Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1981). · Go Syfert
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Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“egislative intent 986 is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law.”
79 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Murthy v. Sinha Corp. (fla, 1994-09-08)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 34 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Murthy v. Sinha Corp.
Fla. · 1994 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
egislative intent 986 is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Macchione v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Ch.2010-51, § 1, at 381, Laws of Fla. In Hassen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 674 So.2d 106 (Fla.1996), the Florida Supreme Court, conducting an analysis of a similar title, stated: [T]he conclusion that the amendment at issue here was intended to be a substantive rather than a remedial change in the law is further supported by the title to chapter 92-318, which reads in pertinent part “[a]n act relating to insurance; ... amending s. 627.727, F.S.; ... revising provisions with respect to subro-gation rights of underinsured motorist insurers.” Ch. 92-318, at 3081-84, Laws …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Johnson v. Badger Acquisition
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
We agree. "[L]egislative intent . . . should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one." Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994). "[L]egislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law." Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981) (citing State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191 , 116 So. 255 (1928)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DADELAND DEPOT. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine
Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
Further, we have recognized that we have "the right and duty, in arriving at the correct meaning of a prior statute, to consider subsequent legislation." Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981) (quoting Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 59 So.2d 788, 790 (Fla.1952)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
We are aided in this task by the maxim that "legislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law." In our attempt to discern the legislative intent behind the conflicting statutes, we must consider "the history of the Act, the evil to be corrected, the purpose of the enactment, and the law then in existence bearing on the same subject." Id. at 224 (citation omitted) (quoting Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981), and State Board of Accountancy v. Webb, 51 So.2d 296, 299 (Fla.1951)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Clearwater v. Acker
Fla. · 1999 · confidence medium
We are aided in this task by the maxim that `legislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law.'" DeBolt v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 427 So.2d 221, 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)(quoting Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shurgard Income Properties Fund 16—Ltd. Partnership v. Muns
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So.2d 1130, 1137 (Fla.1990); Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981) (“[Lj]egislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law.”), (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brigham (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
The court did not consider itself called upon to depart from the literal meaning of the statute, but it acknowledged that such a departure is permitted when "... a literal interpretation would lead to an illogical result or one not intended by the lawmakers." Id. at 1091 (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Fla. · 1996 · confidence medium
Moreover, the conclusion *110 that the amendment at issue here was intended to be a substantive rather than a remedial change in the law is further supported by the title to chapter 92-318, which reads in pertinent part "[a]n act relating to insurance; ... amending s. 627.727, F.S.;... revising provisions with respect to subrogation rights of underinsured motorist insurers." Ch. 92-318, at 3081-84, Laws of Fla. Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981) (recognizing that title of enacting legislation is one indicator of legislative intent).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sun Bank/South Florida, NA v. Baker
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981). [9] Of course, the "reasonableness" issue must be litigated at trial without disclosing the existence of workers' compensation coverage to the jury.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Slaughter
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
"The primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent." City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1983); Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Perez
Fla. · 1988 · confidence medium
Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981); Armstrong v. City of Edgewater, 157 So.2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1963).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dade County v. AT & T INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981); State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla. 1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Hartsfield
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
“As always, legislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law.” Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kirksey v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
One indicator of the legislature's intent is the title of the law enacting the statute, especially where, as here, "`the phraseology of the act is susceptible of more than one interpretation.'" Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeBolt v. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Services
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
We are aided in this task by the maxim that "legislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law." Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981).
discussed Cited "see" Ramirez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 , 1091 (Fla.1981) (“[D]eparture [from the plain, literal meaning of the statute] is permitted when a literal interpretation would lead to an illogical result or one not intended by the lawmakers.”); see also State v. Brigham, 694 So.2d 793, 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“Even if this were a proper literal interpretation of the statute, there is no requirement that such a literal interpretation of the statute be utilized when that interpretation reaches an absurd result”).
cited Cited "see" Maddox v. State
Fla. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1091 (Fla.1981).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Allan Cabrera-Ruiz
11th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parker v. Florida, 406 So.2d 1089, 1091 (Fla.1981).
cited Cited "see" State v. Veilleux
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla.1981).
cited Cited "see" McGhee v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981).
cited Cited "see" State v. Kliphouse
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parker v. State, *20 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981); Armstrong v. City of Edgewater, 157 So.2d 422, 425 (Fla.1963).
cited Cited "see" Turner v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981) (holding that a statute's title can assist in determining legislative intent).
cited Cited "see" Putnam Berkley Group, Inc. v. Dinin
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla.1981).
discussed Cited "see" Snyder v. Douglas
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 1981) (title of enacting legislation is one indicator of legislative intent). [6] We reject one of the respondents' contentions that the June 1993 order declared Manatee insolvent.
cited Cited "see" FLA. EXPORT TOBACCO v. Dept. of Revenue
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 , 1092 (Fla. 1982).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 1981); Carter v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 377 So.2d 242 (1 D.C.A.Fla., 1979).
cited Cited "see" Lavette v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Schueren v. State, 370 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) overruled in part on other grounds in Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kasischke v. State
Fla. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The Title "The title is more than an index to what the section is about or has reference to; it is a direct statement by the legislature of its intent." State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 825 (Fla.1981) (citing Berger v. Jackson, 156 Fla. 251 , 23 So.2d 265 (1945)); see also Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981); Foley v. State, ex rel.
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Drury
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla.1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also , Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 1981) (title of law enacting a statute may be used as an indicator of the Legislature's intent). 12 Section 162.03 , F.S. 13 Section 162.09 (2)(a), F.S. 14 See , Speights v. State, 4145 So.2d 574 (1 D.C.A.
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re Order on Prosecution of Cr. App.
Fla. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 1981).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Morea
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Barker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla.1982).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State ex rel. Quigley v. Quigley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1982); State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla.1981).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Walter A. PARKER, Jr., Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
59674.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct 8, 1981.
406 So. 2d 1089
Adkins.
Cited by 64 opinions  |  Published

