Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 440.02 (2025)

Definitions.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section FL-LEGleg.state.fl.us JustiaFla. Statutes CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

440.02 Definitions.—When used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(1) “Accident” means only an unexpected or unusual event or result that happens suddenly. Disability or death due to the accidental acceleration or aggravation of a venereal disease or of a disease due to the habitual use of alcohol or controlled substances or narcotic drugs, or a disease that manifests itself in the fear of or dislike for an individual because of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment. Subject to s. 440.15(5), if a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration of death or acceleration or aggravation of the preexisting condition reasonably attributable to the accident is compensable, with respect to any compensation otherwise payable under this chapter. An injury or disease caused by exposure to a toxic substance, including, but not limited to, fungus or mold, is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment unless there is clear and convincing evidence establishing that exposure to the specific substance involved, at the levels to which the employee was exposed, can cause the injury or disease sustained by the employee.

(2) “Adoption” or “adopted” means legal adoption prior to the time of the injury.

(3) “Agency” means the Agency for Health Care Administration.

(4) “Arising out of” pertains to occupational causation. An accidental injury or death arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death.

(5) “Carrier” means any person or fund authorized under s. 440.38 to insure under this chapter and includes a self-insurer, and a commercial self-insurance fund authorized under s. 624.462.

(6) “Casual” as used in this section refers only to employments for work that is anticipated to be completed in 10 working days or less, without regard to the number of persons employed, and at a total labor cost of less than $500.

(7) “Child” includes a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, and a stepchild or acknowledged child born out of wedlock dependent upon the deceased, but does not include married children unless wholly dependent on the employee. “Grandchild” means a child as above defined of a child as above defined. “Brother” and “sister” include stepbrothers and stepsisters, half brothers and half sisters, and brothers and sisters by adoption, but does not include married brothers or married sisters unless wholly dependent on the employee. “Child,” “grandchild,” “brother,” and “sister” include only persons who at the time of the death of the deceased employees are under 18 years of age, or under 22 years of age if a full-time student in an accredited educational institution.

(8) “Compensation” means the money allowance payable to an employee or to his or her dependents as provided for in this chapter.

(9) “Construction design professional” means an architect, professional engineer, landscape architect, or surveyor and mapper, or any corporation, professional or general, that has a certificate to practice in the construction design field from the Department of Business and Professional Regulation.

(10) “Construction industry” means for-profit activities involving any building, clearing, filling, excavation, or substantial improvement in the size or use of any structure or the appearance of any land. However, “construction” does not mean a homeowner’s act of construction or the result of a construction upon his or her own premises, provided such premises are not intended to be sold, resold, or leased by the owner within 1 year after the commencement of construction. The division may, by rule, establish codes and definitions thereof that meet the criteria of the term “construction industry” as set forth in this section.

(11) “Corporate officer” or “officer of a corporation” means any person who fills an office provided for in the corporate charter or articles of incorporation filed with the Division of Corporations of the Department of State or as authorized or required under part I of chapter 607. The term “officer of a corporation” includes a member owning at least 10 percent of a limited liability company as defined in and organized pursuant to chapter 605.

(12) “Date of maximum medical improvement” means the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.

(13) “Death” as a basis for a right to compensation means only death resulting from an injury.

(14) “Department” means the Department of Financial Services; the term does not include the Financial Services Commission or any office of the commission.

(15) “Disability” means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.

(16) “Division” means the Division of Workers’ Compensation of the Department of Financial Services.

(17) “Domestic individual self-insurer” means an individual self-insurer:

(a) Which is a corporation formed under the laws of this state;

(b) Who is an individual who is a resident of this state or whose primary place of business is located in this state; or

(c) Which is a partnership whose principals are residents of this state or whose primary place of business is located in this state.

(18)(a) “Employee” means any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any work or service while engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract for hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes, but is not limited to, aliens and minors.

(b) “Employee” includes any person who is an officer of a corporation and who performs services for remuneration for such corporation within this state, whether or not such services are continuous.

1. Any officer of a corporation may elect to be exempt from this chapter by filing notice of the election with the department as provided in s. 440.05.

2. As to officers of a corporation who are engaged in the construction industry, no more than three officers of a corporation or of any group of affiliated corporations may elect to be exempt from this chapter by filing a notice of the election with the department as provided in s. 440.05. Officers must be shareholders, each owning at least 10 percent of the stock of such corporation and listed as an officer of such corporation with the Division of Corporations of the Department of State, in order to elect exemptions under this chapter. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “affiliated” means and includes one or more corporations or entities, any one of which is a corporation engaged in the construction industry, under the same or substantially the same control of a group of business entities which are connected or associated so that one entity controls or has the power to control each of the other business entities. The term “affiliated” includes, but is not limited to, the officers, directors, executives, shareholders active in management, employees, and agents of the affiliated corporation. The ownership by one business entity of a controlling interest in another business entity or a pooling of equipment or income among business entities shall be prima facie evidence that one business is affiliated with the other.

3. An officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from this chapter by filing a notice of the election with the department as provided in s. 440.05 is not an employee.

Services are presumed to have been rendered to the corporation if the officer is compensated by other than dividends upon shares of stock of the corporation which the officer owns.

1. A sole proprietor or a partner who is not engaged in the construction industry, devotes full time to the proprietorship or partnership, and elects to be included in the definition of employee by filing notice thereof as provided in s. 440.05.

2. All persons who are being paid by a construction contractor as a subcontractor, unless the subcontractor has validly elected an exemption as permitted by this chapter, or has otherwise secured the payment of compensation coverage as a subcontractor, consistent with s. 440.10, for work performed by or as a subcontractor.

3. An independent contractor working or performing services in the construction industry.

4. A sole proprietor who engages in the construction industry and a partner or partnership that is engaged in the construction industry.

