Carter v. State, 277 So. 2d 896 (Ala. 1973). · Go Syfert
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Carter v. State, 277 So. 2d 896 (Ala. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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A defendant must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for a crime as a constitutional prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea.

A defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping and was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary. He appealed, arguing that his guilty plea was not intelligent or voluntary because the court did not state the specific minimum and maximum potential punishments on the record. Although the defendant stated he understood the penalties involved, the record did not reflect the exact range of possible sentences. The court holds that a defendant must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime as an absolute constitutional prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea.

193 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ex parte Stanford Pritchett., 167 So. 3d 321 (Ala. 2014)
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
277 So. 2d at 898 Advising defendants of sentencing range before plea5 citing cases“a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime”1 citing court quotes it
  • Ex parte Stanford Pritchett., 167 So. 3d 321 (Ala. 2014).published 2 cites
    “a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime”
  • Thomas v. State, 654 So. 2d 57 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).published
    This court, citing Ex parte Rivers, 597 So.2d 1308 (Ala.1991), remanded Garrett to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. “ ‘Since Carter v. State, [ 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896, at 898 (1973) ], this court and the Court of Criminal Appeal…
  • Garrett v. State, 611 So. 2d 493 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).published
    Rivers follows previous Alabama law on this issue: “Since Carter v. State, [ 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896, at 898 (1973) ], this court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have consistently held that a defendant must be informed of the maximum…
  • Ex Parte Rivers, 597 So. 2d 1308 (Ala. 1991).published
    Rivers petitioned this Court for the writ of certiorari, which we issued, based on the authority of Carter v. State , 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 at 898 (1973), in which this Court held "that a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be…
  • Trice v. State, 601 So. 2d 180 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).published 4 cites
    Accord, e.g., Carter v. State , 291 Ala. 83 , 85 , 277 So.2d 896 , 897 (1973); Tinsley v. State , 485 So.2d 1249 , 1251 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986).
291 Ala. at 85 “a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime.”4 citing cases3 citing courts quote it
  • Ex parte Stanford Pritchett., 167 So. 3d 321 (Ala. 2014).published 2 cites
    Drawing on Boykin , this Court has held that “a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime.” Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 85 , 277 So.2d 896, 898 (1973)…
  • Ex Parte Rivers, 597 So. 2d 1308 (Ala. 1991).published
    Rivers petitioned this Court for the writ of certiorari, which we issued, based on the authority of Carter v. State , 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 at 898 (1973), in which this Court held "that a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be…
  • Looney v. State, 563 So. 2d 3 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).published
  • Alston v. State, 414 So. 2d 488 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).published
277 So. 2d at 897 Inquiry into voluntariness and intelligence of guilty plea4 citing casescourt stated that ‘[o]ur inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant’s guilty plea was “intelligent and voluntary,” as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ... (19692 citing courts put it this way
  • Brooks v. State, 606 So. 2d 615 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).published
    Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 244 n. 7, 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 1713 n. 7, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 85 , 277 So.2d 896, 897 (1973).” Lochli v. State, 565 So.2d 294, 296-97 (Ala. Crim.App.1990). “ ‘A defendant has a…
  • Vittitoe v. State, 556 So. 2d 1062 (Miss. 1990).published
    NOTES [1] Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896, 897 (1973); State v. Price, 715 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Alaska App. 1986); State v. Escalante, 148 Ariz. 298 , 714 P.2d 468, 471 (App. 1986); McDaniel v. State, 288 Ark. 629 , 708 S.W.2d 613…
  • Cantu v. State, 660 So. 2d 1026 (Ala. 1994).published 4 cites
    See, e.g., Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 84 , 277 So.2d 896, 897 (1973) (court stated that ‘[o]ur inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant’s guilty plea was “intelligent and voluntary,” as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 89…
  • Par. v. State, 660 So. 2d 227 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).published 4 cites
    See, e.g., Carter v. State , 291 Ala. 83 , 84 , 277 So.2d 896 , 897 (1973) (court stated that "[o]ur inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant's guilty plea was 'intelligent and voluntary,' as required by Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238…
court stated that ‘[o]ur inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant’s guilty plea was “intelligent and voluntary,” as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] ... (1969no pin page on record · 2 citing cases listed
  • Cantu v. State, 660 So. 2d 1026 (Ala. 1994).published 4 cites
    (court stated that ‘[o]ur inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant’s guilty plea was “intelligent and voluntary,” as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] ... (1969)
  • Par. v. State, 660 So. 2d 227 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).published 4 cites
    (court stated that "[o]ur inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant's guilty plea was 'intelligent and voluntary,' as required by Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] . . . (1969)
277 So. 2d at 1007 Guilty pleas do not waive jurisdictional challenges to conviction1 citing case
  • Gordon v. Nagle, 647 So. 2d 91 (Ala. 1994).published 3 cites
    However, a guilty plea does not waive such jurisdictional challenges to a conviction as an argument that the indictment failed to charge an offense 6 or that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 7 Id. at 1007.
Other citing cases7 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lawrence Carter
v.
the State of Alabama.
SC 355.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 17, 1973.
Published opinion
277 So. 2d 896
1973 Ala. LEXIS 1053
Marlin M. Mooneyham, Montgomery, for appellant. Before a guilty plea can be accepted by the trial court, the record must affirmatively show that the plea was voluntarily and understandingly made; that the defendant was informed of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; that he was informed of his right to a jury trial; that he was informed of his right to confront one's accusers and that he was informed of what the plea connotes and of its consequence, i. e., minimum and maximum punishment allowed by law: Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ; Dunkin v. State, 47 Ala. App. 696 , 260 So.2d 604 ; Clark v. State, 48 Ala. App. 108 , 262 So.2d 310 ; Powell v. State, 47 Ala. App. 622 , 259 So.2d 675 ; Cooper v. State, 47 Ala. App. 178 , 252 So.2d 104 ; Spidell v. State, 48 Ala. App. 24 , 261 So.2d 443 ; Jones v. State, 48 Ala. App. 32 , 261 So.2d 451 . William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and George White, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. Where judgment entry states that defendant waived privilege against self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, and right to confront his accusers, and that he had full understanding of what guilty plea connotes and of its consequences and record does contain inquiries regarding said rights together with the defendant's responses thereto and judgment entry does affirmatively show that defendant's counsel was present at sentencing, conviction should be affirmed. Honeycutt v. State, 47 Ala. App. 640 , 641 , 259 So.2d 846 (1); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 only holds as regards punishment that the Court make sure that the accused has a full understanding of what his plea connotes and of its consequence. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 .
Faulkner, Heflin, Merrill, Har-Wood, Maddox.
Cited by 88 opinions  |  Published
FAULKNER, Justice.

