adjudication hearing in Texas

2006The adjudication hearing must provide a defendant with minimum substantive and procedural due process protection.”); Goins v. State, 826 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); see also Homan v. Hughes, 708 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (“Nothing in Art. 42.12, supra, prohibits appeal of matters unrelated to the determination of guilt after a deferred adjudication.

2006The adjudication hearing must provide a defendant with minimum substantive and procedural due process protection.”); Goins v. State , 826 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); see also Homan v. Hughes , 708 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex. Crim.

2015Here, “[w]e presume from the trial court’s denial of [appellant’s] motion[s] [for new trial] that the [medical records], even if discovered [by counsel and presented at the adjudication hearing], would not have affected [the trial court’s] decision on sentencing.” Goody, 433 S.W.3d at 81 ; see also Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 345 (“[W]e presume that [the trial court] knew . . . what the appellant’s testimony . . . would be, and that, even assuming any such testimony to be accurate and reliable, knew that it would not have influenced his” punishment determination); Potts v. State, No. 14-10-01172-CR,

2015Here, “[w]e presume from the trial court’s denial of [appellant’s] motion[s] [for new trial] that the [medical records], even if discovered [by counsel and presented at the adjudication hearing], would not have affected [the trial court’s] decision on sentencing.” Goody, 433 S.W.3d at 81 ; see also Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 345 (“[W]e presume that [the trial court] knew . . . what the appellant’s testimony . . . would be, and that, even assuming any such testimony to be accurate and reliable, knew that it would not have influenced his” punishment determination); Potts v. State, No. 14-10-01172-CR,

2016Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759 , 763–64 (Tex. Crim.

2015Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763-64 (Tex. Crim.

2006Bearden v. State, 147 S.W.3d 661, 662 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.); accord Davis v. State, 141 S.W.3d 694, 697-98 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. ref'd); Nava v. State, 110 S.W.3d 491, 493 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.); Arista v. State, 2 S.W.3d 444, 445-46 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.); contra Marbut v. State, 76 S.W.3d 742, 746-47 (Tex.App.Waco 2002, pet. refd).

2006Bearden v. State, 147 S.W.3d 661, 662 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.); accord Davis v. State, 141 S.W.3d 694, 697-98 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. ref'd); Nava v. State, 110 S.W.3d 491, 493 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.); Arista v. State, 2 S.W.3d 444, 445-46 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.); contra Marbut v. State, 76 S.W.3d 742, 746-47 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd).

2006Bearden v. State, 147 S.W.3d 661, 662 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.); accord Davis v. State, 141 S.W.3d 694, 697-98 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. ref'd); Nava v. State, 110 S.W.3d 491, 493 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.); Arista v. State, 2 S.W.3d 444, 445-46 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.); contra Marbut v. State, 76 S.W.3d 742, 746-47 (Tex.App.Waco 2002, pet. refd).

2006Bearden v. State, 147 S.W.3d 661, 662 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.); accord Davis v. State, 141 S.W.3d 694, 697-98 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. ref'd); Nava v. State, 110 S.W.3d 491, 493 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.); Arista v. State, 2 S.W.3d 444, 445-46 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.); contra Marbut v. State, 76 S.W.3d 742, 746-47 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd).

2006The adjudication hearing must provide a defendant with minimum substantive and procedural due process protection.”); Goins v. State, 826 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); see also Homan v. Hughes, 708 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (“Nothing in Art. 42.12, supra, prohibits appeal of matters unrelated to the determination of guilt after a deferred adjudication.

2006The adjudication hearing must provide a defendant with minimum substantive and procedural due process protection.”); Goins v. State , 826 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); see also Homan v. Hughes , 708 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex. Crim.

2021See Thirty-Third Emergency 1 To be clear, at an adjudication hearing as opposed to a waiver of jurisdiction or transfer hearing, “the juvenile is guaranteed the same constitutional rights as an adult in a criminal proceeding.” See In re P.M., 543 S.W.3d 365, 378 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359, 365 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1070, 1073 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). 5 Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, Misc.