(d) “Employee” does not include:

1. An independent contractor who is not engaged in the construction industry.

a. In order to meet the definition of independent contractor, at least four of the following criteria must be met:

(I) The independent contractor maintains a separate business with his or her own work facility, truck, equipment, materials, or similar accommodations;

(II) The independent contractor holds or has applied for a federal employer identification number, unless the independent contractor is a sole proprietor who is not required to obtain a federal employer identification number under state or federal regulations;

(III) The independent contractor receives compensation for services rendered or work performed and such compensation is paid to a business rather than to an individual;

(IV) The independent contractor holds one or more bank accounts in the name of the business entity for purposes of paying business expenses or other expenses related to services rendered or work performed for compensation;

(V) The independent contractor performs work or is able to perform work for any entity in addition to or besides the employer at his or her own election without the necessity of completing an employment application or process; or

(VI) The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services rendered on a competitive-bid basis or completion of a task or a set of tasks as defined by a contractual agreement, unless such contractual agreement expressly states that an employment relationship exists.

b. If four of the criteria listed in sub-subparagraph a. do not exist, an individual may still be presumed to be an independent contractor and not an employee based on full consideration of the nature of the individual situation with regard to satisfying any of the following conditions:

(I) The independent contractor performs or agrees to perform specific services or work for a specific amount of money and controls the means of performing the services or work.

(II) The independent contractor incurs the principal expenses related to the service or work that he or she performs or agrees to perform.

(III) The independent contractor is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the work or services that he or she performs or agrees to perform.

(IV) The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services performed for a commission or on a per-job basis and not on any other basis.

(V) The independent contractor may realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing work or services.

(VI) The independent contractor has continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations.

(VII) The success or failure of the independent contractor’s business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures.

c. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this subparagraph, an individual claiming to be an independent contractor has the burden of proving that he or she is an independent contractor for purposes of this chapter.

2. A real estate licensee, if that person agrees, in writing, to perform for remuneration solely by way of commission.

3. Bands, orchestras, and musical and theatrical performers, including disk jockeys, performing in licensed premises as defined in chapter 562, if a written contract evidencing an independent contractor relationship is entered into before the commencement of such entertainment.

4. An owner-operator of a motor vehicle who transports property under a written contract with a motor carrier which evidences a relationship by which the owner-operator assumes the responsibility of an employer for the performance of the contract, if the owner-operator is required to furnish motor vehicle equipment as identified in the written contract and the principal costs incidental to the performance of the contract, including, but not limited to, fuel and repairs, provided a motor carrier’s advance of costs to the owner-operator when a written contract evidences the owner-operator’s obligation to reimburse such advance shall be treated as the owner-operator furnishing such cost and the owner-operator is not paid by the hour or on some other time-measured basis.

5. A person whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer.

6. A volunteer, except a volunteer worker for the state or a county, municipality, or other governmental entity. A person who does not receive monetary remuneration for services is presumed to be a volunteer unless there is substantial evidence that a valuable consideration was intended by both employer and employee. For purposes of this chapter, the term “volunteer” includes, but is not limited to:

a. Persons who serve in private nonprofit agencies and who receive no compensation other than expenses in an amount less than or equivalent to the standard mileage and per diem expenses provided to salaried employees in the same agency or, if such agency does not have salaried employees who receive mileage and per diem, then such volunteers who receive no compensation other than expenses in an amount less than or equivalent to the customary mileage and per diem paid to salaried workers in the community as determined by the department; and

b. Volunteers participating in federal programs established under Pub. L. No. 93-113.

7. Unless otherwise prohibited by this chapter, any officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from this chapter. Such officer is not an employee for any reason under this chapter until the notice of revocation of election filed pursuant to s. 440.05 is effective.

8. An officer of a corporation that is engaged in the construction industry who elects to be exempt from the provisions of this chapter, as otherwise permitted by this chapter. Such officer is not an employee for any reason until the notice of revocation of election filed pursuant to s. 440.05 is effective.

9. An exercise rider who does not work for a single horse farm or breeder, and who is compensated for riding on a case-by-case basis, provided a written contract is entered into prior to the commencement of such activity which evidences that an employee/employer relationship does not exist.

10. A taxicab, limousine, or other passenger vehicle-for-hire driver who operates said vehicles pursuant to a written agreement with a company which provides any dispatch, marketing, insurance, communications, or other services under which the driver and any fees or charges paid by the driver to the company for such services are not conditioned upon, or expressed as a proportion of, fare revenues.

11. A person who performs services as a sports official for an entity sponsoring an interscholastic sports event or for a public entity or private, nonprofit organization that sponsors an amateur sports event. For purposes of this subparagraph, such a person is an independent contractor. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “sports official” means any person who is a neutral participant in a sports event, including, but not limited to, umpires, referees, judges, linespersons, scorekeepers, or timekeepers. This subparagraph does not apply to any person employed by a district school board who serves as a sports official as required by the employing school board or who serves as a sports official as part of his or her responsibilities during normal school hours.

12. Medicaid-enrolled clients under chapter 393 who are excluded from the definition of employment under s. 443.1216(4)(d) and served by Adult Day Training Services under the Home and Community-Based or the Family and Supported Living Medicaid Waiver program in a sheltered workshop setting licensed by the United States Department of Labor for the purpose of training and earning less than the federal hourly minimum wage.

13. Medicaid-enrolled clients under chapter 393 who are excluded from the definition of employment under s. 443.1216(4)(d) and served by Adult Day Training Services under the Family and Supported Living Medicaid Waiver program in a sheltered workshop setting licensed by the United States Department of Labor for the purpose of training and earning less than the federal hourly minimum wage.

