Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2001). · Go Syfert
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Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
31 citation events (31 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2002 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) (PC) Humes v. Sacramento County
E.D. Cal. · 2019 · confidence medium
The Clerk is directed to close the case. 16 DATED: September 30, 2019. 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 Although the Magistrate Judge relies on Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2002) for 23 the proposition the ADA “neither addresses the imposition of criminal penalties, nor . . . suggest[s] that mentally disabled Americans should be treated differently from other Americans 24 who commit crimes,” the court is not so certain ADA claims regarding disability accommodation related to imposition of criminal penalties are entirely foreclosed, at least in the Ninth Circuit. 25 See, e.g., Kral v. K…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maxwell, Ex Parte Terrell
Tex. Crim. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
App. 2004) (applying Atkins retroactively to applicant seeking habeas corpus relief); Bell v. Cockrell , 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2002) (retroactively applying Atkins in federal habeas proceedings); Hill v. Anderson , 300 F.3d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that Atkins applies retroactively). 26.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maxwell, Ex Parte Terrell (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (applying Atkins retroactively to applicant seeking habe-as corpus relief); Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002) (retroactively applying Atkins in federal habeas proceedings); Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 681 (6th Cir.2002) (stating that Atkins applies retroactive-!y). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Sparks
5th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
For this reason, the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins barring the execution of the mentally retarded has been given retroactive effect, see, e.g., Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002), as has the Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), barring the execution of juvenile offenders, see Arroyo v. Dretke, 362 F.Supp.2d 859, 883 (W.D.Tex.2005), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Felix Rocha v. Rick Thaler, Director (2×)
5th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Felix Rocha v. Rick Thaler, Director
5th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
App. 1996) (en banc) (McCormick, P.J., concurring) (“The successive writ provisions of Article 11.071, Section 5(a), for the most 20 we developed an unbroken line of precedent holding that a successive state habeas application that had been dismissed as an abuse of the writ because it failed to satisfy § 5(a) had been dismissed on an independent and adequate state- law ground.70 Then, in 2002, the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons.71 This new rule of constitutional law was made retroactive on habeas review…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maldonado v. Thaler
S.D. Tex. · 2009 · confidence medium
A “welter of uncertainty” followed the Atkins decision because “[t]he Supreme Court neither conclusively defined mental retardation nor provided guidance on how its ruling should be applied to prisoners already convicted of capital murder.” Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pruitt v. State (2×)
Ind. · 2005 · confidence medium
See, e.g., In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002) (Atkins did not conclusively define mental retardation); Gray v. State, 887 So.2d 158, 168 (Miss.2004) ("Determining who is mentally retarded for purposes of this prohibition has been left to the individual States."); Johnson v. State, 102 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Mo.2003) ("Atkins did not define the perimeters of mental retardation, but left 'to the States the task of " enforcing the restriction); Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn.2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. Dretke
5th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kenneth Wayne Morris v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division (2×)
5th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) BAEZ ARROYO v. Dretke
W.D. Tex. · 2005 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002) (holding Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), which forbid the execution of the mentally retarded, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review); Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d.133, 139 (2nd Cir.2001) (holding that Richardson v. United States, 526 *884 U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707 , 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999), announced a new substantive rule of law and therefore should be applied retroactively in habeas proceedings).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) IN RE: Glenn Holladay
11th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Appx. 758 , No. 02-22 (4th Cir. May 6, 2003) ("[T]he Court in Atkins announced a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review."); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that under Penry and Atkins the Atkins rule is retroactively applicable); Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002) (agreeing "that Atkins constitutes an exception to the non-retroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), and therefore applies retroactively"); Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 681 (6th Cir.2002) ("In Atki…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Holladay
11th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Walker v. True, 4th Cir., 2003 WL 21008657 , 67 Fed.Appx. 758 , No. 02-22 (4th Cir. May 6, 2003) (“[T]he Court in Atkins announced a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.”); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that under Penry and Atkins the Atkins rule is retroactively applicable); Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002) (agreeing “that Atkins constitutes an exception to the non-retro-activity rule of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), and therefore applies retroactively�…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Moore
5th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Our decision thus “allow[s] the troactive to cases on collateral review by the district court to make a more informed judg- Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)(A); ment than is available to us” on Moore’s claim see Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th and on the state’s defenses that Moore is not Cir. 2002) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. retarded and that his claim is procedurally de- 302, 330 (1989)).
cited Cited "see, e.g." McGowen v. Thaler
S.D. Tex. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Lucas, 132 F.3d at 1076 (citation omitted); see also Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir.2002).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." STATE EX REL. TART v. State
La. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Edwards v. Cain, 02-0514 (La.3/21/03), 841 So.2d 768 ; see also Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002)(same) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2953 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989)), the district court is ordered to make a substantive ruling on whether relator qualifies as mentally retarded under Atkins and is hence ineligible for execution.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ex Parte Blue (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.2002); Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 681 (6th Cir.2002); In re: Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (11th Cir.2003). .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Blue, Ex Parte Carl Henry
Tex. Crim. App. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Bell v. Cockrell , 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5 th Cir. 2002); Hill v. Anderson , 300 F.3d 679, 681 (6 th Cir. 2002); In re: Holladay , 331 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (11 th Cir. 2003). 8.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Walker v. True
4th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[I]nferior federal courts have no useful role to play until and unless following Atkins, a death sentence is reaffirmed or again imposed on [the petitioner] by the state courts. . . . [T]he state must be given the first opportunity to apply the Supreme Court's holding in order to insure consistency among state institutions and procedures and to adjust its prosecutorial strategy to the hitherto unforeseen new rule."); Hill, 300 F.3d at 682 ("The Supreme Court's decision to return Atkins's case to state courts sug- gests that we…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Walker v. True
4th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332-33 (5th Cir.2002) (“[I]nferior federal courts have no useful role to play until and unless following Atkins , a death sentence is reaffirmed or again imposed on [the petitioner] by the state courts.... [T]he state must be given the first opportunity to apply the Supreme Court’s holding in order to insure consistency among state institutions and procedures and to adjust its prosecutorial strategy to the hitherto unforeseen new rule.”); Hill, 300 F.3d at 682 (“The Supreme Court’s decision to return Atkins’s case to state courts suggests …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bell
v.
Cockrell
01-40340.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Dec 14, 2001.
310 F.3d 330
Unpublished

