Ratner v. United States, 423 U.S. 898 (1975). · Go Syfert
Search
Ratner v. United States, 423 U.S. 898 (1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
64 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 25 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Gomes v. University of Maine System (med, 2004-02-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1975 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Gomes v. University of Maine System
D. Me. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 , 96 S.Ct. 202 , 46 L.Ed.2d 131 (1975) (discipline upheld against graduate student who published material without proper attribution for most part prior to enrollment as student); Due v. Florida Agric. & Mech.
discussed Cited "see" Gorman v. University of Rhode Island
D.R.I. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, 514 F.2d 622, 625 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 , 96 S.Ct. 202 , 46 L.Ed.2d 131 (1975); Givens v. Poe, 346 F.Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C.1972) (“due process requires a number of procedural safeguards such as ... the requirement that the decision of the authorities be based upon substantial evidence.”); Center for Participant Education v. Marshall, 337 F.Supp. 126, 136 (N.D.Fla.1972) (“in order to satisfy due process requirements, a university disciplinary proceeding should afford the student... punishment based only upon substantial evide…
discussed Cited "see" Ronald H. Gullick v. Everett I. Perrin, Etc.
1st Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nassar v. Vinzant, 519 F.2d 798 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 , 96 S.Ct. 202 , 46 L.Ed.2d 132 (1975); Souza v. Howard, 488 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 , 94 S.Ct. 2646 , 41 L.Ed.2d 237 (1974). 11 .
cited Cited "see" James Willard Summitt v. Donald E. Bordenkircher, Warden, Kentucky State Penitentiary, Respondent- John Gregory Watkins v. Donald E. Bordenkircher, Warden, Kentucky State Penitentiary, Respondent
6th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nassar v. Vinzant, 519 F.2d 798 (1st Cir.), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 , 96 S.Ct. 202 , 46 L.Ed.2d 132 (1975).
cited Cited "see" Summitt v. Bordenkircher
6th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nassar v. Vinzant, 519 F.2d 798 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 , 96 S.Ct. 202 , 46 L.Ed.2d 132 (1975).
cited Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Jackson
Mass. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nassar v. Vinzant, 519 F.2d 798, 801 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975).
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Levinson (2×)
Pa. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Webster, 462 Pa. 125, 130-133 , 337 A.2d 914, 917-918 (1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 898 , 96 S.Ct. 201 , 46 L.Ed.2d 131 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Russell v. Salve Regina College
D.R.I. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir.) (“The student-university relationship is unique and it should not be and cannot be stuffed into one doctrinal category”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 , 96 S.Ct. 202 , 46 L.Ed.2d 131 (1975); Napolitano v. Princeton Univ.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Harvey v. Palmer College of Chiropractic
Iowa Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id.; see also Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 898 , 96 S.Ct. 202 , 46 L.Ed.2d 131 (1975); Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton University, 186 N.J.Super. 548, 565-66 , 453 A.2d 263, 271-73 (1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jaksa v. Regents of University of Michigan
E.D. Mich. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, 514 F.2d 622, 625 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 , 96 S.Ct. 202 , 46 L.Ed.2d 131 (1975) (Due process satisfied where there “was an adequate hearing on the charge with a meaningful opportunity given to plaintiff to participate, to present his position, and to hear the witnesses presenting the facts they had knowledge of.”); Jones v. Snead, 431 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir.1970) (“[Pjrocedural due process must be afforded a student on .the college campus ‘by way of adequate notice, definite charge, and a hearing with opportunity to pre…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Samuel Ratner
v.
United States
74-1282.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 3, 1975.
423 U.S. 898
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, being of the view, stated in his previous opinions1 and those of Mr. Justice Black,3 that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity abridges freedom of speech and of the press contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments, would grant certiorari and summarily reverse.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view, stated in his previous opinions[1] and those[*899] of Mr. Justice Black,[2] that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity abridges freedom of speech and of the press contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments, would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment.

1

Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (1973) (dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (dissenting); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 426-433 (1966) (concurring in judgment); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 491-492 (1966) (dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508-514 (1957) (dissenting).

2

Ginzburg v. United States, supra, at 476 (dissenting); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 515-518 (1966) (dissenting).

Dissent

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas of mailing obscene magazines and films, and mailing advertisements describing how to obtain such magazines and films, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, which provides in pertinent part:

“Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance; . . .
“Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
“Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing ... of anything declared by this section ... to be nonmailable, . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years . . . .”

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 502 F. 2d 1300 (1974).

1 adhere to my dissent in United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which is similar in scope to § 1461, I expressed the view that “[wjhatever the extent of the Federal Government’s power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.”[*900] 413 U. S., at 147-148. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was rendered after Orito, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Finally, it appears from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was not adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards.

Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits.