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Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 10× by 9 distinct cases, last quoted 2004 · 7 courts↓ Fading · …to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. at p. 439 ✓ Topic ↗
cited 8× by 6 distinct cases, last quoted 1976 · 3 courts↓ Fading · …designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. at p. 439 ✓ Topic ↗
cited 7× by 4 distinct cases, 1971–2016 · 3 courts↓ Fading · …operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. at p. 439 ✓ Topic ↗
1,274 citation events (117 in the last 25 years) across 88 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1965 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1965 1995 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited "but see" Sims v. Baggett (3×)
M.D. Ala. · 1965 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 , 81 S.Ct. 125 , 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 , 84 S. Ct. 603 , 11 L.Ed.2d 512 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F.Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.1965), aff’d 86 S.Ct. 24 (1965); but cf. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 , 85 S.Ct. 498 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401 (1965). 13 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tennessee State Conference of the NAACP v. Lee
M.D. Tenn. · 2024 · confidence medium
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miles Brown & a. v. Secretary of State
N.H. · 2023 · confidence medium
Id. at 150 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added); see Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 146, 150-51 (1971); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holmes v. Moore
N.C. · 2022 · confidence medium
MOORE 2022-NCSC-122 Opinion of the Court are not per se invalid under the federal Equal Protection Clause,” (first citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142 (1971); the Court has “recognized that multi- member districts may well ‘operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population,” and then quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)). ¶ 32 After the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed and judicial intervention enforced the Act, states were forced to remove the barriers to African American voting that had been imp…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holmes v. Moore
N.C. · 2022 · confidence medium
MOORE 2022-NCSC-122 Opinion of the Court are not per se invalid under the federal Equal Protection Clause,” (first citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142 (1971); the Court has “recognized that multi- member districts may well ‘operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population,” and then quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)). ¶ 32 After the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed and judicial intervention enforced the Act, states were forced to remove the barriers to African American voting that had been imp…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jeffrey Short v. Edmund Brown, Jr.
9th Cir. · 2018 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (cautioning that the Equal Protection Clause would not tolerate a districting plan that “designedly or otherwise . . . operate[d] to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Public Integrity Alliance, Inc. v. City of Tucson
9th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
See City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624, 631 (Ariz. 2012) (“Tucson council members, although nominated by ward, represent the entire city, just as do council members elected at large in other cities.”); see also Dallas Cty. v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 480 (1975) (“[E]lected officials represent all of those who elect them . . . .”); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 (1965) (similar).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walsh v. Katz
NY · 2011 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court also reiterated a basic teaching of representative government that it discussed previously in Dusch ( 387 US at 115 ) and Fortson v Dorsey ( 379 US 433, 438 [1965]), “that elected officials represent all of those who elect them, and not merely those who are their neighbors” (Dallas County, 421 US at 480 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walsh v. Katz
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Significantly, although the holder of the Fishers Island seat must be a resident of Fishers Island, all six members of the Town Board, including the Town Supervisor, are elected at large by the entire town electorate, and none is elected solely by the residents of Fishers Island (see Dallas County v Reese, 421 US 477, 480 [1975], citing Fortson v Dorsey, 379 US 433, 438 [1965]; cf. Board of Estimate of City of New York v Morris, 489 US 688, 690 [1989]).
examined Cited as authority (rule) League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (4×)
SCOTUS · 2006 · confidence medium
A purely partisan desire “to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population,” Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965), is not such a purpose.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Vieth v. Jubelirer (4×)
SCOTUS · 2004 · confidence medium
Consistent with that goal, we also reviewed claims that the majority had discriminated against particular groups of voters by drawing multimember districts that threatened "to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Commission (2×)
N.J. · 2003 · confidence medium
The effect of two districts would now “operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 , 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1294 , 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 388 (1966) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 , 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1965)); Voting Rights Act Extension, S.Rep.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Representative Burling v. Chandler
N.H. · 2002 · confidence medium
Use of multi-member districts is constitutionally permissible, however, unless the districts are designed to or would “minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population,” Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965); see Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. at 150-51 , or their use “produces deviations from substantial equality beyond the range of constitutional tolerance,” Opinion of the Justices, 307 A.2d 198, 209 (Me. 1973) (quotation omitted). b.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Stephenson v. Bartlett (7×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.C. · 2002 · confidence medium
The Court has also recognized that multi-member districts may well "operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 , 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1965), quoted in Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 , 106 S.Ct. at 2765 , 92 L.Ed.2d at 44 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gorin v. Karpan (2×)
D. Wyo. · 1991 · confidence medium
Whereas state-created multi-member districts are not per se unconstitutional and will be overturned only upon a showing that the plan operates to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population, Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 436, 439 , 85 S.Ct. 498, 500, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401 (1965), “single-member districts are to be preferred in court-ordered legislative reapportionment plans unless the court can articulate a ‘singular combination of unique factors’ that justifies a different result.” Connor, 431 U.S. at 415 , 97 S.Ct. at 1834 (ci…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hallahan v. NIS Corp. ( in Re Hallahan)
C.D. Ill. · 1990 · confidence medium
