Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1952). · Go Syfert
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Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1952). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we have oft-times held that the rule ... is applicable in connection with statutory construction.”
367 citation events (73 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: University of Miami v. Frank (fladistctapp, 2006-01-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1952 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1952 1989 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) University of Miami v. Frank (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
we have oft-times held that the rule ... is applicable in connection with statutory construction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SC14-1266 & SC14-1305 Lewis Brooke Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. and the Plantation at Ponte Vedra v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. and Gideon M.G. Gratsiani v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. – Corrected Opinion
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
May v. Holley, 59 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1952); Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 967-68 (Scales, J., dissenting) (citing Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952); Cragin v. Ocean & Lake Realty Co., 133 So. 569, 573-74 (Fla. 1931)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) & SC14-1266 & SC14-1305 Lewis Brooke Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. & The Plantation at Ponte Vedra v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. & Gideon M.G. Gratsiani v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. (2×)
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
May v. Holley, 59 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1952); Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 967-68 (Scales, J., dissenting) (citing Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952); Cragin v. Ocean & Lake Realty Co., 133 So. 569, 573-74 (Fla. 1931)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Olmstead v. Federal Trade Commission (2×)
Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
See Cont’l Assurance Co. v. Carroll, 485 So.2d 406 , 409 (Fla.1986) (“This Court cannot grant an exception to a statute nor can we construe an unambiguous statute different from its plain meaning.”); Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla.1952) (“We apprehend that had the legislature intended to establish other exceptions it would have done so clearly and unequivocally. ...
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zivitz v. Zivitz
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf., e.g., Limbaugh v. State, 887 So.2d 387, 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“[W]e take the omission of any reference to search warrants [in the statute] as a plain legislative decision that search warrants for medical records are not affected by these [statutory] provisions.”) (citing Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla.1952)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Putnam Berkley Group, Inc. v. Dinin
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Carey; Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla.1952) (`We cannot write into the law any other exception, nor can we create by judicial fiat a reason, or reasons, for tolling the statute since the legislature dealt with such topic and thereby foreclosed judicial enlargement thereof.'); Swartzman v. Harlan, 535 So.2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (finding that under section 95.051(2), Florida Statutes (1987), the court was not able to create an exception to toll the statute of limitations not specifically enumerated by the legislature); In re Southeast Banking Corp., 855 F.Supp. 353 (S.D.Fl…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Romero v. Shadywood Villas Homeowners Ass'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
See Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976); Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hot., 56 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952); Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 651 So.2d 1269, 1270-71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Scope v. Fannelli, 639 So.2d 141, 143 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Barry v. Garcia, 573 So.2d 932, 937 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 583 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alvarez v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CITY PENSION FUND
Fla. · 1991 · confidence medium
Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952) (where the legislature provides express exceptions to the precise language of a statute, "[w]e must assume that it thoroughly considered and purposely preempted the field of exceptions to ... the statute"); Williams v. American Sur.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FLORIDA LEGAL SERVICES, INC v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
Where the legislature creates specific exceptions to the language in a statute, we may apply the rule to infer that "had the legislature intended to establish other exceptions it would have done so clearly and unequivocally." Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952).
discussed Cited "see" Deltona Transformer Corporation v. Deltran Operations USA, Inc., Carson Clarke, Chase Clarke, Michael Prelec, Jr., Michael Prelec, Sr., and Evin Dyon
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fla. Legal Servs., Inc. v. State, 381 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (quoting Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952)) (“Where the legislature creates specific exceptions to the language in a statute, we may apply the rule to infer that ‘had the legislature intended to establish other exceptions it would have done so clearly and unequivocally.’”).
discussed Cited "see" Citizens Property Insurance Corp., etc. v. Perdido Sun Condominium Association, Inc., etc.
Fla. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See § 627.351(6)(s)l.e., Fla. Stat. As this Court has recognized, where the Legislature made one exception clearly, if it had “intended to establish other exceptions it would have done so clearly and unequivocally.” Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla.1952).
cited Cited "see" Limbaugh v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla.1952) ("The legislature made one exception to the precise language of the statute of limitations.
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See , Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 , 342 (Fla. 1952); Biddle v. State Beverage Department, 187 So.2d 65 , 67 (4 D.C.A.
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See , Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 , 342 (Fla. 1952); Biddle v. State Beverage Department, 187 So.2d 65 , 67 (4 D.C.A.
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 , 817 (Fla. 1976), and Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 , 342 (Fla. 1952).
cited Cited "see" Swartzman v. Harlan