[*1090] I. Paul Mandelkern of Russ & Mandelkern, Orlando, for petitioner.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Edward M. Chew, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for respondent.

ADKINS, Justice.

We have for review a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Parker v. State, 386 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), which has been certified to this Court as being in direct conflict with an earlier decision of a different district court of appeal, Aylin v. State, 362 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. (1980).

Petitioner, Walter A. Parker, Jr., was charged by information with, among other things, conspiracy to possess more than 100 pounds of cannabis. His plea of nolo contendere to that charge was accepted by the trial judge and petitioner was sentenced to four years probation.

After serving one year of his probation, petitioner filed a motion contesting the four year length thereof. He argued that under the law controlling at the time that he was sentenced, possession of in excess of 100 pounds of cannabis was a third-degree felony and so the conspiracy to possess such was a first-degree misdemeanor. He further contended that since the maximum penalty for a first-degree misdemeanor is one year in prison and a $1,000 fine, it was illegal for the probation period imposed to exceed one year.

The trial court denied petitioner's motion and was affirmed, upon appeal, by the district court. The district court denied petitioner's motion for clarification, but granted his petition for certificate of direct conflict and certified such to this Court. Petitioner then invoked our discretionary jurisdiction.

Resolution of this matter, and of the conflict between the district courts, depends upon our interpretation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1977). If, under that law, possession of more than 100 pounds of cannabis is a third-degree felony, then petitioner is correct in his claim that conspiracy to possess such is a first-degree misdemeanor, punishable by not more than one year's imprisonment. If possession of such is a second-degree felony, as respondent contends, then the conspiracy offense is a third-degree felony, and petitioner's probation period does not exceed the maximum sentence which may be imposed therefor.

Subsection 893.13(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1977), provides as follows:

Except as authorized by this chapter and chapter 500, it is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance. Any person who violates this provision with respect to:
* * * * * *
A controlled substance named or described in s. 893.03(1)(c) [wherein cannabis[*1091] is named] is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.084; except that the sale, delivery, or possession of in excess of 100 pounds of cannabis as controlled in s. 893.03(1)(c) shall constitute a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

Petitioner contends that in order to be convicted of a second-degree felony under subsection 893.13(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1977), the person charged with possessing in excess of 100 pounds of cannabis must have possessed such with intent to sell or deliver the cannabis. He further asserts that simple possession of over 100 pounds is covered by subsection 893.13(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides:

It is unlawful for any person to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance unless such controlled substance was lawfully obtained from a practitioner or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice or to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. Any person who violates this provision is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

Petitioner's position is supported by several decisions from the first and second district courts. See Reinersman v. State, 382 So.2d 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Beasley v. State, 382 So.2d 47 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 388 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1980); Schueren v. State, 370 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Chewning v. State, 366 So.2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); and Aylin v. State, 362 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

Respondent, the state, on the other hand, argues that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1977), and the legislative intent thereof are both clear, and that mere possession of more than 100 pounds of cannabis is a second-degree felony. Respondent's argument is supported by decisions from the Fourth District Court of Appeal. See Chesnut v. State, 382 So.2d 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); and State v. Brady, 379 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).

We agree with respondent's contention that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1977), clearly and unambiguously establishes that mere possession of over 100 pounds of cannabis constitutes a second-degree felony, regardless of the possessor's intended use therefor.

Section 893.13(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1977), provides generally that one who sells, manufactures, delivers, or possesses with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver cannabis is guilty of a third-degree felony. Simple possession of cannabis is not included in the conduct proscribed under the provisions of the first portion of said section. The last clause of section 893.13(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1977), however, creates an exception for cases involving over 100 pounds of cannabis. That clause provides that "the sale, delivery, or possession of in excess of 100 pounds of cannabis" (emphasis added) constitutes a second-degree felony. The exception does not address "possession with intent" as does the first portion of the section, rather, it covers simple "possession."