Id. 382 U.S. at 337 , 86 S.Ct. at 477 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 401.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Bandemer (4×)
SCOTUS · 1986 · confidence medium
Fortson, supra, at 439 (emphasis added).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Thornburg v. Gingles (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 1986 · confidence medium
This Court has long recognized that multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may " `operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting population.' " [13] Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. *48 73, 88 (1966) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Karcher v. Daggett (2×)
SCOTUS · 1983 · confidence medium
Thus, the question reserved in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965), related to an apportionment scheme that might "operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." See also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 751, 754 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-770 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 143-144 ; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88-89 (1966).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Milton v. Smathers
Fla. · 1980 · confidence medium
A districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously discriminatory because they are employed "to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 [ 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401 ] (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fullilove v. Klutznick (2×)
SCOTUS · 1980 · confidence medium
Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 760 (1974); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438-439 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 515 (1964); see United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 20-24 (1960).
examined Cited as authority (rule) City of Mobile v. Bolden (14×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 1980 · confidence medium
A districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously discriminatory because they are employed ‘to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.’ Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors
S.D. Miss. · 1979 · confidence medium
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 , 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1294 , 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 388 (1966) (emphasis added), quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 , 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1965).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kirksey v. BD. OF SUP'RS OF HINDS CTY., MISS.
S.D. Miss. · 1979 · confidence medium
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 , 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1294 , 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 388 (1966) (emphasis added), quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 , 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Markoe v. Legislature of the Virgin Islands
3rd Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
In Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 (1965), an early reapportionment case, the Supreme Court held that “[i]t is not accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district county as the representative of only that district. . . wherein he resides.” In that case the plan of apportionment required various state senators to reside in particular subdivisions of the voting unit.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Story v. Anderson
Wash. · 1979 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 656 , 87 S. Ct. 1554 (1967) controls in Dallas County, went on to say that: Dusch reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 [ 13 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wise v. Lipscomb (2×)
SCOTUS · 1978 · confidence medium
Multi-member districts, which are disfavored as court-devised remedies because of their “tendency” or potential to create racial dilution, should a fortiori be disfavored when they are proposed to cure a proved use of a “multi-member . . . scheme ... to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial . . . elements of the voting population.” Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965). 2 Based on respondents’ proof of a diluting effect on Negro voting strength in Dallas — and of the long history of de jure discrimination contributing to it — the District Court held the Dall…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Markoe v. Legislature of the Virgin Islands
D.V.I. · 1978 · confidence medium
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 (1965); see also, Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 478 (1975; Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S., 112, 115 (1967). 5 To successfully challenge the residency requirement it would be incumbent on plaintiff to show that this particular plan in fact operates impermissibly to dilute the voting strength of the voting population of the District of St.
cited Cited as authority (rule) WISE Et Al. v. LIPSCOMB Et Al.
SCOTUS · 1977 · confidence medium
Cf. Dusch, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fanny Paige, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Cross-Appellants v. James Gray, Mayor of the City of Albany, Georgia, Cross-Appellees. United States of America v. City of Albany
5th Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
As the Supreme Court said in Chapman : 31 (I)t must be shown that 32 "designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." 379 U.S., at 439 ( 85 S.Ct. 498, at 501 ). 33 Further, there must be more evidence than a simple disproportionality between the voting potential and the legislative seats won by a racial or political group.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paige v. Gray
5th Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
As the Supreme Court said in Chapman : [I]t must be shown that “designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” 379 U.S., at 439 [ 85 S.Ct. 498, at 501 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Henry J. Kirksey, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, Mississippi (2×)
5th Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 , 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1294 , 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 388 (1966) (emphasis added), quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 , 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1965). 15 On the other hand, the minority “ ‘is not constitutionally entitled to an apportionment structure designed to maximize its political advantage.’ ” 16 And so it appears the designer’s lines should 17 be drawn so as to avoid favoring and must be drawn so as not to disfavor the minority group of which the internal racial bloc is a part.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stewart v. United States
N.D. Miss. · 1975 · confidence medium
However, an at-large election system may be susceptible to constitutional challenge whenever such scheme “designedly or otherwise . . . under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 ,' 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 , 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 388 , 86 S.Ct. 1286 (1966).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ethelyn Gilbert v. W. L. Sterrett, Dallas County Judge, Etc. (2×)
5th Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
The trial judge employed the 'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength' (of minorities) language of Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 , 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1963), but cited only Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 , 86 S.Ct. 1286 , 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966), and Howard v. Adams County Board of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455 (CA5, 1972), cert. denied 407 U.S. 925 , 92 S.Ct. 2461 , 32 L.Ed.2d 812 (1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dallas County v. Reese
