State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354 (Iowa 1999). · Go Syfert
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State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354 (Iowa 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2018–2019 · …the court is not required to give consideration to the defendant's ability to pay at p. 357 ✓
58 citation events (53 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State of Iowa v. Daniel Wesley Davis Jr. (4×) also: Cited "see"
Iowa · 2020 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
unless that section 910.7 remedy has been exhausted, we have no basis for reviewing the issue in this court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Tavish Coleon Shackford
Iowa Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Iowa Code § 356.7 (1) (emphasis added). “[T]he language ‘who has been convicted of a criminal offense’ describes who may be charged rather than the services for which charges may be made.” State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999) (quoting Iowa Code § 356.7 (1)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Larry Gross
Iowa Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Iowa Code § 910.2 ; State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999) (noting until a restitution plan is filed “the court is not required to give consideration to the defendant’s ability to pay”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Harold Lathrop
Iowa Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
We agree the court is not obliged to determine the defendant’s reasonable ability to pay until a “plan of restitution contemplated by Iowa Code section 910.3 [i]s complete.” State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999); see also Swartz, 601 N.W.2d at 354 (finding challenge to sentencing court’s failure to determine Swartz’s ability to pay premature because (1) the plan of restitution was not complete when notice of appeal was filed and (2) appellate court had no basis for review until offender petitioned for modification under Iowa Code section 910.7).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Clarence M. Ford, III
Iowa Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
See State v. Jose, 636 N.W.2d 38, 45-46 (Iowa 2001) (“The ability to pay is an issue apart from the amount of restitution and is therefore not an ‘order incorporated in the sentence’ and is therefore not directly appealable as such.” (quoting State v. Janz, 358 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Iowa 1984)); State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999) (determining a court is not required to consider a defendant’s ability to pay until plan of restitution is completed); State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1999) (concluding a defendant’s ability to pay cannot be assessed until entry of a p…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Stephon Travell Curry
Iowa Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Until the amount of restitution is set, however, “the [district] court is not required to give consideration to the defendant’s ability to pay.” State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Ronald Skyler Steenhoek
Iowa Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
To the extent Steenhoek argues the district court was required to determine his reasonable ability to pay prior to ordering the plan of restitution, our case law dictates otherwise: “Until [a plan of restitution] is done, the court is not required to give consideration to the defendant’s ability to pay.” State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Cornelius Tyrone Brown
Iowa Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Unless that remedy has been exhausted, we have no basis for reviewing the issue in this court. 2 The relevant order left specific values for another date. 10 State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Daimonay Darice Richardson (2×)
Iowa · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Amended May 5, 2017 State of Iowa v. Daimonay Darice Richardson
Iowa · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Michael J. Alexander, Jr.
Iowa Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
In State v. Jackson, for example, the court issued an incomplete restitution order after the defendant pled guilty to attempted burglary. 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Robert W. Kemmerling
Iowa Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Until a plan of restitution is completed, “the court is not required to give consideration to the defendant’s ability to pay.” State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Antonio Riccardo Campbell (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Iowa Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
In a companion case to Swartz, the court explained: “Until [the plan of restitution is complete], the court is not required to give consideration to the defendant’s ability to pay.” State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999) (citing Swartz, 601 N.W.2d. at 354 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Diane Clara Dann
Iowa Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
However, Dann is “not permitted to challenge the court’s failure to determine [her] reasonable ability to pay because the plan of restitution was not complete at the time the notice of appeal was filed and the remedy for a hearing under section 910.7 ha[s] not been exhausted.” State v. Kurtz, No. 15-0832, 2016 WL 743098, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) (citing State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1999), and State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Zedekiah Douglas Kurtz
Iowa Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Id. at 45-46 .- The Jose court noted a challenge to the court’s failure to consider a defendant’s ability to pay is a challenge to the “restitution-plan of payment,” not the “plan of restitution.” Id. at 45 (citing State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1999) and State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999)); see also State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) (“A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant’s] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the. total amount due.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jose
Iowa · 2001 · confidence medium
Id. 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Financial Corp.
N.D. Iowa · 2001 · confidence medium
