judicial estoppel doctrine in Tennessee

2006If Metro were a private individual or private entity, it would be barred by judicial estoppel from taking such totally inconsistent positions: Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action.” Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S

2003Recently the Supreme Court explained the doctrine of judicial estoppel as follows: Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action.” Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn.1975); Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.2d 7

2025A. Judicial estoppel Generally, “‘[u]nder the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts[.]”’” Kershaw, 583 S.W.3d at 548 (quoting Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Obion Cnty. v. McKinnis, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tenn. 1962))).

2009“Pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party will not be permitted to take a position that is directly contrary to or inconsistent with a position previously taken by the party where the party had or was chargeable with full knowledge of the facts and where the conduct would prejudice another.” Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 382 (Tenn.2006) (citing Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn.1999)).

2025A. Judicial estoppel Generally, “‘[u]nder the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts[.]”’” Kershaw, 583 S.W.3d at 548 (quoting Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Obion Cnty. v. McKinnis, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tenn. 1962))).

2006If Metro were a private individual or private entity, it would be barred by judicial estoppel from taking such totally inconsistent positions: Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action.” Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S

2003Designed to prevent a party from “gaining an unfair advantage,” Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 30 (Tenn.1995), the indoctrination of judicial estoppel by Tennessee courts has been cogently explained by this Court in Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633 , 266 S.W. 313 (1924): The distinctive feature of the Tennessee law of judicial estoppel (or estoppel by oath) is the expressed purpose of the court, on broad grounds of public policy, to uphold the sanctity of an oath.

1996Therefore, we conclude that the judicial estoppel rule does not apply in this situation. 13 BRUCE.OPN Although we conclude that the rule is not technically applicable, we nevertheless realize that having to maintain inconsistent positions in different lawsuits is somewhat anomalous. 900 S.W.2d at 30 .

2024However, “The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply when there is ‘an innocent inconsistency or apparent inconsistency that is actually reconcilable.’” Id. at 549 (quoting 28 Am.

2013The Tennessee Supreme Court recently clarified the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303 (Tenn.2009).

2006If Metro were a private individual or private entity, it would be barred by judicial estoppel from taking such totally inconsistent positions: Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action.” Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S

2003Recently the Supreme Court explained the doctrine of judicial estoppel as follows: Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel “a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action.” Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn.1975); Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.2d 7

2004This Court has defined the doctrine of judicial estoppel as “where one states on oath in former litigation, either in a pleading or in a deposition or on oral testimony, a given fact as true, he will not be permitted to deny that fact in subsequent litigation, although the parties may not be the same.” Melton v. Anderson, 222 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

2001Judicial Estoppel Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, “where one states on oath in former litigation, either in a pleading or in a deposition or on oral testimony, a given fact as true, he will not be permitted to deny that fact in subsequent litigation, although the parties may not be the same.” Melton v. Anderson, 222 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948) (citing Tate v. Tate, 148 S.W. 1042 (Tenn. 1912)).

2005Canale & Co., No. W2000-02067-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 394 , at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2001) (“Anything short of a willfully false statement is insufficient to invoke judicial estoppel.”); Woods v. Woods, 638 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies only where there has been a willful misstatement of fact — that is, perjury.”).

2000“The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies only where there has been a willful misstatement of fact – that is, perjury.” Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997)(quoting Woods v. Woods, 638 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1982)).

2003Designed to prevent a party from “gaining an unfair advantage,” Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 30 (Tenn.1995), the indoctrination of judicial estoppel by Tennessee courts has been cogently explained by this Court in Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633 , 266 S.W. 313 (1924): The distinctive feature of the Tennessee law of judicial estoppel (or estoppel by oath) is the expressed purpose of the court, on broad grounds of public policy, to uphold the sanctity of an oath.

2002Designed to prevent a party from "gaining an unfair advantage," Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 30 (Tenn.1995), the indoctrination of judicial estoppel by Tennessee courts has been cogently explained by this Court in Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633 , 266 S.W. 313 (1924): -2- The distinctive feature of the Tennessee law of judicial estoppel (or estoppel by oath) is the expressed purpose of the court, on broad grounds of public policy, to uphold the sanctity of an oath.

2012See Allen v. Neal, 217 Tenn. 181 , 396 S.W.2d 344, 346 (1965) (noting that “[j]udicial estoppels arise from sworn statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, generally in a former litigation, and are based on public policy upholding the sanctity of an oath and not on prejudice to adverse party by reason thereof, as in the case of equitable estoppel”).

2012See Allen v. Neal, 217 Tenn. 181 , 396 S.W.2d 344, 346 (1965) (noting that “[j]udicial estoppels arise from sworn statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, generally in a former litigation, and are based on public policy upholding the sanctity of an oath and not on prejudice to adverse party by reason thereof, as in the case of equitable estoppel”).