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Ideal Farms Drainage District v. Certain Lands, 19 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1944); Devin v. City of Hollywood, 351 So.2d 1022 (4 D.C.A.
discussed Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 , 817 (Fla. 1976) ("where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned").
discussed Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 , 342 (Fla. 1952); Biddle v. State Beverage Department, 187 So.2d 65 , 67 (4 D.C.A.Fla., 1966); Williams v. American Surety Company of New York, 99 So.2d 877 , 880 (2 D.C.A.Fla., 1958), for the proposition that where a statute sets forth exceptions, no others may be implied to be intended.
discussed Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Biddle v. State Beverage Dept., 187 So.2d 65 (4 D.C.A.Fla., 1966); Williams v. American Surety Co. of New York, 99 So.2d 877 (2 D.C.A.Fla., 1958).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See , Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Biddle v. State Beverage Department, 187 So.2d 65 (4 D.C.A.
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952), and State ex rel .
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, et al ., 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952), and State ex rel .
discussed Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 19 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1944); Interlachen Lake Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1973). `An officer may not do everything not forbidden in advance by some legislative act.' 67 C.J.S.
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1953).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1974); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952) and Williams v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 99 So.2d 877 (2 D.C.A.
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1972); and Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1974).
discussed Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
Since the statute does not provide for any other operating costs, the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius — express mention of one thing is the exclusion of another — is controlling; see Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel et al., 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952), Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1974), so that, by clear implication, no revenue-sharing moneys derived from the tax on motor fuel may be expended for the operating expenses of "electricity cost for all street lighting." However, such moneys may be expended for initial capital outlay and for the maintenance of s…
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1974).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
discussed Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952), for the rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one thing is the exclusion of another expressio unius est exclusio alterius; cf. s. 561.29 (1)(d), F. S., providing that the Division of Beverage may revoke or suspend the license of any liquor vendor for "[m]aintaining licensed premises that are unsanitary, or are not approved as sanitary by the county board of health or the [Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services] having jurisdiction thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
cited Cited "see" In Re Aron's Estate
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1960 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, Fla. 1952, 56 So.2d 341 .
cited Cited "see" Williams v. American Surety Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1958 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, Fla.1952, 56 So.2d 341 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, Etc. v. Beauvais (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Cragin v. Ocean & Lake Realty Co., 133 So. 569, 573-74 (Fla. 1931); see also Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952) (holding that courts must presume that the legislature, in establishing a statute of limitations, “thoroughly considered and purposely preempted the field of exceptions to, and possible reasons for tolling, the statute.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Inman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla.1952) (noting the court's frequent holding that the rule "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," meaning "express mention of one thing is the exclusion of another," is applicable in statutory construction and that "had the legislature intended to establish other exceptions [within the statute at issue] it would have done so clearly and unequivocally"); Williams v. Am.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Solar Pane Insulating Glass v. HANSEEN
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Florida Hosp. v. Williams, 689 So.2d 1255, 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), review denied, 698 So.2d 840 (Fla.1997).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel 56 So.2d 341 , 342 (Fla. 1952) (where a statute sets forth exceptions, no others may be implied to be intended). 6 Chapter 493 , F.S., regulates licensed and unlicensed persons and businesses engaged in the security industry. 7 Placement of "residential and business" between the terms "private" and "communities" shows a legislative intent to encompass only private residential communities and private business communities. 8 Section 316.003 (1), F.S. 9 Memorandum to Chief Calvin Ross from Matthew D.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also , Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 , 342 (Fla. 1952) (where a statute sets forth exceptions, no others may be implied to be intended). 14 See , State, Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil Company, Inc., 577 So.2d 988 (1 D.C.A.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952), and Ideal Farms Drainage District v. Certain Lands, 19 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1944) (under rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, express legislative mention of a thing is implied exclusion of things not mentioned).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
When the controlling law directs how a thing shall be done that is, in effect, a prohibition against its being done in any other way. . . ."); see also, Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 , 342 (Fla. 1952); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 , 817 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1984 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952) (rule of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," meaning that express mention of one thing is the exclusion of another).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g ., Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 19 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1944).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1980 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
DOBBS
v.
SEA ISLE HOTEL et al.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan 18, 1952.
56 So. 2d 341
Hobson.
Cited by 343 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 72%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)

