Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App. 1983). · Go Syfert
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Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Talford v. Columbia Medical Center at Lancaster Subsidiary, L.P. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Patterson, P.C. v. Leal, 942 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied) (citing Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1983, no writ)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Slate v. Saxon, Marquoit, Bertoni & Todd
Or. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
See White v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 807 F Supp 1212, 1214-20 (DSC 1992), order aff'd 998 F2d 1011 (4th Cir 1993) (rejecting both breach of express contract and promissory estoppel theories); Morsinkhoff v. DeLuxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 344 SW2d 639, 643-45 (Mo App 1961) (same); Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 SW2d 561, 562 (Tex App 1983) (same); Sartin v. Mazur, 237 Va 82, 375 SE2d 741, 743 (1989) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heinritz v. Lawrence University
Wis. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bower v. AT&T Technologies, 852 F.2d 361 , 362-63 (8th Cir. 1988) (relied on Morsinkhoff rationale); Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 S.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (at-will employee cannot recover damages before or after commencing employment); Sartin v. Mazur, 375 S.E.2d 741, 743 (Va. 1989) (illogical to hold that at-will employment not terminable prior to commencement).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nava v. Steubing
Tex. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 S.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1983, no writ).
cited Cited "see" Robert J. Patterson, P.C. v. Leal
Tex. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1983, no writ).
cited Cited "see" Collins v. Allied Pharmacy Management, Inc.
Tex. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1983, no writ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Blase Industries Corp. v. Anorad Corp.
5th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence medium
At Will Employees Cannot Collect for Future Lost Salary “Damages for anticipated lost salary are inappropriate where employment is at will.” Allied Vista, Inc. v. Holt, 987 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); see also Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1983, no writ) (“When the period of employment is left to the discretion of either party ... the loss of wages that the employee would have earned in the indefinite future is not a recoverable item of damages.”).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Browne v. Maxfield
E.D. Pa. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex.App.1983).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Eugene INGRAM, Appellant,
v.
FRED OAKLEY CHRYSLER-DODGE, Et Al., Appellees
08-83-00142-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
Dec 7, 1983.
663 S.W.2d 561
David R. Casey, Hurst, for appellant., James B. Harris, Thompson & Knight, William J. Neilon, Jr., Nathan K. Griffin, Thomas & Neilon, Dallas, for appellees.
Osborn.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

OSBORN, Justice.

Eugene Ingram appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge and Chrysler Corporation in a suit on an employment contract. We affirm.

Ingram alleged that in March, 1979, he entered into an employment contract whereby he was to be employed as a service manager with a salary of $2,400.00 per month, plus five percent of the net profits of the Parts and Service Department and was to have the use of two automobiles. He resigned from his position at Big D Chrysler Dodge effective on April 13, 1979, and was then advised prior to his date of employment of May 1, 1979, that he would not be hired at Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge. He did not find other employment for several weeks.

The two defendants filed motions for summary judgment contending that the contract was oral and was for an indefinite period of time and terminable at the will of either party. In support of the motions, defendants filed in the trial court the depositions of Eugene Ingram, the plaintiff, Dan Baum, and William Everett Dickinson, employees of the motor company. In his response, Ingram acknowledged that the oral contract of employment was for an indefinite period of time, but asserted he was entitled to damages because of the motor company’s anticipatory repudiation of the contract after he had terminated his prior employment.

The depositions filed in the trial court were never filed in the appellate court in Dallas, from which this case was transferred to this Court, although the district court so ordered. When the summary judgment record is incomplete, the omitted evi[*562] dence is presumed to establish the correctness of the judgment. DeBell v. Texas General Realty, Inc., 609 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ). In such case, we must affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Nevertheless, based upon the pleadings and Appellant’s acknowledgment that his employment was terminable at the will of either party, we conclude that he cannot recover damages in this case. Neither could the motor company enforce the contract or recover damages had he refused to report for work.

When the period of employment is left to the discretion of either party, or the term is indefinite, either party may end it at their will without cause and the loss of wages that the employee would have earned in the indefinite future is not a recoverable item of damages. Reynolds Manufacturing Company v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We find no reason to make a distinction between a termination of employment before one starts to work and termination after employment has commenced. Points of Error Nos. One and Two are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.