Sunshine Towing, Inc. v. Fonseca, 933 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). · Go Syfert
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Sunshine Towing, Inc. v. Fonseca, 933 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“where the legislature has used a term in one section of a statute but omitted the term in another section, the court will not read the term into the sections where it was omitted.”
6 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Estate of Edenfield Ex Rel. Edenfield (fladistctapp, 2010-06-04)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Estate of Edenfield Ex Rel. Edenfield
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where the legislature has used a term in one section of a statute but omitted the term in another section, the court will not read the term into the sections where it was omitted.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PHILLIP S. LANE v. Workforce Business Services, Inc. etc., etal
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
It is well-established that “[wjorkers’ compensation is purely a creature of statute and, as such, is subject to the basic principles of statutory construction.” Sunshine Towing, Inc. v. Fonseca, 933 So.2d 594, 594-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing McDade v. Palm Beach Cnty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Auman v. LEVEROCK'S SEAFOOD HOUSE
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Pizza & Pasta Inc., 956 So.2d 542, 543-44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("Workers' compensation is purely a creature of statute and, as such, is subject to the basic principles of statutory construction." (quoting Sunshine Towing, Inc. v. Fonseca, 933 So.2d 594, 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Desir v. Nouveau Associates
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Pizza & Pasta Inc., 956 So.2d 542, 543-44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("Workers' compensation is purely a creature of statute and, as such, is subject to the basic principles of statutory construction." (quoting Sunshine Towing, Inc. v. Fonseca, 933 So.2d 594, 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thorkelson v. NY Pizza & Pasta Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
"Workers' compensation is purely a creature of statute and, as such, is subject to the basic principles of statutory construction." Sunshine Towing, Inc. v. Fonseca, *544 933 So.2d 594, 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
SUNSHINE TOWING, INC., and FCCI Insurance Group, Appellants,
v.
Miguel FONSECA, Appellee.
1D05-3258.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jun 14, 2006.
933 So. 2d 594
Thomas.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 86%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)

Diane B. Hernandez of Hernandez & Hicks, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellants.

Bill McCabe of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, and Bill B. Berke, Cape Coral, for Appellee.

THOMAS, J.

Sunshine Towing, Inc., and FCCI Insurance Group ("E/C") appeal a final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims ("JCC") denying E/C's motion to involuntarily impose a lien as a condition precedent to making medically necessary modifications to Claimant's home. Because we find that the JCC did not err in determining there was no statutory or legal authority to involuntarily impose a lien on Claimant's home, we affirm.

Claimant was injured in a workers' compensation accident and is now a quadriplegic. E/C accepted Claimant's injury as compensable, provided treatment at an in-patient facility, and agreed that it was responsible for modifying Claimant's home to meet his medical needs under section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). E/C sought to impose a lien to prevent unjust enrichment or repetitive expenses from a variety of causes, including, but not limited to, Claimant's sale of his home.

Workers' compensation is purely a creature of statute and, as such, is subject to the basic principles of statutory construction. McDade v. Palm Beach[*595] County Sch. Dist., 898 So.2d 126, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sitko, 496 So.2d 920, 921 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)). Where the legislature has used a term in one section of a statute but omitted the term in another section, the court will not read the term into the sections where it was omitted. Leisure Resorts Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).

Here, E/C is not entitled to involuntarily impose a lien because there is no statutory authorization for a lien. Section 440.13(2)(a) does not provide for a lien, nor does any other section that E/C cites. See J.J. Murphy & Son, Inc. v. Gibbs, 137 So.2d 553, 562 (Fla.1962) (explaining that workers' compensation "must be governed by what the statutes provide, not by what deciding authorities feel the law should be."). In addition, because the legislature used the term of imposing a lien in other areas of chapter 440 but not in section 440.13(2)(a), we cannot read this term into section 440.13(2)(a). See §§ 440.23 & 440.39(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Therefore, the JCC's order is AFFIRMED.

BENTON and POLSTON, JJ., concur.