2021See Thirty-Third Emergency 1 To be clear, at an adjudication hearing as opposed to a waiver of jurisdiction or transfer hearing, “the juvenile is guaranteed the same constitutional rights as an adult in a criminal proceeding.” See In re P.M., 543 S.W.3d 365, 378 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359, 365 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1070, 1073 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). 5 Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, Misc.

2010See Euler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Griffith v. State, 166 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Dissenting Op. at 580-81.

2010See Euler v. State , 218 S.W.3d 88 , 92 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Griffith v. State , 166 S.W.3d 261 , 265 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Dissenting Op. at 580-81.

2009See Villarreal v. State, 860 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref'd) (stating the trial court had no duty to sua sponte examine retrospectively the volun-tariness of the defendant’s guilty plea even though he was found incompetent at the adjudication hearing).

2009See Villareal v. State, 860 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. App. –Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref’d) (stating the trial court had no duty to sua sponte examine retrospectively the voluntariness of the defendant’s guilty plea even though he was found incompetent at the adjudication hearing).

2000See In the Matter of A.F., 895 S.W.2d 481, 485-86 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995, no writ) (rejecting claim that social history report should have been excluded under various provisions of the Rules of Civil Evidence); In the Matter of A.N.M., 542 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, no writ) (rejecting argument that trial court had no authority to consider record of the adjudication hearing at the disposition hearing); see also In the Matter of J.R.C., 551 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejecting hearsay challenge to use of social history report in a transfer t

2000See In the Matter of A.F., 895 S.W.2d 481 , 485-86 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (rejecting claim that social history report should have been excluded under various provisions of the Rules of Civil Evidence); In the Matter of A.N.M., 542 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (rejecting argument that trial court had no authority to consider record of the adjudication hearing at the disposition hearing); see also In the Matter of J.R.C., 551 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex.Civ.

2000See In the Matter of A.F., 895 S.W.2d 481, 485-86 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995, no writ) (rejecting claim that social history report should have been excluded under various provisions of the Rules of Civil Evidence); In the Matter of A.N.M., 542 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, no writ) (rejecting argument that trial court had no authority to consider record of the adjudication hearing at the disposition hearing); see also In the Matter of J.R.C., 551 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejecting hearsay challenge to use of social history report in a transfer t

2000See In the Matter of A.F., 895 S.W.2d 481 , 485-86 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (rejecting claim that social history report should have been excluded under various provisions of the Rules of Civil Evidence); In the Matter of A.N.M., 542 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (rejecting argument that trial court had no authority to consider record of the adjudication hearing at the disposition hearing); see also In the Matter of J.R.C., 551 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex.Civ.

1995State v. Casanova, 494 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1973) (Where a delinquency judgment is reversed and the juvenile is over seventeen, it is error to remand for a new trial because the juvenile court has lost jurisdiction); G.A.O. v. State, 854 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993 no writ) (authority exists that an appellant court may not remand for a new adjudication hearing in cases involving persons who are seventeen years of age or older because the juvenile court has no jurisdiction).

1995State v. Casanova, 494 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1973) (Where a delinquency judgment is reversed and the juvenile is over seventeen, it is error to remand for a new trial because the juvenile court has lost jurisdiction); G.A.O. v. State, 854 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1993 no writ) (authority exists that an appellant court may not remand for a new adjudication hearing in cases involving persons who are seventeen years of age or older because the juvenile court has no jurisdiction).

2001No appeal may be taken from this determination. *51 The lower court cited Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), which it interpreted as holding that Article 42.12 § 5(b) prohibits even a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the adjudication hearing.

1996Tex. Code CRIM.PROC.Ann. art. 42.12, § 5 (Vernon Supp.1996); Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding that defendant could not appeal the determination to adjudicate guilt even though his counsel was not present at the adjudication hearing); Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940, 941-42 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Edwards v. State, 835 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1992, no pet.).

2025“An assertion that a defendant was not competent at the time of the adjudication hearing . . . raises a preliminary due- process issue that must be resolved before the adjudication process may begin.” Durgan v. State, 240 S.W.3d 875, 878 (Tex. Crim.

