Conservatorship of Justin R., 662 A.2d 232 (Me. 1995). · Go Syfert
Conservatorship of Justin R., 662 A.2d 232 (Me. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guardianship of Donovan C. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Me. · 2019 · confidence medium
See In re Sterling N. , 673 A.2d at 1314-15 ; Guardianship of Zachary Z. , 677 A.2d 550 , 553 (Me. 1996) ; Conservatorship of Justin R. , 662 A.2d at 234 (Me. 1995) ; In re Krystal S. , 584 A.2d 672 , 674 n.6 (Me. 1991) (citing with approval Title 22's definition of abandonment in a guardianship action involving suspension of parental rights by circumstances of abandonment). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re DIS
Colo. · 2011 · confidence medium
Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act (1997) § 202, 8A ULA 301, 333 cmt. (2003) (stating that in reviewing a petition for confirmation of appointment of a standby guardian, the court must assess "the powers to be given the guardian," and "if an unlimited guardianship" is formed, "why a limited guardianship would not work"); Id. at 341 cmt. (referring to the duties and responsibilities of a guardian, regardless of "whether the guardianship of the minor ward is limited or unlimited, it is essential that the minor be involved in decision making"). [4] See In re Guardianship of Ann S., 45 Cal…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sidman v. Sidman
Colo. · 2011 · confidence medium
See In re Guardianship of Ann S., 45 Cal.4th 1110 , 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 701 , 202 P.3d 1089, 1098 (2009) (recognizing that once a court appoints a guardian, the authority of the parent "ceases" and parental rights are completely suspended); Conservatorship of Justin R., 662 A.2d 232, 234 (Me.1995) (recognizing that probate court may appoint a guardian for a minor if all "parental rights of custody have been terminated or suspended"); In re Guardianship of Copenhaver, 124 Idaho 888 , 865 P.2d 979, 983 (1993) (observing that whether a guardianship should exist depends, in part, on if "parental rights…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Dis
Colo. · 2011 · confidence medium
Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act (1997) § 202, 8A ULA 301, 333 cmt. (2003) (stating that in reviewing a petition for confirmation of appointment of a standby guardian, the court must assess "the powers to be given the guardian," and "if an unlimited guardianship" is formed, "why a limited guardianship would not work"); Id. at 341 cmt. (referring to the duties and responsibilities of a guardian, regardless of "whether the guardianship of the minor ward is limited or unlimited, it is essential that the minor be involved in decision making"). [4] See In re Guardianship of Ann S., 45 Cal…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rideout v. Riendeau (2×)
Me. · 2000 · confidence medium
Id. 530 U.S. at ___ , 120 S.Ct. at 2061 ; Conservatorship of Justin R., 662 A.2d 232, 234-35 (Me.1995) (affirming a denial of the grandparent's guardianship petition in the absence of parental unfitness); Stanley v. Penley, 142 Me. 78 , 46 A.2d 710, 712 (1946) (declining to award custody of children to maternal grandparents when father was fit and present).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guardianship of Zachary Z.
Me. · 1996 · confidence medium
The Probate Court as a court of limited jurisdiction is authorized to issue a guardianship decree only after the court finds parental rights terminated or suspended. 18-A M.R.S.A. §§ 5-204, 5-207(b) (1981); Conservatorship of Justin R., 662 A.2d 232, 234 (Me.1995).
discussed Cited "see" Guardianship of Jakob A. Gionest
Me. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conservatorship of Justin R., 662 A.2d 232, 234 (Me.1995). [¶6] Contrary to Sharon’s assertions, the court properly applied the correct legal test according to the correct standard of proof by explicitly evaluating, to the clear and convincing standard, first, whether Jessica is a fit parent, and second, whether the award of guardianship is in the best interest of the child.
cited Cited "see" In Re Amberley D.
Me. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conservatorship of Justin R., 662 A.2d 232, 234 (Me.1995) (citing Estate of Paine, 609 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Me.1992)).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Sterling N.
Me. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conservatorship of Justin R., 662 A.2d 232, 234 (Me.1995) (affirming court’s finding that petitioners had failed to meet burden of proof to establish mother’s parental rights of custody suspended by circumstances); In Re Krystal S., 584 A.2d 672, 675 (Me.1991) (having determined mother’s parental rights of custody to minor child had not been suspended by circumstances, the court exceeded its authority by imposing on mother requirement that she foster a relationship between child and unsuccessful petitioner and that petitioner have reasonable rights of contact with child).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CONSERVATORSHIP OF JUSTIN R. Et Al.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Jul 27, 1995.
662 A.2d 232
Melissa Moll, Hale & Hamlin, Ellsworth, for petitioners., Joseph T. Walsh, Jr., Bangor, for respondents.
Wathen, Roberts, Glassman, Clifford, Rudman, Dana, Lipez.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
[*233] DANA, Justice.

