Mary Gormley v. Dir., Connecticut State Dep't of Adult Prob., 449 U.S. 1023 (1980). · Go Syfert
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Mary Gormley v. Dir., Connecticut State Dep't of Adult Prob., 449 U.S. 1023 (1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
322 citation events (96 in the last 25 years) across 29 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dorman v. Satti (ctd, 1988-02-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 46 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dorman v. Satti
D. Conn. · 1988 · confidence medium
He reasoned that, because "speech may be ‘annoying’ without losing its First Amendment protection,” the statute might well be "substantially overbroad and hence unconstitutional.” Id. at 1024.
discussed Cited "see" People v. Harper
N.Y. App. Div. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
"It is well established that property seized as a result of . . . unlawful [police conduct] must be suppressed, unless that property was abandoned" ( People v Mueses , 132 AD3d 1257, 1258 [4th Dept 2015]; see People v Howard , 50 NY2d 583, 592 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]; People v Jones , 174 AD3d 1532 , 1534 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 982 [2019]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Jones
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
"It is well established that property seized as a result of an unlawful pursuit must be suppressed, unless that property was abandoned" ( People v Mueses , 132 AD3d 1257, 1258 [4th Dept 2015]; see People v Howard , 50 NY2d 583, 592 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Swain
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
Having discarded the handgun in the street, we find that defendant waived any challenge to the seizure of this item ( see People v Howard , 50 NY2d 583, 588-589 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]; People v Rozier , 143 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2016]; People v Stevenson , 273 AD2d 826, 827 [2000]; People v Riddick , 224 AD2d 782, 784 [1996]; compare People v Mueses , 132 AD3d 1257, 1258 [2015]; see generally People v Howard , 50 NY2d 583, 588-589 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Rozier
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
That observation “was unobtrusive and did not limit the defendant’s freedom of movement” (Feliciano, 140 AD3d at 1777 ; see generally People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Rozier
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
That observation “was unobtrusive and did not limit the defendant’s freedom of movement” (Feliciano, 140 AD3d at 1777 ; see generally People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]).
cited Cited "see" ROZIER, GLASCO P., PEOPLE v
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
That observation “was unobtrusive and did not limit the defendant’s freedom of movement” (Feliciano, 140 AD3d at 1777 ; see generally People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
discussed Cited "see" BROWN, KRYSTIAN, PEOPLE v
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
The court properly determined that the officer was engaged merely in observation and was not in pursuit when he followed defendant into the store (see People v Feliciano, 140 AD3d 1776, 1777 ; see generally People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Brown
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
The court properly determined that the officer was engaged merely in observation and was not in pursuit when he followed defendant into the store (see People v Feliciano, 140 AD3d 1776, 1777 [2016]; see generally People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Brown
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
The court properly determined that the officer was engaged merely in observation and was not in pursuit when he followed defendant into the store (see People v Feliciano, 140 AD3d 1776, 1777 [2016]; see generally People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]).
discussed Cited "see" FELICIANO, ROBERTO, PEOPLE v
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the officer engaged in mere observation, and was not in pursuit, when he followed defendant after defendant ignored the officer’s question and continued to ride away on the bicycle (see People v Rainey, 122 AD3d 1314 , 1314- 1315, lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 ; see generally People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Feliciano
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the officer engaged in mere observation, and was not in pursuit, when he followed defendant after defendant ignored the officer’s question and continued to ride away on the bicycle (see People v Rainey, 122 AD3d 1314 , 1314-1315 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]; see generally People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Feliciano
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the officer engaged in mere observation, and was not in pursuit, when he followed defendant after defendant ignored the officer’s question and continued to ride away on the bicycle (see People v Rainey, 122 AD3d 1314 , 1314-1315 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]; see generally People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Hightower
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
“Flight alone is insufficient to justify pursuit because an individual has a right to be let alone and refuse to respond to police inquiry” (People v Riddick, 70 AD3d 1421, 1422 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 14 NY3d 844 [2010]; see People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 590-591 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Hightower
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
“Flight alone is insufficient to justify pursuit because an individual has a right to be let alone and refuse to respond to police inquiry” (People v Riddick, 70 AD3d 1421, 1422 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 14 NY3d 844 [2010]; see People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 590-591 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]).
discussed Cited "see" HIGHTOWER, DARREN, PEOPLE v
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
“Flight alone is insufficient to justify pursuit because an individual has a right to be let alone and refuse to respond to police inquiry” (People v Riddick, 70 AD3d 1421, 1422 [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 14 NY3d 844 ; see People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 590-591 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
discussed Cited "see" Tompkins v. Cyr (2×)
N.D. Tex. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dep’t of Probation, 632 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 (1980); United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir.1978).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Troche
N.Y. App. Div. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
