employment doctrine in Texas

2005Wrongful Breach of Employment Contract “Texas follows the doctrine of employment at will, under which employment for an indefinite term may be terminated at will and without cause.” Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc. , 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991).

2005Wrongful Breach of Employment Contract “Texas follows the doctrine of employment at will, under which employment for an indefinite term may be terminated at will and without cause.” Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex.1991).

2016Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013); Grant v. Joe Meyers Toyota, Inc., 11 S.W.3d 419, 422-23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

2015Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013); Grant v. Joe Meyers Toyota, Inc., 11 S.W.3d 419, 422-23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

2021Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 453 (Tex. 1996); see, e.g., Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (creating the at-will employment exception prohibiting employers from terminating employees for refusing to commit illegal acts) see also Word v. N. Jones Reg’l Health Sys., No. 05-06-00881-CV, 2007 WL 2421500 , at *4 (Tex. App.— Dallas Aug. 28, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Statutes protecting workers from retaliatory discharge are exceptions to the common law doctrine of employment at will.”).

2020In Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985), the supreme court held that public policy required a narrow exception to the doctrine of employment at will.

1990Caballero cites Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734-35 (Tex.1985), and McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex.1989), for the proposition that “discharge based on handicap is a statutory exception to the employment at will doctrine.” Neither case had anything to do with “handicap.” Neither case was predicated on article 5221k.

1990Appellant also asserts his argument is supported by McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex.1989) cert. granted — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1804 , 108 L.Ed.2d 935 (1990), where, in creating another exception to the employment at will doctrine, the supreme court held that if “the principal reason for his termination was the employer’s desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employer’s pension fund,” such termination is illegal, (emphasis supplied).

2010Other than this “narrow exception to the employment at will doctrine,” Hawthorne v. Star Enter., Inc., 45 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied), courts have been reluctant to further modify the doctrine or impose new duties that alter the nature of an at-will relationship even when significant public-policy interests weigh in favor of modification, see, e.g., O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d at 216 (declining to recognize duty of good faith and fan-dealing in employment relationships); Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.1998) (holding that there is no common-law whistleb

2010Other than this "narrow exception to the employment at will doctrine," Hawthorne v. Star Enter., Inc., 45 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied), courts have been reluctant to further modify the doctrine or impose new duties that alter the nature of an at-will relationship even when significant public-policy interests weigh in favor of modification, see, e.g., O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d at 216 (declining to recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships); Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.1998) (holding that there is no common-law whistle

2010Other than this “narrow exception to the employment at will doctrine,” Hawthorne v. Star Enter., Inc., 45 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied), courts have been reluctant to further modify the doctrine or impose new duties that alter the nature of an at-will relationship even when significant public-policy interests weigh in favor of modification, see, e.g., O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d at 216 (declining to recognize duty of good faith and fan-dealing in employment relationships); Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.1998) (holding that there is no common-law whistleb

2010Other than this "narrow exception to the employment at will doctrine," Hawthorne v. Star Enter., Inc., 45 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied), courts have been reluctant to further modify the doctrine or impose new duties that alter the nature of an at-will relationship even when significant public-policy interests weigh in favor of modification, see, e.g., O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d at 216 (declining to recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships); Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.1998) (holding that there is no common-law whistle

2010Other than this “narrow exception to the employment at will doctrine,” Hawthorne v. Star Enter., Inc., 45 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied), courts have been reluctant to further modify the doctrine or impose new duties that alter the nature of an at-will relationship even when significant public-policy interests weigh in favor of modification, see, e.g., O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d at 216 (declining to recognize duty of good faith and fan-dealing in employment relationships); Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.1998) (holding that there is no common-law whistleb

2010Other than this "narrow exception to the employment at will doctrine," Hawthorne v. Star Enter., Inc., 45 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied), courts have been reluctant to further modify the doctrine or impose new duties that alter the nature of an at-will relationship even when significant public-policy interests weigh in favor of modification, see, e.g., O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d at 216 (declining to recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships); Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.1998) (holding that there is no common-law whistle

2022Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 453 (Tex. 1996); see also Word v. Wilson N. Jones Reg’l Health Sys., No. 05-06-00881-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6885 , at **10-11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Statutes protecting workers from retaliatory discharge are exceptions to the common law doctrine of employment at will.”).

