Bautista v. State, 699 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · Go Syfert
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Bautista v. State, 699 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
53 citation events (53 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Shalita Jackson Harris v. State (gactapp, 2021-06-30)
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2011 2018 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shalita Jackson Harris v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
At trial, the State’s expert confirmed it was his “impression that the [bus] was going too fast[.]” Although Harris’s expert disagreed with this conclusion, “[i]t was for the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses . . . , as well 14 Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 212 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010). 8 as the weight to be accorded the expert . . . testimony.”15 Additionally, “[circumstantial] evidence need not exclude every inference or hypothesis except the guilt of the accused, but only reasonable inferences and hypotheses, so as to justify the inference beyond a reaso…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lewis Terrance Williams v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case, we must uphold the jury’s verdict.4 “The standard of Jackson v. Virginia[5] is met if the evidence is sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged.”6 With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to the Appellant’s specific claims of error. 3 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). 4 Walker v. State, 329 Ga. App. 369, 370 ( 765 SE2d 599 ) (2014) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 5 443 U.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Faheem Ameer Ali v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
H. as required in Counts 3 and 4, respectively, of the indictment.8 We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find, 5 Walker v. State, 329 Ga. App. 369, 370 ( 765 SE2d 599 ) (2014) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 6 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). 7 Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 211 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010) (citation omitted). 8 In his appellate brief, the Appellant concedes that the evidence was “very strong” and therefore did not challenge his convictions for the two counts of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, and possessi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Tyrone Carmichael v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, 8 Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 211 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010). 9 See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”); see also Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (1) (“The sequence of arguments in the briefs shall follow the order of the enumeration of errors, and shall be numbered accordingly.”). 9 but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mis…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Anthony Frazier v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Former OCGA § 16-7-1 (a) provided that a person committed burglary when, 6 Walker v. State, 329 Ga. App. 369, 370 ( 765 SE2d 599 ) (2014) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 7 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). 8 Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 211 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010). 5 without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, he enters or remains within the dwelling house of another or any building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, or other such structure designed for use as the dwelling of another or enters or remains within any other building, railroad car, aircra…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vincent Lamont Easley, Jr. v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Specifically, the Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted the continuance because the State untimely served him with a “small portion” of Sterling’s two-and-a-half-hours-long custodial interview three days prior to trial.8 He argues that the continuance could have provided the Appellant with 5 Walker v. State, 329 Ga. App. 369, 370 ( 765 SE2d 599 ) (2014) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 6 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). 7 Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 211 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010). 8 OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (3) states in relevant part: The prosecuting attorney sh…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) George Cordova, Jr. v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Appellant’s identity was established as the perpetrator of each of the crimes, as indicted. (a) Burglary OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) states, in relevant part that, “[a] person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree when, without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, he or she enters or remains within an occupied . . . dwelling house of another[.]” The State charged the Appellant in Count 1 of the indictment 11 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). 12 Bautist…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brandon Shayne Sullins v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
The trial transcript shows, however, that Gonzalez testified at trial that the Appellant shot his handgun toward her, Mitchell, and their children, who were all standing outside the apartment.12 To the extent that other evidence conflicted with 9 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). 10 Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 211 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010). 11 The indictment alleged that the Appellant “discharge[d] a firearm from within a motor vehicle toward a person, to wit: TERRIE ANNETTE MITCHELL[.]” See also OCGA § 16-15-21 (a) (4) (criminalizing the discharge of a firearm “from within a motor…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gebre Whitelock v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Because the trial in this case took place in 2011, the former Evidence Code applies. 13 Walker v. State, 329 Ga. App. 369, 370 ( 765 SE2d 599 ) (2014) (punctuation and other footnote omitted). 14 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). 15 See Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 211 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010). 16 We note that there is no evidence in the record that a physician ever diagnosed the grandmother with a severe mental illness or that the grandmother actually suffered from a severe mental illness at the time the victim was being 12 arguments, the Appellant contends that the victim’s mother sho…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Raoul Lynch v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
As an initial matter, we must address the Appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in applying the 1996 amendment to former OCGA § 17-3-1 (b),10 which extended the statute of limitation period for rape from seven to fifteen years,11 to the 7 Walker, 329 Ga. App. at 370 (punctuation and other footnote omitted). 8 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). 9 Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 211 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010). 10 See Ga. L. 1996, pp. 1115, 1117, § 4.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michelle Fouts v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“The offense of reckless driving may be committed in a variety of ways, and whether a defendant’s manner of driving under the circumstances demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety of others is a question that is reserved for the jury.” (Citation omitted.) Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 212 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fouts v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“The offense of reckless driving may be committed in a variety of ways, and whether a defendant’s manner of driving under the circumstances demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety of others is a question that is reserved for the jury.” (Citation omitted.) Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 212 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Travis v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
“The offense of reckless driving may be committed in a variety of ways, and whether a defendant’s manner of driving under the circumstances demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety of others is a question that is reserved for the jury.” (Citation omitted.) Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 212 (1) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010).
discussed Cited "see" Jose Torres v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 213 (2) ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010) (indictment survived general demurrer because it both tracked the language of the statute and described the acts constituting the offense sufficiently to put the 2 OCGA § 16-11-37 was revised effective May 3, 2016, after Torres was indicted.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Mondor (2×)
Ga. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bautista v. State , 305 Ga. App. 210 , 213, 699 S.E.2d 392 (2010) ; see also Duggan v. State , 225 Ga. App. 291 , 297, 483 S.E.2d 373 (1997).
discussed Cited "see" State v. MONDOR (And Vice Versa) (2×)
Ga. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bautista v. State, 305 Ga. App. 210, 213 ( 699 SE2d 392 ) (2010); see also Duggan v. State, 225 Ga. App. 291, 297 ( 483 SE2d 373 ) (1997).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bautista
v.
the State
A10A1330.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Jul 13, 2010.
699 S.E.2d 392
Leah D. Madden, for appellant., David McDade, District Attorney, Ryan R. Leonard, James A. Dooley, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Ellington, Andrews, Doyle.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 45%
Ellington, Judge.