Lucille Snowden, Miami, for appellant.

Goble D. Dean and Brown & Dean, Miami, and Wendell C. Heaton, Tallahassee, for appellees.

HOBSON, Justice.

Counsel for appellant very frankly confesses that her first question is intended to "present the facts of this cause and to try to convince this Court that their holding in Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Florida v. White, 153 Fla. 70, 13 So.2d 595, should be reversed." Although counsel has presented authorities from other jurisdictions which sustain the view contrary to the one[*342] which we expressed in the case of Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. White, supra, we are not convinced that we should "dance the back step" in connection with our opinion therein. Indeed, upon a careful reconsideration of said case and a restudy of Chapter 440, F.S.A., and particularly Sections 440.02(18) and 440.19(1), we are firmly convinced that we should not recede from our opinion and judgment in the case of Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. White. supra, but should adhere thereto.

We fail to find in any one of the cases cited by counsel for appellant that the court of the foreign jurisdiction was dealing with a statute such as ours which by its own terms, in clear and unambiguous language, defines the phrase "time of injury" Section 440.02(18) reads as follows: "The term `time of injury' means the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury." Section 440.19(1) reads as follows: "The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two years after the time of injury, and the right to compensation for death shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two years after the death, except that if payment of compensation has been made without an award on account of such injury or death a claim may be filed within two years after the date of the last payment. Such claim shall be filed with the commission." (Emphasis supplied.)

Since the legislature in clear and unambiguous language has defined the expression "time of injury" to mean the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury, there is no room for us to theorize; nor are we authorized to place a different construction upon the term "time of injury" as used in Section 440.19 (1).

Counsel for appellant propounds another question which is stated by her in the following language: "Where the employer/carrier has failed to perform its statutory duty, and is subject to civil penalties under the compensation law, may it invoke the statute of limitations in bar of claimants rights?"

We are of the opinion that the answer to this question is likewise found in Chapter 440, F.S.A. and particularly in Section 440.19(1).

It is very clear that the legislature intended there should be but one exception to the provision that the right to compensation should be barred unless a claim therefor be filed within two years after the time of injury, which exception is clearly expressed in the following words: "except that if payment of compensation has been made without an award on account of such injury or death, a claim may be filed within two years after the date of the last payment." (Emphasis supplied). We have oft-times held that the rule "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" is applicable in connection with statutory construction. This maxim, which translated from the Latin means: express mention of one thing is the exclusion of another, is definitely controlling in this case. The legislature made one exception to the precise language of the statute of limitations. We apprehend that had the legislature intended to establish other exceptions it would have done so clearly and unequivocally. We must assume that it thoroughly considered and purposely preempted the field of exceptions to, and possible reasons for tolling, the statute. We cannot write into the law any other exception, nor can we create by judicial fiat a reason, or reasons, for tolling the statute since the legislature dealt with such topic and thereby foreclosed judicial enlargement thereof.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit which affirmed the full Commission's order of May 31, 1951, is hereby affirmed.

SEBRING, C.J., and CHAPMAN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.