green
Positive treatment
Issue: adjudication hearingTX ↗
Issue: sort challengeTX ↗
Issue: direct claimTX ↗
29.6 score
G Cite
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, last quoted 2004 ·
…held from the beginning of deferred adjudication practice that the legislature had meant what it said in article 42.12 5(b)
at p. 606
⚠ not in text
Topic ↗
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980
2003
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 47 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Deidra Lanell Campbell v. State
(2×)
Connolly, 983 S.W.2d at 740 ; Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Williams v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Deidra Lanell Campbell v. State
(2×)
Connolly, 983 S.W.2d at 740 ; Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Williams v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Deidra Lanell Campbell v. State
(2×)
Connolly, 983 S.W.2d at 740 ; Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Williams v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Durgan v. State
(2×)
Id. . 592 S.W.2d 604, 605-06 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). . 608 S.W.2d 924, 927-28 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). . 615 S.W.2d 771, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). . 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). . 826 S.W.2d at 941-42 . .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sanchez v. State
See id. at 740-41 (citing Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (explaining that court of criminal appeals had “held from the beginning of deferred adjudication practice that the Legislature [had] meant what it said in Article 42.12 § 5(b)”)); Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (on appeal of trial court’s decision to revoke probation and adjudicate, even if the appellant’s right to counsel had been violated, the appellant could not use direct appeal as the vehicle with which to seek redress); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App.19…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Harry James Whitney v. State
In fact, a plain reading of the germane section indicates just the opposite.”); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Whitney v. State
(2×)
In fact, a plain reading of the germane section indicates just the opposite.”); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 261-63 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 872 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); De Leon v. State, 797 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no pet.) ("[A] body of decisional law has developed to allow a defendant to raise limited challenges to the trial court’s decision to adjudicate.”). .
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Hogans v. State
(4×)
LEXIS 8927 at *2. [5] TEX.CODE CRIM PROC. art. 42.12, § 5(b). [6] Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.App.1980) ("under the terms of the [deferred adjudication] statute, no appeal may be taken from the hearing in which the trial court determines to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge").
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph Neriz v. State
App. 1992) (defendant not permitted to raise point of error concerning whether his right to counsel had been violated at adjudication hearing); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Javier De La Rosa v. State
App. 1992) (defendant not permitted to raise point of error concerning whether his right to counsel had been violated at adjudication hearing); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vedal Abdul Davis v. State
App. 1992) (explaining that Court of Criminal Appeals had "held from the beginning of deferred adjudication practice that the Legislature [had] meant what it said in Article 42.12, § 5(b)"); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Adrian Luis Fierro v. State
See, e.g., Connolly v. State , 983 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (reiterating what it characterized as the plain meaning of article 42.12, section 5(b) and holding that defendant was not permitted to appeal whether State utilized due diligence); Olowosuko v. State , 826 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (following adjudication of guilt, defendant not permitted to raise points of error related to alleged vagueness of conditions of probation or sufficiency of motion to revoke); Phynes v. State , 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (defendant not permitted to raise point of error co…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Marissa Yvonne Trevino v. State
In fact, a plain reading of the germane section indicates just the opposite."); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Trevino v. State
(2×)
In fact, a plain reading of the germane section indicates just the opposite."); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 261-63 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993), pet. dism'd, improvidently granted, 872 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); De Leon v. State, 797 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no pet.) ("[A] body of decisional law has developed to allow a defendant to raise limited challenges to the trial court's decision to adjudicate."). [11] See, e.g., Earley, 855 S.W.2d at 262-63 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Marissa Yvonne Trevino v. State
In fact, a plain reading of the germane section indicates just the opposite."); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lenard Zane Carson, Sr. v. State
App. 1992) (defendant not permitted to raise point of error concerning whether his right to counsel had been violated at adjudication hearing); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
John Aaron Cox v. State
