Terry stop in Louisiana

2013Mena, 544 U.S. at 99 , 125 S.Ct. at 1470 (“The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs - on Mena, who was already being lawfully detained during a search of the house, was undoubtedly a separate intrusion in addition to detention in the converted garage.”); State v. Broussard, 00-3230, p. 4 (La.5/24/02), 816 So.2d 1284, 1287 (“ ‘There is no question that the use of handcuffs, being one of the most recognizable indicia of a traditional arrest, substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of a putative Terry stop.’”)(quoting United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir.1998)(internal q

2013United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir.l994)(“Because the specific nature of this stop [in which defendant was handcuffed and strapped into a police cruiser] was not justified under the Terry doctrine,. we must treat it as an arrest, requiring probable cause.”); Broussard , 00-3230, pp. 3-4, 816 So.2d at 1287 (“[B]revity alone does not always distinguish investigatory stops from arrests, as the former may be accompanied by arrest-like features, e.g., use of drawn weapons and handcuffs, which may, but do not invariably, render the seizure a de facto arrest.”)(citing Acos

2014This Court has stated the use of handcuffs during a putative Terry stop is reasonable if the State can “‘point to some specific fact or circumstance that could have supported a reasonable belief that the use of such restraints was necessary to carry out the legitimate purposes of the stop without exposing law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an undue risk of harm.’ ” State v. Porche, 06-0312, p. 8 (La.11/29/06), 943 So.2d 335, 339 (per curiam) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)....

2014In State v. Turner, 13-0180, p. 3 (La.3/1/13), 108 So.3d 753, 754-55 (quoting State v. Porche, 06-312, p. 8 (La.11/29/06), 943 So.2d 335, 339 ), the supreme court stated “the use of handcuffs during a putative Terry stop is reasonable if the State can ‘point to some specific fact or circumstance that could have supported a reasonable belief that the use of such restraints was necessary to carry out the legitimate purposes of the stop without exposing law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an undue risk of harm.’ ” Corporal Domingue testified at trial that, based on the

2013United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir.l994)(“Because the specific nature of this stop [in which defendant was handcuffed and strapped into a police cruiser] was not justified under the Terry doctrine,. we must treat it as an arrest, requiring probable cause.”); Broussard , 00-3230, pp. 3-4, 816 So.2d at 1287 (“[B]revity alone does not always distinguish investigatory stops from arrests, as the former may be accompanied by arrest-like features, e.g., use of drawn weapons and handcuffs, which may, but do not invariably, render the seizure a de facto arrest.”)(citing Acos

2013United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir.l994)(“Because the specific nature of this stop [in which defendant was handcuffed and strapped into a police cruiser] was not justified under the Terry doctrine,. we must treat it as an arrest, requiring probable cause.”); Broussard , 00-3230, pp. 3-4, 816 So.2d at 1287 (“[B]revity alone does not always distinguish investigatory stops from arrests, as the former may be accompanied by arrest-like features, e.g., use of drawn weapons and handcuffs, which may, but do not invariably, render the seizure a de facto arrest.”)(citing Acos

2013Mena, 544 U.S. at 99 , 125 S.Ct. at 1470 (“The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs - on Mena, who was already being lawfully detained during a search of the house, was undoubtedly a separate intrusion in addition to detention in the converted garage.”); State v. Broussard, 00-3230, p. 4 (La.5/24/02), 816 So.2d 1284, 1287 (“ ‘There is no question that the use of handcuffs, being one of the most recognizable indicia of a traditional arrest, substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of a putative Terry stop.’”)(quoting United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir.1998)(internal q

2013United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir.l994)(“Because the specific nature of this stop [in which defendant was handcuffed and strapped into a police cruiser] was not justified under the Terry doctrine,. we must treat it as an arrest, requiring probable cause.”); Broussard , 00-3230, pp. 3-4, 816 So.2d at 1287 (“[B]revity alone does not always distinguish investigatory stops from arrests, as the former may be accompanied by arrest-like features, e.g., use of drawn weapons and handcuffs, which may, but do not invariably, render the seizure a de facto arrest.”)(citing Acos

1993See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 , 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3310, 3312 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985).

1993See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 , 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3310, 3312 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985).

2018App. 4 Cir. 7/24/13), 120 So.3d 886 , 893, quoting Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032 , 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) : "[Once a valid Terry stop of the vehicle occurs] the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational *769 inferences from those facts, reasonably warra

2018App. 4 Cir. 7/24/13), 120 So.3d 886 , 893, quoting Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032 , 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) : "[Once a valid Terry stop of the vehicle occurs] the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational *769 inferences from those facts, reasonably warra

2006In State v. Miller, 00-1657 (La.10/26/01), 798 So.2d 947, 949 , the Louisiana Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion noted that the courts have not developed a bright-line test for determining when a police-citizen encounter exceeds the bounds of a Terry stop.