Freda 0. and Laurence E. Reynolds, paternal grandparents of twins, Justin and Joshua Reynolds, appeal from judgments entered in the Hancock County Probate Court (.Patterson, J.) dismissing their petitions to be appointed guardians and conservators of the twins and appointing the twins’ mother, Beatrice Reynolds Valenzuela, as conservator for Justin. Beatrice cross-appeals the court’s appointment of the grandparents as conservators for Joshua. We affirm the judgments.

Facts

Beatrice and Laurence S. Reynolds married in February 1989. At the time both were serving on active duty in the Army. Beatrice had a three-year-old son, Randy, by a previous marriage. Justin and Joshua were born in July 1989 while the couple was stationed in Germany.

Laurence and Beatrice separated for a ten-month period in 1990 during which period the children all resided with Beatrice. Because of the possibility of being deployed in support of the Gulf War, the couple took the three children to stay with Beatrice’s mother in California. In June 1991 the twins visited them grandparents in Maine before returning to their parents in Germany. When the couple separated again in August 1991, Randy stayed with Beatrice and the twins stayed with Laurence. The twins went to live with their grandparents in Maine in February 1992. Laurence was discharged from the Army later that month and returned to Maine to live with his sons and his parents.

In 1992 Beatrice was transferred to California. In October the twins came to visit her and stayed with her for two months. In December Beatrice and Laurence entered into a marital settlement agreement providing for the joint legal custody of the twins, but with Laurence having primary physical custody of them. The agreement also gave Beatrice the right to visit the twins at all reasonable times and obligated her to pay child support of $800 per month and provide medical and dental insurance. A judgment of divorce was entered in April 1993 incorporating this agreement. Thereafter and until the time of the events giving rise to the instant petitions, Beatrice’s only contact with the twins was a few telephone calls and the sending of gifts at birthdays and Christmas.

Following her discharge from the Army, Beatrice moved to Las Vegas where she eventually secured a job, remarried, and purchased a house. In the spring of 1994, Beatrice arranged for the twins to fly to Las Vegas and visit her for three weeks in June.

On May 19, 1994, Laurence was killed in a motorcycle accident. Laurence had a $200,-000 life insurance policy. In what the parties believe to have been a mistake, the policy named Justin as the principal beneficiary and Joshua as a contingent beneficiary instead of a co-beneficiary. The grandparents obtained an order appointing themselves temporary guardians of the twins and filed petitions seeking to be appointed guardians and conservators pursuant to 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-207(b) (1981).

The Probate Court held a hearing on July 12 at which the grandmother and mother testified. Although the court indicated that the grandparents had failed to meet then-burden of proving a suspension of Beatrice’s parental rights, it continued the appointment of the grandparents as temporary guardians until a further non-testimonial hearing could be held at which the parties could make their arguments. During the interim period Beatrice filed petitions seeking to be appointed conservator for the twins and the grandparents had the twins examined by R. Maxwell Goode, a licensed clinical social worker. Goode drafted a report recommending that the grandparents rear the twins and the grandparents filed a motion requesting that the court “consider Mr. Goode’s testimony regarding the best interest of the children prior to rendering its decision.”

The court denied the motion on the ground that the issue of the best interests of the children does not arise in this case unless Beatrice’s parental rights were terminated by circumstances. After a further hearing the court entered orders denying the grandparents’ petitions for guardianship. Citing a potential conflict of interest between the twins with respect to the insurance policy,[*234] the court appointed Beatrice as Justin’s conservator and the grandparents as conservators for Joshua. We consolidated the appeals that followed.

