fell into error in Alabama

1975Amerson v. State, 43 Ala.App. 148 , 182 So.2d 901 .

1975Amerson v. State, 43 Ala.App. 148 , 182 So.2d 901 .

1977We held that prejudicial error was committed in a strikingly similar situation in Johnson v. State, 49 Ala.App. 356 , 272 So.2d 282 , cert. denied 289 Ala. 745 , 272 So.2d 286 , in which it was stated: “In our opinion the court erred in not allowing the appellant to answer the question propounded above.

1977We held that prejudicial error was committed in a strikingly similar situation in Johnson v. State, 49 Ala.App. 356 , 272 So.2d 282 , cert. denied 289 Ala. 745 , 272 So.2d 286 , in which it was stated: “In our opinion the court erred in not allowing the appellant to answer the question propounded above.

1977We held that prejudicial error was committed in a strikingly similar situation in Johnson v. State, 49 Ala.App. 356 , 272 So.2d 282 , cert. denied 289 Ala. 745 , 272 So.2d 286 , in which it was stated: “In our opinion the court erred in not allowing the appellant to answer the question propounded above.

1977We held that prejudicial error was committed in a strikingly similar situation in Johnson v. State, 49 Ala.App. 356 , 272 So.2d 282 , cert. denied 289 Ala. 745 , 272 So.2d 286 , in which it was stated: “In our opinion the court erred in not allowing the appellant to answer the question propounded above.

1977Carter and Impson , supra. Finally appellant urges that the trial court fell into error by qualifying several charges requested by appellant, which the Court read to the jury.

1975The rule covering such a situation is stated in Henning v. Kyle, 190 Va. 247 , 56 S.E.2d 67 (though there considering a civil case), as follows: “None of the evidence adduced upon the first trial may be considered in determining whether or not false representations of material facts upon which she relied were made to defendant.

1975The rule covering such a situation is stated in Henning v. Kyle, 190 Va. 247 , 56 S.E.2d 67 (though there considering a civil case), as follows: “None of the evidence adduced upon the first trial may be considered in determining whether or not false representations of material facts upon which she relied were made to defendant.

1975Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 .

1975Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83 , 277 So.2d 896 .

1972“Under the general authority as stated in the case of Family Land & Investment Company, Inc. v. Williams, et al., 273 Ala. 273 , 138 So.2d 696 and the statutes pertaining to the issues of the cause the Court can only find that title should vest in Frank Romano, to the following described real property:” We can say what this court said in the case cited by the trial court — “We are not prepared to say that the trial court fell into error by quieting title in the appellees.” There were some deficiencies in the pleadings, but each side presented its claim to possession and title, and the trial co

1972“Under the general authority as stated in the case of Family Land & Investment Company, Inc. v. Williams, et al., 273 Ala. 273 , 138 So.2d 696 and the statutes pertaining to the issues of the cause the Court can only find that title should vest in Frank Romano, to the following described real property:” We can say what this court said in the case cited by the trial court — “We are not prepared to say that the trial court fell into error by quieting title in the appellees.” There were some deficiencies in the pleadings, but each side presented its claim to possession and title, and the trial co

1954Among these is charge lettered I: “The Court charges the jury that, if the jury, upon considering all the evidence, have a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt, arising out of any part of the evidence, they should find him not guilty.” In the early case of Hurd v. State, 94 Ala. 100 , 10 So. 528 , the court devoted its entire opinion to a discussion of this charge and reversed the judgment below because it was refused.

1953They are erroneous; and in giving them the trial court fell into error, which is fatal to the judgment rendered.” In Ray v. State, 147 Ala. 5 , 41 So. 519, 520 , we pointed out that the opinion in Walls v. State, supra, explained and qualified the opinion in Smith v. State, supra: “The defendant was indicted and tried under section 4346 of the Code of 1896, which provides: ‘Any person who commits an assault upon another, with intent to murder,’ etc. And in order to convict the defendant it is incumbent upon the state to prove that the assault was committed with the intent to murder; but, like

1953They are erroneous; and in giving them the trial court fell into error, which is fatal to the judgment rendered.” In Ray v. State, 147 Ala. 5 , 41 So. 519, 520 , we pointed out that the opinion in Walls v. State, supra, explained and qualified the opinion in Smith v. State, supra: “The defendant was indicted and tried under section 4346 of the Code of 1896, which provides: ‘Any person who commits an assault upon another, with intent to murder,’ etc. And in order to convict the defendant it is incumbent upon the state to prove that the assault was committed with the intent to murder; but, like

1953Walls v. State, 90 Ala. 618 , 8 So. 680 (where the case of Smith v. State, 88 Ala. 23 , 7 So. 103 , is explained and qualified); * * The State concedes the incorrectness of the statements in the opinion here under review to the effect that a conviction under an indictment charging the offense of assault with intent to murder can be had on proof showing no more than that the accused intended to do grievous bodily harm to the assaulted party, provided such intent to do grievous bodily harm is accompanied with present ability to effect such harm.

