clear and convincing standard in Maine

2009Thus, punitive damages are not recoverable for gross negligence or reckless I "In order to persuade a fact-finder by a clear and convincing standard of proof, the party with the burden must convince the fact-finder that the truth of the asserted factual contentions is 'highly probable.' Batchelder v. Realty Resources Hospitality, LLC, 2007 ME 17 , Cj[13 n.6, 914 A.2d 1116 , 1121 n.6, citing Taylor v. Comm'r ofMental Health & Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139, 152 (Me. 1984). 5 indifference.

2007In order to persuade a fact-finder by a clear and convincing standard of proof, the party with the burden must convince the fact-finder that the truth of the asserted factual contentions is “highly probable." Taylor v. Comm'r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139, 152 (Me.1984).

2008The clear and convincing standard "was first applied in equity to claims which experience had shown to be inherently subject to fabrication, lapse of memory, or the flexibility of conscience." Id. ("fears that innovative plaintiffs would fabricate equitable claims regarding documents to avoid restrictions at law were the impetus for adoption of a higher proof requirement at equity in Maine") (citations omitted).

2007See, e.g., Ballard v. Wag *1125 ner, 2005 ME 86, ¶ 19 , 877 A.2d 1088, 1089 (upholding an award of punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence in a work-related defamation claim against a union president); Gayer v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 687 A.2d 617, 622 (Me.1996) (applying the clear and convincing standard to apprentices’ requests for punitive damages based on claims against their former employers). [¶ 25] Adoption of a higher standard of proof is necessary “to meet the degree of confidence our society thinks [the factfin-der] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions invol

2020See State v. Twardus, 2013 ME 74, ¶¶ 29-30 , 72 A.3d 523 . [¶9] Peaslee was sentenced to sixty years in prison6 and, thereafter, timely appealed. 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2020); M.R.

2020See State v. Twardus, 2013 ME 74, ¶¶ 29-30 , 72 A.3d 523 . [¶9] Peaslee was sentenced to sixty years in prison6 and, thereafter, timely appealed. 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2020); M.R.

2019See In re Children of Bradford W. , 2019 ME 15 , ¶¶ 8-9, 200 A.3d 1256 .

2019See In re Children of Bradford W., 2019 ME 15, ¶¶ 8-9 , --- A.3d ---. 8 [¶10] The father also argues that his killing of the mother cannot be considered “heinous and abhorrent” according to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1-A)(A) or otherwise form the basis of his parental unfitness because he has yet to be convicted of murder.

2018See In re Child of James R. , 2018 ME 50 , ¶¶ 11, 22-23, 182 A.3d 1252 .

2018See In re Child of James R. , 2018 ME 50 , ¶¶ 11, 22-23, 182 A.3d 1252 .

2018See In re M.C. , 2014 ME 128 , ¶ 8, 104 A.3d 139 .

2018See In re M.C. , 2014 ME 128 , ¶ 8, 104 A.3d 139 .

2019At issue in this case is the consideration of factual findings, not evidence. 6 may take judicial notice of prior findings in a termination proceeding, it must independently assess all facts presented and must be confident to a clear and convincing standard that the evidence taken as a whole is sufficient to meet the strict statutory prerequisites for terminating parental rights.” Id. [¶8] That standard was met in Scott S. when the trial court heard evidence of the mother’s continuing inability to protect her children from jeopardy.

2014See In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 19 , 775 A.2d 1144 . [¶40] Nevertheless, because this is our first articulation of the force and duration of the consequences of de facto parenthood, and our first announcement 18 As noted earlier, the parental rights and responsibilities action involving the child’s biological parents, Moore and Hague, was consolidated with Pitts’s de facto parenthood action, and Hague actually participated in and testified during the consolidated hearing.

2013See In re David H., 637 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Me.1994).

1994“The clear and convincing standard requires us to review the evidence to determine whether the District Court could reasonably have been persuaded that the required factual findings were proved to be highly probable.” Id.

2007To further serve this goal of “avoiding an overbroad application of the doctrine of punitive damages,” we held that punitive damages must be proved by a clear and convincing standard of proof. 6 Id. at 1362-63 .

1993Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1363 (Me.1985).

2004In re Elijah R., 620 A.2d 282, 284 (Me.1993) (citations omitted). [¶ 22] Central to both parents’ challenge is the fact that a rehabilitation and reunification plan was never established as to *202 William during the nineteen-month period between the entry of the jeopardy order and the entry of the termination order.

1994Id.

2003We are not convinced that the court misunderstood or misapplied the clear and convincing standard, see id., and we will not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court.

2001We have specifically stated in will contest cases, however, that “[ujndue influence must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” Estate of Langley, 586 A.2d 1270, 1271 (Me.1991) (citing Estate of Dodge, 576 A.2d 755, 757 (Me.1990)).

2002The United States Supreme Court, in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), established that termination proceedings must be guided by the clear and convincing standard because “at the fact-finding, the interests of the child and his natural parents coincide to favor use of error-reducing procedures.” The severity and irrevoca-bility of a termination requires procedures that engender accurate and impartial fact-finding.