SCOTUS · 1975 · confidence medium
Dusch reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438 (1965), that when an official's “tenure depends upon the county-wide electorate he must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the people in the *480 county, and not merely those of people in his home district.” Because the districts in the present plan are used “merely as the basis of residence for candidates, not for voting or representation,” ibid.; Dusch v. Davis, supra, at 115 , each commissioner represents the citizens of the entire county and not merely those of the district in which he resides…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lipscomb v. Wise (2×)
N.D. Tex. · 1975 · confidence medium
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 , 95 S.Ct. 751 , 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 437-438 , 85 S.Ct. 498 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 404 (1965).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chapman v. Meier
SCOTUS · 1975 · confidence medium
Tr. of Oral Arg. 16-17. 9 Cf., however, Fort-son v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438 (1965), for the suggestion that the at-large representative serves all residents in the subdistricts.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lytle v. Commissioners of Election of Union County
D.S.C. · 1974 · confidence medium
In upholding a residence requirement for the election of state senators from a multi-district county we said in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 [ 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401 ]: ‘It is not accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district county as the representative of only that district within the county wherein he resides.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gaffney v. Cummings
SCOTUS · 1973 · confidence medium
A districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously discriminatory because they are employed “to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White v. Regester (2×)
SCOTUS · 1973 · confidence medium
In the Texas case, the Court does affirm, however, the District Court’s determination that the use of multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties had the unconstitutional effect of minimizing the voting strength of racial groups. 1 See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 142-144 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cousins v. City Council of City of Chicago
7th Cir. · 1972 · confidence medium
More recently, in cases involving voting rights, the Court has made it abundantly clear that invidious discrimination against various kinds of groups, in addition to racial groups, is condemned by the Equal Protection Clause. 126 Thus, in Whitcomb v. Chavis the Court plainly stated that it would not countenance districts "conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial or economic discrimination." 403 U.S. 124, 149 , 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1872 . 12 The question reserved in Fortson v. Dorsey related to an apportionment scheme that might "operate to minimize or cancel out the voting stren…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles F. Zimmer, Stewart Marshall, Intervenor-Appellant v. John J. McKeithen (2×)
5th Cir. · 1972 · confidence medium
The standard which the Supreme Court has articulated' is whether “designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 , 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1294 , 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 388 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 , 85 S.Ct. 498 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1965). 2 The majority opinion presumes that since the blacks in East Carroll Parish constitute a numerical majority (59%) it i…
examined Cited as authority (rule) In Re Apportionment Law, Senate Joint Res. No. 1305 (4×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 1972 · confidence medium
But we have deemed the validity of multi-member district systems justiciable, recognizing also that they may be subject to challenge where the circumstances of a particular case may `operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.' Fortson, 379 U.S., at 439 , 85 S.Ct., at 501 [ 13 L.Ed.2d at 405 ], and Burns, 384 U.S., at 88 , 86 S.Ct., at 1294 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at 388 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kelly v. Bumpers
E.D. Ark. · 1972 · confidence medium
But we have deemed the validity of multi-member district systems justiciable, recognizing also that they may be subject to challenge where the circumstances of a particular case may ‘operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.’ Fortson, 379 U.S., at 439 [ 85 S.Ct. at 501 ], and Burns, 384 U.S., at 88 [86 S.Ct., at 1294].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Graves v. Barnes
SCOTUS · 1972 · confidence medium
Meanwhile, the forthcoming election may be held under the plan found to be deficient. (c) The multi-member district plans for Dallas and Bexar Counties were found to be unconstitutional under the standard prescribed by this Court in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438-439 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966); and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 143 (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitcomb v. Chavis (2×)
SCOTUS · 1971 · confidence medium
Other past decisions have suggested that multi-member constituencies would be unconstitutional if they could be shown "under the circumstances of a particular case . . . to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Opinion of the Justices
N.H. · 1971 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 401, 405 , 85 S. Ct. 498, 501 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Calderon v. City of Los Angeles (2×)
Cal. · 1971 · confidence medium
Although such a discriminatory effect would have to be proved at trial, 9 the United States Supreme Court has asserted that an otherwise acceptable apportionment plan may fail to pass constitutional muster if “designedly or otherwise,” it operates “to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” (Fortson v. Dorsey (1965) 379 U.S. 433, 439 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 , 85 S.Ct. 498 ]; see Burns v. Richardson, supra, 384 U.S. 73, 88 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 388 ]; Chavis v. Whitcomb (S.D.Ind. 1969) 305 F.Supp. 1364 , prob. juris, noted sub nom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bryant v. Whitcomb
S.D. Ind. · 1970 · confidence medium
Since the four members-at-large feature of the questioned statute cannot in fact dilute the vote of the Ghetto Area, it cannot be construed as having been designed to do so or as being contrary in any way to the dictates of Fortson v. Dorsey, 397 U.S. 433 , 85 S.Ct. 498 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bleckley v. Vickers
Ga. · 1969 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court of the United States in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438 (85 SC 498, 13 LE2d 401) stated: “It is not accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district county as the representative of only that district within the county wherein he resides.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
FORTSON, SECRETARY OF STATE OF GEORGIA
v.
DORSEY Et Al.
178.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 18, 1965.
379 U.S. 433
Paul Rodgers, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Eugene Cook, Attorney General of Georgia., Edwin F. Hunt argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were William C. O’Kelley and Charles A, Moye, Jr.
Brennan, Harlan, Douglas.
Cited by 383 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