As this court has recently observed, although evidence of flight alone is insufficient to justify an arrest, "when combined with other indicia of criminal activity, evidence of flight weighs heavily in determining whether probable cause exists to make an arrest” (People v Kelland, 171 AD2d 885 ; see generally, People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ; People v Elliot, 162 AD2d 609, 610 ).
discussed Cited "see" In Re DJ
D.C. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 586 , 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 581 , 408 N.E.2d 908, 910 (person questioned by police may remain silent or walk or run away), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 590 , 66 L.Ed.2d 484 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" In re D.J.
D.C. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 586 , 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 581 , 408 N.E.2d 908, 910 (person questioned by police may remain silent or walk or run away), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 590 , 66 L.Ed.2d 484 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Mingo
N.Y. App. Div. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
It is well settled that "where there are indications of criminal activity, flight from police [is] 'an important factor in determining probable cause’ ” (People v Chapman, 103 AD2d 494, 497 ; see, People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592, cert denied 449 US 1023 ; People v Medina, 107 AD2d 302, 307 ; People v Ortiz, 103 AD2d 303 , supra).
discussed Cited "see" Tantilla v. Stonegate Security Services, Ltd. (In Re Stonegate Security Services, Ltd.)
N.D. Ill. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gormley, 449 U.S. at 1023-24 , 101 S.Ct. at 591-92 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari petition); Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, 716 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.1983), district court opinion aff'd, 723 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc) 2 (holding Texas harassment statute unconstitutionally vague).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Joy
N.Y. App. Div. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
"In evaluating the [initial] police action in light of the combined effect of these factors we conclude that rather than being whimsical it was reasonable” (People v De Bour, supra, at p 220; see, People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
examined Cited "see" Raymond Wayne Hill v. The City of Houston, Texas (4×)
5th Cir. · 1985 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Department of Probation, 632 F.2d 938 , 942 n. 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 (1980); Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 , 96 S.Ct. 208 , 46 L.Ed.2d 136 (1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Williams
nycountyct · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence low
In any event, defendant’s act of tossing the dark object was an independent act not precipitated by improper police conduct, and reasonably begets the exclusive inference that he consciously intended to relinquish it, and, in so doing, surrendered any privacy interest in it (see generally Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99 ; see also People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 593 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1023 [1980]; People v Boodle, 47 NY2d 398, 404 [1979], cert denied 444 US 969 [1979]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. SCOTT LaFONTAINE (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence low
The statute proscribes conduct, *557 not the content of the telephone calls.”); State v. Anonymous (1978-4), 34 Conn. Sup. 689 , 696, 389 A.2d 1270 (1978) (“it is the manner and means employed to communicate [the messages] which is the subject of the prohibition rather than their content”); see also Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dept. of Probation, 632 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S. Ct. 591 , 66 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Charles (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
Ed. 2d 830 (1973); see also Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dept. of Probation, 632 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S. Ct. 591 , 66 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Hanks
N.Y. App. Div. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
We reject the contention of defendant that the court erred in determining that he abandoned the car and therefore lacked standing to challenge the inventory search (see, People v Strunkey, 202 AD2d 610, 611-612 ; see also, People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592-593 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Murphy (2×)
Conn. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
General Statutes § 53a-183 (a) (2) prohibits communications by mail that are made “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm” and “in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm . . . .” Thus, § 53a-183 (a) (2) proscribes harassing conduct via mail and does not seek to regulate the content of communications made by mail. 16 State v. Snyder, 49 Conn. App. 617, 625 , 717 A.2d 240 (1998); see also Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dept. of Probation, 632 F.2d 938, 942 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S. Ct. 591 , 66 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Hendrickson (2×)
Pa. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Gormley v. Director, Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 (1980); State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31 , 896 P.2d 357 (1995); McKillop v. State, 857 P.2d 358 (Alaska App.1993); People v. Hernandez, 231 Cal.App.3d 1376 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 81 (1991). 4 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Ross
N.Y. App. Div. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
“Flight alone * * * or even in conjunction with equivocal circumstances that might justify a police request for information (see, People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 190 ; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 218-220 ), is insufficient to justify pursuit because an individual has a right To be let alone’ and refuse to respond to police inquiry (see, People v May, 81 NY2d 725, 727-728 )” (P eople v Holmes, 81 NY2d 1056, 1058 ; see also, People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ; People v Hooper, 245 AD2d 1020 ; People v Hope, 237 AD2d 885 , lv denied 90 NY2d 859 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Shack
NY · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
The statute is narrowly drafted and furthers the State’s compelling interest in protecting its citizens from "persons who employ the telephone, not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives” (United States v Lampley, 573 F2d 783, 787; see also, Gormley v Director, Conn. State Dept. of Probation, 632 F2d 938, 941, cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Roesch, No. Cr94-87735 (Jun. 6, 1995) (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
