MEMORANDUM OPINION1

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

II. DISCUSSION

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B provides, in pertinent part:

2.01. If the trial court judge enters an order denying a motion for the judge’s disqualification or recusal, . . . the trial court’s ruling either can be appealed in an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, as provided in this section 2, or the ruling can be raised as an issue in an appeal as of right, see Tenn. R. App. P. 3, following the entry of the trial court’s judgment. These two alternative methods of appeal--the accelerated interlocutory appeal or an appeal as of right following entry of the trial court’s judgment--shall be the exclusive methods for seeking appellate review of any issue concerning the trial court’s denial of a motion filed pursuant to this rule. In both types of appeals authorized in this section, the trial court’s ruling on the motion for disqualification or recusal shall be reviewed by the appellate court under a de novo standard of review, and any order or opinion issued by the appellate court should state with particularity the basis for its ruling on the recusal issue.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.01. The only issue we may consider in a Rule 10B appeal is whether the trial judge should have granted the motion for recusal. Elseroad v. Cook, 553 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018); Boren v. Hill Boren, PC, 557 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). We do not review the merits or correctness of the trial court’s other rulings. Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).

Appellant goes to great lengths on appeal to argue that Judge Collins should have granted the motion for recusal. Ultimately, he asks this Court to reverse the order denying recusal and disqualify Judge Collins from proceeding over any further proceedings. However, because Judge Collins has entered an order presenting the case to the presiding judge for reassignment and hearing by interchange, we conclude that any issue regarding the recusal motion is now moot.^[4]

entitle Appellant to any relief on appeal. See Halliburton v. Ballin, No. W2022-01208-COA-T10B-CV, 2022 WL 4397190, at *4 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2022) (agreeing with the appellant that the trial judge “should have promptly addressed” his recusal motion but explaining that the delay did not entitle him to relief on appeal where he did not “point to any orders that were entered while the motion was pending,” he agreed that “[t]here were no orders given by the court during a ten-month hiatus,” and he had asked the trial court to “do[ ] nothing” until his federal habeas petition was exhausted); Xingkui Guo v. Rogers, No. M2020-01321-COA-T10B-CV, 2020 WL 6781244, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2020) (noting that Rule 10B does not define “promptly” but concluding that an unexplained delay of six weeks before hearing the motion, during the coronavirus pandemic, provided “no basis for reversal of the trial court’s order denying recusal”).

This Court considered a similar situation in Dougherty v. Dougherty, No. W2020- 01606-COA-T10B-CV, 2020 WL 7334388, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2020), where a trial judge denied motions to recuse filed by a father, but in the same order, announced that certain facts had recently come to light that led the court to recuse itself “on the Court’s own motion and not on any of the grounds set forth in Mr. Dougherty’s motions.” The father filed a Rule 10B appeal and argued “vigorously” that the trial judge erred in denying his motions for recusal. Id. at *3. However, we explained that the father had “missed the point.” Id. “Although the Trial Court did not grant Father’s amended motion for recusal, within the very same order the Trial Court sua sponte recused itself.” Id. “As such, Father’s argument that the Trial Court erred in not granting his amended motion for recusal and instead sua sponte recused [was], at best, moot.” Id.

Tennessee courts have deemed recusal issues moot in other scenarios as well. See, e.g., Manookian v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 685 S.W.3d 744, 778 (Tenn. 2024) (“[T]he initial hearing panel member gave notice that he was voluntarily stepping off the panel, rendering Mr. Manookian’s motion to disqualify moot.”); Georgewill v. CMH Homes, Inc., No. E2025-00865-COA-T10B-CV, 2025 WL 2053042, at *1 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2025) (“The plaintiff has also sought recusal of Justice Bivins, Judge Davis and Judge Frierson. Justice Bivins and Judge Davis are not involved in this appellate panel, so the motions as to them are moot.”); Houston v. State, No. E2020-00342-CCA- R3-HC, 2021 WL 303584, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2021) (denying a motion to recuse as moot where the case was removed from the original docket and placed upon a subsequent docket to which the judge at issue was not assigned); Foster v. Foster, No. M2018-00595-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1959603, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2019) (deeming a recusal motion moot when it was filed two weeks after the trial court entered its final order when there was no matter pending before the court); Citizens Real Est. & Loan Co. v. Mountain States Dev. Corp., 633 S.W.2d 763, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (“Our determination requiring a new trial renders any consideration of the issue of the trial judge’s recusal moot, since the record before us establishes the trial judge has now recused himself from any further consideration of any issues in this case.”).