[*434] Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Georgia’s 1962 Senatorial Reapportionment Act[1] appor- . tions the 54 seats of the Georgia Senate among the State’s[*435] 159 counties. The 54 senatorial districts created by the Act are drawn, so far as possible, along existing , county lines; Thirty-three of the senatorial districts are made up of from one to eight counties each,[2] and voters in these districts elect their senators by a district-wide vote. The remaining 21 senatorial districts are allotted in groups of from two to seven among the seven most populous counties, but voters in these districts do not elect a senator by a district-wide vote; instead they join with the voters of the other districts of the county in electing all the county’s senators by á county-wide vote.

The appellees, registered voters of Georgia, brought this action in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against the Secretary of State of Georgia and local election officials seeking a decree that the requirement of county-wide voting in the seven multi-district counties violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment, stating that “The statute causes a clear difference in the treatment accorded voters in each of the two classes of senatorial districts. It is the same law applied differently to dif[*436] ferent" persons. The voters select their own senator in one class of districts. In the other they do not. They must join with others in selecting a group of senators and their own choice of a senator may be nullified by what voters in other districts of the group desire. This difference is a discrimination as between voters in the two classes. . . . The statute here is nothing more than a classification of voters in senatorial districts on the basis of homesite, to the end that some are allowed to select their representatives while others are not. It is an invidious discrimination tested by any standard.” 228 F. Supp. 259, 263. We noted probable jurisdiction, 379 U. S. 810. We reverse.

