Carter v. State, 277 So. 2d 896 (Ala. 1973). · Go Syfert
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Carter v. State, 277 So. 2d 896 (Ala. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1996 · …a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime ≈ altered
cited 2× by 1 distinct case · …a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime. ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case · …an absolute constitutional prerequisite to acceptance of a guilty plea, ✓
193 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ex parte Stanford Pritchett. (2×)
Ala. · 2014 · confidence medium
Drawing on Boykin , this Court has held that “a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime.” Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 85 , 277 So.2d 896, 898 (1973) (emphasis added).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Gordon v. Nagle (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ala. · 1994 · confidence medium
However, a guilty plea does not waive such jurisdictional challenges to a conviction as an argument that the indictment failed to charge an offense 6 or that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 7 Id. at 1007.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
This court, citing Ex parte Rivers, 597 So.2d 1308 (Ala.1991), remanded Garrett to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. “ ‘Since Carter v. State, [ 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896, at 898 (1973) ], this court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have consistently held that a defendant must be informed of the maximum and minimum possible sentences as an absolute prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea.’ Ex parte Rivers at 1309.” Garrett v. State, 611 So.2d at 494 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garrett v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Rivers follows previous Alabama law on this issue: “Since Carter v. State, [ 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896, at 898 (1973) ], this court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have consistently held that a defendant must be informed of the maximum and minimum possible sentences as an absolute prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea.” Ex parte Rivers, at 1309.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ex Parte Rivers
Ala. · 1991 · confidence medium
Rivers petitioned this Court for the writ of certiorari, which we issued, based on the authority of Carter v. State , 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 at 898 (1973), in which this Court held "that a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime." We reverse and remand.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brooks v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 244 n. 7, 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 1713 n. 7, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 85 , 277 So.2d 896, 897 (1973).” Lochli v. State, 565 So.2d 294, 296-97 (Ala. Crim.App.1990). “ ‘A defendant has a constitutional right to be informed of the range of punishment prescribed by law for the offenses to which he is pleading guilty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vittitoe v. State
Miss. · 1990 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896, 897 (1973); State v. Price, 715 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Alaska App. 1986); State v. Escalante, 148 Ariz. 298 , 714 P.2d 468, 471 (App. 1986); McDaniel v. State, 288 Ark. 629 , 708 S.W.2d 613, 615 (1986); In re Birch, 10 Cal.3d 314 , 110 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216 , 515 P.2d 12, 16 (1973); People v. Chippewa, 713 P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Colo. App. 1985); D'Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144 , 476 A.2d 543, 550 (1984); Gaston v. United States, 535 A.2d 893, 896-97 (D.C.App. 1988); Wells v. State, 396 A.2d 161, 162 (Del. 1978); Perez v. State, 449 So.2d 407, 408 …
discussed Cited "see" Peoples v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jones v. State , [ 48 Ala. App. 32 , 261 So.2d 451 (1972)].' " Carter v. State , 291 Ala. 83 , at 85, 277 So.2d 896 , at 897-98 (1973).
examined Cited "see" Trice v. State (4×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1992 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, e.g., Carter v. State , 291 Ala. 83 , 85 , 277 So.2d 896 , 897 (1973); Tinsley v. State , 485 So.2d 1249 , 1251 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986).
discussed Cited "see" Bush v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 (1973).
examined Cited "see" Johnson v. State (8×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 (1973) and McNalley v. State, 468 So.2d 209 (Ala.Crim.App.1985).
discussed Cited "see" Hamm v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 (1973).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Muse (2×)
La. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 (1973); People v. Troyan, 21 Ill.App.3d 375 , 315 N.E.2d 335 (1974); White v. State, 222 Kan. 709, 568 P.2d 112 (1977); Fletcher v. Cupp, 1 Or.App. 467 , 463 P.2d 365 (1969).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Cantu v. State (4×)
Ala. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 84 , 277 So.2d 896, 897 (1973) (court stated that ‘[o]ur inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant’s guilty plea was “intelligent and voluntary,” as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] ... (1969) [, where the a]p-pellant argues that he was not advised on the record what the minimum and maximum punishments for his offense would be’).” 660 So.2d at 229-30 (emphasis added in Parish).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Parish v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 84 , 277 So.2d 896, 897 (1973) (court stated that “[o]ur inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant’s guilty plea was ‘intelligent and voluntary,’ as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] ... (1969) [, where the ajppellant argues that he was not advised on the record what the minimum and maximum punishments for his offense would be”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Parish v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Carter v. State , 291 Ala. 83 , 84 , 277 So.2d 896 , 897 (1973) (court stated that "[o]ur inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant's guilty plea was 'intelligent and voluntary,' as required by Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] . . . (1969) [, where the a]ppellant argues that he was not advised on the record what the minimum and maximum punishments for his offense would be").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Reeves v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 (1973).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Abbott v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Carter v. State , 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 (1973); Pratte v. State , 448 So.2d 502 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984); McGhee v. State , 412 So.2d 327 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982) and cases cited therein.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lawrence Carter
v.
the State of Alabama.
SC 355.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 17, 1973.
277 So. 2d 896
Marlin M. Mooneyham, Montgomery, for appellant. Before a guilty plea can be accepted by the trial court, the record must affirmatively show that the plea was voluntarily and understandingly made; that the defendant was informed of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; that he was informed of his right to a jury trial; that he was informed of his right to confront one's accusers and that he was informed of what the plea connotes and of its consequence, i. e., minimum and maximum punishment allowed by law: Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ; Dunkin v. State, 47 Ala. App. 696 , 260 So.2d 604 ; Clark v. State, 48 Ala. App. 108 , 262 So.2d 310 ; Powell v. State, 47 Ala. App. 622 , 259 So.2d 675 ; Cooper v. State, 47 Ala. App. 178 , 252 So.2d 104 ; Spidell v. State, 48 Ala. App. 24 , 261 So.2d 443 ; Jones v. State, 48 Ala. App. 32 , 261 So.2d 451 . William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and George White, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. Where judgment entry states that defendant waived privilege against self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, and right to confront his accusers, and that he had full understanding of what guilty plea connotes and of its consequences and record does contain inquiries regarding said rights together with the defendant's responses thereto and judgment entry does affirmatively show that defendant's counsel was present at sentencing, conviction should be affirmed. Honeycutt v. State, 47 Ala. App. 640 , 641 , 259 So.2d 846 (1); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 only holds as regards punishment that the Court make sure that the accused has a full understanding of what his plea connotes and of its consequence. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 .
Faulkner, Heflin, Merrill, Har-Wood, Maddox.
Cited by 88 opinions  |  Published
FAULKNER, Justice.

