MURRY, Judge.

Telvin Jenkins (Defendant) appeals the trial court’s (1) jury instruction on self- defense, (2) finding that the State did not violate pretrial discovery rules, (3) denial of his motion to dismiss for purportedly misinterpreting N.C.G.S. § 14-34.10, and (4)

entrance of judgment under that same statute. For the reasons below, we dismiss in part on the first issue, hold no error in part on the second and third issues, and vacate and remand for resentencing in part on the fourth issue.

STATE V. JENKINS

Opinion of the Court

I. Background On 13 June 2020, Rosa Powell Harris was driving on a local road when Defendant pulled up beside her and fired into her vehicle. The bullet shattered Harris’s window, entered her left arm, and lodged into her back near her right scapula. After being shot, Harris drove herself home where her daughter called the police. Harris purportedly identified Defendant by name prior to her hospital transfer. First to arrive at the scene, Detective Austin V. Holland spoke with Harris before paramedics arrived. After Harris’s departure for the hospital, Harris’s daughter identified Defendant as the shooter to Detective Holland. Captain Bryan T. Corey interviewed Harris at the hospital later that day, at which point she identified Defendant as the shooter. Captain Corey noted in the post-interview report that Harris “believed it was” Defendant who shot her and that, when “asked . . . why . . . she th[ought]” so, she “stated her grandson and [Defendant] ha[d] been having problems.” On 24 July 2020, Defendant moved to compel discovery by requesting “copies of all statements of any . . . witnesses for the State.” In June 2022, the State informed Defendant’s counsel that discovery was available through North Carolina Criminal Discovery Automated System, that he could view physical evidence in-person, and that supplemental discovery remained available. The State provided discovery related to Harris’s statements that she “believe[d] it was [Defendant]” who shot her.

STATE V. JENKINS

Opinion of the Court

On 31 May 2022, a grand jury indicted Defendant for attempted first-degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury (AWDWIKISI), discharging a weapon into a conveyance in operation (DW-Into), discharging a firearm within an occupied enclosure to incite fear (DW-Within), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. N.C.G.S. § 14-17(a) (attempted murder); id. § 14-32(a) (AWDWIKISI); id. § 14-34.1(b) (DW-Into); id. § 14-34.10 (DW-Within); id. § 14-415.1(a) (firearm possession). The matter came to trial on 12 February 2024. In its opening statement, the State noted Harris’s intent to identify Defendant in open court as the individual who shot her. Harris so identified him, testifying that she would never “forget the face [she] saw that day when that person was shooting at [her]” and that she had no “doubt in [her] mind about who [she] saw [shoot] her.” She also purported to identify Defendant to law enforcement on the day of the incident. Detective Holland testified that Harris did not identify any suspect when he interviewed her, while Captain Corey testified that Harris identified the shooter at the hospital because her grandson and Defendant “ha[d] problems.” At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss all indictments. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, finding “ample evidence to go before the jury and let the jury decide at this time.” Defendant offered no evidence in his own defense. Thereafter, the trial court conducted a charge conference, where the State submitted its requested jury instructions. The trial court asked Defendant’s counsel if he had anything to add. Defendant’s counsel affirmed that “everything else [was]

STATE V. JENKINS

Opinion of the Court

fine.” With all parties present, the trial court went through each charge individually. At the conclusion of the conference, Defendant’s counsel reaffirmed his “satisf[action] with the way the instructions are to be read to the jury.” The trial court then instructed the jury on all charges, including first-degree murder, stating that a finding of self-defense would preclude a guilty verdict as to that charge. It instructed the jury, in relevant part, to a possible self-defense claim if Defendant “believed it . . . necessary to use potentially deadly force against the victim in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm.” The trial court stated that it made this instruction because, “for you to find . . . [him] guilty of attempted first-degree murder, the State must first prove beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . that . . . [D]efendant did not act in self-defense.” On 14 February 2024, the jury found Defendant guilty of Class B2 felony attempted first-degree murder, Class C felony AWDWKISI, Class C felony DW-Into, Class F felony DW-Within, and Class G felony possession of a firearm by a felon. Following the jury verdict, Defendant’s counsel renewed his motion to dismiss, this time arguing that the State violated pretrial discovery rules by failing to disclose that Harris would identify Defendant in the courtroom. He argued that Harris’s in-court identification “was something that we had not had, in any sort of clear and concise way, been given additional discovery after there had been a meeting between the State and [Harris].” In response, the State argued that it was unnecessary to “spell out” Harris’s testimony and that “the State [wa]s allowed to elicit in-court