For instance, if the terms of the statute are explicit, the plain meaning of the language will be applied.” Teggatz v. Ringlet, 610 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Iowa 2000) (citing State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999)); see also Drahaus v. State, 584 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Iowa 1998) (when text of statute is plain and its meaning clear, court will not search for meaning beyond express terms of statute or resort to rules of statutory construction); State v. Hesford, 242 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1976) (“[n]o court, under the guise of judicial construction, may add words of qualification to the statut…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leonard G. Tillman v. Lebanon County Correctional Facility Robert L. Raiger, Warden (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Ford v. Arizona, 979 P.2d 10, 11, 13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); Iowa v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 356-57 (Iowa 1999); State Treasurer v. Gardner , 583 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Mich. 1998); cf. Auge v. New Jersey Dep't of Corrections, 743 A.2d 315 , No. A-3472-98T1, (N.J.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tillman v. Lebanon Co. Corr. Facility
3rd Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Ford v. Arizona, 979 P.2d 10, 11, 13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); Iowa v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 356-57 (Iowa 1999); State Treasurer v. Gardner , 583 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Mich. 1998); cf. Auge v. New Jersey Dep't of Corrections, ___ A.2d ___, No. A-3472-98T1, 2000 WL 17309 , *6 (N.J.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Teggatz v. Ringleb (2×) also: Cited "see"
Iowa · 2000 · confidence medium
State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999); see also Drahaus v. State, 584 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Iowa 1998) (when text of statute is plain and its meaning clear, court will not search for meaning beyond express terms of statute or resort to rules of statutory construction).
discussed Cited "see" State of Iowa v. Justin Cole Moore
Iowa Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999) (concluding that “[i]f the sheriff fails to certify any room and board costs, the defendant will have no obligation to make restitution for room and board at the jail,” and “the court is not required to give consideration to the defendant’s ability to pay” when a plan of restitution was not complete).
discussed Cited "see" State of Iowa v. Jonathan Shane Weston
Iowa Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999) (stating until a plan of restitution is completed, “the court is not required to give consideration to the defendant’s ability to pay”); State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1999) (same).1 AFFIRMED. 1 We note any costs arising from counts I and III were assessed to the State by a court order dismissing those counts prior to trial.
discussed Cited "see" State of Iowa v. Jerry Darnell Mosley
Iowa Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999) (stating until a plan of restitution1 is completed, “the court is not required to give consideration to the defendant’s ability to pay”); State v. 1 A “plan of restitution” “sets out the amounts and kind of restitution in accordance with the priorities established in section 910.2.” State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). 7 Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1999) (same).
cited Cited "see" State of Iowa v. Johnnie Lee Boutchee
Iowa Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jackson , 601 N.W.2d at 357 .
cited Cited "see" State of Iowa v. Tobias Issac Fry
Iowa Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999); State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1999).
cited Cited "see" State v. Taylor
Iowa Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
discussed Cited "see" State of Iowa v. Quinten Brice McMurry
Iowa Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999) (stating that until a plan of restitution is completed, the court is not required to consider the defendant’s ability to pay, and noting that an offender may challenge the amount of restitution by petition under Iowa Code section 910.7).
discussed Cited "see" State of Iowa v. Allison Miranda Hedgepeth (2×)
Iowa Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: accord · confidence high
“Generally, a restitution order is only appealable when the amount of restitution has been determined completely.” State v. Alexander, No. 16-0669, 2017 WL 510950, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2017) (emphasis added); accord State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999) (declining to consider an appeal of a restitution order where plan of restitution was incomplete upon filing of notice of appeal); State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1999) (same).
cited Cited "see" State of Iowa v. Jake Christian Smith
Iowa Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999); State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1999).
cited Cited "see" State of Iowa v. Donnell Christopher Pearl
Iowa Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Abrahamson (2×)
Iowa · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Bradley
Iowa Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354 , 356 *214 (Iowa 1999) (ordering restitution for court costs mandatory); Walters v. Grossheim, 525 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Iowa 1994) (ordering restitution for victim damages compulsory).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State of Iowa v. Marc A. Hagen
Iowa · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Restitution is mandatory “[i]n all criminal cases in which there is a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction is rendered.” Iowa Code § 910.2 ; see also State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999) (finding that restitution must be ordered by sentencing judge for correctional fees certified by county sheriff); State v. Watts, 587 N.W.2d 750, 751 (Iowa 1998) (noting that restitution is mandatory when a defendant pleads guilty); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 373 (requiring that sentencing court order restitution where defendant pled guilty an…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Iowa, Appellee,
v.
Robert L. JACKSON, Appellant
98-919.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Sep 9, 1999.
601 N.W.2d 354
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Trida A. Johnston, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant., Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence H. Schultz, County Attorney, and Bruce A. Ingham, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Larson, Carter, Ternus, Cady, Harris.
Cited by 39 opinions  |  Published
CARTER, Justice.