2005In State v. Miller, 00-1657, pp. 2-3 (La.10/26/01), 798 So.2d 947, 949 ( per curiam ), the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the courts have not developed a bright-line test to determine when a police-citizen encounter exceeds the bounds of a Terry stop.

2014Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-48 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [footnote omitted][emphasis added] With regard to an officer’s observation of a hand-to-hand transaction, in State v. Ulmer, 12-0949, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/29/13), 116 So.3d 1004 , 1009⅜0, 7 8 this Court recently recited the Louisiana Supreme Court’s finding that such an observation can suffice as a basis for an investigatory stop: Explaining its finding that the observation of “an apparent hand-to-hand transaction” provided justification for an investigatory Terry stop, the Louisiana Supreme Court in the

2014Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-48 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [footnote omitted][emphasis added] With regard to an officer’s observation of a hand-to-hand transaction, in State v. Ulmer, 12-0949, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/29/13), 116 So.3d 1004 , 1009⅜0, 7 8 this Court recently recited the Louisiana Supreme Court’s finding that such an observation can suffice as a basis for an investigatory stop: Explaining its finding that the observation of “an apparent hand-to-hand transaction” provided justification for an investigatory Terry stop, the Louisiana Supreme Court in the

2026Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); see also State v. Shirley, 2008-2106, p. 9 (La. 5/5/09), 10 So.3d 224, 230 (noting that “although...an individual detained in a Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion has had his freedom of movement curtailed in a significant way, until an arrest actually occurs, these Fourth Amendment seizures do not constitute custody for Miranda purposes.”).

2026Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); see also State v. Shirley, 2008-2106, p. 9 (La. 5/5/09), 10 So.3d 224, 230 (noting that “although...an individual detained in a Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion has had his freedom of movement curtailed in a significant way, until an arrest actually occurs, these Fourth Amendment seizures do not constitute custody for Miranda purposes.”).

2025See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (context and location are proper factors in Terry analysis).

2025See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (context and location are proper factors in Terry analysis).

2013La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A); State v. Fauria, 393 So.2d 688, 690 (La.1981).

2013La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A); State v. Fauria, 393 So.2d 688, 690 (La.1981).

2002Thus, when the government seeks to prove that an investigatory detention involving the use of handcuffs did not exceed the limits of a Terry stop, it must be able to point to some specific fact or circumstance that could have supported a reasonable belief that the use of such restraints was necessary to carry out the legitimate purposes of the stop without exposing law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an undue risk of harm.") (citations omitted); State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 296 (La.1985)("[W]hen the officers stopped the Cadillac, drew their weapons, ordered defen

2002Thus, when the government seeks to prove that an investigatory detention involving the use of handcuffs did not exceed the limits of a Terry stop, it must be able to point to some specific fact or circumstance that could have supported a reasonable belief that the use of such restraints was necessary to carry out the legitimate purposes of the stop without exposing law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an undue risk of harm.") (citations omitted); State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 296 (La.1985)("[W]hen the officers stopped the Cadillac, drew their weapons, ordered defen

2010In State v. Morton, 08-164 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/29/08) , 993 So.2d 651, 657 , this Court discussed the law regarding when the use of handcuffs escalates a Terry stop into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause: Inherent in the right of police to conduct a brief investigatory detention is also the right to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention.

2010In State v. Morton, 08-164 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/29/08) , 993 So.2d 651, 657 , this Court recognized that since police officers should not be required to take unnecessary risks in performing their duties, they are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of a Terry stop.

2000Nevertheless, while fully aware that an officer who "lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent" may seize the object, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), the trial court ruled that because "the canister itself was not the contraband," and the officer could not feel the cocaine inside the closed container, LaPueble's shaking of the film canister and then removing its top to peer inside exceeded the limits of a valid Terry stop.

2000Nevertheless, while fully aware that an officer who "lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent" may seize the object, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), the trial court ruled that because "the canister itself was not the contraband," and the officer could not feel the cocaine inside the closed container, LaPueble's shaking of the film canister and then removing its top to peer inside exceeded the limits of a valid Terry stop.

2018App. 4 Cir. 7/24/13), 120 So.3d 886 , 893, quoting Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032 , 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) : "[Once a valid Terry stop of the vehicle occurs] the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational *769 inferences from those facts, reasonably warra

2018App. 4 Cir. 7/24/13), 120 So.3d 886 , 893, quoting Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032 , 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) : "[Once a valid Terry stop of the vehicle occurs] the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational *769 inferences from those facts, reasonably warra

2025Rather, the determination of whether a detention exceeds the bounds of a Terry stop is a fact-intensive inquiry.” State v. Turner, 13-0180 (La. 3/1/13), 108 So. 3d 753 .

