People v. Phelps, 280 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1972). · Go Syfert
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People v. Phelps, 280 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases · …it is unnecessary to determine the legality of petitioner's original detention or the voluntary nature of his confession since a voluntary plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional errors. at p. 38 ✓ Topic ↗
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases · …that petitioner may have been motivated by his coerced confession does not invalidate his otherwise knowing and intelligent plea of guilty , since that plea represented a voluntary and intelligent choice of the alternatives available to him. at p. 38 ⚠ not in text Topic ↗
66 citation events (41 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) People v. Smith
Ill. App. Ct. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
it is unnecessary to determine the legality of petitioner's original detention or the voluntary nature of his confession since a voluntary plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional errors.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) People v. Johnson (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
Ill. App. Ct. · 2021 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
that petitioner may have been motivated by his coerced confession does not invalidate his otherwise knowing and intelligent plea of guilty , since that plea represented a voluntary and intelligent choice of the alternatives available to him.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) People v. Johnson (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
Ill. App. Ct. · 2021 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
that petitioner may have been motivated by his coerced confession does not invalidate his otherwise knowing and intelligent plea of guilty , since that plea represented a voluntary and intelligent choice of the alternatives available to him.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) People v. Johnson (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
Ill. App. Ct. · 2021 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
that petitioner may have been motivated by his coerced confession does not invalidate his otherwise knowing and intelligent plea of guilty , since that plea represented a voluntary and intelligent choice of the alternatives available to him.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Moreta
Ill. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38 (1972). ¶ 16 Moreover, defendant does not argue on appeal the unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to shape and advance the Jennifer claim in the amended postconviction petition.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ajibola
Ill. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38 (1972); People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, ¶ 55 . ¶ 27 When a superseding amended petition omits a claim which was raised in a defendant’s initial pro se petition, the issue is no longer before the trial court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Johnson
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
The State cited People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38 (1972), for the principle that “a voluntary plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional errors.” Thus, the State claimed that Johnson’s plea warranted dismissal of the TIRC claim with respect to the Miles case. ¶ 46 With regard to the Miggins case, the State asserted that Johnson lacked standing under the TIRC Act, insofar as the statutory definition of a “ ‘[c]laim of torture’ ” requires that the “tortured confession was used to obtain the conviction.” 775 ILCS 40/5(1) (West 2018).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shores v. Pfister
N.D. Ill. · 2018 · confidence medium
Oaks, 863 F.3d at 727 (quoting People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38 , 280 N.E.2d 203, 204 (Ill. 1972)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Douglas Oaks v. Randy Pfister
7th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
His pro se petition was inadequate to raise the claims: Illinois treats claims that have been raised in a pro se petition but not in a petition amended by counsel as “not before the court.” People v. Phelps, 280 N.E.2d 203, 204 (Ill. 1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Oaks v. Pfister
7th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
His pro se petition was inadequate to raise the claims: Illinois treats claims that have been raised in a pro se petition but not in a petition amended by counsel as “not before the court.” People v. Phelps, 51 Ill.2d 35 , 280 N.E.2d 203, 204 (1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Illinois Department of Corrections
N.D. Ill. · 1992 · confidence medium