Defendant Robert Jackson was convicted, on plea of guilty, of the offense of attempted burglary in the third degree, an aggravated misdemeanor. See Iowa Code §§ 713.2, 713.6B (1997). He was given an indeterminate two-year prison sentence and required to make restitution. On this appeal he contends that certain portions of the restitution required are contrary to law. He also argues that in ordering restitution the district court failed to exercise its discretion not to order restitution for room and board costs in the county jail and failed to consider defendant’s ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered. After reviewing the record and considering the arguments presented, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. The Illegal Sentence Issue.

In addition to defendant’s prison sentence, the district court ordered him to pay restitution for pecuniary damages, court costs, court-appointed attorney fees, and for room and board jail expenses at the rate of $10 per day. Defendant asserts that he may not be required to pay[*356] for jail expenses incurred during the period of time before his plea of guilty. He bases this argument on language contained in Iowa Code section 356.7(1) (1997), which provides, in part:

The county sheriff may charge a prisoner who is eighteen years of age or older and who has been convicted of a criminal offense or sentenced for contempt of court for violation of a domestic abuse order for the room and board provided to the prisoner while in the custody of the county sheriff.

Defendant contends that the language “who has been convicted of a criminal offense” limits the recoupment of room and board costs from jail prisoners to the period of time they spent in jail following conviction. We disagree.

Certain rules offer guidance in determining the meaning of a statute. If the terms of the statute are explicit, the plain meaning of the language will be applied. Woodbury County v. City of Sioux City, 475 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Iowa 1991); State v. Perry, 440 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Iowa 1989). We are convinced that the language “who has been convicted of a criminal offense” describes who may be charged rather than the services for which charges may be made. The expenses that may be recouped are identified by the language “room and board provided to the prisoner while in the custody of the county sheriff.” This language denotes all room and board while in such custody.

If any ambiguity exists concerning the meaning of section 356.7(1), and we believe that it does not, the same interpretation is demanded by our obligation to reach a reasonable interpretation that effectuates rather than defeats the purpose of the legislation. State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 761 (Iowa 1998); Metier v. Cooper Transp. Co., 378 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Iowa 1985). It is the purpose of this legislation to assist the county in recovering the costs incurred for housing and feeding prisoners during jail stays. No reason appears to distinguish between time spent in jail before conviction and time spent in jail following conviction in achieving that goal. If the interpretation proposed by defendant was adopted, only a small portion of these costs could be recouped, thereby curtailing the apparent purpose that the statute seeks to accomplish. The district court did not act beyond its authority in requiring restitution based on charges certified by the sheriff for the entire period of defendant’s stay in the county jail.

II. Whether the Sentencing Judge Failed to Exercise Discretion in Requiring Restitution of Room and Board Costs at the Jail.

During the sentencing hearing the sentencing judge expressed the view that he was required by law to order restitution for defendant’s room and board at the jail. Defendant contends that this was an incorrect statement of the law because the imposition of restitution for room and board expenses for a defendant’s stay in jail is discretionary. As support for this contention, he relies on the language of section 356.7(1) that provides: “The county sheriff may charge a prisoner ... for the room and board provided to the prisoner while in the custody of the county sheriff.” (Emphasis added.)

The defendant is correct in contending that, if a court has discretion, a defendant is entitled to have it exercised. State v. Harrison, 351 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Iowa 1984). We believe, however, that defendant’s effort to establish discretion by the use of the word “may” in section 356.7(1) confuses the obligation of the sheriff to seek restitution, which is discretionary, with the obligation of the court to order restitution of the amounts certified by the sheriff, which is not. Iowa Code section 910.2 requires a sentencing judge to order restitution for court costs “including correctional fees approved pursuant to section 356.7.”

[*357] As a postscript to the court’s restitution order, the following notations were set forth:

Restitution for pecuniary damages: $ not avail.
Restitution for court costs: $ 75.00
Restitution for court-appointed attorney^s fees: $ 542.25
Restitution to Clinton County for $ not yet avail, room and board jail expenses:

We interpret the sentencing order as only requiring restitution for those room and board costs that the sheriff ultimately certifies, not exceeding ten dollars per day. If the sheriff fails to certify any room and board costs, the defendant will have no obligation to make restitution for room and board at the jail.

III. Whether the Sentencing Judge Improperly Failed to Consider Defendant’s Ability to Pay Restitution.

As a final issue, defendant contends that in ordering restitution the sentencing judge failed to take into account his ability to pay. In another case decided today, we have established two principles that preclude us from granting relief to defendant in this regard. First, it does not appear in the present case that the plan of restitution contemplated by Iowa Code section 910.3 was complete at the time the notice of appeal was filed. Until this is done, the court is not required to give consideration to the defendant’s ability to pay. State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1999). Second, Iowa Code section 910.7 permits an offender who is dissatisfied with the amount of restitution required by the plan to petition the district court for a modification. Unless that remedy has been exhausted, we have no basis for reviewing the issue in this court. Id.

We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.