(19)(a) “Employer” means the state and all political subdivisions thereof, all public and quasi-public corporations therein, every person carrying on any employment, and the legal representative of a deceased person or the receiver or trustees of any person. The term also includes employee leasing companies, as defined in s. 468.520(5), and employment agencies that provide their own employees to other persons. If the employer is a corporation, parties in actual control of the corporation, including, but not limited to, the president, officers who exercise broad corporate powers, directors, and all shareholders who directly or indirectly own a controlling interest in the corporation, are considered the employer for the purposes of ss. 440.105, 440.106, and 440.107.

(b) A homeowner shall not be considered the employer of persons hired by the homeowner to carry out construction on the homeowner’s own premises if those premises are not intended for immediate lease, sale, or resale.

(c) Facilities serving individuals under subparagraph (18)(d)12. shall be considered agents of the Agency for Health Care Administration as it relates to providing Adult Day Training Services under the Home and Community-Based Medicaid Waiver program and not employers or third parties for the purpose of limiting or denying Medicaid benefits.

(20)(a) “Employment,” subject to the other provisions of this chapter, means any service performed by an employee for the person employing him or her.

(b) “Employment” includes:

1. Employment by the state and all political subdivisions thereof and all public and quasi-public corporations therein, including officers elected at the polls.

2. All private employments in which four or more employees are employed by the same employer or, with respect to the construction industry, all private employment in which one or more employees are employed by the same employer.

3. Volunteer firefighters responding to or assisting with fire or medical emergencies whether or not the firefighters are on duty.

1. Domestic servants in private homes.

2. Agricultural labor performed on a farm in the employ of a bona fide farmer, or association of farmers, that employs 5 or fewer regular employees and that employs fewer than 12 other employees at one time for seasonal agricultural labor that is completed in less than 30 days, provided such seasonal employment does not exceed 45 days in the same calendar year. The term “farm” includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, fur-bearing animals, fish, and truck farms, ranches, nurseries, and orchards. The term “agricultural labor” includes field foremen, timekeepers, checkers, and other farm labor supervisory personnel.

3. Professional athletes, such as professional boxers, wrestlers, baseball, football, basketball, hockey, polo, tennis, jai alai, and similar players, and motorsports teams competing in a motor racing event as defined in s. 549.08.

4. Labor under a sentence of a court to perform community services as provided in s. 316.193.

5. State prisoners or county inmates, except those performing services for private employers or those enumerated in s. 948.036(1).

(21) “Foreign individual self-insurer” means an individual self-insurer:

(a) Which is a corporation formed under the laws of any state, district, territory, or commonwealth of the United States other than this state;

(b) Who is an individual who is not a resident of this state and whose primary place of business is not located in this state; or

(c) Which is a partnership whose principals are not residents of this state and whose primary place of business is not located in this state.

(22) “Individual self-insurer” means any employer who has secured payment of compensation pursuant to s. 440.38(1)(b) as an individual self-insurer.

(23) “Injury” means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury. Damage to dentures, eyeglasses, prosthetic devices, and artificial limbs may be included in this definition only when the damage is shown to be part of, or in conjunction with, an accident. This damage must specifically occur as the result of an accident in the normal course of employment.

(24) “Insolvency” or “insolvent” means:

(a) With respect to an individual self-insurer:

1. That all assets of the individual self-insurer, if made immediately available, would not be sufficient to meet all the individual self-insurer’s liabilities;

2. That the individual self-insurer is unable to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business;

3. That the individual self-insurer has substantially ceased or suspended the payment of compensation to its employees as required in this chapter; or

4. That the individual self-insurer has sought protection under the United States Bankruptcy Code or has been brought under the jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy as a debtor pursuant to the United States Bankruptcy Code.

(b) With respect to an employee claiming insolvency pursuant to s. 440.25(5), a person is insolvent who:

1. Has ceased to pay his or her debts in the ordinary course of business and cannot pay his or her debts as they become due; or

2. Has been adjudicated insolvent pursuant to the federal bankruptcy law.

(25) “Insolvent member” means an individual self-insurer which is a member of the Florida Self-Insurers Guaranty Association, Incorporated, or which was a member and has withdrawn pursuant to s. 440.385(1)(b), and which has been found insolvent, as defined in subparagraph (24)(a)1., subparagraph (24)(a)2., or subparagraph (24)(a)3., by a court of competent jurisdiction in this or any other state, or meets the definition of subparagraph (24)(a)4.

(26) “Insurer” means a group self-insurers’ fund authorized by s. 624.4621, an individual self-insurer authorized by s. 440.38, a commercial self-insurance fund authorized by s. 624.462, an assessable mutual insurer authorized by s. 628.6011, and an insurer licensed to write workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurance in this state. The term “carrier,” as used in this chapter, means an insurer as defined in this subsection.

(27) “Misconduct” includes, but is not limited to, the following, which shall not be construed in pari materia with each other:

(a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer’s interests as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of the employee; or

(b) Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer.

(28) “Office of Insurance Regulation” means the Office of Insurance Regulation of the Financial Services Commission.

(29) “Parent” includes stepparents and parents by adoption, parents-in-law, and any persons who for more than 3 years prior to the death of the deceased employee stood in the place of a parent to him or her and were dependent on the injured employee.

(30) “Partner” means any person who is a member of a partnership that is formed by two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business with the understanding that there will be a proportional sharing of the profits and losses between them. For the purposes of this chapter, a partner is a person who participates fully in the management of the partnership and who is personally liable for its debts.

(31) “Permanent impairment” means any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss determined as a percentage of the body as a whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury.

(32) “Person” means individual, partnership, association, or corporation, including any public service corporation.