We think that the variation in the wording of the two clauses is a distinction with a difference. There is a marked difference between "possession with intent" and simple "possession." The first clause of section 893.13(1)(a)2 contains a provision that the last part does not, and "[t]he presence of such a provision in the one part and its absence in the other is an argument against reading it as implied." United States v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway Co., 220 U.S. 37, 44, 31 S.Ct. 362, 363, 55 L.Ed. 361 (1911).

Nor is this a situation justifying departure from the plain, literal meaning of the statute. Such departure is permitted when a literal interpretation would lead to an illogical result or one not intended by the lawmakers. State ex rel. Hughes v. Wentworth, 135 Fla. 565, 185 So. 357, 360 (1938). A literal reading of section 893.13(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1977), results in[*1092] neither of the above. It is not illogical to draw distinctions between the treatment of those possessing less than 100 pounds of cannabis and those possessing more than 100 pounds, and, as we have noted, we believe that a literal reading of the statute, far from frustrating legislative intent, is required in order to comply with the legislature's intent.

Petitioner argues that when the word "possession," as used in the last clause of the statute, is considered in light of the rules of statutory construction and is subsumed to and construed in pari materia with the rest of the statute, it is clear that possession really means "possession with intent." Regardless, however, of the merits of petitioner's statutory interpretation language, section 893.13(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1977), provides that "possession with intent" of cannabis is a third-degree felony while simple "possession" of over 100 pounds of the same constitutes a second-degree felony. According to the plain, literal meaning of the statute there is a distinctive difference.

Resort to the rules of statutory construction supports our conclusion regarding the clear meaning of the statute. As always, legislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law. See State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191, 116 So. 255 (1928). The legislature has evidenced an intent, in section 893.13(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1977), to punish more severely those possessing large quantities of cannabis.

One indicator of the legislature's intent is the title of the law enacting the statute. As we noted in Foley v. State, 50 So.2d 179, 184 (Fla. 1951):

[I]f the phraseology of the act is ambiguous or is susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is the court's duty to glean the legislative intent from a consideration of the act as a whole, "the evil to be corrected, the language of the act, including its title, the history of its enactment, and the state of the law already in existence bearing on the subject", ...

(Emphasis added.) The title to chapter 76-200, Laws of Florida, 1976, which amended section 893.13(1)(a) by adding the clause pertaining to amounts of cannabis exceeding 100 pounds, reads as follows:

AN ACT relating to criminal penalties; amending s. 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, providing that the sale, delivery or possession in excess of 100 pounds of cannabis is a felony of the second degree; providing an effective date.

The clear import of the title to chapter 76-200 is that those possessing over 100 pounds of cannabis are guilty of a second-degree felony — no reference whatsoever is made to an intent requirement.

Petitioner argues that it is unreasonable to interpret chapter 76-200 as covering simple possession because a clause so doing would logically be located in section 893.13(1)(e), which relates to simple possession of cannabis. We agree that perhaps the provision relating to possession of over 100 pounds of cannabis could have been better located, but that affects neither the rule nor the clear meaning of the law. And, repeating ourselves, although the introductory clause of section 893.13(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1977), refers to "possession with intent," the portion in question creates an exception to that which precedes it, and need not and does not track the provisions thereof.

Also relevant here are any amendments of section 893.13 since the enactment of chapter 76-200, for, "[t]he court has the right and duty, in arriving at the correct meaning of a prior statute, to consider subsequent legislation." Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Florida, 59 So.2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1952). The subsequent legislative history of the act buttresses our interpretation thereof.

Chapter 79-1, Laws of Florida, 1979, enacted section 893.135, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides that anyone "who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, in excess of 100 pounds of cannabis is guilty of a felony of the first degree." Such bears out respondent's observation that the legislature intends that more severe[*1093] penalties be imposed upon those possessing large quantities of cannabis.

Petitioner counters that section 893.135, Florida Statutes (1979), did nothing to resolve the question here, because it did not resolve the conflicting provisions of section 893.13 regarding possession and possession with intent, and that section 893.13(1)(e), Florida Statutes, would still control in a "mere possession" situation. Chapter 80-70, Laws of Florida, 1980, however, eliminated any such confusion the following year. It amended section 893.135 to provide that those possessing over 100 pounds of cannabis are guilty of a first-degree felony "notwithstanding the provisions of s. 893.13." The legislature thus made it clear that if one possesses over 100 pounds of cannabis, the penalty is the same regardless of the intent involved. The legislature's removal of any doubts regarding the statute reinforces our conclusion that section 893.13(1)(a)2 was intended to cover those who simply possessed over 100 pounds of cannabis.

In light of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the district court ruled properly in affirming petitioner's sentence. Section 893.13(1)(a)2 quite clearly provides that possession of over 100 pounds of cannabis is a second-degree felony. Statutory interpretation via accepted rules of construction reinforces such conclusion. The district court's decision is therefore, approved, and all other decisions not consistent herewith are overruled.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.