Smith v. Missouri, 414 U.S. 1031 (1973). · Go Syfert
Search
Smith v. Missouri, 414 U.S. 1031 (1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
10 citation events across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tijerina v. New Mexico (scotus, 1974-06-10)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Tijerina v. New Mexico
SCOTUS · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
That, in my opinion, requires that we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse, for I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Smith v. Missouri, 4…
discussed Cited "see" Moton v. Swenson
SCOTUS · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
That, in my opinion, requires that we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse, for I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Smith v. Missouri, 4…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Chambers (2×)
Mo. · 1975 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Smith, 491 S.W.2d 257 (Mo.1973), certiorari denied, Smith v. State, 414 U.S. 1031 , 94 S.Ct. 460 , 38 L.Ed.2d 322 (1973), which affirmed two convictions of defendant for felony-murder of a man and his wife where both killings occurred during the robbery of the husband and the rape of his *834 wife, a same or single transaction, and both offenses when tried separately were proved by substantially the same evidence.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Neal (2×)
Mo. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Smith, 491 S.W. 2d 257 , supra, certiorari denied Smith v. State, 414 U.S. 1031 , 94 S.Ct. 460 , 38 L.Ed. 2d 322 (1973), where defendant was charged separately with the murder of two persons in a single transaction, and trial on one charge did not preclude trial on the second charge, even though substantially the same evidence was presented in both trials.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Willie J. Smith
v.
State of Missouri
72-6919.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 19, 1973.
414 U.S. 1031
Brennan, Douglas, Marshall.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MARSHALL concur, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall concur,

dissenting.

After petitioner and one Edward Johnson forcefully entered a St. Louis apartment occupied by Mrs. Hermine Rohs, her son Willy Rohs, and his wife Marilyn Rohs, robbed them, raped both women, and finally stabbed all three to death, petitioner was indicted on three separate charges of murder in the first degree.* The State proceeded first with the trial of petitioner for the murder of Marilyn Rohs, seeking the death penalty. The jury convicted petitioner of first-degree murder, but assessed punishment at life imprisonment. Subsequently, the State tried petitioner for the murder of Willy Rohs, again seeking the death penalty. Again the jury found petitioner guilty of first-degree murder and assessed life imprisonment. The trial judge specified that the second life sentence would run consecutively to the first and the State thereupon entered a plea of nolle prosequi on the third indictment. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed both convictions, rejecting petitioner’s claim that the second prosecution violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. See 491 S. W. 2d 257 (1973).

Although both charges of murder clearly arose out of the same transaction or episode, they were prosecuted by the State in separate proceedings. That, in my[*1032] opinion, requires that we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse, for I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Miller v. Oregon, 405 U. S. 1047 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (statement of Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.); Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387, 395 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).

Edward Johnson, who was also indicted, tried, and convicted for first-degree murder, has not petitioned this Court to review his conviction.