Lawrence Ray Carter pled guilty to kidnapping James O. McGhee. The details of the crime do not appear of record. Carter was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary. He appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, and the appeal was thereafter transferred to this Court.

Our inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant’s guilty plea was “intelligent and voluntary,” as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Appellant argues that he was not advised on the record what the minimum and maximum punishments for his offense would be.

[*85] With relation to the issue of prospective punishment, the record discloses the following dialogue in open court:

“DISTRICT ATTORNEY: And he [defense counsel] explained it to you thoroughly and you thoroughly understand what you are charged with and the penalties involved and the elements of the crime. (Emphasis supplied.)
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”

Boykin, supra, does not specifically posit revelation of the maximum and minimum punishment as a necessary element of an “intelligent and voluntary” guilty plea. Justice Douglas speaks only of making sure the defendant understands the “consequence” of his plea. 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d at 280. A footnote cites with approval a Pennsylvania state case requiring explanation of the “permissible range of sentences.”

Subsequent to Boykin, supra, it has become established that the defendant must be informed of maximum and minimum possible sentences as an absolute constitutional prerequisite to acceptance of a guilty plea. Jones v. State, 48 Ala.App. 32, 261 So.2d 451 (1972); Spidell v. State, 48 Ala.App. 24, 261 So.2d 443 (1972); People v. Ingeneri, 7 Ill.App.3d 809, 288 N.E.2d 550 (1972); People v. Buck, 7 Ill.App.3d 758, 288 N.E.2d 548 (1972); United States ex rel. Hill v. United States, 452 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1971); Cooper v. State, 47 Ala. App. 178, 252 So.2d 104 (1971).

In light of this background, the precise issue in this case is whether the defendant’s statement that he knew the “penalties involved” is effective when the exact nature of those penalties (2-10 years in the penitentiary) was not stated on the face of the record.

We think appellant’s argument is well taken. The “utmost solicitude” required by Boykin, supra, requires a showing not only that the defendant believed he knew the range of punishment, but that his belief was accurate. The better practice is to elicit the maximum and minimum sentences from the defendant himself, so that his knowledge thereof appears on the face of the record. See Jones v. State, supra.

The abuse to which disregard of this rule can lead is well-illustrated in this case. We find the following colloquy relating to the defendant’s alleged crime, carrying a 2-10 year sentence:

“THE COURT: Well, one other thing, you knew that under these circumstances that the jury might have suggested that you be put in the electric chair, didn’t you ?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”

Defendant, despite his statement, obviously did not know what the possible range of sentence was. Thus we see that the requirements of Boykin, supra, rather than being mere technicalities, are protective of substantial rights.

We hold that a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime.

Appellee argues that the judgment entry shows that the defendant understood the “range of the sentence.” This entry clearly refers to the answer of the defendant that he understood the “penalties involved,” discussed supra, and is no evidence of any further explanation of rights in the case.

The judgment of conviction and sentence are reversed.

Reversed and remanded.

HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, HAR-WOOD and MADDOX, JJ., concur.