A Douglas County jury found Rigoberto Bautista guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of homicide by vehicle in the first degree, OCGA § 40-6-393 (a); reckless driving, OCGA § 40-6-390 (a); and driving without a license, OCGA § 40-5-20 (a). [1] Bautista appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and contending the trial court erred in denying his general demurrer to the counts of the indictment charging him with first degree vehicular homicide (Count 1) and reckless driving (Count 3). For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

1. Bautista contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for reckless driving. Specifically, he contends that the State based the charge of reckless driving on evidence that he committed the offenses of failure to yield the right-of-way and driving without a license and that, as a matter of law, such conduct does not amount to reckless driving absent other aggravating factors such as speeding or driving while intoxicated. Further, Bautista contends that, because the charge of homicide by vehicle in the first degree was predicated on the offense of reckless driving, the evidence also failed to support his conviction for vehicular homicide.

On appeal from a criminal conviction, [the appellate court] view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and an appellant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. [The appellate court] determines whether the[*211] evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. Any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case, [the appellate court] must uphold the jury’s verdict.

(Citations omitted.) Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 (606 SE2d 269) (2004). The standard of Jackson v. Virginia is met if the evidence is sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Clark v. State, 275 Ga. 220, 221 (1) (564 SE2d 191) (2002).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows the following. On February 10, 2007, Bautista was turning left out of the West Chase Townhomes to go west on Selman Drive in Douglasville. A stop sign required Bautista to yield the right-of-way to traffic on Selman Drive. From the stop sign, Bautista had a clear line of sight 800 to 900 feet to his left. Bautista failed to yield the right of way and pulled into the path of Allen Major, who was driving eastbound on Selman Drive at approximately 35 to 40 mph. Major’s car, which left no skid marks from sudden braking, struck Bautista’s vehicle nearly head-on in Major’s lane of travel. Major suffered severe internal injuries and died within ten minutes of the impact. Bautista, who failed to carry a driver’s license on February 10, 2007, offered evidence at trial that he had a driver’s license issued by Mexico.

The offense of first degree vehicular homicide may be committed in five different ways. As it applies to this case, OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) provides that “[a]ny person who, without malice aforethought, causes the death of another person through the violation of. . . Code Section 40-6-390 [(reckless driving)] . . . commits the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree[.]” OCGA § 40-6-390 (a) defines reckless driving as “driving] any vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property[.]”

