City of Cooper v. Sunshine Wireless, 654 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). · Go Syfert
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City of Cooper v. Sunshine Wireless, 654 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2011 · …to prevent 'ambush' by allowing the nonmoving party to be prepared for the issues that will be argued at the summary judgment hearing. at p. 284 ✓
19 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DESIGN NEUROSCIENCE CENTERS, P.L., etc. v. PRESTON J. FIELDS, P.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
The rule “is designed to prevent ‘ambush’ by allowing the nonmoving party to be prepared for the issues that will be argued at the summary judgment hearing.” Fla. Holding 4800, LLC v. Lauderhill Lending, LLC, 275 So. 3d 183, 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (quoting City of Cooper City 3 v. Sunshine Wireless Co., Inc., 654 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) MAGGY HURCHALLA v. HOMEOWNERS CHOICE PROPERTY & CASUALTY COMPANY, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
City of Cooper City v. Sunshine Wireless Co., Inc., 654 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FLORIDA HOLDING 4800 LLC v. LAUDERHILL LENDING, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Rule 1.510(c) “is designed to prevent ‘ambush’ by allowing the nonmoving party to be prepared for the issues that will be argued at the summary judgment hearing.” City of Cooper City v. Sunshine Wireless Co., Inc., 654 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (quoting Swift Indep.
examined Cited as authority (rule) SALVATORE AMBROGIO & ROSEMARIE AMBROGIO v. MARCELINE MCGUIRE, AN INDIVIDUAL & AS TRUSTEE (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Co., 359 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978))); City of Cooper City v. Sunshine Wireless Co., 654 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ("This rule is designed to prevent 'ambush' by allowing the nonmoving party to be prepared for the issues that will be argued at the summary judgment hearing." (quoting Swift Indep.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gee v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
The purpose of this rule is “to prevent ‘ambush’ by allowing the nonmoving party to be prepared for the issues that will be argued at the summary judgment hearing.” City of Cooper City v. Sunshine Wireless Co., 654 So.2d 283, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gee v. US BANK NAT. ASS'N (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
The purpose of this rule is "to prevent `ambush' by allowing the nonmoving party to be prepared for the issues that will be argued at the summary judgment hearing." City of Cooper City v. Sunshine Wireless Co., 654 So.2d 283, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Casa Inv. Co., Inc. v. Nestor
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Moreover, Rule 1.510(c) requires that a summary judgment motion “state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial matters of law to be argued.” The purpose of this rule is “to prevent ‘ambush’ by allowing the nonmoving party to be prepared for the issues that will be argued at the summary judgment hearing.” City of Cooper City v. Sunshine Wireless Co., 654 So.2d 283, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Bank of America Corp.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
See id.; Deluxe Motel, Inc. v. Patel, 727 So.2d 299, 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); City of Cooper City v. Sunshine Wireless Co., 654 So.2d 283, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); George G.
discussed Cited "see" Ambrogio v. McGuire (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sunshine Wireless Co. , 654 So.2d at 284 .
cited Cited "see" Koelling v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of Cooper City v. Sunshine Wireless Company, Inc., 654 So.2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
cited Cited "see" Rea v. BARTON PROTECTIVE SERV., INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of Cooper City v. Sunshine Wireless Co., Inc., 654 So.2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The CITY OF COOPER CITY, Appellant,
v.
SUNSHINE WIRELESS COMPANY, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee.
94-2120.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 3, 1995.
654 So. 2d 283
Per Curiam.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published

[*284] Michael T. Burke of Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke & George, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Gary S. Phillips and Steven B. Chaneles of Buchanan Ingersoll Professional Corp., North Miami Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises out of an action for breach of an annexation agreement and rescission. After the pleadings were closed and discovery had been taken, appellee moved for summary judgment. Appellee asserted in its motion that the contract was void ab initio, but did not raise the breach of contract issue.

Although the trial court held that the contract was not void or voidable, it found that appellant had breached the contract and ordered rescission. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment based on breach of contract and rescission because appellant did not have notice that these issues would be dealt with at the hearing. We agree and reverse.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c) requires a party seeking summary judgment to "state with particularity the grounds upon which [the motion] is based and the substantial matters of law to be argued." This rule is designed to prevent "ambush" by allowing the nonmoving party to be prepared for the issues that will be argued at the summary judgment hearing. Swift Indep. Packing Co. v. Basic Food Int'l, Inc., 461 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Since appellant did not receive notice that the issues of breach of contract and the related entitlement to rescission would be addressed, it had no opportunity to prepare and to present evidence on the issues actually adjudicated by the trial court.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause with leave for the trial court to reconsider the issues of breach of contract and rescission after appellant has been afforded proper notice and opportunity to be heard.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

DELL, C.J., and WARNER and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.