Only last Term, in our opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, decided after the decision below, we rejected the notion that equal protection necessarily requires the formation of single-member districts. In discussing the impact on bicameralism of the equal-protection standards, we said, “One body could be composed of single-member districts while the other could have at least some multi-member districts.” 377 U. S., at 577. (Emphasis supplied.) Again, in holding that a State might legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, such as counties, we said: “Single-member districts may be the rule in one State, while another State might desire to achieve some flexibility by creating multi-member or floterial districts. Whatever the means of accomplishment, the overriding objective must-be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.” 377 U. S., at 579. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is not contended that there is not “substantial equality of population” among the 54 senatorial districts. The equal protection argument is focused solely upon the question whether county-wide voting in the seven multi-[*437] district counties results in denying the residents therein a vote “approximately equal in weight to that of” voters resident in the single-member constituencies. Contrary to the District Court, we cannot say. that it does. There is .clearly no mathematical disparity. Fulton County, the State’s largest constituency, has a population nearly seven times larger than that of a single-district constituency and for that reason elects seven senators. Every Fulton County voter, therefore, may vote for seven senators to represent his interests in the legislature. But the appellees assert that this scheme is defective because county-wide voting in multi-district counties could, as a matter of mathematics, result in the nullification of the unanimous choice of the voters of a district, thereby thrusting upon them a senator for whom no one in the district had voted. But this is only a highly hypothetical assertion[3] that, in any event, ignores the practical reali[*438] ties of representation in a multi-member constituency. It is not accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district county as the representative of only that district within the county wherein he resides. The statute uses districts in multi-district counties merely as the basis of residence for candidates, not for voting or representation. Each district’s senator must be a resident of that district, but since his tenure depends upon the county-wide electorate he must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the people in the county, and not merely those of people in his home district; thus in. fact he is the county’s and not merely the district’s senator. If the weight of the vote of any voter in a Fulton County district, when he votes for seven senators to represent him in the Georgia Senate, is not the exact equivalent of that of a. resident of a single-member constituency, we cannot say that his vote is not “approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State*”