(33) “Self-insurer” means:

(a) Any employer who has secured payment of compensation pursuant to s. 440.38(1)(b) or (6) as an individual self-insurer;

(b) Any employer who has secured payment of compensation through a group self-insurance fund under s. 624.4621;

(d) A public utility as defined in s. 364.02 or s. 366.02 that has assumed by contract the liabilities of contractors or subcontractors pursuant to s. 624.46225; or

(e) Any local government self-insurance fund established under s. 624.4622.

(34) “Soft-tissue injury” means an injury that produces damage to the soft tissues, rather than to the skeletal tissues or soft organs.

(35) “Sole proprietor” means a natural person who owns a form of business in which that person owns all the assets of the business and is solely liable for all the debts of the business.

(36) “Specificity” means information on the petition for benefits sufficient to put the employer or carrier on notice of the exact statutory classification and outstanding time period of benefits being requested and includes a detailed explanation of any benefits received that should be increased, decreased, changed, or otherwise modified. If the petition is for medical benefits, the information shall include specific details as to why such benefits are being requested, why such benefits are medically necessary, and why current treatment, if any, is not sufficient. Any petition requesting alternate or other medical care, including, but not limited to, petitions requesting psychiatric or psychological treatment, must specifically identify the physician, as defined in s. 440.13(1), who is recommending such treatment. A copy of a report from such physician making the recommendation for alternate or other medical care shall also be attached to the petition. A judge of compensation claims shall not order such treatment if a physician is not recommending such treatment.

(37) “Spouse” includes only a spouse substantially dependent for financial support upon the decedent and living with the decedent at the time of the decedent’s injury and death, or substantially dependent upon the decedent for financial support and living apart at that time for justifiable cause.

(38) “Statement,” for the purposes of ss. 440.105 and 440.106, shall include the exact fraud statement language in s. 440.105(7). This requirement includes, but is not limited to, any notice, representation, statement, proof of injury, bill for services, diagnosis, prescription, hospital or doctor record, X ray, test result, or other evidence of loss, injury, or expense.

(39) “Time of injury” means the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury.

(40) “Wages” means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury and includes only the wages earned and reported for federal income tax purposes on the job where the employee is injured and any other concurrent employment where he or she is also subject to workers’ compensation coverage and benefits, together with the reasonable value of housing furnished to the employee by the employer which is the permanent year-round residence of the employee, and gratuities to the extent reported to the employer in writing as taxable income received in the course of employment from others than the employer and employer contributions for health insurance for the employee or the employee’s dependents. However, housing furnished to migrant workers shall be included in wages unless provided after the time of injury. In employment in which an employee receives consideration for housing, the reasonable value of such housing compensation shall be the actual cost to the employer or based upon the Fair Market Rent Survey promulgated pursuant to s. 8 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1974, whichever is less. However, if employer contributions for housing or health insurance are continued after the time of the injury, the contributions are not “wages” for the purpose of calculating an employee’s average weekly wage.

(41) “Weekly compensation rate” means and refers to the amount of compensation payable for a period of 7 consecutive calendar days, including any Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, and other nonworking days which fall within such period of 7 consecutive calendar days. When Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or other nonworking days immediately follow the first 7 calendar days of disability or occur at the end of a period of disability as the last day or days of such period, such nonworking days constitute a part of the period of disability with respect to which compensation is payable.

History.—s. 2, ch. 17481, 1935; s. 1, ch. 17482, 1935; s. 1, ch. 17483, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(2); s. 1, ch. 18413, 1937; s. 1, ch. 20672, 1941; s. 1, ch. 28238, 1953; s. 1, ch. 29778, 1955; s. 1, ch. 57-155; s. 1, ch. 57-225; s. 1, ch. 59-100; s. 1, ch. 65-184; s. 1, ch. 67-554; ss. 17, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 1, ch. 71-80; s. 162, ch. 71-377; s. 1, ch. 72-243; s. 1, ch. 73-127; s. 1, ch. 73-283; s. 116, ch. 73-333; s. 1, ch. 74-46; s. 1, ch. 74-124; s. 1, ch. 74-197; s. 1, ch. 75-209; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 1, ch. 77-290; ss. 1, 23, ch. 78-300; s. 15, ch. 79-7; ss. 2, 124, ch. 79-40; s. 21, ch. 79-312; s. 1, ch. 80-236; s. 3, ch. 81-119; ss. 1, 20, ch. 83-305; s. 1, ch. 84-267; s. 6, ch. 86-171; s. 1, ch. 87-330; s. 1, ch. 88-203; s. 2, ch. 89-61; ss. 3, 43, ch. 89-289; ss. 9, 56, ch. 90-201; ss. 7, 52, ch. 91-1; s. 1, ch. 91-2; s. 2, ch. 93-415; s. 117, ch. 94-119; s. 59, ch. 94-218; s. 97, ch. 97-103; s. 1, ch. 98-174; s. 89, ch. 2000-153; s. 7, ch. 2001-91; s. 11, ch. 2002-194; s. 5, ch. 2002-236; s. 54, ch. 2003-164; s. 467, ch. 2003-261; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2003-412; s. 2, ch. 2003-422; s. 59, ch. 2004-5; s. 32, ch. 2004-373; s. 21, ch. 2005-60; s. 12, ch. 2005-71; s. 1, ch. 2005-78; s. 4, ch. 2006-15; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2012-213; s. 1, ch. 2013-141; s. 46, ch. 2014-209; s. 19, ch. 2015-148; s. 11, ch. 2022-138; s. 95, ch. 2023-8.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 698 cases (19 in the last 5 years), 1942–2026 · leading case: Vegas v. Globe SEC., 627 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Vegas v. Globe SEC., 627 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). · cites it 41× “14, and made no mention whatever of the definition of wages contained in section 440.02. Expressly referring to section 440.”

& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). · cites it 12× “The “date of maximum medical improvement” is defined in section 440.02(10), Florida Statutes (2009), as “the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.”

