Hysaw v. Estelle, Corr. Dir., 414 U.S. 1030 (1973). · Go Syfert
Search
Hysaw v. Estelle, Corr. Dir., 414 U.S. 1030 (1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
14 citation events across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Chambers (mo, 1975-07-14)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Chambers (2×)
Mo. · 1975 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Smith, 491 S.W.2d 257 (Mo.1973), certiorari denied, Smith v. State, 414 U.S. 1031 , 94 S.Ct. 460 , 38 L.Ed.2d 322 (1973), which affirmed two convictions of defendant for felony-murder of a man and his wife where both killings occurred during the robbery of the husband and the rape of his *834 wife, a same or single transaction, and both offenses when tried separately were proved by substantially the same evidence.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Neal (2×)
Mo. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Smith, 491 S.W. 2d 257 , supra, certiorari denied Smith v. State, 414 U.S. 1031 , 94 S.Ct. 460 , 38 L.Ed. 2d 322 (1973), where defendant was charged separately with the murder of two persons in a single transaction, and trial on one charge did not preclude trial on the second charge, even though substantially the same evidence was presented in both trials.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Willie Clarence Hysaw
v.
W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections
72-6785.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 12, 1973.
414 U.S. 1030
Brennan, Douglas, Marshall.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioner was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment upon his plea of guilty to a charge of burglary. Later on the same day, the same conduct was the basis of a charge of theft, for which he received a consecutive eight-year sentence when he also pleaded guilty to that charge. Although neither conviction was directly appealed, petitioner sought state habeas corpus, claiming that, since both charges arose out of the same criminal transaction, his second conviction for theft violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Petitioner’s application was denied by the 179th District Court of Harris County and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2 conceded that the charges of burglary and theft arose out of the same-criminal transaction. That, in my opinion, requires that we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse, for I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Miller v. Oregon, 405 U. S. 1047 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting);[*1031] Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (statement of Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.); Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387, 395 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).