CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 19, 2012 | 734 S.E.2d 403, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3593
...t placed the child in the temporary custody of her maternal grandmother, appellee Denise Dunbar, a resident of Cobb County. On October 10, 2008, the juvenile court gave Mrs. Dunbar custody of the child until she turns eighteen years of age. See OCGA §
15-11-58 (i)....
...in the case before us, that reasonable efforts to reunify the deprived child with her family would be detrimental to the child and that it was not in the child’s best interest to refer the case for termination of parental rights and adoption. OCGA §
15-11-58 (i) (1) (A).3
There is no statute that gives a juvenile court jurisdiction over a petition for permanent custody of a child in the absence of a transfer order from a superior court (OCGA §
15-11-28 (c) (1); Douglas v....
...all retain it, unless a good reason shall be given for the interference of equity.”
The placement/custody order “may he modified following a petition for modification hy a party or upon motion of the court pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-40.” OCGA §
15-11-58 (i) (1) (D). Such a long-term temporary custody arrangement is subject to triennial review on the issue of whether the person to whom custody has been given “continues to be qualified to receive and care for the child. . . .” OCGA §
15-11-58 (i) (2).
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 4, 2006 | 636 S.E.2d 496
...thority to place *59conditions and limitations on DFACS’ legal custody, including a limitation that physical custody of the child be placed in accordance with the court’s mandate. In the alternative, the juvenile court found that, even if OCGA §§
15-11-58 and
15-11-55 prevented it from dividing custody of a deprived child in this manner, these statutory provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution....
...to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The juvenile court maintained that no rational basis existed for providing reunification services to parents whose children were in the legal custody of DFACS, see OCGA §
15-11-58, while not providing such services to parents whose children were placed in the legal custody of “a parent or relative of the child or other persons who have demonstrated an ongoing commitment to the child.” OCGA §
15-11-55 (a) (2) (...
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 18, 2013 | 751 S.E.2d 315, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 3522
...y guarded right than the right of a natural parent to [his or her] offspring.”). Moreover, the State itself also has a legitimate interest in the preservation of the family. See Jones v. Swett,
244 Ga. 715, 718 (261 SE2d 610) (1979). See also OCGA §
15-11-58 (a) (2) (in deprivation cases, “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families”).
In every investigation of alleged parental neglect of a child, a balance must be struck between these competing interests, and DFCS policy acknowledges as much....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 15, 2009 | 285 Ga. 548, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 2001
...Accordingly, the habeas court erred when it concluded that the juvenile court had awarded permanent custody to Mother. Moreover, the juvenile court's order, which disposed of the Department's deprivation proceeding, expired as a matter of law two years after it was entered. OCGA §
15-11-58.1(a); In the Interest of A.J., 269 Ga....
...he order within thirty days of its entry on June 20, 2002, but the father did not seek an appeal. The father's second opportunity to act on his legal rights came two years later in June 2004 when the juvenile court order purportedly expired per OCGA §
15-11-58.1; however, appellant did nothing to assert his rights for almost four more years....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 8, 1999 | 270 Ga. 791, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2242, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 1325
...264, 265,
417 S.E.2d 11 (1992) (holding that tape or transcript of a judge's remarks in open court must be made available for public inspection based on Uniform State Court Rule 21); Unif. Prob. Ct. R. 17 (adopting same balancing test before limiting access to court records in probate cases). [8] See, e.g., OCGA §
15-11-58 (1994) (with certain exceptions, court order required before files and records in a juvenile proceeding are open to inspection)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 17, 2014 | 756 S.E.2d 526, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 524
...the juvenile court
granted in March 2010. Subsequently, however, both Alizota and S. K.’s
mother consented to non-reunification, prompting DFACS to move for non-
reunification with relinquishment of custody before the juvenile court. See
OCGA §
15-11-58 ( i)....
...continued to be deprived and that Alizota had agreed to non-
reunification and to the relinquishment of custody to the Stanfields until S. K.
reached 18 years of age. Additionally, the order instructed DFACS to review
S. K.’s placement every 36 months as provided by OCGA §
15-11-58 (i) (2)
(A), and required Alizota to pay child support while allowing him supervised
visits with S....
...s “shall not
affect the superior court’s exclusive jurisdiction to terminate the legal parent-child relationship as
set forth in Chapters 6 through 9 of Title 19.” (Emphasis supplied.)
4
OCGA §
15-11-58 (i), the doctrine of priority jurisdiction prevented the superior
court from exercising jurisdiction over a termination of parental rights
proceeding in conjunction with the Stanfields’ adoption petition.
The doctrine of priori...
...takes jurisdiction shall retain it, unless a good reason shall be given for the
interference of equity.
5
of the juvenile court’s long-term temporary custody order under OCGA § 15-11-
58 (i) (1).4 See OCGA §§
15-11-54 to
15-11-58.1 (setting forth procedures and
rules governing deprivation proceedings); OCGA §§ 15-11-93 to
15-11-106
(setting forth procedures and rules governing termination proceedings)....
...The
juvenile code treats deprivation actions and termination actions separately, and
the fact that a juvenile court is authorized to decide in a deprivation proceeding
whether a “referral for termination of parental rights and adoption is not in the
best interest of the child” as required by OCGA §
15-11-58 (i) (1) is not the
same as being authorized to decide that the actual termination of parental rights
is or is not in a child’s best interests....
...See OCGA § 15-11-94.