Fast Tract Framing, Inc. v. Caraballo, 994 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). · cites it 23× “Claimant further asserts that Fast Tract and Maronda Homes provide no legal authority to support their argument that Claimant earned no wages and therefore no benefits were due; however, section 440.02 is the paramount legal authority on which we must rely in deciding workers'…”

City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). · cites it 20× “" § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). We find no such proof in the present case.”

Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). · cites it 16× “pinion, the claimant carried his burden to show both that he was unable to do anything more strenuous than sedentary work — which was not available to him within a radius of fifty miles — at the end of 104 weeks of temporary benefits, and that he would not be able to perform…”

Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). · cites it 18× “" The main problem with this interpretation is that "date of maximum medical improvement" is statutorily-defined as the date after which the employee is not reasonably anticipated to have further medical recovery or improvement from the injury, see § 440.02(10), Fla. Stat.,…”

Escambia Cty. Council v. Goldsmith, 500 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). · cites it 16× “[4] Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1979) specifically states: "Where a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by an accident arising out of, and in the course of, employment and resulting in death, only acceleration of death reasonably attributable to…”

Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989). · cites it 8× “" § 440.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). Similarly, Florida courts have extended the definition of "accident arising out of .”

Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1993). · cites it 10× “" The section then provides an extensive definition of the term "employee," including: [a]ny person who is an officer of a corporation and who performs services for remuneration for such corporation within this state, whether or not such services are continuous.”

Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR INC., 889 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 2004). · cites it 4× “" Accident is further defined in section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1991) as "only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly.”

Hensley v. Punta Gorda, 686 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). · cites it 17× “Judy Hensley, appellant and claimant in this workers' compensation matter, asks us to rule that section 440.02(1) Florida Statutes (Supp.”

B & B Steel Erectors v. Burnsed, 591 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). · cites it 18× “Section 440.02(12)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), provided, in part, that "any officer *646 of a corporation may elect to be exempt from coverage under this chapter by filing written certification of the election with the division as provided in s.”

Show all 698 citing cases →

— 440.02(1) — 75 cases

Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989). “" § 440.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). Similarly, Florida courts have extended the definition of "accident arising out of .”

Hensley v. Punta Gorda, 686 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). “Judy Hensley, appellant and claimant in this workers' compensation matter, asks us to rule that section 440.02(1) Florida Statutes (Supp.”

Marvin Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016).

Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR INC., 889 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 2004). “" Accident is further defined in section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1991) as "only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly.”

City of Holmes Beach v. Grace, 598 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1992).

— 440.02(1)(a) — 1 case

Randell, Inc. v. Chism, 404 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

— 440.02(1)(b) — 5 cases

Iley v. Linzey, 531 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Putnam Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Debose, 667 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

Radney v. Edwards, 424 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Randell, Inc. v. Chism, 404 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

Univ. of Fla., Inst. of Agr. v. Karch, 393 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

— 440.02(1)(b)(2) — 1 case

Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1997).

— 440.02(1)(c) — 7 cases

Rudolph v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 447 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Kerce v. Coca-Cola Co.-Foods Div., 389 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1980).

Miles v. Montreal Baseball Club, 379 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).

Rollins Bldg. Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, 393 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

Iley v. Linzey, 531 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

— 440.02(1)(c)(4) — 1 case

Whitney v. Colonial Inn, 172 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965).

— 440.02(10) — 13 cases

Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). “pinion, the claimant carried his burden to show both that he was unable to do anything more strenuous than sedentary work — which was not available to him within a radius of fifty miles — at the end of 104 weeks of temporary benefits, and that he would not be able to perform…”

& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “The “date of maximum medical improvement” is defined in section 440.02(10), Florida Statutes (2009), as “the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.”

Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “" The main problem with this interpretation is that "date of maximum medical improvement" is statutorily-defined as the date after which the employee is not reasonably anticipated to have further medical recovery or improvement from the injury, see § 440.02(10), Fla. Stat.,…”

Benniefield v. City of Lakeland, 109 So. 3d 1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

Crum v. Richmond, 46 So. 3d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

— 440.02(11) — 19 cases

Vegas v. Globe SEC., 627 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). “14, and made no mention whatever of the definition of wages contained in section 440.02. Expressly referring to section 440.”

Roberts v. Gator Freightways, Inc., 538 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983).

Vencor Hosp. v. Ahles, 727 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1993). “" The section then provides an extensive definition of the term "employee," including: [a]ny person who is an officer of a corporation and who performs services for remuneration for such corporation within this state, whether or not such services are continuous.”

— 440.02(11)(a) — 3 cases

Cenvill Dev. Corp. v. Candelo, 478 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

Herman v. Roche, 533 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Smith v. Ford, 472 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

— 440.02(11)(b) — 1 case

— 440.02(11)(d) — 3 cases

Mandico v. Taos Const., Inc., 605 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1992).

Edwards v. Caulfield, 560 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

Herman v. Roche, 533 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

— 440.02(11)(d)(1) — 1 case

Sunshine Ace Hardware v. Gray, 541 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

— 440.02(11)(d)(4) — 2 cases

Dobbins v. Weber, 585 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

— 440.02(12) — 24 cases

Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1989).

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Viera, 440 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Vegas v. Globe SEC., 627 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). “14, and made no mention whatever of the definition of wages contained in section 440.02. Expressly referring to section 440.”

Gulf Solar, Inc. v. Westfall, 447 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

Viking Sprinkler Co. v. Thomas, 413 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

— 440.02(12)(a) — 2 cases

Globe SEC. v. Pringle, 559 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

Philyaw v. Arthur H. Fulton, Inc., 569 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

— 440.02(12)(b) — 2 cases

B & B Steel Erectors v. Burnsed, 591 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “Section 440.02(12)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), provided, in part, that "any officer *646 of a corporation may elect to be exempt from coverage under this chapter by filing written certification of the election with the division as provided in s.”

