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13 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Craft v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Id. at 1053 ; see also Craft v. State, 638 So.2d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that an officer's belief that he or she may be in peril if the knock and announce procedure is followed should be based on particular circumstances existing at the time of entry and should be based on something more than generalized knowledge that a defendant has been known to carry a weapon at some time in the past). 1996Id. at 1053 . | 1 | 2 |
Gene E. Rutland v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2024See Rutland, 166 So. 3d at 878–79 (noting trial court’s “overwhelming focus” at violation hearing on failure to report). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Mendezgreen1 sentence2020In Miller v. Mendez, 804 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 2001), this Court held “that a candidate for judicial office must be a resident of the territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time he or she assumes office,” disapproving the conclusion “that the residence requirement refers to residence at the time of qualifying or taking the oath of candidate.” Further, in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 192 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 1966), this Court stated that the bar membership eligibility requirement “refer[s] to eligibility at the time of assuming office and not at the - 26 - time of qualificat | 1 | 1 |
Florida Bar v. Rogersgreen1 sentence2020In Miller v. Mendez, 804 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 2001), this Court held “that a candidate for judicial office must be a resident of the territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time he or she assumes office,” disapproving the conclusion “that the residence requirement refers to residence at the time of qualifying or taking the oath of candidate.” Further, in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 192 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 1966), this Court stated that the bar membership eligibility requirement “refer[s] to eligibility at the time of assuming office and not at the - 26 - time of qualificat | 1 | 1 |
Fazio v. Faziogreen1 sentence1993See Fazio v. Fazio, 66 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1953); Chisholm; Wise. | 1 | 1 |
Gillman v. Gillmangreen1 sentence1989Thus, the residence requirement is not satisfied by the mere maintenance of a vacation or other temporary home in this state." Gillman v. Gillman, 413 So.2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Florida Real Estate Commission v. McGregorgreen1 sentence1978Thus in Shapiro ... we stated: `The residence requirement and the oneyear waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites.' And in Memorial Hospital , ... quoting Dunn , ... the Court explained that Shapiro and Dunn did not question `the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements.'" [6] See Florida Real Estate Comm'n v. McGregor, 336 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. 1976). [7] See, among others, § 466.24, Fla. Stat. (1975). [8] The Board tests competency and invokes disciplinary measures only on the basis of complaints, rather than peri | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bamber
green
2 sentences2024The Court in Bamber addressed a no-knock search conducted under a search warrant in violation of section 933.09 and refused to expand the exclusionary rule exceptions recognized under Benefield to include a blanket exception “any time a small quantity of drugs is believed to be present in a residence with standard plumbing.” 630 So. 2d at 1053 . 2003Id. at 1053 ; see also Craft v. State, 638 So.2d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that an officer's belief that he or she may be in peril if the knock and announce procedure is followed should be based on particular circumstances existing at the time of entry and should be based on something more than generalized knowledge that a defendant has been known to carry a weapon at some time in the past). | 2 | 2003–2024 |
State Farm Fire & Cas. v. CTC DEVELOPMENT
green
1 sentence2005The court focused on whether the event constituted an "occurrence" under the policy, which was broadly defined to include "[a]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions which result in bodily injury or property damage." Id. at 1073 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Armenteros v. State
green
1 sentence1994The State in the present case urges us to expand this exception to embrace the "blanket approach" adopted by the district courts in Armenteros v. State, 554 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989), and State v. Bell, 564 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), which excuses forcible entry any time a small quantity of drugs is believed to be present in a residence with standard plumbing — regardless of immediacy of destruction. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Gastelo
green
2 sentences1994This approach, however, has been rejected by an increasing number of courts in favor of the position articulated by Chief Justice Traynor in People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586 , 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 (1967): The Attorney General contends that unannounced forcible entry to execute a search warrant is always reasonable in narcotics cases, on the ground that narcotics violators normally are on the alert to destroy the easily disposable evidence quickly at the first sign of an officer's presence. 1994This approach, however, has been rejected by an increasing number of courts in favor of the position articulated by Chief Justice Traynor in People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586 , 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 (1967): The Attorney General contends that unannounced forcible entry to execute a search warrant is always reasonable in narcotics cases, on the ground that narcotics violators normally are on the alert to destroy the easily disposable evidence quickly at the first sign of an officer's presence. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Bell
green
1 sentence1994The State in the present case urges us to expand this exception to embrace the "blanket approach" adopted by the district courts in Armenteros v. State, 554 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989), and State v. Bell, 564 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), which excuses forcible entry any time a small quantity of drugs is believed to be present in a residence with standard plumbing — regardless of immediacy of destruction. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Fortson v. Dorsey
green
2 sentences1976In upholding a residence requirement for the election of state senators from a multi-district county we said in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 , 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401 : “ ‘It is not accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district county as the representative of only that district within the county wherein he resides. 1976In upholding a residence requirement for the election of state senators from a multi-district county we said in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 , 85 S.Ct. 498, 501 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401 : “ ‘It is not accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district county as the representative of only that district within the county wherein he resides. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Ponder v. Graham
green
2 sentences1973Whether divorces should be granted, and if granted, only for the cause of adultery; whether the residence requirement should be three months, six months, or two years, are matters for the Legislature to decide; and when the decision has been made, it becomes incumbent upon the Judicial branch to enforce it. " (emphasis added) Appellant urges Ponder, supra , as a basis for voiding the legislative provision for "no fault divorce." The dissolution of marriage provided in the new law is not, however, "a legislative divorce" which was granted in the early day of Ponder, supra , by the Legislative C 1973Whether divorces should be granted, and if granted, only for the cause of adultery; whether the residence requirement should be three months, six months, or two years, are matters for the Legislature to decide; and when the decision has been made, it becomes incumbent upon the Judicial branch to enforce it. " (emphasis added) Appellant urges Ponder, supra , as a basis for voiding the legislative provision for "no fault divorce." The dissolution of marriage provided in the new law is not, however, "a legislative divorce" which was granted in the early day of Ponder, supra , by the Legislative C | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Smith v. Texas
green
2 sentences1966Smith v. State of Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 , 34 S.Ct. 681 , 58 L.Ed. 1129 , L.R.A. 1915D, 677 . 1966Smith v. State of Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 , 34 S.Ct. 681 , 58 L.Ed. 1129 , L.R.A. 1915D, 677 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck
green
2 sentences1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber 1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber | 1 | 1966–1966 |
In Re Fassett
green
2 sentences1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber 1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Soares v. City of Santa Maria
green
2 sentences1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber 1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne
green
2 sentences1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber 1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Wormsen v. Moss
green
2 sentences1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber 1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Van Harlingen v. Doyle
green
2 sentences1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber 1966Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 , 56 S.Ct. 457 , 80 L.Ed. 675 ; Del Mar Canning Co. v. Payne, 29 Cal.2d 380 , 175 P.2d 231 ; Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53 , 66 P. 44 , 54 L.R.A. 771 ; Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App.2d 215, 218 , 100 P.2d 1108 ; In re Fasset, 21 Cal. App.2d 557 , 69 P.2d 865 ." In Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19 , 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 , the Supreme Court of New York struck down a residence requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license to act as a massage operator, and said (p. 801): "In so far as one is deprived of the right to labor, his liber | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.