In reversing the District Court we should emphasize that the equal-protection claim below was based upon an alleged infirmity that attaches to the statute on its face. Agreeing with appellees’ contention that the multi-mem-ber constituency feature of the Georgia scheme was per se bad, the District Court entered the decree on summary judgment. We treat the question as presented in that[*439] context, and our opinion is not to be understood to say that in all instances or under all circumstances such a system as Georgia has will comport with the dictates of . the Equal Protection Clause. It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular casé, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. When this is demonstrated it will be time enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster. This question, however, is not presented by the record before us. It is true that appel-lees asserted in one Short paragraph of their brief in this Court that the county-wide election method was resorted to by Georgia in order to minimize the strength of racial and political minorities in the populous urban counties. But appellees never seriously pressed , this point below and offered no proof to support it,, the District Court did not consider or rule on its merits, and in oral argument here counsel for appellees stressed that they do not rely on this argument. The record thus does not contain any substantiation of the bald assertion in appellees’ brief. Since, under these circumstances, this issue has "not been formulated to bring it into focus, and the evidence has not been offered or appraised to decide it, our holding has no bearing on that' wholly separate question.” Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, 58.

Reversed.

1

Ga. Laws, Sept.-Oct. 1962, Extra. Sess., pp. 7-31; Ga. Code Ann. §47-102 (Cum. Supp. 1963). Section 9, the provision in question here, provides in pertinent part that:

“Each Senator must be a resident of his own Senatorial District and shall be elected by the voters of his own District, .except that the Senators from those Senatorial Districts consisting of less than one county shall be elected by all the voters of the county in which such Senatorial District is located.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Shortly after the enactment of this statute, and prior to the election of senators under it in.the 1962 general elections, an action was brought in a state court that challenged the validity of the above provision under the Georgia Constitution. The state court held that the exception in' the 1962 statute was unconstitutional as a matter of state law under the then-existing Georgia Constitution. Finch v. Gray, No. A 96441 (Fulton County Super. Ct., Oct. 30, 1962). The court entered a permanent injunction requiring that elections in Fulton and DeKalb Counties-be held on a district-wide basis only. Appeal was taken from this decision but was withdrawn. In its opinion the Georgia Court noted that the Georgia Legislature had authorized the submission of a constitutional amendment to the people ratifying the 1962 reapportionment statute with its multi-district-voting exception and all elections held under that statute. (The amendment was ratified. See Ga. Const. Art. III, § II, par. I; Ga. Code Ann. § 2-1401 (Cum. Supp. 1963).) The court stated concerning the proposed amendment:

“It. is to be observed that by Paragraph (b) of said proposed Amendment to the Constitution, the -General Assembly submitted to the people the question whether they would ratify the Reapportionment Act and elections thereunder. This proposed Amendment, of course, is prospective and will become a part of the Constitution only if ratified by the voters in the coming general election.
“The effect of ratification by the people of the Reapportionment Act containing the unconstitutional exception aforesaid is not now before the Court for determination. See, however, on this subject: Walker v. Wilcox Co., 95 Apps. 185; Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313; Bailey v. Housing Authority of City, of Bainbridge, 214 Ga.[*435] 790; Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613; 9 Mercer L. Rev. 194, 195; 11 Am. Juris., page 832, section 151. The importance here of the aforesaid proposed constitutional Amendment is simply for the light .it sheds upon the intention of the General Assembly in enacting the Reapportionment statute.”

The question of Georgia law raised by the decisions cited by the court as to whether a statute declared unconstitutional under Georgia law may be revived by a subsequent constitutional amendment was not raised below and has not been urged here. Of course, this question of Georgia law is not for us; our decision concerns only the federal constitutional question presented and argued.

2

These 33 senatorial districts embrace 152 of the State’s 159 counties. Of the 33 districts, only two consist of single counties; the remaining 31 districts are comprised of from two to eight counties each.

