(a) A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm another person, and for no legitimate purpose, such person: (1) Communicates with a person by telegraph or mail, electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, electronic mail or text message or any other electronically sent message, whether by digital media account, messaging program or application, or otherwise by computer, computer service or computer network, as defined in section
53a-250, or any other form of communication, in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation or alarm; (2) makes a telephone call or engages in any other form of communication, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation or alarm; or (3) communicates or shares a photograph, video or words or engages in any other form of communication to a digital, electronic, online or other meeting space, in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation or alarm.
(b) For the purposes of this section, such offense may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the communication originated or at the place where it was received.
(c) The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by one or more psychiatrists.
(d) Harassment in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 185; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 44; P.A. 89-103, S. 2; P.A. 90-282, S. 2; P.A. 95-143, S. 2; P.A. 12-114, S. 13; P.A. 21-56, S. 5.)
History: 1971 act substituted “telegraph” for “telephone” in Subsec. (a)(2); P.A. 89-103 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include communicating by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network; P.A. 90-282 changed name of offense to harassment in the second degree; P.A. 95-143 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include communication by computer network; P.A. 12-114 amended Subsec. (b) to substitute “where the communication originated” for “where the telephone call was made” and make technical changes; P.A. 21-56 amended Subsec. (a) by substantially revising existing elements of offense and adding Subdiv. (3) re communicating or sharing a photograph, video or words to a digital, electronic, online or other meeting space.
Cited. 204 C. 4; 209 C. 52.
Cited. 4 CA 520; 5 CA 79; 8 CA 598; 43 CA 527; 44 CA 84. Section applies to communications made by means of a cellular telephone. 117 CA 493.
Cited. 39 CS 428; 43 CS 46. Internet service provider has federal immunity from tort liability for damages related to e-mail sent via provider's service. 46 CS 406.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 223 C. 731. Contrary to prior interpretations, Subsec. prohibits not only harassing or alarming conduct, but offending speech as well, that is not protected by first amendment including, in particular, true threats; defendant did not have fair warning that she could be prosecuted under Subsec. solely on basis of content of her speech, therefore conviction reversed. 310 C. 337.
Subdiv. (3): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647. Cited. 25 CA 503. Subdiv. (2): Section does not require state to prove defendant engaged in a direct communication with the person whom he intended to harass. 40 CA 544. Cited. 41 CA 847; 43 CA 527. Subdiv. (3): Is not unconstitutionally vague either on its face or as applied to defendant's conduct. 46 CA 661. Subdiv. (2): Not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. 49 CA 617. Subdiv. (3): Statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad; statute prohibits purposeful telephone harassment and does not involve first amendment concerns since it proscribes conduct and not the content of calls; section is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's conduct. 55 CA 475, but see 310 C. 337. Criminal violation of a protective order pursuant to Sec. 53a-110b and harassment in the second degree pursuant to Subdiv. (3) constitute separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 61 CA 118. Defendant who made 5 phone calls to victim was not placed in double jeopardy for multiple convictions of harassment under section because fact that victim listened to the messages consecutively did not transform defendant's separate offenses into one act or one offense and the phrase “a telephone call” coupled with the phrase “likely to cause annoyance” shows legislative intent to punish each call made with the requisite intent. 93 CA 582. A person's speech during a telephone call may be evidence of the person's intent in physically making the telephone call, but cannot be basis for conviction under section without implicating the person's freedom of speech rights; it is the physical act of placing the call and causing a ring at the receiving end that constitutes the actus reus under Subdiv. (3). 120 CA 330, but see 310 C. 337. Subdiv. (3): Legislature intended the standard of conduct for provision re “annoyance or alarm” to be that perceived as such by a reasonable person operating under contemporary community standards; section unconstitutionally applied to defendant's speech in violation of first amendment re defendant's telephone call to the office of his ex-wife's attorney because the evidence of the harassing manner of defendant's telephone call rested entirely on the content of the speech he conveyed. 128 CA 546. Subdiv. (2): Subdiv. does not unconstitutionally prohibit certain forms of speech protected by first amendment to U.S. Constitution. 155 CA 560. Subdiv. (2): Unconstitutional as applied because conviction was dependent upon content of e-mail, rather than the manner in which it was communicated, therefore violating defendant's right to free speech. Id., 758.
