's beatings; that early in their marriage he threatened her life with a machete; that more recently he threatened her life with a butcher knife; that she feared for the children because the father twice hit V.B. by striking her as she held the infant in her arms; that he spanked the children for not sleeping when told to nap; and that he used excessive force in spanking the children.[2]

The State also entered in evidence the father's long criminal history for violence at the termination hearing.[3] In other hearing testimony, a pre-school teacher testified that she believed the children had been subjected to domestic violence because U. B., whom she knew to be truthful, reported that the father held a knife to the mother's throat, cursed the mother, made the mother cry, and that she feared her parents might kill her. One of the caseworkers testified that the father had a low opinion of women, explaining that he had threatened her[4] and been abusive of his first wife and the children's mother. Another caseworker testified that the father became upset when visiting the children under DFCS supervision, physically removing them from the visitation room before being stopped by police who were called to the scene. Both children cried uncontrollably during this episode. U.B. later suffered a stress-related seizure because of it. There was evidence that U.B. had broken her arm while in the father's care, the parents thereafter variously explaining how it happened, and that the father had indicated to caseworkers he was unable to care for the children, once offering to commit himself to a mental hospital if DFCS allowed the children to remain with the mother.

On cross-examination, although generally denying the mother's allegations, the father admitted that he had been diagnosed as retarded; that he had a long history of circumstances in which he directed his anger at the mother in the presence of the children; that he was concerned to see U.B. exhibit the abusive behavior she observed in the home by spitting and cursing at the mother; and that he had a problem controlling his temper but had participated only intermittently in 12 years of counseling for the problem. Other evidence showed that the father could not[*281] read, did not have a valid driver's license, and required DFCS services to assist him in his daily needs activities.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit the juvenile court to find clear and convincing evidence of U.B.'s and V.B.'s deprivation and that the father's misconduct or inability to care for their physical, mental, emotional, and moral needs rendered him unfit to retain custody. See OCGA § 15-11-81(b)(4); In the Interest of R.U., 239 Ga.App. 573, 577(1), 521 S.E.2d 610 (1999) ("On appeal, this [C]ourt neither weighs the evidence nor determines the credibility of witnesses; we defer to the juvenile court's factfinding and affirm unless the appellate standard is not met.").

2. The children's father further enumerates that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that reunification not be attempted. OCGA § 15-11-58(h) pertinently provides:

[t]here shall be a presumption that reunification services should not be provided if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) The parent has unjustifiably failed to comply with a previously ordered plan designed to reunite the family; (2) A child has been removed from the home on at least two previous occasions and reunification services were made available on those occasions; (3) Any of the grounds for the [termination of] parental rights exist, as set forth in subsection (b) of Code Section 15-11-94; or (4) Any of the circumstances set out in paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this Code Section exist, making it unnecessary to provide reasonable efforts to reunify.

We have held that the existence of any one of the foregoing criteria is sufficient to support a presumption that further reunification efforts should not be provided. In the Interest of K.M., 240 Ga.App. 67, 71, 522 S.E.2d 667 (1999).

It is undisputed that the children were twice removed from the parents' custody and were returned to them after receiving DFCS reunification services. There was clear and convincing evidence on which to terminate the father's parental rights to the children for medically verifiable, longstanding deficiencies in the father's mental and emotional health, for imprisonment negatively impacting the children's lives, for egregious conduct toward the children, and for mentally and emotionally neglecting them. OCGA § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(i), (iii), (iv), and (v), respectively. See Division 1.

At the termination hearing, DFCS's caseworkers and the children's guardian ad litem unanimously recommended that reunification services not be rendered. Further, the father's treating mental health counselor at the time of the termination hearing testified that, although the father had been diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder, he believed that depression was also present. He also opined that treatment would take two to three years; that relapse was a possibility; and that he did not recommend the children be returned to the father any earlier than a year from the time of the hearing. And, while the father testified he would never hurt the children in the future despite his difficulties with anger, "`[t]he decision as to a child's future must rest on more than positive promises which are contrary to negative past fact.' [Cit.]" In the Interest D.I.W., 215 Ga. App. 644, 646(1), 451 S.E.2d 804 (1994).

In light of the foregoing, the juvenile court, as factfinder, could have found clear and convincing evidence which showed reunification not to be in the best interests of the children for the likelihood that it would only prolong their deprivation. Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in approving the nonreunification plan. In the Interest of R.U., supra; In the Interest of S.A.W., 228 Ga.App. 197, 200(2), 491 S.E.2d 441 (1997).

3. Finally, pointing to OCGA § 15-11-58(h), the father challenges the juvenile court's order accepting the instant nonreunification plan as fatally defective for want of an express finding that its approval of nonreunification was based upon clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify the family would be detrimental to the children. However, OCGA § 15-11-58(h), interpreted for its plain meaning as we are required to do, Robinson v. Ray, 254 Ga. 237, 238(1), 327 S.E.2d 721 (1985), requires[*282] that trial courts approve non-reunification plans upon clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify a child with his or her family would be detrimental to the child alone, not that non-reunification be approved by special words. To interpret it for more would elevate form over substance. This we decline to do. The instant non-reunification plan was here proper. See Division 2. Accordingly, this claim of error is without merit.

Judgment affirmed.

BLACKBURN, P.J., and BARNES, J., concur.

1 The mother divorced the father in 1998. She does not appeal from the juvenile court's order.
2 In this regard, the mother testified, "When he spanks them he leaves red marks on them and it makes me mad."
3 On December 11, 1987, the father was convicted in the Superior Court of Bulloch County of two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of pointing a pistol at another, one count of public drunkenness, two counts of terroristic threats and acts, and one count of possessing a firearm as a felon. He was sentenced to ten years confinement to serve twelve months, and the balance was probated. On February 2, 1989, after serving his sentence to confinement, the father's sentence to probation was revoked for the machete incident referenced above which arose out of a marital dispute between the mother and the father in 1988. The father subsequently pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to four years and eleven months to serve. He was paroled on January 13, 1993. His parole was revoked following an April 18, 1997 arrest upon rape and aggravated sodomy charges made by the mother and charges of terroristic threats and acts and obstruction of an officer made by a female parole officer. Subsequently, the father pled guilty to the charges made by the parole officer and was returned to prison where he remained to the date of his release in late 1997.
4 The father told the caseworker, "[Y]ou know people get hit by cars when they go outside."