1953Walls v. State, 90 Ala. 618 , 8 So. 680 (where the case of Smith v. State, 88 Ala. 23 , 7 So. 103 , is explained and qualified); * * The State concedes the incorrectness of the statements in the opinion here under review to the effect that a conviction under an indictment charging the offense of assault with intent to murder can be had on proof showing no more than that the accused intended to do grievous bodily harm to the assaulted party, provided such intent to do grievous bodily harm is accompanied with present ability to effect such harm.

1949The following authorities are conclusive on this point of decision: Cawley v. State, 133 Ala. 128 , 32 So. 227 ; Wiley v. State, 99 Ala. 146 , 13 So. 424 ; Naugher v. State, 116 Ala. 463 , 23 So. 26 ; Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85, 137 ; Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. 14, 17 ; People v. Singh, 78 Cal.App. 488 , 248 P. 986 ; Preston v. U. S., 65 App. D.

1949The following authorities are conclusive on this point of decision: Cawley v. State, 133 Ala. 128 , 32 So. 227 ; Wiley v. State, 99 Ala. 146 , 13 So. 424 ; Naugher v. State, 116 Ala. 463 , 23 So. 26 ; Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85, 137 ; Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. 14, 17 ; People v. Singh, 78 Cal.App. 488 , 248 P. 986 ; Preston v. U. S., 65 App. D.

1949The following authorities are conclusive on this point of decision: Cawley v. State, 133 Ala. 128 , 32 So. 227 ; Wiley v. State, 99 Ala. 146 , 13 So. 424 ; Naugher v. State, 116 Ala. 463 , 23 So. 26 ; Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85, 137 ; Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. 14, 17 ; People v. Singh, 78 Cal.App. 488 , 248 P. 986 ; Preston v. U. S., 65 App. D.

1949The following authorities are conclusive on this point of decision: Cawley v. State, 133 Ala. 128 , 32 So. 227 ; Wiley v. State, 99 Ala. 146 , 13 So. 424 ; Naugher v. State, 116 Ala. 463 , 23 So. 26 ; Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85, 137 ; Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. 14, 17 ; People v. Singh, 78 Cal.App. 488 , 248 P. 986 ; Preston v. U. S., 65 App. D.

1949The following authorities are conclusive on this point of decision: Cawley v. State, 133 Ala. 128 , 32 So. 227 ; Wiley v. State, 99 Ala. 146 , 13 So. 424 ; Naugher v. State, 116 Ala. 463 , 23 So. 26 ; Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85, 137 ; Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. 14, 17 ; People v. Singh, 78 Cal.App. 488 , 248 P. 986 ; Preston v. U. S., 65 App. D.

1949In the case of Mosely v. State, 19 Ala. App. 335 , 97 So. 247 , the court said: “It has been many times announced, and the well-settled rule is, that the law makes no presumption as to reputation or character.

1949In the case of Mosely v. State, 19 Ala. App. 335 , 97 So. 247 , the court said: “It has been many times announced, and the well-settled rule is, that the law makes no presumption as to reputation or character.

1949The following authorities are conclusive on this point of decision: Cawley v. State, 133 Ala. 128 , 32 So. 227 ; Wiley v. State, 99 Ala. 146 , 13 So. 424 ; Naugher v. State, 116 Ala. 463 , 23 So. 26 ; Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85, 137 ; Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. 14, 17 ; People v. Singh, 78 Cal.App. 488 , 248 P. 986 ; Preston v. U. S., 65 App. D.

1949The following authorities are conclusive on this point of decision: Cawley v. State, 133 Ala. 128 , 32 So. 227 ; Wiley v. State, 99 Ala. 146 , 13 So. 424 ; Naugher v. State, 116 Ala. 463 , 23 So. 26 ; Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85, 137 ; Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. 14, 17 ; People v. Singh, 78 Cal.App. 488 , 248 P. 986 ; Preston v. U. S., 65 App. D.

1948In this ruling we are of opinion that the court fell into error.” In Watts v. State, 177 Ala. 24 , 59 So. 270 , the court held that by showing that, prior to the fatal difficulty, the deceased attacked the defendant with a pair of scissors was not going into the details of the altercation against the rule appertaining.

1948In this ruling we are of opinion that the court fell into error.” In Watts v. State, 177 Ala. 24 , 59 So. 270 , the court held that by showing that, prior to the fatal difficulty, the deceased attacked the defendant with a pair of scissors was not going into the details of the altercation against the rule appertaining.

1948Proof that on the day before the killing the decedent, in a difficulty with the defendant, drew a gun on him was held admissible in Nelson v. State, 13 Ala.App. 28 , 68 So. 573 .

1948Proof that on the day before the killing the decedent, in a difficulty with the defendant, drew a gun on him was held admissible in Nelson v. State, 13 Ala.App. 28 , 68 So. 573 .