This Court’s recent decision in Ertter is instructive as to the proper
application of priority jurisdiction in this case. In that case, the juvenile court
presiding over a deprivation action entered a long-term temporary custody order
4
OCGA §
15-11-58 (i) (1) provides:
If the court has entered an order finding that reasonable efforts to reunify a
child with his or her family would be detrimental to the child in accordance with
subsection (h) of this Code secti...
...not in the best interest of the child,
the court may, upon proper petition, enter a custody order which shall remain in
effect until the child’s eighteenth birthday.
6
pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-58 (i) which named the child’s grandmother as
custodian and was to remain in force until the child’s eighteenth birthday subject
to triennial reviews by the juvenile court....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 4, 2006
...The juvenile court denied DFACS' motion, finding that it had the statutory authority to place conditions and limitations on DFACS' legal custody, including a limitation that physical custody of the child be placed in accordance with the court's mandate. In the alternative, the juvenile court found that, even if OCGA §§
15-11-58 and
15-11-55 prevented it from dividing custody of a deprived child in this manner, these statutory provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution....
...to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The juvenile court maintained that no rational basis existed for providing reunification services to parents whose children were in the legal custody of DFACS, see OCGA §
15-11-58, while not providing such services to parents whose children were placed in the legal custody of "a parent or relative of the child or other persons who have demonstrated an ongoing commitment to the child." OCGA §
15-11-55(a)(2)(D)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 10, 2003 | 276 Ga. 314
...Thompson, Jr., Calhoun, for appellee. George P. Govignon, Calhoun, for amicus curiae. SEARS, Presiding Justice. We granted certiorari to consider the Court of Appeals' ruling in In Interest of J.W.K. [1] that the juvenile court erred by holding that OCGA §
15-11-58 (which sets forth the reunification efforts required in deprivation actions) does not apply to this private child deprivation proceeding. As explained below, we conclude that by its express terms, OCGA §
15-11-58 does not apply to this case because the juvenile court did not order the removal of the child from his home. Furthermore, we conclude that OCGA §
15-11-58, as written at the time of the juvenile court ruling in this case, was not intended to apply to private deprivation proceedings....
...aunt and uncle be granted legal custody over him for two years, and that his biological mother be granted such visitation as best serves J.W.K.'s interest. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the juvenile court erred in concluding that OCGA §
15-11-58 does not apply to private deprivation matters. The appellate court held that under OCGA §
15-11-58, the juvenile court was required to determine as a matter of fact whether the Division of Family and Children Services of the Department of Human Resources (DFACS) had undertaken reasonable efforts aimed at reunifying J.W.K....
...and his biological mother, and if not, to instruct DFACS to determine whether reunification was appropriate and to propose a reunification plan to the court. We granted certiorari to consider this ruling, and we now reverse. 1. At the time of the juvenile court's ruling in this case, September 2000, OCGA §
15-11-58(a) provided that: A court's order removing a child from the child's home shall be based upon a finding by that court that continuation in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the child....
...[2] This Code section contains 16 subsections that detail the extensive efforts that DFACS must undertake to attempt reunification, including extensive case plans and *398 reports to be made to the court and the judicial citizens review panel, if applicable. [3] By its express terms, OCGA §
15-11-58 applies only when a court orders the removal of "a child from the child's home." [4] In this appeal, the evidence is irrefutable that the only home J.W.K....
...Under the facts of this particular case, J.W.K.'s home is with his aunt and uncle. Therefore, the juvenile court's deprivation order did not order the removal of J.W.K. from his home. To the contrary, the order served to keep J.W.K. in the only home he has ever known. It follows that, by its own terms, OCGA §
15-11-58(a) does not apply to this matter, and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise. 2. In May 2002, more than 18 months after the juvenile court's ruling in this case, OCGA §
15-11-58 was amended to specify that it applies only to deprivation actions in which a child is placed in the custody of DFACS. [5] At the time of JWK's deprivation proceeding, however, the statute contained no language limiting its application; hence, it was unclear at that time whether OCGA §
15-11-58 also applied to private deprivation actions such as this one. The juvenile court concluded that the section did not apply to private deprivations, and the Court of Appeals reversed that ruling. As explained below, we conclude the Court of Appeals' ruling was erroneous. Because OCGA §
15-11-58, as written before May 2002, was silent on the question of whether it applied to private deprivation proceedings, the legislature's May 2002 amendment excluding private deprivations from the statute is not necessarily inconsistent with the statute's previous language. Therefore, it is not clearly evident that the legislature intended to change the law as expressed in OCGA §
15-11-58....
...[6] In construing statutes, subsequent acts of the General Assembly may be considered in order to give effect to the legislative intent behind the earlier enactment. [7] In light of these legal *399 precepts, we believe the May 2002 amendment to OCGA §
15-11-58 simply clarified the legislative intent of the statute as it existed at the time of the juvenile court's ruling in this matter. Therefore, we conclude that the juvenile court properly held that OCGA §
15-11-58 did not apply to private deprivation actions such as J.W.K.'s, and the Court of Appeals erred by concluding otherwise. [8] Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1]
254 Ga.App. 661,
563 S.E.2d 514 (2002). [2] OCGA §
15-11-58(a) (2000) (emphasis supplied). [3] OCGA §
15-11-58(b)-(q). [4] OCGA §
15-11-58(a). [5] OCGA §
15-11-58(a), as amended by Ga....
