Norwood v. State, 548 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · Go Syfert
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Norwood v. State, 548 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“sjpecific sentencing provisions prevail over the general recidivist statute at ocga 17-10-7. . . .”
38 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Williams v. State (gactapp, 2009-04-09)
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Williams v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
sjpecific sentencing provisions prevail over the general recidivist statute at ocga 17-10-7. . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
See also Woodard v. State, 256 Ga. App. 464, 465 (1) ( 568 SE2d 528 ) (2002) (“In the context of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, ‘once a defendant requests an attorney, all police-initiated interrogation is prohibited, and any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.’ ”). 13 See McNeil, supra at 178 (Fifth Amendment right to counsel is invoked when suspect makes, “at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interro…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Summers v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508 (1) ( 548 SE2d 478 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
The apparent conflict between the specific sentencing scheme for shoplifting and the general recidivist sentencing scheme is addressed by application of the principle that “a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366, 368 ( 541 SE2d 645 ) (2001); Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508-509 ( 548 SE2d 478 ) (2001).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Stephens v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Citing Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508-509 (2) ( 548 SE2d 478 ) (2001), he contends that the trial court had discretion to sentence him to less than the maximum sentence since OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) provides specific sentencing guidelines for multiple burglary convictions, and as such the enhanced sentencing provisions for repeat offenders pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 would not apply.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2002 · confidence medium
Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366, 368 (1), 541 S.E.2d 645 (2001); Vines v. State, supra. See also Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 509 (2), 548 S.E.2d 478 (2001); Chastain v. State, 231 Ga.App. 225, 228 (4), 498 S.E.2d 792 (1998) ("`(w)here a crime is penalized by a special law, the general provisions of the penal code are not applicable.' [Cits.]"); Stovall v. State, 216 Ga.App. 138, 142 (7), 453 S.E.2d 110 (1995) (the more specific sentencing statute prevailed despite providing a greater punishment).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buckner v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
XII. 12 (Citations omitted.) Burtts v. State, 269 Ga. 402, 403 (3) ( 499 SE2d 326 ) (1998); see Goodroe v. State, 224 Ga. App. 378, 380 (1) ( 480 SE2d 378 ) (1997). 13 Burtts, supra, 269 Ga. at 403 (3). 14 Id. at 403-404 (3). 15 Id. 16 See also Brown v. State, 237 Ga. App. 231, 234-235 (3) ( 517 SE2d 529 ) (1999). 17 139 Ga. App. 820 ( 229 SE2d 685 ) (1976). 18 (Citations omitted.) Id. at 823 (3); accord Wallace v. State, 175 Ga. App. 685, 686 (5) ( 333 SE2d 874 ) (1985); State v. Carter, 175 Ga. App. 38, 39-40 ( 332 SE2d 349 ) (1985). 19 See Bradshaw v. State, 237 Ga. App. 627, 630 (2) ( 516 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cain
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Moreover, because specific sentencing provisions such as OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) prevail over the general recidivist statute at OCGA § 17-10-7, “the general recidivist scheme of OCGA § 17-10-7 will not apply to multiple or repeat convictions under OCGA § 16-7-1 (a) because OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) does not contemplate or permit the applicability of OCGA § 17-10-7.” Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508-509 (2) ( 548 SE2d 478 ) (2001) (citing Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366, 368 ( 541 SE2d 645 ) (2001)).
discussed Cited "see" Goldberg v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508 (2) ( 548 SE2d 478 ) (2001).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Thomas v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Kyles v. State, 254 Ga. 49, 50-51 ( 326 SE2d 216 ) (1985). 11 Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 117 ( 582 SE2d 13 ) (2003). 12 Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U. S. 1, 11 (107 SC 2680, 97 LE2d 1) (1987). 13 Griffin v. State, 266 Ga. 115, 117 (2) ( 464 SE2d 371 ) (1995), overruled in part on other grounds, Washington v. State, 276 Ga. 655, 658 ( 581 SE2d 518 ) (2003). 14 Smith v. State, 214 Ga. App. 631, 632 (2) ( 448 SE2d 906 ) (1994). 15 Weaver v. State, 224 Ga. App. 243, 244 ( 480 SE2d 286 ) (1997). 16 Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508 (1) ( 548 SE2d 478 ) (2001). 17 Summers v. State…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Butler v. State (4×)
Ga. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Norwood v. State, 249 Ga.App. 507 (2), 548 S.E.2d 478 (2001) (enhanced sentencing scheme of OCGA § 16-7-1 prevails over general recidivist scheme of § 17-10-7). [3] The same rule is applicable here—the enhanced sentencing provision of the statute Butler was convicted of violating, OCGA § 16-13-30, prevails over the general recidivist sentencing scheme.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Goldberg v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508-509 (2) ( 548 SE2d 478 ) (2001) (where only prior felony conviction *607 used to enhance defendant’s sentence was one for burglary, trial court erred in utilizing general recidivist statute).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Chambers (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: compare · confidence medium
He was a [six]-time felony offender under the general recidivist provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 (a).” Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564, 565 ( 578 SE2d 179 ) (2003); compare Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508-509 (2) ( 548 SE2d 478 ) (2001) (where the only prior felony conviction used to enhance the defendant’s sentence was one for burglary, the trial court erred in applying sentence under general recidivist statute).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Norwood
v.
the State
A01A0515.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
May 7, 2001.
548 S.E.2d 478
William E. Whitaker, for appellant., Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, Scott T. Poole, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Miller, Sentence, Andrews, Eldridge.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 87%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (1)
Miller, Judge.