2009“Pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party will not be permitted to take a position that is directly contrary to or inconsistent with a position previously taken by the party where the party had or was chargeable with full knowledge of the facts and where the conduct would prejudice another.” Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 382 (Tenn.2006) (citing Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn.1999)).

2009“Pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party will not be permitted to take a position that is directly contrary to or inconsistent with a position previously taken by the party where the party had or was chargeable with full knowledge of the facts and where the conduct would prejudice another.” Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 382 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1999)).

2005The doctrine of judicial estoppel will only apply where “the previous statement was not only untrue but was willfully false in the sense of conscious and deliberate perjury.” Monroe, 231 S.W.2d 386, 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (citing Davis v. Mitchell, 178 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943)) (emphasis added); see also Rose v. Snyder, 206 S.W.2d 897, 906 (Tenn. 1947) (“[I]t does not apply where there is an explanation showing such statement was . . . anything short of a ‘wilfully false’ statement of fact.”); Chandler v. D.

2005Rose & Co. v. Snyder, 185 Tenn. 499, 520 , 206 S.W.2d 897, 906 (1947); accord Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn. Ct.App.1997).

2005The doctrine of judicial estoppel will only apply where “the previous statement was not only untrue but was willfully false in the sense of conscious and deliberate perjury.” Monroe, 231 S.W.2d 386, 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (citing Davis v. Mitchell, 178 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943)) (emphasis added); see also Rose v. Snyder, 206 S.W.2d 897, 906 (Tenn. 1947) (“[I]t does not apply where there is an explanation showing such statement was . . . anything short of a ‘wilfully false’ statement of fact.”); Chandler v. D.

2002Appellee insists the doctrine is relevant here and was properly applied by the trial court in considering its grant of summary judgment.5 However, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “can never find application . . . unless it appear[s] that the previous statement was not only untrue but was wilfully false in the sense of conscious and deliberate perjury.” Monroe County Motor Co., 231 S.W.2d at 393 .

2019Barnes v. Barnes, 193 S.W.3d 495, 500 (Tenn. 2006).

2019Id. at 501 . -18- V.

2016Scott v. Brown, 937 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)).

2013Regions Financial Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 382, 402 (Tenn.Ct.App.2009) (citing Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183 , 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962)).

2012Cothern v. Scott, 446 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969) (quoting 31 C.J.S.

2010Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County v. Tenn. State Bd. of Equalization, 817 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tenn.1991). [4] For the purpose of Article I, Section 20, a retrospective statute is one which operates forward but looks backward in that it attaches new consequences or legal significance in the future to past acts or facts that existed before the statute came into effect.

2007As we noted in Smalling v. Terrell, “a resulting trust is a judge-formulated ‘creature’ by which the judicial authority is able ‘to reach an interest in property belonging to one person yet titled in and held by another.’” Smalling v. Terrell, 943 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Wells v. Wells, 556 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)).

2007As we noted in Smalling v. Terrell, “a resulting trust is a judge-formulated ‘creature’ by which the judicial authority is able ‘to reach an interest in property belonging to one person yet titled in and held by another.’” Smalling v. Terrell, 943 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Wells v. Wells, 556 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)).

2005While we must adhere to the general statement of the doctrine formulated by our supreme court, Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976), Southern Security cites to no case applying the doctrine to the unique facts of this case.

2005See, e.g., Allen v. Neal, 396 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tenn. 1965) (“Judicial estoppels arise from sworn statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, generally in former litigation . . . .”); Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 266 S.W. 313 , 318 (Tenn. 1924) (“The distinctive feature of the Tennessee law of judicial estoppel (or estoppel by oath) is the expressed purpose of the court, on broad grounds of public policy, to uphold the sanctity of an oath.”); Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 502 (Tenn. 1955)) (“[I]n order for t

2005The doctrine of judicial estoppel will only apply where “the previous statement was not only untrue but was willfully false in the sense of conscious and deliberate perjury.” Monroe, 231 S.W.2d 386, 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (citing Davis v. Mitchell, 178 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943)) (emphasis added); see also Rose v. Snyder, 206 S.W.2d 897, 906 (Tenn. 1947) (“[I]t does not apply where there is an explanation showing such statement was . . . anything short of a ‘wilfully false’ statement of fact.”); Chandler v. D.

2002In Cardin v. Campbell, [ 920 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)] the court held that “where a person states under oath in former litigation, either in pleadings or testimony, that a fact is true, she will not be permitted to deny that fact in subsequent litigation.” The Cardin court did not mention Rule 803(1.2).

2001See Gilley v. Jernigan, 597 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).