See Connolly, 983 S.W.2d at 740 -741 (citing Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (explaining that court of criminal appeals had “held from the beginning of deferred adjudication practice that the Legislature [had] meant what it said in Article 42.12 § 5(b)”); Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (on appeal of trial court’s decision to revoke probation and adjudicate, even if the appellant’s right to counsel had been violated, the appellant could not use direct appeal as the vehicle with which to seek redress); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 60…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kendall Glen Dennis v. State
App. 1992) (on appeal of trial court's decision to revoke probation and adjudicate, even if the appellant's right to counsel had been violated, the appellant could not use direct appeal as the vehicle with which to seek redress); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Billy Joe Brown v. State
App. 1992) (on appeal of trial court's decision to revoke probation and adjudicate, even if the appellant's right to counsel had been violated, the appellant could not use direct appeal as the vehicle with which to seek redress); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Alfonso Aguirre-Melero v. State
See, e.g., Connolly v. State , 983 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999)(reiterating what it characterized as the plain meaning of article 42.12, section 5(b) and holding that defendant was not permitted to appeal whether State utilized due diligence); Olowosuko v. State , 826 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992)(following adjudication of guilt, defendant not permitted to raise points of error related to alleged vagueness of conditions of probation or sufficiency of motion to revoke); Phynes v. State , 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992)(defendant not permitted to raise point of error conce…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cecil Ray Madlock v. State
App. 1992) (on appeal of trial court's decision to revoke probation and adjudicate, even if the appellant's right to counsel had been violated, the appellant could not use direct appeal as the vehicle with which to seek redress); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Norman Paul Manziel v. State
App. 1992) (explaining that court of criminal appeals had "held from the beginning of deferred adjudication practice that the Legislature [had] meant what it said in Article 42.12 § 5(b)"); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shirley Ann Howell v. State
App. 1992) (explaining that Court of Criminal Appeals had "held from the beginning of deferred adjudication practice that the Legislature [had] meant what it said in Article 42.12 §5(b)"); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cedric Eugene Rowe v. State
App. 1992) (defendant not permitted to raise point of error concerning whether his right to counsel had been violated at adjudication hearing); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Alberto Isassi v. State
App. 1992) (defendant not permitted to raise point of error concerning whether his right to counsel had been violated at adjudication hearing); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
David Renteria v. State
See, e.g., Connolly v. State , 983 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999)(reiterating what it characterized as the plain meaning of Article 42.12, section 5(b) and holding that defendant was not permitted to appeal whether State utilized due diligence); Olowosuko v. State , 826 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992)(following adjudication of guilt, defendant not permitted to raise points of error related to alleged vagueness of conditions of probation or sufficiency of motion to revoke); Phynes v. State , 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992)(defendant not permitted to raise point of error conce…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Terry Edmund Massey v. State
App. 1992); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert Franklin Caldwell v. State of Texas
App. 1979) (trial court's decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt is one of absolute discretion and is not reviewable); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kamel Nadir Luqman v. State of Texas
App. 1979) (trial court's decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt is one of absolute discretion and is not reviewable); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert Franklin Caldwell v. State of Texas
App. 1979) (trial court's decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt is one of absolute discretion and is not reviewable); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Freddie James Foreman v. State of Texas
App. 1979) (trial court's decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt is one of absolute discretion and is not reviewable); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rodriguez v. State
Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at 661, citing David v. State, 704 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Manuel v. State
(2×)
David v. State, 704 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Connolly v. State
(2×)
In Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), given facts and argument essentially identical to those in Williams v. State, supra, we held again that, “under the terms of the ... statute, no appeal may be taken from the hearing in which the trial court determines to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge.” Accord: Daniels v. State, 615 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Small v. State
(2×)
In fact, a plain reading of the germane section indicates just the opposite."); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 261-63 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1993), pet. dism'd, improvidently granted, 872 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); De Leon v. State, 797 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1990, no pet.) ("[A] body of decisional law has developed to allow a defendant to raise limited challenges to the trial court's decision to adjudicate."); Fuller v. State, 653 S.W.2d 65, 65-67 (Tex.App.Tyler 1983, no pet.)