Perkins v. A. Perkins Drywall, 615 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

— 440.02(12)(c) — 2 cases

Perkins v. A. Perkins Drywall, 615 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Bedsole v. Hancock-Hazlett Constr., 559 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

— 440.02(12)(d) — 1 case

Baxter v. Hog Valley Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 669 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

— 440.02(12)(d)(4) — 1 case

— 440.02(13) — 31 cases

Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1976).

City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Bivens v. City of Lakeland, 993 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

Auman v. Leverock's Seafood House, 997 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

City of Mary Esther v. McArtor, 902 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

— 440.02(13)(7) — 1 case

Armstrong v. Ormond in the Pines, 734 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

— 440.02(13)(a) — 6 cases

Bath v. Shee-Con, Inc., 560 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

Wright v. Douglas N. Higgins, Inc., 617 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

Waldorf v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 622 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Philyaw v. Arthur H. Fulton, Inc., 569 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

Hallal v. RDV Sports, Inc., 682 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

— 440.02(13)(b) — 4 cases

Iley v. Linzey, 531 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Covert v. Hall, 467 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

Bath v. Shee-Con, Inc., 560 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

McCollough v. Bush, 868 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

— 440.02(13)(b)(2) — 2 cases

Roberts v. Gator Freightways, Inc., 538 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

— 440.02(13)(c) — 9 cases

Armstrong v. Ormond in the Pines, 734 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

Arruda v. Gold Crest Kitchens, 642 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Perkins v. A. Perkins Drywall, 615 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Johnson v. Edwards, 569 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

Bath v. Shee-Con, Inc., 560 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

— 440.02(13)(d) — 11 cases

Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 667 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1995).

Lowry v. Logan, 650 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Mcclung-gagne v. Harbour City Volunteer, 721 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

Armstrong v. Ormond in the Pines, 734 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

Deen v. Quantum Resources, Inc., 750 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1999).

— 440.02(13)(d)(1) — 2 cases

Arruda v. Gold Crest Kitchens, 642 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Dept. of Fin. v. Mj Versaggi Trust, 952 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

— 440.02(13)(d)(3) — 1 case

Mcclung-gagne v. Harbour City Volunteer, 721 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

— 440.02(13)(d)(4) — 2 cases

Perkins v. A. Perkins Drywall, 615 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

— 440.02(13)(d)(5) — 3 cases

Arruda v. Gold Crest Kitchens, 642 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Dept. of Fin. v. Mj Versaggi Trust, 952 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

— 440.02(13)(d)(8) — 1 case

Dept. of Fin. v. Mj Versaggi Trust, 952 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

— 440.02(13)(d)(l) — 1 case

Smith v. Larry Rice Constr., 730 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

— 440.02(13)(e) — 1 case

Smith v. Larry Rice Constr., 730 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

— 440.02(14) — 12 cases

Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989). “" § 440.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). Similarly, Florida courts have extended the definition of "accident arising out of .”

Doctor's Bus. Serv., Inc. v. Clark, 498 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986).

Zundell v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 609 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Mcclung-gagne v. Harbour City Volunteer, 721 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

— 440.02(14)(a) — 1 case

Gayer v. Fine Line Const. & Elec., Inc., 970 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

— 440.02(14)(c) — 2 cases

Allied Trucking of Florida, Inc. v. Lanza, 826 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Smith v. Larry Rice Constr., 730 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

— 440.02(14)(d) — 2 cases

Reynolds v. Csr Rinker Transp., 31 So. 3d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Smith v. Larry Rice Constr., 730 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

— 440.02(14)(d)(l) — 1 case

Bogdanova v. Royal Hanneford Circus, 848 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

— 440.02(14)(e) — 1 case

Contractor's Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Dixon, 734 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

— 440.02(15) — 7 cases

Gonzalez v. J.W. Cheatham LLC, 125 So. 3d 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

King v. Keller, 141 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1962).

Twin City Roofing Constr. Specialists, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Fin. Servs., 969 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Reaves v. United Parcel Serv., 792 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

Hopkins v. E-Sys., Com. Div., 423 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

— 440.02(15)(a) — 16 cases

Hazealeferiou v. Labor Ready, 947 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Fast Tract Framing, Inc. v. Caraballo, 994 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). “Claimant further asserts that Fast Tract and Maronda Homes provide no legal authority to support their argument that Claimant earned no wages and therefore no benefits were due; however, section 440.02 is the paramount legal authority on which we must rely in deciding workers'…”

Vigliotti v. K-Mart Corp., 680 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Arreola v. Admin. Concepts, 17 So. 3d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Powers, 959 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

— 440.02(15)(b) — 6 cases

Putnam Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Debose, 667 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

Gomez Lawn Serv., Inc. v. The Hartford, 98 So. 3d 212 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

Mcclung-gagne v. Harbour City Volunteer, 721 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

Solomon v. Huddleston, 657 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Reaves v. United Parcel Serv., 792 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

— 440.02(15)(b)(2) — 1 case

Gayton v. Mills Septic Tank, 695 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

— 440.02(15)(c) — 8 cases

Moradiellos v. Gerelco Traffic Controls, Inc., 176 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).

Bend v. Shamrock Servs., 59 So. 3d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

Gonzalez v. J.W. Cheatham LLC, 125 So. 3d 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Lovering v. Nickerson, 72 So. 3d 780 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).

Wood v. S. Crane Serv., Inc., 117 So. 3d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

— 440.02(15)(c)(2) — 1 case

Adams Homes of Nw. Florida, Inc. v. Cranfill, 7 So. 3d 611 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

— 440.02(15)(d) — 4 cases

Gonzalez v. J.W. Cheatham LLC, 125 So. 3d 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Reynolds v. Csr Rinker Transp., 31 So. 3d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Charles Gladden v. Fisher Thomas, Inc., The Green etc. (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).