2021Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 453 (Tex. 1996); see, e.g., Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (creating the at-will employment exception prohibiting employers from terminating employees for refusing to commit illegal acts) see also Word v. N. Jones Reg’l Health Sys., No. 05-06-00881-CV, 2007 WL 2421500 , at *4 (Tex. App.— Dallas Aug. 28, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Statutes protecting workers from retaliatory discharge are exceptions to the common law doctrine of employment at will.”).

2016Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013); Grant v. Joe Meyers Toyota, Inc., 11 S.W.3d 419, 422-23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

2015Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013); Grant v. Joe Meyers Toyota, Inc., 11 S.W.3d 419, 422-23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

2010See Ed Rachal Found. v. D’Unger, 207 S.W.3d 330, 332-33 (Tex.2006); Mayfield v. Lockheed Eng’g & Scis.

2010See Ed Rachal Found. v. D'Unger, 207 S.W.3d 330, 332-33 (Tex.2006); Mayfield v. Lockheed Eng'g & Scis.

2003Grant v. Joe Myers Toyota, Inc. , 11 S.W.3d 419, 422-23 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook , 479 U.S. 60, 73 (1986)).

2000See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 73 , 107 S.Ct. 367 , 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); see also Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.

2003Id. at 806-07 (citations omitted).

2003Id. at 806 B 07 (citations omitted).

1998Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

1995Id. at 577-78 .

1967In Garcia v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Company, 146 Tex. 413 , 209 S.W.2d 333, 336 , our Supreme Court quoted with approval the following statement of the Supreme Court of New Jersey: “The sound rule is that whenever conditions attached to the place of employment or otherwise incident- to the employment are factors in the catastrophic combination, the consequent injury arises out of the employment.” We think the court properly found that William Patterson was insane and incapable of entertaining a rational intention and incapable of reasoning and that therefore no exception to compensability c

1967In Garcia v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Company, 146 Tex. 413 , 209 S.W.2d 333, 336 , our Supreme Court quoted with approval the following statement of the Supreme Court of New Jersey: “The sound rule is that whenever conditions attached to the place of employment or otherwise incident- to the employment are factors in the catastrophic combination, the consequent injury arises out of the employment.” We think the court properly found that William Patterson was insane and incapable of entertaining a rational intention and incapable of reasoning and that therefore no exception to compensability c

2024Kingsaire, Inc. v. Melendez, 477 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. 2015).

2021To satisfy the fourth prong of the test, an employee may in some instances alternatively establish that he or she was treated differently than similarly situated employees, also referred to as “comparators.” See, e.g., Remaley v. TA Operating LLC, 561 S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (recognizing that the fourth prong of the test will vary depending on the context of the plaintiff’s employment claim); Acosta v. Gov’t Employees Credit Union, 351 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2011, no pet.) (recognizing that the precise requirements to establish a prima fac

2021To satisfy the fourth prong of the test, an employee may in some instances alternatively establish that he or she was treated differently than similarly situated employees, also referred to as “comparators.” See, e.g., Remaley v. TA Operating LLC, 561 S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (recognizing that the fourth prong of the test will vary depending on the context of the plaintiff’s employment claim); Acosta v. Gov’t Employees Credit Union, 351 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2011, no pet.) (recognizing that the precise requirements to establish a prima fac

2021Id. at 519.

2018See Tex. A&M Univ. v. Starks, 500 S.W.3d 560, 568 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, no pet.) (stating an employment claim is jurisdictionally barred if the charge of discrimination is not filed within 180 days of the adverse employment action).

2015See Holmes at 684 (“Even if it was necessary for Holmes to exhaust his remedies with the EEOC before bringing federal suit, under no circumstances was Holmes required to exhaust his internal university remedies.”).

2014The Offshore Petroleum court stated that "the cause of action for fraud, which encompasses misrepresentations made before employment, as well as those made during employment, is not barred by the employment at will doctrine.” Id. at 956 (emphasis added).

2006See Ingram, 663 S.W.2d at 562 .

2001Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d 583, 589 (5th Cir.1995).

1998Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex.1993); East Line & R.R.R.

1998Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

1997See Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Hicks v. Baylor University Medical Ctr, 789 S.W.2d 299, 304 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied).

1997See, e.g., Rios v. Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1996, n.w.h.); Ebasco Constructors, Inc. v. Rex, 923 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).