State v. Fearheiley, 979 So. 2d 487 (La. 2008). · Go Syfert
State v. Fearheiley, 979 So. 2d 487 (La. 2008). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
38 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 2008 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2008 2017 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Louisiana v. Corey Stevenson
La. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Ulmer, 2012-0949, pp. 7-8, 116 So.3d at 1009 (finding that there was reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop a where the police observed an apparent hand-to-hand transaction in high drug-trafficking area); State v. Fearheiley, 2008-0307, p. 2 (La. 4/18/08), 979 So.2d 487, 489 (holding that the officer was justified in detaining the defendant for a drug transaction for an exchange that lasted no more than fifteen to twenty seconds inside a car in a parking lot even though officer could not see what either person had in his hand, and the encounter had a possible innocent explanation);…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Louisiana v. Corey Stevenson
La. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Ulmer, 2012-0949, pp. 7-8, 116 So.3d at 1009 (finding that there was reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop a where the police observed an apparent hand-to-hand transaction in high drug-trafficking area); State v. Fearheiley, 2008-0307, p. 2 (La. 4/18/08), 979 So.2d 487, 489 (holding that the officer was justified in detaining the defendant for a drug transaction for an exchange that lasted no more than fifteen to twenty seconds inside a car in a parking lot even though officer could not see what either person had in his hand, and the encounter had a possible innocent explanation);…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Rapp
La. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
That the encounter had other possible innocent |inexplanations, including the one offered by defendant after the stop that the unidentified female involved in the transaction had paid off a debt she owed him, did not require the police officer to turn a blind eye to the circumstances and ignore what two years of experience in narcotics investigations, encompassing 15 to 20 arrests, had taught him, that in the narcotics trade, “when it’s done outside, it’s done very fast from one hand to the next.” State v. Fearheiley, 08-0307, pp. 1-2 (La.4/18/08), 979 So.2d 487, 488-89 (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. McMillan
La. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See also State v. Temple, 02-1895 (La.9/9/03), 854 So.2d 856, 861 (holding that reasonable suspicion for a stop was more than “looking nervous” and sitting on a porch in a “high crime area.”); State v. Fearheiley, 08-0307 (La.4/18/08), 979 So.2d 487, 489 (holding that a police officer’s observation of a apparent brief hand-to-hand transaction inside a vehicle gave rise to reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop because the officer was not “required to turn a blind eye to the circumstances and ignore what two years of experience in narcotics investigations ... had taught him,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Pratt
La. · 2009 · confidence medium
State v. Fearheiley, 08-0307, p. 2 (La.4/18/08), 979 So.2d 487, 489 (Police officer’s observation of apparent brief hand-to-hand transaction inside a vehicle gave rise to reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop because he was not required “to turn a blind eye to the circumstances and ignore what two years of experience in narcotics investigations ... had taught him, that in the narcotics trade, ‘when it’s done outside, it’s done very fast and from one hand to the next.’ ”) (citation omitted); cf. State v. Johnson, 01-2081, p. 3, 815 So.2d 809, 811 (Police may “draw on th…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Bush (2×)
La. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Fearheiley, 08-0307, pp. 1-3 (La.4/18/08), 979 So.2d 487, 488-489 (La.2008) (finding sufficient justification for an investigatory stop when “the police officer observed the independent, yet complementary and simultaneous actions by two parties” who displayed “no apparent purpose ... other than facilitating the brief exchange” and the officer drew upon his experience in narcotics investigations, which “had taught him, that in the narcotics trade, ‘when it’s done outside, it’s done very fast from one hand to the next.’ ”).
discussed Cited "see" State v. BURKETTE
La. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Fearheiley, XXXX-XXXX, p. 2 (La. 4/18/08), 979 So.2d 487, 489 (per curiam) ("[t]hat the encounter had other possible innocent explanations ... did not require the police officer to turn a blind eye to the circumstances and ignore what ... years of experience in narcotics investigations ... had taught him").
cited Cited "see" State v. Kelley
La. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See, State v. Fearheiley, 08-307 (La.4/18/08), 979 So.2d 487, 489 (per curiam ). 16 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Hall
La. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Pratt, 08-1819 (La.9/4/09), 16 So.3d 1163, 1165 (quoting State v. Fearhei-ley, 08-0307, p. 2 (La.4/18/08), 979 So.2d 487, 489 , in reversing a trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress, noting that "[p]olice officer's observation of apparent brief hand-to-hand transaction inside a vehicle gave rise to reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop ...”). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Louisiana
v.
Brent FEARHEILEY.
2008-KK-0307.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Apr 18, 2008.
979 So. 2d 487
Per Curiam.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published

[*488] PER CURIAM.

Granted. The order of the court of appeal is vacated, the decision of the trial court denying defendant's motion to suppress is reinstated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

While the police may not detain individuals on the basis of an "`inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch,"'" United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)), in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to conduct an investigatory stop, i.e., whether the police possessed the requisite "minimal level of objective justification," INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), courts must take into account the totality of the circumstances in a process that allows the police "`to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that "might well elude an untrained person."'" State v. Johnson, 01-2081, p. 3, 815 So.2d 809, 811 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750-51, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002))(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, the police officer observed the "independent, yet complementary and simultaneous actions by two parties," conducting an apparent hand-to-hand transaction, Black v. United States, 810 A.2d 410, 413 (D.C.2002), although the officer could not see what either person had in his or her hand. The apparent exchange lasted no more than 15 to 20 seconds inside one of two cars which had arrived separately in the parking lot of a Circle K store with no apparent purpose that evening other than facilitating the brief exchange before the parties, who appeared[*489] to the officer to have no other connection to each other, went their separate ways. That the encounter had other possible innocent explanations, including the one offered by defendant after the stop that the unidentified female involved in the transaction had paid off a debt she owed him, did not require the police officer to turn a blind eye to the circumstances and ignore what two years of experience in narcotics investigations, encompassing 15 to 20 arrests, had taught him, that in the narcotics trade, "when it's done outside, it's done very fast from one hand to the next." See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 751 ("Although an officer's reliance on a mere `hunch' is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.") (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883 and Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1585).

Given the minimal objective and particularized justification for the ensuing detention of the defendant, the subsequent warrantless seizure of a plastic baggie filled with crystalline methamphetamine, plainly visible on the front passenger seat of the vehicle after defendant opened the car door, was lawful, whether rationalized as an incident of an arrest based on probable cause, Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004); State v. Melton, 412 So.2d 1065, 1068 (La.1982) ("Where there is probable cause but no formal arrest, a limited search to preserve evidence is justified."), or as part of a search conducted under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement which rests on the diminished expectations of privacy associated with vehicles and on their inherent mobility. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996).