Indicted as a recidivist in the Superior Court of Cherokee County, Alvin Norwood, also known as Rogers Hamilton, was charged with a single count of burglary. On March 20, 2000, with the assistance of counsel, Norwood entered a nonnegotiated guilty plea “to all counts of the indictment” and was sentenced to serve 20 years without parole. On appeal, he enumerates the denial of his motion in autrefois convict and the imposition of the 20-year sentence. We affirm his conviction but vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

1. Norwood filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that he had already pleaded guilty in Cobb County to a charge of burglary allegedly involving the same conduct and same property for which he was charged in Cherokee County.

The special presentment in this case alleged Norwood entered the dwelling of Linda Tabor in Woodstock, without permission and with the intent to commit a theft therein. The Cobb County indictment alleged that Norwood burglarized two dwellings on George Busbee Parkway in Cobb County. Norwood pleaded guilty in Cobb Superior Court to one count of burglary and a reduced count of theft by receiving. The factual basis for that plea was that residents of an apartment complex in the Cobb County portion of George Busbee Parkway reported two males carrying furniture and belongings out of one of the apartments and loading them into a U-Haul truck. Within moments, police spotted a U-Haul truck, and when the patrol activated their blue lights, a high-speed chase ensued. The driver and passenger tried to flee the truck but were apprehended. Stolen items were located in the back of the truck.

The Cherokee Superior Court found as fact that Cobb County police recovered property from all three burglaries when they searched the U-Haul. [1] Nevertheless, the transcript of the Cobb[*508] County plea hearing makes no mention of Tabor or the burglary of her Woodstock residence, nor does it demonstrate that any of her property was included in the stolen items for which Norwood pleaded guilty to theft by receiving.

Where the record shows the accused committed two entirely separate criminal transactions in different counties, though part of a single criminal episode, a guilty plea in one does not bar prosecution for the other by reason of double jeopardy [2] or otherwise authorize a plea of autrefois convict. [3] Here, the Cobb Superior Court’s acceptance of Norwood’s guilty plea to the reduced offense of theft by receiving (arising out of an alleged burglary on George Busbee Parkway in Cobb County) does not amount to a binding determination that someone other than Norwood committed the entirely separate burglary in Woodstock, Cherokee County. The Cherokee Superior Court correctly denied Norwood’s motion to dismiss based on his plea of autrefois convict. [4]

2. Norwood next contends the trial court erred in concluding that, under OCGA § 17-10-7 (a), a 20-year sentence was mandatory. We agree.

“OCGA § 17-10-7 provide [s] for enhanced sentencing of repeat offenders where no other sentencing provision control [s].” [5] OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) provides:

Upon a second conviction for a crime of burglary occurring after the first conviction, a person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two nor more than 20 years. Upon a third conviction for the crime of burglary occurring after the first conviction, a person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years. Adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, probated, deferred, or withheld for any offense punishable under this subsection. [6]
In this case, [OCGA § 16-7-1 (b)] provides a specific sentencing scheme for defendants convicted more than once of [burglary] under [OCGA § 16-7-1 (a)]. For this reason, the general recidivist scheme of [OCGA] § 17-10-7 will [not] apply to[*509] multiple [or repeat] convictions under [OCGA § 16-7-1 (a) because OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) does not contemplate or permit] the applicability of [OCGA] § 17-10-7. [7]
Decided May 7, 2001. William E. Whitaker, for appellant. Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, Scott T. Poole, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Since specific sentencing provisions prevail over the general recidivist statute at OCGA § 17-10-7, [8] we hold the trial court retained the discretion to impose any sentence within the mandatory minimum and the statutory maximum range [9] and is not bound by the provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7. [10] Under OCGA § 16-7-1 (b), for a second burglary as alleged here, that range is imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty years. The trial court erred in imposing a mandatory 20-year sentence. Accordingly, we vacate that sentence and remand for resentencing in the exercise of the court’s enlightened discretion. [11]

3. Remaining contentions have been considered and are found to be without merit.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.

Sentence vacated and case remanded for resentencing. Andrews, P. J, and Eldridge, J., concur.
1

In its notice of intent to present similar transactions, the State asserted that the Cherokee burglary was committed only hours before the Cobb burglaries and that the property stolen in the Cherokee burglary was recovered from the U-Haul.

2

Potts V. State, 261 Ga. 716, 720 (1) (b) (410 SE2d 89) (1991).

3

Cooper v. State, 253 Ga. 736, 737 (2) (325 SE2d 137) (1985). Compare Clark v. State, 144 Ga. App. 69, 70 (240 SE2d 270) (1977) (where defendant pleaded guilty in Gwinnett County to theft by receiving a stolen check-writing machine, that amounted to a binding determination that some other party actually stole the machine and estopped the State from prosecuting Clark in Fulton County for the burglary in which the machine was stolen).

4

See Maxey v. State, 239 Ga. App. 638, 640 (2) (521 SE2d 673) (1999).

5

(Citations omitted.) Mikell v. State, 270 Ga. 467, 468 (510 SE2d 523) (1999).

6

(Emphasis supplied.)

7

Mann a State, 273 Ga. 366, 368 (1) (541 SE2d 645) (2001).

9

Mann v. State, 240 Ga. App. 809, 810 (1) (a) (524 SE2d 763) (1999), aff’d, Mann v. State, supra, 273 Ga. at 368 (1).

10

Mikell v. State, supra, 270 Ga. at 469.

11

Moton v. State, 242 Ga. App. 397, 400 (3) (b) (530 SE2d 31) (2000). Accord Mikell v. State, supra, 270 Ga. at 468-469.