2016“An assertion that a defendant was not competent at the time of the adjudication hearing ... raises a preliminary due-process issue that must be resolved before the adjudication process may begin.” Durgan v. State, 240 S.W.3d 875, 878 (Tex. Crim.App.2007) (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 , 116 S.Ct. 1373 , 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996)).

2000See In the Matter of A.F., 895 S.W.2d 481, 485-86 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995, no writ) (rejecting claim that social history report should have been excluded under various provisions of the Rules of Civil Evidence); In the Matter of A.N.M., 542 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, no writ) (rejecting argument that trial court had no authority to consider record of the adjudication hearing at the disposition hearing); see also In the Matter of J.R.C., 551 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejecting hearsay challenge to use of social history report in a transfer t

2000App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejecting hearsay challenge to use of social history report in a transfer to criminal court proceeding); Tyler v. State, 512 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1974, no writ) (denying due process challenge to use of a social history report).

2025Earley, 855 S.W.2d at 262 .

2006In fact, a plain reading of the germane section indicates just the opposite.”); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 261-63 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 872 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); De Leon v. State, 797 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no pet.) ("[A] body of decisional law has developed to allow a defendant to raise limited challenges to the trial court’s decision to adjudicate.”). .

2018Atchison v. State, 124 S.W.3d 755, 760 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, 4 pet. ref’d) (citing Sullivan v. State, 975 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d)).

2004Sullivan v. State, 975 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, pet. ref'd).

2013See Atchison v. State, 124 S.W.3d 755, 760 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. ref’d) (“the correct question [is] whether the twenty-year sentence was warranted by the crime for which appellant was convicted, and not whether it was warranted by the supervisory violations proved at the adjudication hearing”).

2010See, e.g., Atchison v. State, 124 S.W.3d 755, 760 (Tex. App.–Austin 2003, pet. ref’d) (“Even if we were to perform a proportionality analysis, the correct question would be whether the twenty-year sentence was warranted by the crime for which appellant was convicted, and not whether it was warranted by the supervisory violations proved at the adjudication hearing.”). 2 the issue of the proportionality of the sentence was never litigated in the trial court, there is no evidence in the appellate record concerning the sentences assessed in similar cases.

2018Atchison v. State, 124 S.W.3d 755, 760 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, 4 pet. ref’d) (citing Sullivan v. State, 975 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d)).

2004Sullivan v. State, 975 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, pet. ref'd).

2008However, we do reform the judgment to state that appellant pled 1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). 2 Grounds for ineffectiveness raised by appellant are 1) failure to quash enhancem ent portion of the indictm ent, 2) lying to appellant when counsel represented that he had filed a pre-trial m otion to rem ove the enhancem ent portion of the indictm ent and 3) failing to contact any potential defense witnesses in preparation for the adjudication hearing or in conducting any type of investigation prior to the hearing. 2 “no contest,” as opposed t

2008However, we do reform the judgment to state that appellant pled 1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). 2 Grounds for ineffectiveness raised by appellant are 1) failure to quash enhancem ent portion of the indictm ent, 2) lying to appellant when counsel represented that he had filed a pre-trial m otion to rem ove the enhancem ent portion of the indictm ent and 3) failing to contact any potential defense witnesses in preparation for the adjudication hearing or in conducting any type of investigation prior to the hearing. 2 “no contest,” as opposed t

2022The trial judge testified that he did not remember anything about the applicant’s case, and based on his review of the reporter’s record from the adjudication hearing, “it looked to him as if he was simply making good on a promise he had made during the original plea hearing.” Id. at 455 .

2015The trial judge also testified that he did not remember anything about the applicant’s case, and based on his review of the reporter’s record from the adjudication hearing, “it looked to him as if he was simply making good on a promise he had made during the original plea hearing.” Id. at 455 .

2023Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 2009) .........................................................11 Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim.

2020App. 2015) (citing Carroll v. State, 975 S.W.2d 630, 631-32 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Cairoll v. State’, 975 S.W.2d 630, 631-32 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). .

2017Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Tex. Crim.

2015Vidaurri, 49 S.W.3d at 886 .