Cnty. of Obion v. McKinnis, 364 S.W.2d 356 (Tenn. 1962). · Go Syfert
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Cnty. of Obion v. McKinnis, 364 S.W.2d 356 (Tenn. 1962). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 5× by 5 distinct cases, last quoted 2006 · 2 courts · …a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another … at p. 357 ✓
27 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1975 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Markus E.
Tenn. Crim. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
A. Judicial estoppel Generally, “‘[u]nder the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts[.]”’” Kershaw, 583 S.W.3d at 548 (quoting Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Obion Cnty. v. McKinnis, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tenn. 1962))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Polly Spann Kershaw v. Jeffrey L. Levy
unknown court · 2019 · confidence medium
In general, “[u]nder the doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts. . . .’” Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Obion County v. McKinnis, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tenn. 1962)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Polly Spann Kershaw v. Jeffrey L. Levy
unknown court · 2019 · confidence medium
In general, “[u]nder the doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts. . . .’” Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Obion County v. McKinnis, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tenn. 1962)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Freda Boyce and Marvell Boyce v. LPP Mortgage LTD
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Regions Financial Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 382, 402 (Tenn.Ct.App.2009) (citing Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Saundra Thompson v. Memphis City Schools Board of Education
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
This Court, in Reynolds v. Tognetti, No. W2010–00320–COA–R3–CV, 2011 WL 761525 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 4, 2011), recently discussed the requirements for the application of judicial estoppel: [J]udicial estoppel is a common law doctrine under which “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position . . . which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced.” Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1999) (quoti…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lamar Reynolds v. Louis R. Tognetti and Wendee L. Tognetti
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court has referred to this Advisory Commission Comment as “imprecise.” Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn.1976); see also Lawrence A. Pivnick, Tennessee Circuit Court Practice, Vol. 1 § 5:2 (2010). -6- v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Obion County v. McKinnis, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tenn. 1962)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. v. Marsh USA, Inc.
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Faust v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
If Metro were a private individual or private entity, it would be barred by judicial estoppel from taking such totally inconsistent positions: Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action.” Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 5…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Webber v. Webber
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Recently the Supreme Court explained the doctrine of judicial estoppel as follows: Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action.” Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn.1975); Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nancy Webber v. Gary Webber
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Recently the Supreme Court explained the doctrine of judicial estoppel as follows: Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel "a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action." Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn.1975); Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.2d 7…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nancy E. Cotter v. Ted A. Burkhalter
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
The Marcus court noted that “Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, . . . .’” quoting, Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marcus v. Marcus
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action.” Obion County v. McKinnis, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tenn. 1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn. 1975); Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn. App. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marcus v. Marcus
Tenn. · 1999 · confidence medium
Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action.” Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn.1975); Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn. App.1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.
M.D. Tenn. · 1975 · confidence medium
Duke v. Hopper, Tenn. App., 486 S.W.2d 744, 748 (1972); Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1963).
discussed Cited "see" Bradley Jetmore v. City of Memphis
unknown court · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1999) (“Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action.’” (quoting Obion Cty. v. McKinnis, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962)).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Banks (2×)
Tenn. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn.1999) (quoting Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183, 186 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962)) (holding that "a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him”). 47 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
County of Obion and Earl Thorpe, Trustee of Obion County, Tennessee
v.
D. W. McKinnis, Jr.
Tennessee Supreme Court.
Dec 7, 1962.
364 S.W.2d 356
Paul, Hudgins, C. W. Miles, III, Union City, for plaintiffs in error., Heathoock, Elam & Cloys, Union City, for defendant in error.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

This is a suit by D. W. McKinnis, Jr., against Obion County, seeking to recover certain money as salary and ex officio services for his service as County Judge of said County.

The office of County Judge of this County was created by Chapter 136, Private Acts of 1891. This Act provided[*185] a salary of $1,000.00 per annum. By Chapter 234 of the Private Acts of 1945, and Chapter 312 of the Private Acts of 1947, a purchasing agent was created with a salary of $2,000.00 per annum. By Chapter 235 Private Acts of 1945, and Chapter 313 Private Acts of 1947, the position of Director of Budgets of the County was created with a salary of $2,000.00 per annum. Both of said positions were to be filed by the County Judge of said County, making in all the sum of $5,000.00 per annum as compensation to the County Judge.

Then by the County Judge Minimum Salary Bill, Chapter 172 of the Public Acts of 1957, codified Sections 8-2414 — 8-2416 of T.C.A., he was to receive, according to the classification therein, based on a population basis, the sum-of $6,500.00 per annum for his services.

The Circuit Judge was of the opinion that the Minimum Salary Act did not repeal the two Acts above referred to providing for $2,000.00 per annum to the County Judge for his services as purchasing agent, and $2,000.00 for his services as Budget Director, and entered a judgment to this effect in favor of the County Judge.

The County has appealed in error here. So the only question we have presented is whether the petitioner below is entitled to the $4,000.00 per annum in addition to the $6,500.00 per annum provided by the Minimum Salary Law.

It is to be observed that the petitioner was the budget officer of said County, and it is inconceivable that he failed to put in the $2,000.00 provided for by the Private Act, and the $2,000.00 provided for him as purchasing agent if he did not feel the $6,500.00 a year minimum salary[*186] under the Acts of 1957 repealed these two Private Acts. In other words, the petitioner was drawing $1,000.00 a year as provided by the Acts of 1891, $2,000.00 as provided by the Private Acts creating a Budget Director, and $2,000.00 a year as purchasing agent, making a total of $5,000.00 per annum.

Then comes the Minimum Salary Law Act of 1957, which had for its effect paying him $1,500.00 per. annum more than he received before, or $6,500.00. For three years he made no complaint and did not collect or try to collect this additional $4,000.00 per annum.

Generally speaking, a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action. 19 Am. Jur, p. 636, Sec. 35.

“An estoppel may operate in favor of the public. In fact, is is said that an estoppel in favor of a public interest will be raised upon circumstances slighter than are requisite to raise an estoppel in favor of an individual.” 19 Am. Jur. p. 818. See Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, etc., Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658.

The doctrine of laches and estoppel are closely related especially where, as is the case in most jurisdictions, delay alone is not regarded as constituting laches, but only delay which places another at a disadvantage.'

It results that we think the judgment of the lower court erroneous and is reversed, and the petition herein dismissed at the cost of petitioner.