Osceola Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Boos, 912 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

— 440.02(15)(d)(6) — 2 cases

Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Powers, 959 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Twin City Roofing Constr. Specialists, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Fin. Servs., 969 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

— 440.02(15)(d)(l) — 2 cases

Strickland v. Timco Aviation Servs., Inc., 66 So. 3d 1002 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

Slora v. Sun 'n Fun Fly-In, Inc., 173 So. 3d 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

— 440.02(16) — 11 cases

Smith v. Chepolis, 896 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Fuster v. E. Airlines, Inc., 545 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Orlando Precast Prods. v. Ciofalo, 501 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Regal Marine Indus. v. Cappucci, 523 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Rodriguez v. Albertson's, 614 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

— 440.02(16)(a) — 9 cases

Bifulco v. Patient Bus. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 39 So. 3d 1255 (Fla. 2010).

Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

Hazealeferiou v. Labor Ready, 947 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Ahlers v. Wilson, 867 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Felder v. King Motor Co. of South Florida, 110 So. 3d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

— 440.02(17) — 9 cases

Turner v. PCR, INC., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000).

Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. Drewno, 727 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 573 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. McGuire, 629 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

— 440.02(17)(a) — 2 cases

Florida Workers' Comp. Jt. Underwriting etc. et a v. Am. Residuals & Talent, Inc. etc. (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

Florida Workers' Comp. Jt. Underwriting Ass'n, Inc. v. Am. Residuals & Talent, Inc., d/b/a Art Payroll (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

— 440.02(17)(b) — 3 cases

Ficocelli v. Just Overlay, Inc., 932 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Wood v. S. Crane Serv., Inc., 117 So. 3d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

McCollough v. Bush, 868 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

— 440.02(17)(c) — 2 cases

David Olson, M.D. v. Christopher & Tammy Costello, as Pers. Representatives of the Est. of Ryan Costello, & Inf (Fla. 6th DCA 2026).

— 440.02(17)(c)(3) — 1 case

Arena Football League & Arena Football One, LLC v. Bryon Bishop, 220 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).

— 440.02(18) — 53 cases

Escambia Cty. Council v. Goldsmith, 500 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “[4] Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1979) specifically states: "Where a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by an accident arising out of, and in the course of, employment and resulting in death, only acceleration of death reasonably attributable to…”

McCall v. Dick Burns, Inc., 408 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Thorkelson v. NY Pizza & Pasta Inc., 956 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Polk Nursery Co., Inc. v. Riley, 433 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Prahl Bros., Inc. v. Phillips, 429 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

— 440.02(18)(a) — 1 case

Serv. Am. Indem. Co./PMA Ins. Grp. & Robert B. Hess Racing, Inc. v. Bulfrano Andres Bahena (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).

— 440.02(18)(d) — 1 case

Serv. Am. Indem. Co./PMA Ins. Grp. & Robert B. Hess Racing, Inc. v. Bulfrano Andres Bahena (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).

— 440.02(19) — 83 cases

City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “" § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). We find no such proof in the present case.”

— 440.02(2) — 18 cases

Tipper v. Great Lakes Chem. Co., 281 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1973).

Florida Indus. Comm'n v. Schoenberg, 117 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).

S. Stand. Life Ins. v. Holloman, 149 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).

Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse, 74 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1954).

Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 246 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1971).

— 440.02(2)(a) — 5 cases

Pearson v. Harris, 449 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Gene's Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Boyd-Scarp Enter., Inc. v. Saunders, 453 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Tipper v. Great Lakes Chem. Co., 281 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1973).

Mullarkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972).

— 440.02(2)(b) — 3 cases

Vallina v. Victor Fuego Const. Co., 443 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Casey Key Inv. Corp. v. Arbuckle, 378 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

Vanvoorst v. Ruble Trucking Co., 456 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

— 440.02(2)(c) — 4 cases

Boyd-Scarp Enter., Inc. v. Saunders, 453 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Anna Maria Fire Control Dist. v. Angell, 528 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Key v. Goley, 402 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

Ravenswood-Griffin Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Newman, 422 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

— 440.02(2)(d) — 12 cases

Boyd-Scarp Enter., Inc. v. Saunders, 453 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

La Grande v. B & L Servs., Inc., 432 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Edwards v. Caulfield, 560 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

Thundereal Corp. v. Sterling, 368 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

Randell, Inc. v. Chism, 404 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

— 440.02(20) — 2 cases

Bordo Citrus Prods. v. Tedder, 518 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

Crews v. Dep't of Transp., 591 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

— 440.02(21) — 28 cases

Dubois Farms, Inc. v. Paul, 566 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

Tampa Elec. Co. v. Bradshaw, 477 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

Delong v. 3015 West Corp., 491 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Pan Am. World Airways v. Mash, 573 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

— 440.02(22) — 8 cases

Crum v. Richmond, 46 So. 3d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Christian v. Greater Miami Academy, 541 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

— 440.02(23) — 7 cases

Univ. of Florida v. Collins, 678 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Univ. of Florida v. Bowens, 677 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Value Rent a Car v. Liccardo, 603 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Muscanell, 705 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

Whitner v. Boulevard Tire Centers, 812 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

— 440.02(24) — 33 cases

Vegas v. Globe SEC., 627 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). “14, and made no mention whatever of the definition of wages contained in section 440.02. Expressly referring to section 440.”