1937In the first of said propositions it is insisted that when a defendant- pleads an alibi the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish his alibi to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury only, and that in the instant case the court fell into error in charging the jury that “The burden is on the defendant to prove the truthfulness of his alibi.” Exception was duly reserved to the above-quoted portion of the oral charge, and in support of this insistence we are cited the following authorities: Prince v. State, 100 Ala. 144 , 14 So. 409 , 410, 46 Am.St.Rep. 28 ; Roberson v. State, 25 Ala.A

1937In the first of said propositions it is insisted that when a defendant- pleads an alibi the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish his alibi to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury only, and that in the instant case the court fell into error in charging the jury that “The burden is on the defendant to prove the truthfulness of his alibi.” Exception was duly reserved to the above-quoted portion of the oral charge, and in support of this insistence we are cited the following authorities: Prince v. State, 100 Ala. 144 , 14 So. 409 , 410, 46 Am.St.Rep. 28 ; Roberson v. State, 25 Ala.A

1937In the first of said propositions it is insisted that when a defendant- pleads an alibi the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish his alibi to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury only, and that in the instant case the court fell into error in charging the jury that “The burden is on the defendant to prove the truthfulness of his alibi.” Exception was duly reserved to the above-quoted portion of the oral charge, and in support of this insistence we are cited the following authorities: Prince v. State, 100 Ala. 144 , 14 So. 409 , 410, 46 Am.St.Rep. 28 ; Roberson v. State, 25 Ala.A

1937In the first of said propositions it is insisted that when a defendant- pleads an alibi the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish his alibi to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury only, and that in the instant case the court fell into error in charging the jury that “The burden is on the defendant to prove the truthfulness of his alibi.” Exception was duly reserved to the above-quoted portion of the oral charge, and in support of this insistence we are cited the following authorities: Prince v. State, 100 Ala. 144 , 14 So. 409 , 410, 46 Am.St.Rep. 28 ; Roberson v. State, 25 Ala.A

1937In the first of said propositions it is insisted that when a defendant- pleads an alibi the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish his alibi to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury only, and that in the instant case the court fell into error in charging the jury that “The burden is on the defendant to prove the truthfulness of his alibi.” Exception was duly reserved to the above-quoted portion of the oral charge, and in support of this insistence we are cited the following authorities: Prince v. State, 100 Ala. 144 , 14 So. 409 , 410, 46 Am.St.Rep. 28 ; Roberson v. State, 25 Ala.A

1931We are of the opinion that the names “Cleavies Panter,” the admitted true name of this appellant, is not idem son-ans with the names “Clervus Painter alias ■Clevis Painter.” We think the case of Clements v. State, 19 Ala. App. 640 , 99 So. 832, 833 , is ample authority in this connection.

1931We are of the opinion that the names “Cleavies Panter,” the admitted true name of this appellant, is not idem son-ans with the names “Clervus Painter alias ■Clevis Painter.” We think the case of Clements v. State, 19 Ala. App. 640 , 99 So. 832, 833 , is ample authority in this connection.

1929The circumstances regarding the admission *221 of this improper evidence, and its later exclusion, were not, in our opinion, comparable to those surrounding the admission, and later exclusion, of the testimony discussed in the opinion in the case of Watson v. Adams, 187 Ala. 490 , 65 So. 528 , Ann.

1929The circumstances regarding the admission *221 of this improper evidence, and its later exclusion, were not, in our opinion, comparable to those surrounding the admission, and later exclusion, of the testimony discussed in the opinion in the case of Watson v. Adams, 187 Ala. 490 , 65 So. 528 , Ann.

1929In Gray v. State, 63 Ala. 66 , to quote from tlie statement of facts: “The state introduced Spencer Brooks as a witness, who testified, that Matt Gray, the defendant, had been concerned in an assault on him with a knife, whereby he was severely cut in the neck, a short time before the assault charged in the indictment.” Chief Justice Stone,- speaking for the court in answer to the contention that this was going into the particulars, observed: “The prisoner was indicted for an assault with intent to murder Spencer Brooks, which, under our statute, is made a felony.

1917Where value has at any time been given for the instrument,- the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect to all parties who became such prior to that time.” And section 5012: “A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and,” to quote the original statute for the remainder of the section (Acts 1907, p. 671), “may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon.” This change in the law was overlooked in Miller v. Johnson, 189

1917Where value has at any time been given for the instrument,- the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect to all parties who became such prior to that time.” And section 5012: “A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and,” to quote the original statute for the remainder of the section (Acts 1907, p. 671), “may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon.” This change in the law was overlooked in Miller v. Johnson, 189

1915If such assurance was given the witness and in pursuance thereof he gave evidence favorable to the prosecution, it ivas a material fact to which the defendant was entitled, as showing bias or prejudice, and proper to be considered by the jury in weighing the testimony of the witness. —Lodge v. State, 122 Ala. 97 , 26 South. 210 , 82 Am.