See People v. Brown, 41 Ill.2d 503 , 244 N.E.2d 159, 160 (1969); People v. Jackson, 47 Ill.2d 344 , 265 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1970); People v. Scott, 49 Ill.2d 231 , 274 N.E.2d 39, 40 (1971); People v. Stanley, 50 Ill.2d 320 , 278 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1972); People v. Phelps, 51 Ill.2d 35 , 280 N.E.2d 203, 204 (1972); People v. Goodwin, 5 Ill.App.3d 1091 , 284 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1st Dist.1972); People v. Patterson, 3 Ill.App.3d 824 , 279 N.E.2d 169, 170 (5th Dist.1972); People v. Owens, 131 Ill.App.3d 381 , 475 N.E.2d 649, 650 (4th Dist.1985); People v. Stice, 160 Ill.App.3d 132 , 112 Ill.Dec. 49 , 513 N…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) US Ex Rel. Del Vecchio v. ILL. DEPT. OF CORR.
N.D. Ill. · 1992 · confidence medium
See People v. Brown, 41 Ill.2d 503 , 244 N.E.2d 159, 160 (1969); People v. Jackson, 47 Ill.2d 344 , 265 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1970); People v. Scott, 49 Ill.2d 231 , 274 N.E.2d 39, 40 (1971); People v. Stanley, 50 Ill.2d 320 , 278 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1972); People v. Phelps, 51 Ill.2d 35 , 280 N.E.2d 203, 204 (1972); People v. Goodwin, 5 Ill.App.3d 1091 , 284 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1st Dist.1972); People v. Patterson, 3 Ill.App.3d 824 , 279 N.E.2d 169, 170 (5th Dist.1972); People v. Owens, 131 Ill.App.3d 381 , 475 N.E.2d 649, 650 (4th Dist.1985); People v. Stice, 160 Ill.App.3d 132 , 112 Ill.Dec. 49 , 513 N…
discussed Cited "see" People v. Bucio
Ill. App. Ct. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38 (1972); People v. Williams, 2023 IL App (1st) 191309-U, ¶ 26 (defendant’s “claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not revolve around the voluntariness of his plea.
discussed Cited "see" People v. Oats
Ill. App. Ct. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 566-67 (2003) (citing People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38 (1972), and Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 384 (1996) (“Where an amended pleading is complete in itself and does not refer to or adopt the prior pleading, the earlier pleading ceases to be part of the record for most purposes and is effectively abandoned and withdrawn.”)).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Alfonso
Ill. App. Ct. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38 (1972) (the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel brought up in the defendant’s pro se postconviction petition was not before the court because it was not included in the amended petition filed by appointed counsel); Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 384 (1996) (“Where an amended pleading is complete in itself and does not refer to or adopt the prior pleading, the earlier pleading ceases to be part of the record for most purposes and is effectively abandoned - 11 - 2020 IL App (2d) 170668-U and withdrawn.”).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Pinkonsly (2×)
Ill. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38 (1972) (holding that where an amended postconviction petition filed by appointed counsel did not include allegations from the defendant’s pro se postconviction petition, such issues were not before the court); cf. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 384 (1996) (“Where an amended pleading is complete in itself and does not refer to or adopt the prior pleading, the earlier pleading ceases to be part of the record for most purposes and is effectively abandoned and withdrawn”).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Pinkonsly (2×)
Ill. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Phelps, 51 Ill.2d 35, 38 , 280 N.E.2d 203 (1972) (holding that where an amended postconviction petition filed by appointed counsel did not include allegations from the defendant's pro se postconviction petition, such issues were not before the court); cf. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill.2d 378, 384 , 216 Ill.
examined Cited "see, e.g." George Del Vecchio, Cross-Appellee v. Illinois Department of Corrections (4×)
7th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also People v. Phelps, 51 Ill.2d 35 , 280 N.E.2d 203, 204 (1972); People v. Stanley, 50 Ill.2d 320 , 278 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1972); People v. Jackson, 47 Ill.2d 344 , 265 N.E.2d 622, 624-25 (1970); People v. Stice, 160 Ill.App.3d 132 , 112 Ill.Dec. 49, 53 , 513 N.E.2d 463, 467 (1987); People v. Owens, 131 Ill.App.3d 381 , 86 Ill.Dec. 435, 436 , 475 N.E.2d 649, 650 (1985); People v. Patterson, 3 Ill.App.3d 824 , 279 N.E.2d 169, 170 (1972); People v. Goodwin, 5 Ill.App.3d 1091 , 284 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1972).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee,
v.
DONALD PHELPS, Appellant
42092.
Illinois Supreme Court.
Jan 14, 1972.
280 N.E.2d 203
RICHARD N. MOLCHAN, of Peoria, appointed by the court, for appellant., WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General, of Springfield, and ROBERT S. CALKINS, State’s Attorney, of Peoria, (THOMAS J. IMMEL, Assistant Attorney General, and JOHN D. RIDDLE, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People.
William J. Scott.
Cited by 29 opinions  |  Published
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD

