Lewis v. State, 817 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). · Go Syfert
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Lewis v. State, 817 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
28 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Cameron v. United States (flsd, 2023-03-13)
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2002 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cameron v. United States
S.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
Lewis v. State, 817 So. 2d 933, 934 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DERREN DEJUAN MORRISON v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Lewis v. State, 817 So. 2d 933, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing to section 775.051, Fla. Stat. (1999)). 4 the prosecutor made an improper comment during opening statements referencing the State’s charging decision.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon (4×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
See id.; Lewis v. State, 817 So. 2d 933, 934 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2002) (noting that Florida felony battery is a general intent crime).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon (8×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Rather, the real-world examples of Florida felony battery we are aware of all involve conduct that clearly required the use of physical force, as defined by Curtis Johnson . 17 See, e.g., Williams, 9 So.3d at 659 (biting the victim with such force that the resulting laceration required emergency medical treatment); Lewis, 817 So.2d at 933 (punching the victim in the face “with a force that required stitches and left a scar”); Harris v. State, 111 So.3d 922, 923-24 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 2013) (grabbing the victim, pushing her, sitting on her chest, and strangling her with sufficient force to bre…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patrick v. State
Fla. · 2012 · confidence medium
Gibbs argued “that the court erred in instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any offense proscribed by law.” He further argued “that the instruction amounted to an improper judicial comment. ...” The Fourth District disagreed, stating: As of October 1, 1999, the Florida Legislature eliminated the defense of voluntary intoxication. § 775.051, Fla. Stat. (1999); Lewis v. State, 817 So.2d 933, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Smith
M.D. Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
The touching or striking has to be intentional rather than accidental, W.E.P. v. State, 790 So.2d 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), and this offense is a general intent crime, like simple battery, Lewis v. State, 817 So.2d 933, 934 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gibbs v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
As of October 1, 1999, the Florida Legislature eliminated the defense of voluntary intoxication. § 775.051, Fla. Stat. (1999); Lewis v. State, 817 So.2d 933, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." FRANCISCO-ALONZO
BIA · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, e.g., Lewis v. State, 817 So. 2d 933 (Fla. Dist.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
James Thomas LEWIS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
4D00-4661.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 15, 2002.
817 So. 2d 933
Per Curiam.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Claudine M. LaFrance, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

The motion for rehearing is denied. We withdraw our former opinion and substitute the following.

James Lewis was convicted of felony battery in violation of section 784.041 of the Florida Statutes (1999). At trial, the victim's testimony established that Lewis had been drinking and smoking crack for a substantial amount of time before the two began arguing. She left when he asked, but returned some time later. Lewis became angry when she started to leave a second time and punched her in the face with a force that required stitches and left a scar. Lewis did not put on defense evidence.

However, Lewis requested a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication as a defense. The trial court refused and, upon the state's request pursuant to section 775.051 of the Florida Statutes (1999), instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any offense proscribed by law.

Lewis appeals, claiming that the elimination of the voluntary intoxication defense violated his due process rights under the Florida Constitution. Voluntary intoxication was a defense to specific intent crimes under Florida common law. See Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 153-58, 9 So. 835 (1891); Linehan v. State, 442 So.2d 244, 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), approved on other grounds, 476 So.2d 1262 (Fla.1985). As of October 1, 1999, the Florida Legislature eliminated the defense. See § 775.051, Fla. Stat. (1999).

However, in light of our recent decision in C.B. v. State, we find that the constitutionality of the statute should not be addressed[*934] in this case. 810 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (recognizing that battery is a general intent crime). The element of intent in felony battery is identical to simple battery. Compare § 784.041(1) with § 784.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). Therefore, felony battery is also a general intent crime and the voluntary intoxication defense would not have been available to Lewis even under previous case law. For this reason, we find that section 775.051 would not apply to this case and affirm the decision of the court below.

AFFIRMED.

GUNTHER, TAYLOR, JJ., and DELL, JOHN W., Senior Judge, concur.