Subdiv. (3): Freedom of speech subject to reasonable regulation of place and manner of exercise; not necessary to limit application of statute to “fighting words”; the prohibition is against purposeful harassment by means of device readily susceptible of abuse; trespasser upon our privacy. 34 CS 689.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
85
cases (
12 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case:
State v. Orr, 969 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2009).
State v. Orr, 969 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 30× “The defendant, John Dean Orr, appeals [1] from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a)(3). [2] The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court improperly: (1)…”
State v. Moulton, 991 A.2d 728 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
· cites it 64× “I The defendant first claims that her conviction for harassment must be reversed because the application of the harassment statute, § 53a-183 (a)(3), to her telephone conversation implicated her first amendment rights.”
State v. Buhl, 138 A.3d 868 (Conn. 2016).
· cites it 12× “The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged, relevant to these appeals, with breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a)(4), and harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a)(2).”
State v. Reed, 169 A.3d 326 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 28× “2d 60 , in consideration of violation of § 53a-183 [a][2] ); State v. Murphy , 254 Conn.”
State v. Winter, 979 A.2d 608 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 17× “In conjunction with that claim, the defendant also asserts that his arrest on the 2003 charge of criminal violation of the protective order was invalid because the statute proscribing harassment in the second degree, General Statutes § 53a-183, with which he also had been…”
State v. Snyder, 717 A.2d 240 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
· cites it 22× “The defendant, Van Snyder, appeals from the judgment of conviction, following the denial of his motion to dismiss and the entry of a nolo contendere plea, 1 of harassment in the second degree in violation *619 of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a) (2). 2 On appeal, the defendant…”
State v. Hopkins, 772 A.2d 657 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
· cites it 12× “Hopkins, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 and threatening in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62.”
State v. Cummings, 701 A.2d 663 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
· cites it 11× “The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of stalking in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181c (a) (2), stalking in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181d, two counts of harassment in the…”
State v. Murphy, 757 A.2d 1125 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 17× “Muiphy III, guilty of one count of criminal attempt to commit harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-183 (a) (2) 1 and 53a-49, 2 and, *563 subsequently, also found the defendant guilty of being a persistent offender under General Statutes §…”
State v. Snyder, 672 A.2d 535 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
· cites it 22× “The state appeals 1 from the judgments 2 rendered by the trial court, following the court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the informa-tions charging him with five counts of harassment in the second degree 3 in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a) (2). 4…”
State v. Fagan, 905 A.2d 1101 (Conn. 2006).
· cites it 4× “As a result of the defendant's conduct in the early morning hours of July 28, 2003, he was charged, in part A of a two part information, with one count of second degree harassment in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a)(3), one count of criminal violation of a protective…”
State v. Scott Lafontaine, 16 A.3d 1281 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
· cites it 17× “The defendant, Scott LaFontaine, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a) (3). 1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the statute is (1)…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-183(a) — 4 cases
State v. Moulton, 991 A.2d 728 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
“I The defendant first claims that her conviction for harassment must be reversed because the application of the harassment statute, § 53a-183 (a)(3), to her telephone conversation implicated her first amendment rights.”
State v. Reed, 169 A.3d 326 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
“2d 60 , in consideration of violation of § 53a-183 [a][2] ); State v. Murphy , 254 Conn.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-183(a)(2) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-183(a)(3) — 6 cases
State v. Reed, 169 A.3d 326 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
“2d 60 , in consideration of violation of § 53a-183 [a][2] ); State v. Murphy , 254 Conn.”
State v. Moulton, 991 A.2d 728 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
“I The defendant first claims that her conviction for harassment must be reversed because the application of the harassment statute, § 53a-183 (a)(3), to her telephone conversation implicated her first amendment rights.”
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