Cox v. Louisiana, supra; Giboney v. Empire Storage Ice Co., supra; State v. Culmo, supra, 73; see Mozzochi v. Borden, supra, 1175 (criminal prosecution in response to threatening behavior is not repugnant to the first amendment); see also Gormley v. Director, 632 F.2d 938 , 942 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 (1980) ( first amendment violation not established where speech is not a component of the statutory violation).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Pagan
N.Y. App. Div. · 1994 · signal: compare · confidence low
The observation of a gun in the waistband of one of defendant’s companions justified the officers’ suspicion that their physical safety was endangered so as to implicate the corollary statutory right to frisk the suspects for weapons (CPL 140.50 [3]; People v Benjamin, 51 NY2d 267, 271 ; compare, People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 590 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." McKillop v. State (2×)
Alaska Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Gormley v. Director, Connecticut Dept. of Probation, 632 F.2d 938, 942 (2nd Cir.1980), ce rt. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 ; State v. Gattis, 730 P.2d at 502 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lawrence Shackelford v. Jack Shirley, Sheriff, Lee County, Mississippi (2×)
5th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
Likewise, the court in United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir.1978), in upholding the federal telephone harassment statute, 47 U.S.C. § 223 , against constitutional attack, noted that the statute’s “narrow intent requirement precludes the proscription of mere communication.” Id. at 787; see also Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dep’t of Probation, 632 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 (1980) (rejecting first amendment challenge to Connecticut telephone harassment statute in habeas corpus appeal); State v. Thompson, 701 …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Encarnacion
N.Y. App. Div. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
However, the search and seizure of the bag are justifiable pursuant to a different exception to the warrant requirements: the doctrine which permits warrantless searches of abandoned property (see, Abel v United States, 362 US 217 ; Hester v United States, 265 US 57 ; see also, People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ; People v Braithwaite, 172 AD2d 548 ; People v Kosciusko, 149 AD2d 620 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Perkins v. Commonwealth
Va. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978)(constitutionality of federal statute prohibiting harassing interstate telephone calls upheld); see also Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dep’t of Probation, 632 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980)(upholding Connecticut telephone harassment statute); *15 State v. Elder, 382 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1980).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Grant
N.Y. App. Div. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
(People v Boodle, supra, at 404 ; see also, People v Graham, 149 AD2d 588 , in which the court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress a glove which he dropped as he entered a police car about four minutes after he was approached by the police.) Defendant’s reliance on People v Howard ( 50 NY2d 583 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ) is misplaced.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Campbell
N.Y. App. Div. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
The fact that defendant appeared startled at the sight of the officers and began to walk away is "innocuous behavior [which] will not generate a founded or reasonable suspicion that a crime is at hand” (People v De Bour, supra, at 216; see also, People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Bloomfield
N.Y. App. Div. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
When the police officers saw the defendant and his companion pushing a stereo rack containing stereo components in a high-crime area known to be the scene of many burglaries, the officers properly made a minimally intrusive inquiry with respect to the ownership of the property (see, People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 222-223 ; People v Medina, 107 AD2d 302 ; see also, People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 589-590 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Gonzalez
N.Y. App. Div. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
While the circumstances justified the initial stop and the inquiry, there was nothing to render permissible any greater level of intrusion (see, People v McNatt, 65 NY2d 1046 , 1048; see also, People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 590 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ).
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Thorne (4×)
W. Va. · 1985 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Anonymous, 34 Conn.Supp. 689 , 389 A.2d 1270 , appeal denied, 174 Conn. 803 , 382 A.2d 1332 (1978), denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus aff'd, Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dept. of Probation, 632 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 (1980); Von Lusch v. State, 39 Md.App. 517 , 387 A.2d 306 (1978); People v. Taravella, 133 Mich.App. 515 , 350 N.W.2d 780 (1984); State v. Camp, 59 N.C.App. 38 , 295 S.E.2d 766 , appeal dismissed, 307 N.C. 271 , 299 S.E.2d 216 (1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Bellamy (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
Ed. 2d 124 (1971); see also Gormley v. Connecticut Department of Adult Probation, 632 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S. Ct. 591 , 66 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Burgos
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, cases collected in the majority and dissent opinions in United States v. Boswell, 347 A. 2d 270 (D.C.App. 1975), and People v. Howard, 50 N.Y. 2d 583 , 430 N.Y.S. 2d 578 , 408 N.E. 2d 908 (Ct.App. 1980), cert. den. 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 590 , 66 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1980).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Young
Wash. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
Ed. 2d 357 , 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979) (invalidating *423 Texas statute making it a crime to refuse to identify self on policeman's request); see also People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 590-91 , 408 N.E.2d 908, 913 , 430 N.Y.S.2d 578 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 , 66 L.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Gormley
v.
Director, Connecticut State Department of Adult Probation, Et Al.
80-5134.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 1, 1980.
449 U.S. 1023
White.
Cited by 38 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice WHITE, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice White,

