particularity requirement in Florida

2024Our supreme court has commented that “the particularity requirement stands as a bar to exploratory searches by officers armed with a general warrant,” and “the requirement limits the searching officer’s discretion in the execution of a search warrant, thus safeguarding the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Carlton v. State, 449 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1984).

2004In addition, the purpose of the particularity requirement of warrants is to “stand[ ] as a bar to exploratory searches by officers armed with a general warrant ... [and to] limit[ ] the searching officer’s discretion in the execution of a search warrant, thus safeguarding the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Carlton v. State, 449 So.2d 250, 252 (Fla.1984).

2019And it has said that “[i]f ambiguity within the proposal could reasonably affect the offeree’s decision, the proposal will not satisfy the particularity requirement.” Id. at 1079 .

2017It is true that “if ambiguity within the proposal could reasonably affect the offeree’s decision, the proposal will not satisfy the particularity requirement.” Id.

2018See Sunshine Wireless Co., 654 So. 2d at 284 .3 MORRIS and BLACK, JJ., Concur. 3We express no opinion as to whether the trial court's application of a five- year statute of limitations was correct. -7-

2018See *77 Sunshine Wireless Co. , 654 So.2d at 284 . 3 MORRIS and BLACK, JJ., Concur.

2017As the Florida Supreme Court recently warned in Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 202 So. 3d 846, 852 (Fla. 2016), “courts are discouraged from ‘nitpicking’ proposals for settlement to search for ambiguity.” In interpreting the settlement proposal, “the intention of the parties must be determined from examination of the whole contract and not from separate phrases or paragraphs.” Deeb v. Field, 311 So. 2d 736, 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).

2017However, “parties should not ‘nit-pick’ the validity of a proposal for settlement based on allegations of ambiguity unless the asserted ambiguity could ‘reasonably affect the offeree’s decision’ on whether to accept the proposal for settlement.” Carey-All Transp., Inc. v. Newby, 989 So.2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Nichols, 932 So.2d at 1079 ); see also Anderson, 202 So.3d at 853 (citations omitted) (“[Cjourts are discouraged from ‘nitpicking’ proposals for settlement to search for ambiguity.”) Further, we have held that proposals for settlement are to be interpreted by the same pri

2021For instance, in 5 Saenz v. Campos, 967 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), we held that a PFS failed to satisfy the particularity requirement of rule 1.442 because of ambiguity, when it included “all claims” by the insured against the insurer, but stated that it was in full settlement of claims raised in the suit.

2017For the purpose of construing the particularity requirement of rule 1.442, an “ambiguity” is defined as “ ‘the condition of admitting-more than one meaning.’” Id. at 1117 (quoting The Random House College Dictionary 42 (rev. ed. 1980)). “[T]he dismissal of a lawsuit is a proper and relevant condition in an offer of judgment.” 1 Nation Tech.

2016Ultimately, “[proposals for settlement are intended to end judicial labor, not create more.” Id. (quoting Lucas v. Calhoun, 813 So.2d 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)).

2013The Nichols ’ court states the test as follows: “If ambiguity within the proposal could reasonably affect the offeree’s decision, the proposal will not satisfy the particularity requirement.” Id.

2002See also Polakoff v. State, 586 So.2d 385 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).

1993The trial court reluctantly agreed, noting that while in the federal courts and in at least one other district in Florida the warrant would have met the particularity requirement, the trial court was bound in this district by our holding in Polakoff v. State, 586 So.2d 385 (Fla. 5th DCA) review denied, 593 So.2d 1053 (Fla.1991).

2002Co. v. Hingson, 808 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla.2002) (holding that the old rule required an offer to multiple plaintiffs to be apportioned among the plaintiffs, even without the specificity requirement that was added to the rule in 1997); Dudley v. McCormick, 799 So.2d 436, 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that Rule 1.442 requires that a joint offer made by a single defendant to two separate plaintiffs must specify the amount to go to each plaintiff); McFarland & Son, Inc. v. Basel, 727 So.2d 266, 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ("[A] general offer to a group of defendants without assigning each defendant a

2000Therefore, when a lack of apportionment between offerees prevents them from evaluating the offer independently, the joint offer is unenforceable. [3] See McFarland & Son, Inc. v. Basel, 727 So.2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that a general offer of judgment made to a group of defendants without assigning each defendant a specific amount *798 lacks the particularity required by rule 1.442).

2019The state’s obligation to describe with particularity the files it seeks is required because the “Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the [search] warrant[.]” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004); see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 988 n.5 (1984) (“The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.”).

2019Co., 235 So. 3d 953, 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (relying on the waiver provision of rule 1.140(h)(1) to hold that the defense of nonoccurrence of a condition precedent was waived by virtue of a failure to comply with the particularity requirement for pleading that defense contained in rule 1.120(c)). - 12 - Because Biomet's response to Ms. Gannon's jurisdictional allegation does not cure its failure to assert personal jurisdiction in its motion to dismiss, we can deem the defense preserved only if Biomet's assertion of personal jurisdiction in its amended motion to dismiss does cure that failure.

2019The state’s obligation to describe with particularity the files it seeks is required because the “Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the [search] warrant[.]” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004); see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 988 n.5 (1984) (“The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.”).

2017Corp. v. A1 Teletronics, Inc., 924 So.2d 3, 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

2017However, “parties should not ‘nit-pick’ the validity of a proposal for settlement based on allegations of ambiguity unless the asserted ambiguity could ‘reasonably affect the offeree’s decision’ on whether to accept the proposal for settlement.” Carey-All Transp., Inc. v. Newby, 989 So.2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Nichols, 932 So.2d at 1079 ); see also Anderson, 202 So.3d at 853 (citations omitted) (“[Cjourts are discouraged from ‘nitpicking’ proposals for settlement to search for ambiguity.”) Further, we have held that proposals for settlement are to be interpreted by the same pri

2017As the Florida Supreme Court recently warned in Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 202 So. 3d 846, 852 (Fla. 2016), “courts are discouraged from ‘nitpicking’ proposals for settlement to search for ambiguity.” In interpreting the settlement proposal, “the intention of the parties must be determined from examination of the whole contract and not from separate phrases or paragraphs.” Deeb v. Field, 311 So. 2d 736, 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).

2009Appellant submits this case is controlled by Henderson v. State, in which police officers obtained a warrant to search the suspect’s “residence and the curtilage thereof’ but instead searched two vehicles parked on the street after observing the defendant drive up in one vehicle and place something inside the other. 685 So.2d 970, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

2009See State v. Eldridge, 814 So.2d 1138, 1140-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); State v. Nelson, 542 So.2d 1043, 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (explaining that “the particularity requirement prevents searches and seizures at a location not intended by the search warrant, thus safeguarding the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials”).

2009See State v. Eldridge, 814 So.2d 1138, 1140-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); State v. Nelson, 542 So.2d 1043, 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (explaining that “the particularity requirement prevents searches and seizures at a location not intended by the search warrant, thus safeguarding the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials”).

2003See Zalis, 797 So.2d at 1290 , (requirement of mutual release against any future action fails to comply with rule).

2002Meyers, 771 So.2d 1202, 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that a general offer made to two defendants was deficient even though there was an indemnification agreement between the two defendants); but see Safelite Glass Corp. v. Samuel, 771 So.2d 44, 45-46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that an offer made to two defendants was not deficient for failure to apportion the amount between those defendants because one defendant was vicariously liable for the other defendant's negligence).