While cases charged as first degree vehicular homicide may often involve aggravating factors such as speeding or driving while intoxicated, as Bautista contends, the General Assembly did not choose to limit the definition of the crime in such a way. Rather, in addition to four more specific driving offenses which may serve as the predicate offense for first degree vehicular homicide, [2] the General Assembly[*212] opted to authorize a conviction upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of another person by driving in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. Smith v. State, 285 Ga. 725, 726 (2) (681 SE2d 161) (2009) (“[T]he plain language of OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) makes clear that a person is guilty of homicide by vehicle if he or she causes the death of another, without malice aforethought, by . . . driving recklessly[.]”). The offense of reckless driving may be committed in a variety of ways, and whether a defendant’s manner of driving under the circumstances demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety of others is a question that is reserved for the jury. Lesh v. State, 259 Ga. App. 325, 326-327 (577 SE2d 4) (2003).

In this case, the evidence authorized the jury to find that Major, while driving east on Selman Drive, had the right-of-way at the intersection with West Chase Drive, that Bautista had a clear line of sight 800 to 900 feet up Selman Drive in the direction from which Major approached, and that Bautista drove into Major’s path when Major was so close to the intersection that he did not have time to apply his brakes before impact. The law does not support Bautista’s argument that, as a matter of law, his conduct under these circumstances cannot amount to reckless driving. To the contrary, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Bautista drove his vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of others and that he caused Major’s death through such reckless driving. Ivie v. State, 151 Ga. App. 496, 496-497 (1) (260 SE2d 543) (1979) (evidence that the defendant drove his vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of others by failing to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic was sufficient to convict the defendant of first degree vehicular homicide predicated on reckless driving). His convictions are affirmed.

2. Bautista contends the trial court erred in denying his general demurrer to the counts of the indictment charging him with first degree vehicular homicide (Count 1) and reckless driving (Count 3). In his demurrer, Bautista argued that, even if he were guilty of failing to yield the right-of-way, he still would not be guilty of reckless driving and, therefore, that “the indictment is illegal on its face.”

The true test of the sufficiency of [an] indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of[*213] what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction. An indictment which charges the offense in the language of the defining statute and describes the acts constituting the offense sufficiently to put the defendant on notice of the offense with which he is charged survives a general demurrer. When analyzing a general demurrer, the question is whether a defendant can admit to the conduct and still be innocent of the crime.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Falagian v. State, 300 Ga. App. 187, 192 (3) (684 SE2d 340) (2009). [3]

In this case, Count 1 charged that Bautista,

in the State of Georgia and County of Douglas, on February 10, 2007[,] without malice aforethought, did cause the death of Allen Keith Major, a human being, through a violation of OCGA § 40-6-390, Reckless Driving, in that he operated a motor vehicle at the intersection of Selman Drive and Westchase Drive, in conscious disregard for the safety of persons and property[.]

Count 3 charged that Bautista,

in the State of Georgia and County of Douglas, on February 10, 2007[,] did drive a motor vehicle ... in a reckless manner at the intersection of Selman Drive and Westchase Drive, in conscious disregard for the safety of persons and property[.]

The indictment tracked the language of OCGA §§ 40-6-393 (a) and 40-6-390 (a) and contained other material information to sufficiently place Bautista on notice of the charges against him. Bautista could not admit the conduct alleged in the indictment and still be innocent of first degree vehicular homicide and reckless driving. See Division 1, supra; State v. Pendergrass, 298 Ga. App. 801, 802-803 (1) (681 SE2d 241) (2009). Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Bautista’s general demurrer to Counts 1 and 3.

[*214] Decided July 13, 2010. Leah D. Madden, for appellant. David McDade, District Attorney, Ryan R. Leonard, James A. Dooley, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J., and Doyle, J., concur.
1

Bautista raises no issue on appeal concerning his conviction of several other offenses: reckless conduct, OCGA § 16-5-60 (b); failure to secure a child passenger in an appropriate safety restraint, OCGA § 40-8-76 (b); failure to wear a seat safety belt, OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (b); and making a false statement, OCGA § 16-10-20.

2

The other four predicate driving offenses for the offense of first degree vehicular[*212] homicide are passing or overtaking a school bus, OCGA § 40-6-163; DUI, OCGA § 40-6-391; fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, OCGA § 40-6-395 (a); and felony hit-and-run, OCGA § 40-6-270 (b). OCGA § 40-6-393 (a), (b).

3

See also OCGA § 17-7-54 (a) (“Every indictment of the grand jury which states the offense in the terms and language of this Code or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct.”).