2014In State v. Turner, 13-0180, p. 3 (La.3/1/13), 108 So.3d 753, 754-55 (quoting State v. Porche, 06-312, p. 8 (La.11/29/06), 943 So.2d 335, 339 ), the supreme court stated “the use of handcuffs during a putative Terry stop is reasonable if the State can ‘point to some specific fact or circumstance that could have supported a reasonable belief that the use of such restraints was necessary to carry out the legitimate purposes of the stop without exposing law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an undue risk of harm.’ ” Corporal Domingue testified at trial that, based on the

2020C.Cr.P. art. 218.1, which provides: “When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention.” When examining whether police had reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop or Terry frisk, courts must “take into account the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture, giving deference to the inferences and deductions of a trained police officer that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Duhe, 12-2677 (La. 12/10/13), 130 So. 3d 880, 885-86 .

2016However, in reversing that ruling, the supreme court explained that “given the particular association of methamphetamine production and guns,” the officer’s “decision to handcuff [the] defendant for the duration of the stop was justified for officer safety and did not convert the encounter from a Terry stop to an arrest” and that the search of the vehicle was justified as “a protective search of the vehicle.” Id. at 886-87 . 8Furthermore, in State v. Lewis, 12-902 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/27/13) , 121 So.3d 128 , writ denied, 13-1926 (La. 4/17/14), 138 So.3d 618 , the officers handcuffed the defendan

1980The `narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place." Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, 444 U.S. at 94 , 100 S.Ct. at 344 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 247 .

1980The `narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place." Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, 444 U.S. at 94 , 100 S.Ct. at 344 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 247 .

2025Sims, 02-2208 at 11, 851 So.2d at 1046 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., State v. Owens, 26,952, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/10/95), 655 So.2d 603 , 607- 08 (weapons search justified where subject had bulge near waistband and thrust his hand inside waistband during lawful Terry stop).

2006The trial court relied upon the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in State v. Sims, 2002-2208, pp. 12-13, (La.6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1039, 1047 , in which the court stated: Based on the language of the statutes and jurisprudence restricting the right of resistance to an actual unlawful arrest, the aforementioned policy considerations supporting Terry stop-and-frisks, namely ensuring officer safety and discouraging violence on the streets, and the original intent of the legislature in passing these pre- Terry statutes, we decline to recognize the right to resist an unlawful stop-and-frisk in Loui

2024The State cites State v. Hill, 97-2551 (La. 11/6/98), 725 So.2d 1282 , wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court had to determine whether the lower court properly suppressed evidence seized from the defendant in a search incident to his arrest on outstanding warrants, after determining that the initial Terry stop was unlawful.

2009La.C.Cr.P. art. 891(A)(“For purposes of this Article, a firearm or other dangerous weapon either used in the commission of a felony offense or the use of which constitutes an element of a felony offense may be declared to be crime-related contraband which may be seized by a law enforcement officer in the course of an arrest of issuance of summons or may be seized by order of court pursuant to other provisions of law.”); see State v. Hill, 97-2251 (La.11/6/98), 725 So.2d 1282 (even assuming that Terry stop of defendant was unlawful, discovery of outstanding arrests warrants constituted an inter

2021See State v. James, 99- 3304 ( La. 12/ 8/ 00), 795 So. 2d 1146, 1150 ( per curiam) (" the officer exceeded the scope of a valid Terry stop when he removed the canister from [ the defendant' s] pocket and began manipulating it to determine its contents.

2014The defendant argues that the incriminating character of the object, which Officer Aranda encountered underneath his shorts, was not immediately apparent without an additional form of search or examination to identify it as contraband. | inHe likens the case to State v. James, 99-3304 (La.12/08/00), 795 So.2d 1146 , where the Louisiana Supreme Court suppressed the seizure of a film canister from defendant’s pocket during a valid investigatory stop, because the officer “could not particularize the association of film canisters •with narcotics trafficking to the circumstances as he knew them at

2014The State points out that the reasonable suspicion that justifies a Terry stop “need not rise to the probable cause required for a lawful arrest.” State v. Duhe, 12-2677, p. 7 (La.12/10/13), 130 So.3d 880, 885 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)).

2014The State points out that the reasonable suspicion that justifies a Terry stop “need not rise to the probable cause required for a lawful arrest.” State v. Duhe, 12-2677, p. 7 (La.12/10/13), 130 So.3d 880, 885 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)).

2014In addition, La.Code Crim P. art. 215.1(A) defines the limits of an officer’s actions in effecting a Terry stop as, “A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is |7about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.” The trial court also addressed in its Reasons the definition of “reasonable suspicion,” as defined by the supreme court and stated, “Reasonable cause for an investigatory detention is something less than probable cause and must be determined under the

2012See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195, 1198 (La.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953 , 104 S.Ct. 2158 , 80 L.Ed.2d 543 (1984). |flThe Terry standard, as codified in La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, authorizes police officers to stop a person in a public place whom they reasonably suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and demand that the person identify himself and explain his actions.