2002The United States Supreme Court, in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), established that termination proceedings must be guided by the clear and convincing standard because “at the fact-finding, the interests of the child and his natural parents coincide to favor use of error-reducing procedures.” The severity and irrevoca-bility of a termination requires procedures that engender accurate and impartial fact-finding.

2021See, e.g., Nguyen v. Dep 't ofHealth, 29 P.3d 689 (Wn. 2001 ).

2019See In re Children of Bradford W. , 2019 ME 15 , ¶¶ 8-9, 200 A.3d 1256 .

2018See Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1377 ; Golan, 310 F.3d at 1371 ; Mikohn Gaming, 165 F.3d at 897 (“In general, a threshold showing of incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either, is required in order to find bad faith in the communication of information about the existence or pendency of patent rights.”). “[B]ad faith is not supported when the information is objectively accurate.” See Dominant Semiconductors, 524 F.3d at 1261 (quotation marks omitted). [¶25] Based on facts not in dispute, Puritan failed to meet its burden.

2018See Globetrotter , 362 F.3d at 1377 ; Golan , 310 F.3d at 1371 ; Mikohn Gaming , 165 F.3d at 897 ("In general, a threshold showing of incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either, is required in order to find bad faith in the communication of information about the existence or pendency of patent rights."). "[B]ad faith is not supported when the information is objectively accurate." See Dominant Semiconductors , 524 F.3d at 1261 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 25] Based on facts not in dispute, Puritan failed to meet its burden.

2018See Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1377 ; Golan, 310 F.3d at 1371 ; Mikohn Gaming, 165 F.3d at 897 (“In general, a threshold showing of incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either, is required in order to find bad faith in the communication of information about the existence or pendency of patent rights.”). “[B]ad faith is not supported when the information is objectively accurate.” See Dominant Semiconductors, 524 F.3d at 1261 (quotation marks omitted). [¶25] Based on facts not in dispute, Puritan failed to meet its burden.

2018See Globetrotter , 362 F.3d at 1377 ; Golan , 310 F.3d at 1371 ; Mikohn Gaming , 165 F.3d at 897 ("In general, a threshold showing of incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either, is required in order to find bad faith in the communication of information about the existence or pendency of patent rights."). "[B]ad faith is not supported when the information is objectively accurate." See Dominant Semiconductors , 524 F.3d at 1261 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 25] Based on facts not in dispute, Puritan failed to meet its burden.

2018See Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1377 ; Golan, 310 F.3d at 1371 ; Mikohn Gaming, 165 F.3d at 897 (“In general, a threshold showing of incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either, is required in order to find bad faith in the communication of information about the existence or pendency of patent rights.”). “[B]ad faith is not supported when the information is objectively accurate.” See Dominant Semiconductors, 524 F.3d at 1261 (quotation marks omitted). [¶25] Based on facts not in dispute, Puritan failed to meet its burden.

2018See Globetrotter , 362 F.3d at 1377 ; Golan , 310 F.3d at 1371 ; Mikohn Gaming , 165 F.3d at 897 ("In general, a threshold showing of incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either, is required in order to find bad faith in the communication of information about the existence or pendency of patent rights."). "[B]ad faith is not supported when the information is objectively accurate." See Dominant Semiconductors , 524 F.3d at 1261 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 25] Based on facts not in dispute, Puritan failed to meet its burden.

2018See In re Caleb M. , 2017 ME 66 , ¶¶ 24-26, 159 A.3d 345 . 4 In fact, the protections afforded a parent are greater in a termination proceeding than in the jeopardy phase of a child protection case, because the clear and convincing standard of proof necessary for termination is greater than the preponderance standard applicable at a jeopardy hearing.

2018See In re Caleb M. , 2017 ME 66 , ¶¶ 24-26, 159 A.3d 345 . 4 In fact, the protections afforded a parent are greater in a termination proceeding than in the jeopardy phase of a child protection case, because the clear and convincing standard of proof necessary for termination is greater than the preponderance standard applicable at a jeopardy hearing.

2017See In re K.M., 2015 ME 79, ¶ 9 , 118 A.3d 812 (“Where the court finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the alternative bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” (quotation marks omitted)); Malenko v. Handrahan, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 25 , 979 A.2d 1269 (“As an appellate court, we seek to avoid answering important statutory and constitutional questions unless the answer is truly necessary to the resolution of the parties’ dispute.”). [¶ 4] Second, the court’s affirmative findings supporting its parental unfitness determination, which it set out in the judgment even

2017See In re K.M., 2015 ME 79, ¶ 9 , 118 A.3d 812 (“Where the court finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the alternative bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” (quotation marks omitted)); Malenko v. Handrahan, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 25 , 979 A.2d 1269 (“As an appellate court, we seek to avoid answering important statutory and constitutional questions unless the answer is truly necessary to the resolution of the parties’ dispute.”). [¶ 4] Second, the court’s affirmative findings supporting its parental unfitness determination, which it set out in the judgment even