Waldorf v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 622 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Turnberry Isle Resort v. Fernandez, 666 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

Mehrer v. Creative Hairdressers, Inc., 659 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

— 440.02(24)(1994) — 1 case

Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Muscanell, 705 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

— 440.02(25) — 1 case

Wallace v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., 579 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

— 440.02(27) — 1 case

Whitner v. Boulevard Tire Centers, 812 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

— 440.02(28) — 10 cases

Salinas v. C.A.T. Concrete, LLC, 46 So. 3d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Rene Stone Work Corp. v. Gonzalez, 25 So. 3d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Marin v. Aaron's Rent to Own, 53 So. 3d 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Garcia-Lopez v. Affordable Plumbing/Vinings Ins. Co., 66 So. 3d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

— 440.02(3) — 8 cases

Fumigation Dept. v. Pearson, 559 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

Deen v. Quantum Resources, Inc., 750 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1999).

Interstate Indus. Park v. Afterdeck Restaurant, 478 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

Deen v. Quantum Resources, Inc., 713 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

US Holdings, Inc. v. Belance, 922 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

— 440.02(31)(b) — 1 case

Amend. to Fla. Rules of Workers'comp., 664 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1995).

— 440.02(32) — 18 cases

Vigliotti v. K-Mart Corp., 680 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Closet Maid v. Sykes, 763 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

Lanham v. Dept. of Env't Prot., 868 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Watkins Engineers & Constructors v. Wise, 698 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. Drewno, 727 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

— 440.02(34) — 7 cases

City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “" § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). We find no such proof in the present case.”

Florida Distillers v. Rudd, 751 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

Houck v. Lee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs, 995 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

Bob Wilson Dodge v. Mohammed, 692 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Santana, 718 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

— 440.02(34)(a) — 1 case

City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “" § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). We find no such proof in the present case.”

— 440.02(34)(b) — 1 case

Temp. Labor Source v. EH, 765 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

— 440.02(34)(f) — 12 cases

City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “" § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). We find no such proof in the present case.”

Alachua Cnty. Adult Det. Ctr. v. Alford, 727 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

Allen v. Protel, Inc., 852 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

Home Depot v. Turner, 820 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Butler v. City of Jacksonville, 980 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

— 440.02(34)(f)(1994) — 1 case

Daws Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ostoyic, 756 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

— 440.02(35) — 3 cases

Lanham v. Dept. of Env't Prot., 868 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Tanguilan v. PMI Emp. Leasing, 832 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Harper v. Sebring Int'l Raceway, Inc., 886 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

— 440.02(36) — 6 cases

Sedgwick CMS & The Hartford/Sedgwick CMS v. Tammitha Valcourt-Williams, 271 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

Esad Babahmetovic v. Scan Design Florida Inc/ Zenith Ins. Co., 176 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

Sentry Ins. Co. v. Hamlin, 69 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

Sedgwick CMS & The Hartford/Sedgwick CMS v. Tammitha Valcourt-Williams (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

Jermaine Davis v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off./USIS, 196 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

— 440.02(37) — 2 cases

Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 769 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).

Protegrity Servs., Inc. v. Kourtakis, 827 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

— 440.02(37)(a) — 1 case

Royal & Sunalliance v. Chavez, 920 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

— 440.02(37)(b) — 1 case

Neavins v. City of St. Petersburg, 823 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

— 440.02(38) — 1 case

Paz v. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 45 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

— 440.02(4) — 7 cases

Lingold v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 416 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).

Protegrity Servs., Inc. v. Brehm, 901 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Fink v. Fink, 64 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1953).

O'NEIL v. Dep't of Transp., 468 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1985).

Alford v. Meyer, 201 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967).

— 440.02(40) — 2 cases

Michael Guglielmo v. State of Florida-DOC Zephyrhills C I/Div. of Risk Mgmt. (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).

Daniel Murphy v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, & Com. Risk Mgmt. (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).

— 440.02(5) — 10 cases

Gen. Elec. v. DeCubas, 504 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1988).

Socolow v. Flanigans Enter., 877 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Walt Disney World Co. v. McCrea, 754 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

Theis v. City of Miami, 564 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1990).

— 440.02(6) — 27 cases

S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. McCook, 355 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1977).

Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria, 383 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1980).

Richards Dept. Store v. Donin, 365 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1978).

Davis v. Sun First Nat. Bank of Orlando, 408 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

James v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 864 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

— 440.02(7) — 14 cases

Kirkland v. Harold Pratt Paving, Inc, 518 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

Holiday Care Ctr. v. Scriven, 418 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Jackson v. Columbia Pictures, 610 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Kone, Inc. v. Robinson, 937 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Regal Marine Indus. v. Cappucci, 523 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

— 440.02(7)(a) — 2 cases

Holiday Care Ctr. v. Scriven, 418 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida v. Greater Miami Hebrew Academy, 484 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

— 440.02(7)(b) — 1 case

Lemus v. Indus. Sites Servs., 482 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

— 440.02(8) — 15 cases

Chavarria v. Selugal Clothing, Inc., 840 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

Ficocelli v. Just Overlay, Inc., 932 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “" § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). We find no such proof in the present case.”

Schafrath v. Marco Bay Resort, Ltd., 608 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Scotty's, Inc. v. Sarandrea, 645 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

— 440.02(8)(a) — 2 cases

Krajenta v. Div. of Workers' Comp., Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec., 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

Krajenta v. Div., Wkrs'Comp., 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

— 440.02(81) — 1 case

Furtick v. Shults, 640 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

— 440.02(9) — 42 cases

HS Camp & Sons v. Flynn, 450 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Port Everglades Terminal Co. v. Canty, 120 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1960).

St., Dept. of Pub. Health v. Wilcox, 458 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Bell, 116 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1959).

— 440.02(l)(b) — 1 case

State, Dep't of Corr. v. Tharpe, 413 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

— 440.02(l)(c) — 1 case

State, Dep't of Corr. v. Tharpe, 413 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

— 440.02(ll)(d) — 1 case

Canal Ins. Co. v. Express Movers, Inc., 517 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

— 440.02(ll)(d)(4) — 1 case

Dobbins v. Weber, 585 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.