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lee Andrew Navarro v. State
App. 1981); Wright v. State , 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Castro v. State
Contreras v. State, 645 S.W.2d 298 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Daniels v. State, 615 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Williams v. State, 592 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ybarra v. Azios
Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ex Parte Hernandez
Williams v. State, 592 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); McIntyre v. State, supra, at 417-418.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Seals v. State
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held in a series of cases “that under the terms of the above statute, no appeal may be taken from the hearing in which the trial court determines to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge.” See Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), from which the foregoing quotation has been taken.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Russell v. State
Daniels v. State, 615 S.W.2d 771, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Williams v. State, 592 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hooks v. State
See Ballard v. State, 628 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tex.App. — Amarillo, pet’n ref’d), adhering to Daniels v. State, 615 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980), and Williams v. State, supra. Subsequent to those decisions, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that rather than affirming the conviction upon such an attempted appeal, the court of appeals should not entertain the purported appeal.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ballard v. State
Daniels v. State, 615 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Williams v. State, 592 S.W.2d 931, 932-33 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jackson v. State
The Court of Criminal Appeals declined such an opportunity in Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
cited
Cited "see"
Contreras v. State
See Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) and Daniels v. State, 615 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Tony Curtis WRIGHT, Appellant,
v.
the STATE of Texas, Appellee
v.
the STATE of Texas, Appellee
57230.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Jan 16, 1980.
James P. Finstrom, Dallas, for appellant., Henry M. Wade, Dist. Atty., Maridell Templeton and Les S. Eubanks, Jr., Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Douglas and Tom G. Davis.
Cited by 87 opinions | Published
OPINION
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.Appeal is taken from an order revoking probation. [1]
On January 21, 1977, appellant pled guilty to a charge of burglary of a building. After hearing the evidence, and finding that it substantiated appellant’s guilt, the trial court deferred further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt, and placed appellant on probation for a period of five years.
On May 19, 1977, the State filed a motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. The trial court then revoked appellant’s probation and entered an adjudication of guilt after finding that he had committed the offense of burglary of a habitation during his probationary term. On May 31, 1977, appellant’s punishment was assessed at three years.
Initially, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for burglary of a building. Specifically, he maintains that his judicial confession was improperly admitted into evidence in that he was not given an opportunity to object to the admission of the confession into evidence.
This contention is not supported by the record. The record reflects that after appellant pled guilty, the State introduced his judicial confession into evidence:
“MISS WILSON (prosecutor): Your Hon- or, the State will offer State’s Exhibit No. 1, the Defendant’s signed judicial confession.
“(State’s Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.)
“MR. KAZDOY (defense counsel): No objection.
“THE COURT: State’s Exhibit No. 1 is admitted into evidence.
“(State’s Exhibit No. 1 was admitted into evidence.)
“MISS WILSON: State rests.”
Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at the May 19, 1977, hearing in which the trial court proceeded with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge of burglary of a building.
Art. 42.12, Sec. 3d(b), supra, provides in part:
“On violation of a condition of probation imposed under Subsection (a) of this section, the defendant may be arrested and detained as provided in Section 8 of this Article. The defendant is entitled to a hearing limited to the determination by the court of whether it proceeds with an adjudication of guilt on the original[*606] charge. No appeal may be taken from this determination. . . . ”
We recently held in Williams v. State, 592 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) that under the terms of the above statute, no appeal may be taken from the hearing in which the trial court determines to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge. Accordingly, appellant’s second contention is not reviewable.
Lastly, the judgment in this case recites that the previous order deferring an adjudication of guilt is set aside and a finding of guilt entered with punishment of three years being imposed. However, the sentence recites that the three year sentence had been suspended and appellant placed on probation with that probation subsequently being revoked. We reform the sentence to conform to the recitations in the judgment. See, Art. 44.24(b), V.A.C.C.P.
The judgment is affirmed.
1
. On original submission, this appeal was abated for the trial court to determine whether appellant was entitled to a free transcription of the court reporter’s notes from his original plea of guilty. Such notes have now been transcribed and made a part of the record in this cause. The appeal is reinstated.