3

Appellees take as their example Senatorial District 34, in which there are 82,195 of Fulton County’s total of 556, 326 voters. They say, as a matter of mathematics, that even if every voter in District 34 voted for the same candidate from that district, less than 18% of the voters in the other six districts within the county (i. e., approximately 85,000 of the remaining 474, 131 voters in the county) could outvote the unanimous choice of District 34 voters. First of. all, there is no demonstration that this is likely in- light of the political composition of District 34 vis-a-vis that of the rest of the county. (In fact, the 1962 elections .in both Fulton and DeKalb Counties— wherein all appellees reside — were conducted on a district-wide basis rather than a county-wide basis. See note 1, supra.) But apart from this, appellees’ mathematics are misleading, for not only will the 18%, or 85,000, of the remaining Fulton County voters vote for a senatorial candidate resident in District 34, but,, also the remaining 389,131 voters will presumably participate in his election. Assuming these additional vot.ers split their votes almost evenly between two candidates running from District 34 — the most “favorable” assumption-for appellees in that it will produce the smallest possible percentage of voters who can outvote the unanimous choice of the voters in District 34 — there will be approximately 280,000 votes against the[*438] choice- of the voters in the 34th District, or about 59% of the remaining, out-of-district vote. This is a far cry from the 18% figure calculated by appellees. And, even if, on some odd chance, only 85,000 voters outside of District 34 participate in the selection of a senator from that district, and all vote against the unanimous choice of District 34 voters, the 18% figure is still misleading. For in this eventuality, the relevant voting constituency consists of something under 170,000 voters, and close to 100% — not 18% — of the out-of-district vote has to be cast against-the choice of the in-district vote in order to outvote the latter. Our decision should not be read, however, as resting upon the misleading aspects of appellees’ calculations;

Concurrence

Mr. Justice Harlan,

concurring.

Under the compulsion of last Term’s reapportionment decisions I join the opinion and judgment of the Court, but with one reservation. There is language in today’s opinion, unnecessary to the Court’s resolution of this case, that might be taken to mean that the constitutionality of[*440] state legislative apportionments must, in the last analysis, always be judged in terms of simple arithmetic.

As this Court embarks on the difficult business of putting flesh on the bones of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, and its companion decisions of last June, I desire expressly to reserve for a case which squarely presents the issue, the question of whether the principles announced in those decisions require such a sterile approach to the concept of equal protection in the political field.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Georgia — whose political hierarchy was long constructed on the county-unit* basis — has made an important change. The Georgia Constitution was amended to read:

“The Senate shall consist of 54 members. The General Assembly shall have authority’to create, rearrange and change senatorial districts and to provide for the election of Senators from each senatorial district, or from several districts embraced within one county, in such manner as the General Assembly may deem advisable.” (Italics added.) Art. III, § II, par. I.

, The “senatorial district” is thus made the unit in the election of senators. But the Senatorial Reapportionment Act provides in relevant part:

“Each Senator must be a resident of his own senatorial district and'shall be elected by the voters of his own district, except that the Senators from those senatorial districts, consisting of less than one county shall be elected by all the voters of the county in which such senatorial district is located.”

Thus “senatorial districts” are put into two classifications: first, those, comprising one or more counties; sec[*441] ond, those consisting of less than one county. The “equal protection” problem under the Fourteenth Amendment arises by reason of the fact that all electors of the districts in the first group choose their own senators, while the electors of the districts in the second group must share the choice of their senators with all the other electors in their county. I agree with the District Court: . . voters in some senatorial districts cannot be treated differently from voters in other senatorial districts. The statute here is nothing more than a classification of voters in senatorial districts on the basis of. homesite, to the end that some are allowed to select their representatives while others are not.” 228 F. Supp. 259, 263.

There are seven senatorial districts within Fulton County:

District 34 containing 82,195 voters.
District 35 containing 82,888 voters.
District 36 containing 79,023 voters.
District 37 containing 78,540 voters.
District 38 containing 78,953 voters.
District 39 containing 79,713 voters.
District 40 containing 74,834 voters.

There are three senatorial districts in De.Kalb County:

District 41 containing 75,117 voters.
District 42 containing 95,032 voters.
District 43 containing 86,633 voters.

As appellees point out, even if a candidate for one of those districts obtained all of the votes in that district, he could still be defeated by the foreign vote, while he would of course be elected if he were running in á district in the first group. I have no idea how this weighted voting might produce prejudice race-wise, religion-wise, politics-wise. But to allow some candidates to be chosen by the electors in their districts and others to be defeated by the voters of foreign districts is in my view an “invidi[*442] ous discrimination” — the test of unequal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 244. I had assumed we had settled this question in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 379, where we said: “Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote — ^whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home may be. in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

South v. Peters, 339 U. S. 276.