Guardianship

“A minor’s parents are its natural guardians and the law commits the care and custody of the child to them.” In re Krystal S., 584 A.2d 672, 674 (Me.1991). The Probate Court, however, “may appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor if all parental rights of custody have been terminated or suspended by circumstances or prior court order.” 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204 (1981).

The grandparents first contend that the court erred in finding that they failed to prove that Beatrice’s parental rights had been “terminated or suspended by circumstances.” Specifically, they argue that Beatrice’s parental rights were suspended because she abandoned the twins. “ ‘Abandonment’ means any conduct on the part of the parent showing an intent to forego parental duties or relinquish parental claims.” 22 M.R.S.A. § 4002(1-A) (1992). [1] On a direct appeal from the Probate Court, we review that court’s findings for clear error. Estate of Paine, 609 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Me.1992). Because the grandparents had the burden of proof, they must establish on appeal that the evidence before the Probate Court compelled the court to find that Beatrice’s parental rights had been terminated or suspended. In re Krystal S., 584 A.2d at 673.

The record in this case reveals that Beatrice agreed to allow Laurence to have primary physical custody of the twins and that she has been geographically separated from them. On the other hand, it was undisputed that she made child support payments and that, prior to Laurence’s death, the parties had arranged for the twins to visit her for three weeks in June 1994. Moreover, Beatrice testified that she never intended to abandon the twins and had agreed to allow Laurence to have custody of them because she had custody of her other son, Randy. Based on the evidence before it, the court was not compelled to find that Beatrice intended to forego parental duties or relinquish parental claims to the twins.

The grandparents next argue that the court should have considered Goode’s report in order to determine whether an alternative custody arrangement should have been implemented pursuant to 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-207(b). [2] Contrary to them contention, section 5-207(b) does not authorize the Probate Court to fashion “an alternative custody arrangement” without first finding a termination or suspension of parental rights. See In re James John L., 601 A.2d 630, 631-32 (Me.1992); In re Krystal S., 584 A.2d at 673 n. 4, 674-75. See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

There is no dispute that Goode’s testimony addresses the sole issue of the best interests of the twins. Because this issue is not relevant to the issue of whether Beatrice’s parental rights had been suspended, it was not error for the court to refuse to consider Goode’s testimony when ruling on the threshold issue of the suspension of parental rights.

[*235] Conservatorship

Both parties appeal the court’s decision to appoint Beatrice as conservator for one twin and the grandparents as conservators for the other twin. When appointing a conservator for a minor, the Probate Court must consider the parent of the child before the child’s grandparents. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-410(a)(5)-(6) (1981). “The court, for good cause, may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having less priority or no priority.” Id. § 5-410(b).

The potential conflict between the twins with respect to determining the proper payment of benefits pursuant to the insurance policy is apparent. The policy on its face names Justin the sole beneficiary. The parties agreed that this result was not Laurence’s intention and they anticipate an action to declare that the proceeds be paid to the twins as co-beneficiaries. This potential conflict constitutes good cause to pass over Beatrice and appoint the grandparents as conservators for Joshua. Contrary to the grandparents’ contentions, the record does not compel a finding that there was good cause to pass over Beati’ice with respect to both twins.

The entry is:

Judgments affirmed.

All concurring.

1

. The intent to forego parental duties or relinquish parental claims may be evidenced by:

A. Failure, for a period of at least one year, to communicate meaningfully with the child;
B. Failure, for a period of at least one year, to maintain regular visitation with the child;
C. Failure to participate in any plan or program designed to reunite the parent with the child;
D. Deserting the child without affording means of identifying the child and his parent or custodian;
E. Failure to respond to notice of child protective proceedings; or
F.Any other conduct indicating an intent to forego parental duties or relinquish parental claims.

22 M.R.S.A. § 4002(1-A) (1992).

2

. The statute provides:

Upon hearing, if the court finds that a qualified person seeks appointment, venue is proper, the required notices have been given, the requirements of section 5-204 have been met, and the welfare and best interests of the minor will be served by the requested appointment, it shall make the appointment. In other cases the court may dismiss the proceedings, or make any other disposition of the matter that will best serve the interest of the minor.