STATE V. JENKINS

Opinion of the Court

identification.” The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, finding that “enough was said to put [Defendant’s counsel] on notice that [Defendant] had been identified at the scene.” Finding Defendant a prior offender with a prior record level (PRL) III, the trial court consolidated the convictions for AWDWIKISI, DW-Into, and DW-Within and sentenced him to 96–128 months to run consecutively to the attempted murder conviction.^[1] Defendant timely appealed. II. Jurisdiction Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27, this Court has jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s “final judgment.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b) (2023). III. Analysis On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury on an opinionated self-defense theory,2 (2) ruling that the State complied with pre-trial disclosure requirements, (3) misinterpreting § 14-34.10 to find sufficient evidence of the underlying charge, and (4) entering judgment in violation of the “ ‘unless covered’ provision” in § 14-34.10. See N.C.G.S. § 14-34.10 (2023). We review the first, third, and fourth issues de novo, see, e.g., State v. Chavis, 278 N.C. App. 482,

STATE V. JENKINS

Opinion of the Court

487 (2021) (expressed opinions); State v. Bediz, 269 N.C. App. 39, 42 (2019) (evidence sufficiency); State v. Grappo, 271 N.C. App. 487, 491 (2020) (statutory mandate), but review discovery-violation claims only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gillespie, 362 N.C. 150, 154–55 (2008). For the reasons below, this Court holds that the trial court did not err in determining the first three issues but did err in part by sentencing Defendant under § 14-34.10. A. Self-Defense Instruction First, Defendant claims that “the trial court expressed an opinion on the evidence by instructing the jury on self-defense . . . [without] evidence [to] support[ ] the instruction.” We dismiss Defendant’s argument as invited error. The State argues that Defendant invited error by agreeing to the jury instructions, thereby barring appellate review. Generally, we review jury instructions for plain error if a defendant fails to object at trial. State v. Plotz, 295 N.C. App. 404, 411 (2024). But where a defendant fails to object to the jury instructions and instead expressly agrees with them, he waives any “right to all appellate review concerning the invited error, including plain[-]error review.” State v. Barber, 147 N.C. App. 69, 74 (2001); see State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 570 (1998) (“Where a defendant tells the trial court that he has no objection to an instruction, he [can]not . . . complain on appeal.”). Here, Defendant did not object to the self-defense instruction, despite having at least three opportunities to do so. Defendant confirmed his satisfaction “with the way the instructions are to be read to the jury” and had “nothing to add [or]

STATE V. JENKINS

Opinion of the Court

take away, or [any] concern[s] with the jury charge.” Because his counsel repeatedly affirmed the jury instructions, Defendant waives the right to appellate review on this issue. See Barber, 147 N.C. App. at 74. Thus, this Court dismisses Defendant’s argument as unpreserved. B. Discovery Violations Second, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss based on the State’s discovery violations under N.C.G.S. § 15A-903. For the following reasons, we disagree with Defendant and find no abuse of discretion on this point. Our discovery statutes and “procedures . . . protect the defendant from unfair surprise.” State v. Tucker, 329 N.C. 709, 716 (1991). Upon a defendant’s motion, the State must “make available to . . . [him] the complete files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and prosecutors’ offices involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or [his] prosecution.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2023). Discovery documents generally include oral statements except those “made by a witness to a prosecuting attorney outside the presence of a law enforcement officer,” in which case her statement must be provided only if it contains “significantly new or different information” from her prior statements. Id. § 15A-903(a)(1)(c) (emphasis added); see id. § 15A-907 (recognizing State’s “continuing duty to disclose”). As noted above, questions of discovery-rule compliance are within the trial court’s sound discretion. See Denton v. Peacock, 97 N.C. App. 97, 100 (1990).

STATE V. JENKINS

Opinion of the Court

Defendant claims Harris’s in-court testimony conflicts with her prior statement that “she believe[d] it was” Defendant because “her grandson and [Defendant] ha[d] been having problems.” Defendant’s argument is two-fold: (1) Harris’s prejudicial identification of him evolved from a circumstantial assumption to an eyewitness identification amounting to “significantly new or different,” id.,” information, and (2) the State’s failure to disclose it forced him to present “a defense on the fly.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion here. Defendant was on notice that he “had been identified at the scene . . . as being the perpetrator.” The trial court found that the State did not violate discovery rules because there were “enough indicators” for the Defendant “to prepare and mount a proper defense . . . based on what was in discovery.” The trial court’s determination that the State complied with discovery under N.C.G.S. § 15A-903 was not so “manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Hammond v. Saini, 229 N.C. App. 359, 370 (2013), aff’d, modified on other grounds, 367 N.C. 607 (2014). Thus, this Court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the State complied with discovery. C. Evidence Insufficiency Third, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the State offered insufficient evidence to support the charge of “discharging a firearm within an occupied enclosure with intent incite fear.” N.C.G.S. § 14-34.10 (citation modified). Both he and the State characterize this argument as a