“A case is ‘moot if it no longer serves as a means to provide some sort of relief to

Appellant’s motion for recusal, and there was no order transferring the case to another judge by interchange.” Id. at *1. We explained that “[i]n the absence of the required order granting or denying Mother’s motion to recuse (and, if recusal was granted, an order transferring the case to be heard by interchange), the case was not properly transferred to Judge Scott under Rule 10B.” Id. at *6. Here, however, the trial court’s order did resolve the motion to recuse and present the case to the presiding judge for reassignment. Thus, there is no “absence of the required order.” See id. Appellant complains that the order was prepared by opposing counsel, but it incorporated the trial judge’s lengthy oral ruling and largely restated it within the order as well. It is a valid order and complies with Rule 10B. See Woodward v. Woodward, No. M2023-01298-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 7323285, at[*27] -30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2023).

the party who may prevail or if it no longer presents a present, live controversy.’” Buckley v. Elephant Sanctuary in Tenn., Inc., 639 S.W.3d 38, 47-48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Lance v. York, 359 S.W.3d 197, 204 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011)). Courts will decline to hear a case “if it does not involve a genuine, continuing controversy requiring the adjudication of presently existing rights.” Alliance for Native Am. Indian Rights in Tenn., Inc. v. Nicely, 182 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Here, Appellant filed his recusal motion in order to prevent Judge Collins from presiding over his case, and he asked that the case be reassigned in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures. The trial court’s order grants him the very relief he requested. As such, we deem the issue of recusal moot.

Appellant argues on appeal that he has been prejudiced by the trial judge’s decision to reassign the case to the presiding judge for interchange because the case has now been delayed pending reassignment. He also suggests that reassignment within the same district, if that occurs, will “create an unavoidable appearance of judge-shopping” due to the small number of judges in that district. However, it appears to us that Appellant obtained the very relief he sought in the trial court – reassignment pursuant to the applicable policies and procedures.

Rule 10B provides the following designation procedure in the event of recusal, as pertinent to this appeal:

1.04. Designation Procedure. A judge who recuses himself or herself, whether on the judge’s own initiative or on motion of a party, shall not participate in selecting his or her successor, absent the agreement of all parties. With the agreement of all parties to the case, the judge may seek an interchange in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, § VII(c)(1). Otherwise, the presiding judge of the court shall effect an interchange in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, § VII(c)(2) and/or (3) in sequential order. . . . If an interchange cannot be effected by following the above procedure in sequential order, the presiding judge or the presiding judge pro tempore shall request--by using the designation request form appended to this rule--the designation of a judge by the Chief Justice, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, § VII(c)(4).5 . . . Special permission to skip the sequential steps may be granted by the Chief Justice for good cause shown.

Assuming that Appellant would not have agreed to allowing Judge Collins to seek an interchange upon his recusal, the presiding judge would have effected an interchange. See id. The trial judge’s order likewise refers the case to the presiding judge for reassignment. Thus, we discern no prejudice to Appellant from the trial court’s order regarding reassignment.^[6]

One final point deserves mention. In the context of recusal motions, our Supreme Court has stated that “[a] trial judge has a duty to serve unless the proponent establishes a factual basis warranting recusal.” Adams v. Dunavant, 674 S.W.3d 871, 879 (Tenn. 2023). Our opinion should not be read to encourage the practice employed in this case. We simply conclude that the limited issue before us in this recusal appeal is now moot.

III. CONCLUSION

This appeal is hereby dismissed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Alton Earl Ingram, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________ CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

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