delivered the opinion of the court:

In 1964 petitioner Donald Phelps pleaded guilty in the Peoria County circuit court to count I of an indictment for murder. Upon the recommendation of the State’s Attorney he was sentenced to not less than 25 nor more than 75 years imprisonment. In response to petitioner’s pro se petition filed in 1968 pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 122 — 1 et seq.), counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed which alleged that petitioner had been illegally arrested, confined for more than 40 days without the benefit of counsel, and coerced into confessing to the crime in violation of his rights under the fifth and sixth amendments. Following an evidentiary hearing the trial court dismissed the petition, resulting in this appeal.

At the post-conviction hearing it was established that petitioner had been taken to the Peoria County jail on the night of December 15, 1963, from White County where he was being held as a parole violator. He confessed the following day to an armed robbery, a warrant was issued, preliminary hearing waived, petitioner bound over for grand jury action and remanded to the Peoria County jail. Thereafter on February 4, 1964, petitioner confessed to the murder to which he later pleaded guilty on February 25. He was represented by counsel appointed for him on February 7 at his arraignment on the armed robbery charge. There is substantial conflict in the testimony as to the voluntary or involuntary nature of the confessions. Petitioner testified at the post-conviction hearing that he was constantly interrogated on the murder charge without being advised of his rights; that he was threatened with the death penalty' unless he confessed; that his persistent requests for an attorney were ignored and that he was coerced into confessing to the murder. This testimony was directly contradictory to that of the law enforcement officers who denied that they threatened or improperly interrogated petitioner, testified that he was advised of his constitutional rights and denied that he requested counsel during confinement.

Petitioner on this appeal pursues the same arguments that the allegedly illegal detention and improper interrogation rendered his confession and the subsequent guilty plea involuntary. He also urges that the trial court at the post-conviction hearing erred in refusing to hear evidence of the incompetency of his original counsel.

The record of the guilty plea proceedings indicates that the trial court admonished petitioner at length as to the nature of the charge and the possible sentence, informed him of his right to jury trial and of the consequences of the guilty plea, and sought to ascertain if the plea was voluntarily and understandingly offered. Petitioner admitted his act and expressed his regret; he also at that time acknowledged his satisfaction with the services of counsel who represented him. Additionally, there is in the record some indication that the plea was entered in return for the State’s Attorney’s recommendation as to sentence. In short, the record of the plea proceedings totally belies petitioner’s present contention that he pleaded guilty as a result of fear; to the contrary, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom is that the plea was knowingly and understanding^ entered.

It is unnecessary to determine the legality of petitioner’s original detention or the voluntary nature of his confession since a voluntary plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional errors. (People v. Brown, 41 Ill.2d 503.) Likewise, that petitioner may have been motivated by his coerced confession does not invalidate his otherwise knowing and intelligent plea of guilty (People v. Sephus, 46 Ill.2d 130; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 90 S.Ct. 1441), since that plea represented a voluntary and intelligent choice of the alternatives available to him. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 90 S.Ct. 1463; McMann; North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 91 S.Ct. 160.

Nor do we believe that the trial court at the post-conviction hearing erred in refusing to hear evidence on the issue of the effectiveness of petitioner’s original trial counsel. While the petitioner alleged ineffectiveness of counsel in his pro se petition, the amended petition subsequently filed by appointed counsel contained no such allegation, and, therefore, that issue was not before the court. Counsel’s omission of that allegation was proper as he is under no duty to present frivolous constitutional contentions. (People v. Polansky, 39 Ill.2d 84.) Here, the original pro se petition contained only bare, conclusional allegations, made for the first time more than four years after the event and scarcely impressive in view of the contrary statements of petitioner at the time of his plea. Certainly there was nothing before the trial court requiring a hearing on the competency of original counsel. People v. Heaven, 44 Ill. 2d 249.

The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.