STATE V. JENKINS

Opinion of the Court

matter of statutory misinterpretation, suggesting that the “evidence . . . support[s] a conviction for discharging a weapon into an occupied property” à la N.C.G.S. § 14-34.1(b) “but not [for] discharging a weapon within a vehicle” under N.C.G.S. § 14-34.10.3 (Second emphasis added). Defendant expressly recognizes the sufficiency of the State’s evidence under the former interpretation, just not the latter. We thus analyze this question only in terms of the challenged statutory language because his motion to dismiss hinges on § 14-34.10’s meaning. If § 14-34.10 required the trial court to instruct the jury that both Defendant and Harris must have been “within [one] occupied motor vehicle” as of “discharge” to merit conviction, then it erred by instructing the jury on that count. N.C.G.S. § 14-34.10. But if that same statute requires that only he “discharge[d] a firearm within” either his or Harris’s “occupied . . . vehicle,” then the trial court did not so err. Id. For the reasons discussed below, we read § 14-34.10 as the latter meaning and thus find no error. ^[1]. Statutory Interpretation Generally Given our heightened responsibility to prudentially interpret punitive

STATE V. JENKINS

Opinion of the Court

statutes, we pause to outline certain principles that guide our comparative analysis of §§ 14-34.9 and -34.10. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 296 (1st ed. 2012) [hereinafter Scalia & Garner, Reading Law] (“The rule of lenity . . . rest[s] . . . at least on the judge-made public policy that a legislature ought not to” “decree punishment without making clear what conduct incurs [it] . . . .”). When interpreting statutes, we first “examin[e] . . . the[ir] plain words.” Belmont Ass’n v. Farwig, 381 N.C. 306, 310 (2022) (quotation omitted). The foundational statute relevant for our purposes, § 14-34.1, criminalizes “[a]ny person who willfully discharges any firearm into any vehicle while it is occupied.” N.C.G.S. § 14-34.1(a) (2023) (emphases added; ellipses omitted), enacted as amended by Act of Apr. 28, 1969, ch. 341, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 291. A subsequent statute built upon § 14-34.1’s language, § 14-34.9, similarly sanctions “any person who willfully discharges a firearm, as a part of criminal gang activity, from within any motor vehicle toward a person not within that [vehicle].” Id. § 14-34.9 (emphases added; ellipses omitted), amended by Act of Dec. ^[1], 2017, S.L. 2017-194, sec. ^[6], 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 1370, 1372 [hereinafter 2017 Amendment] (amending “a pattern of criminal street gang activity” to only “criminal gang activity” (emphases added)). Finally, the statute directly challenged by Defendant here, § 14-34.10, criminalizes “any person who willfully discharges a firearm within any occupied motor vehicle with the intent to incite fear in another.” Id. § 14-34.10 (emphases added; ellipses omitted), enacted by Act of June 19, 2013, S.L. 2013-144, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 351. - 10 - STATE V. JENKINS Opinion of the Court We apply “[o]rdinary rules of grammar” to construe these material terms so emphasized “according to the context and approved usage of the[ir] language.” Dunn v. Pac. Emps. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 129, 134 (1992). We further “employ[ ] canons of statutory interpretation” to supplement these grammatical strictures, 4 State v. Campbell, 285 N.C. App. 480, 487 (2022), all of which we presume “the General Assembly . . . to have acted . . . with a knowledge of,” People’s Bank v. Loven, 172 N.C. 666, 670 (1916). One general canon most appropriately applies here: the Related- Statutes Canon,5 see Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 252, where “statute[s] dealing with the same subject matter must be considered and interpreted as” a single organic act. State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 889 (2018) (quotation omitted). Within these challenged statutes, basic and complex grammar rules govern “[t]he particular meaning of a qualifying modifier,” Günter Radden & René Dirven, Cognitive English Grammar 144 (Cognitive Linguistics in Prac. Vol. ^[2], 2007) [hereinafter Radden & Dirven, Grammar], i.e., “within any occupied . . . motor vehicle,” N.C.G.S. § 14-34.10.