Lawrence Ray Carter pled guilty to kidnapping James O. McGhee. The details of the crime do not appear of record. Carter was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary. He appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, and the appeal was thereafter transferred to this Court.

Our inquiry focuses upon whether the appellant’s guilty plea was “intelligent and voluntary,” as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Appellant argues that he was not advised on the record what the minimum and maximum punishments for his offense would be.

[*85] With relation to the issue of prospective punishment, the record discloses the following dialogue in open court:

“DISTRICT ATTORNEY: And he [defense counsel] explained it to you thoroughly and you thoroughly understand what you are charged with and the penalties involved and the elements of the crime. (Emphasis supplied.)
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”

Boykin, supra, does not specifically posit revelation of the maximum and minimum punishment as a necessary element of an “intelligent and voluntary” guilty plea. Justice Douglas speaks only of making sure the defendant understands the “consequence” of his plea. 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d at 280. A footnote cites with approval a Pennsylvania state case requiring explanation of the “permissible range of sentences.”

Subsequent to Boykin, supra, it has become established that the defendant must be informed of maximum and minimum possible sentences as an absolute constitutional prerequisite to acceptance of a guilty plea. Jones v. State, 48 Ala.App. 32, 261 So.2d 451 (1972); Spidell v. State, 48 Ala.App. 24, 261 So.2d 443 (1972); People v. Ingeneri, 7 Ill.App.3d 809, 288 N.E.2d 550 (1972); People v. Buck, 7 Ill.App.3d 758, 288 N.E.2d 548 (1972); United States ex rel. Hill v. United States, 452 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1971); Cooper v. State, 47 Ala. App. 178, 252 So.2d 104 (1971).

In light of this background, the precise issue in this case is whether the defendant’s statement that he knew the “penalties involved” is effective when the exact nature of those penalties (2-10 years in the penitentiary) was not stated on the face of the record.

We think appellant’s argument is well taken. The “utmost solicitude” required by Boykin, supra, requires a showing not only that the defendant believed he knew the range of punishment, but that his belief was accurate. The better practice is to elicit the maximum and minimum sentences from the defendant himself, so that his knowledge thereof appears on the face of the record. See Jones v. State, supra.

The abuse to which disregard of this rule can lead is well-illustrated in this case. We find the following colloquy relating to the defendant’s alleged crime, carrying a 2-10 year sentence:

“THE COURT: Well, one other thing, you knew that under these circumstances that the jury might have suggested that you be put in the electric chair, didn’t you ?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”

Defendant, despite his statement, obviously did not know what the possible range of sentence was. Thus we see that the requirements of Boykin, supra, rather than being mere technicalities, are protective of substantial rights.

We hold that a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his crime.

Appellee argues that the judgment entry shows that the defendant understood the “range of the sentence.” This entry clearly refers to the answer of the defendant that he understood the “penalties involved,” discussed supra, and is no evidence of any further explanation of rights in the case.

The judgment of conviction and sentence are reversed.

Reversed and remanded.

HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, HAR-WOOD and MADDOX, JJ., concur.