dissenting.

Under Connecticut law, a person is guilty of a misdemeanor when “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-183 (a) (3) (1975 rev.). Petitioner was convicted of violating this statute after she made a telephone call to a woman with whom she had some personal quarrel. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal in the state courts,[1] petitioner brought a federal habeas corpus action arguing that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no constitutional infirmity. The petition for certiorari challenges that judgment.

To be sure, a State has a valid interest in protecting its citizens against unwarranted invasions of privacy. Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U. S. 728 (1970). See generally Note, Give Me a Home Where No Salesmen Phone: Telephone Solicitation and the First Amendment, 7 Hastings Const. L. Q. 129 (1979). This is especially true when unprotected speech, such as obscenity or threats of physical violence, is involved. But it is equally clear that a State may not pursue these interests by unduly infringing on what would[*1024] otherwise be protected speech. It is therefore critical to recall that speech may be “annoying” without losing its First Amendment protection[2] and that the Connecticut statute on its face criminalizes any telephone call that annoys and was intended to do so. It is not difficult to imagine various clearly protected telephone communications that would fall within the ban of the Connecticut statute.[3] As such it is fairly arguable that the statute is substantially overbroad and hence unconstitutional. Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972).[4]

Beyond the obvious tension between our prior cases and the judgment below is the difference in opinion among those courts that have considered constitutional challenges to similar state statutes. Contrary to the decision reached by the[*1025] Court of Appeals in this case, state appellate courts have invalidated substantially equivalent .provisions as being unconstitutionally overbroad. People v. Klick, 66 Ill. 2d 269, 362 N. E. 2d 329 (1977) (invalidating statute making it a crime for anyone who “[w]ith intent to annoy another, makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation thereby ensues”); State v. Dronso, 90 Wis. 2d 149, 279 N. W. 2d 710 (Ct. App. 1979) (same). Another court has invalidated a like statute on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague. State v. Blair, 287 Ore. 519, 601 P. 2d 766 (1979) (statute made it a crime to communicate by telephone “in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm” to the receiver). On the other hand, various state courts, like the Connecticut court in this case, have rejected overbreadth challenges to telephone harassment statutes. See, e. g., State v. Elder, 382 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1980) (statute prohibiting a person from making a telephone call “whether or not conversation ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called number”); Constantino v. State, 243 Ga. 595, 255 S. E. 2d 710 (1979) (prohibiting repeated telephoning “for the purpose of annoying, harassing or molesting another or his family”). See generally United States v. Lampley, 573 F. 2d 783 (CA3 1978); People v. Smith, 89 Misc. 2d 789, 392 N. Y. S. 2d 968 (1977). The above cases demonstrate that the state courts are not in agreement concerning application of First Amendment principles in this area of the law.

The foregoing suggests that even if the Court is of the view that the judgment below is correct, there is sufficient reason to grant certiorari and issue a judgment to this effect. Accordingly, I dissent.

1

On direct appeal in the state courts, the First Amendment argument presented here was raised in and rejected by the Appellate Session of the Superior Court, State v. Anonymous, 34 Conn. Supp. 689, 389 A. 2d 1270, appeal denied, 174 Conn. 803, 382 A. 2d 1332 (1978).

2

Norwell v. Cincinnati, 414 U. S. 14 (1973); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615-616 (1971). See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).

3

For example, the Supreme Court of Illinois found that a similar statute risked criminal prosecution for a variety of situations involving protected speech.

“Conceivably, this section could make criminal a single telephone call made by a consumer who wishes to express his dissatisfaction over the performance of a product or service; a call by a businessman disturbed with another’s failure to perform a contractual obligation; by an irate citizen, perturbed with the state of public affairs, who desires to express his opinion to a public official; or by an individual bickering over family matters.” People v. Klick, 66 Ill. 2d 269, 274, 362 N. E. 2d 329, 331-332 (1977).

4

Given that the overbreadth may be substantial, petitioner has standing to raise the First Amendment claim even if the words she used were unprotected threats of violence. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973). Furthermore, the case was submitted to the jury under an instruction which would have permitted a conviction if petitioner was found to have made either an annoying or threatening call with the requisite intent. The general verdict did not reveal on what ground the conviction rested. Even assuming that the facts could have supported a guilty verdict based on petitioner’s unprotected speech, petitioner may have been convicted for making a merely annoying communication.