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _______________________

No. 01-40340 Civil Docket #5:99-CV-00209

_______________________

WALTER BELL, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, versus

JANIE COCKRELL, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas _________________________________________________________________ December 13, 2001

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. By EDITH H. JONES:*

Petitioner Walter Bell was denied habeas corpus relief by the federal district court on his conviction for the capital murder of Ferd Chisum, his former employer, in Port Arthur, Texas, in 1974. Bell presents two contentions in this court. First, he argues that evidence of mild mental retardation presented at his

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. trial disqualifies him from the death penalty by virtue of an alleged evolving national consensus against executing the mentally retarded. The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on this contention. Bell applies for a COA, however, after being turned down on his second contention, that newly discovered evidence demonstrates his confession was coerced by police brutality. Finding no merit in either contention under the standards of review adopted by AEDPA 1, we affirm the judgment on the first contention and deny COA on the second.[2] Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989).

[*331]

Bell’s initial conviction was reversed, and he received a second trial for capital murder of Ferd Chisum so that the state courts could apply the then-new Supreme Court decision in Penry v. Lynaugh. Penry held that a jury must be permitted to find that a defendant’s mental retardation mitigates against infliction of the death penalty because his condition limits his culpability. 492 U.S. at 320-28, 109 S.Ct. at 2947-52. Penry refused to hold that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical exclusion of mentally retarded defendants from receiving the death penalty. 492 U.S. at 331-35, 109 S.Ct. at 2953-55. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals so applied Penry to Bell’s second appeal. Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 55 (1996). Penry has not been subsequently overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court. Until it is, the standard for granting habeas relief under AEDPA, which requires state court decisions to conform to Federal law articulated by the Supreme Court, will not be satisfied. Bell’s argument, formulated on a still evolving national consensus made up of over a dozen states that have legislatively decided to place limits on executions of the mentally retarded, is thus irrelevant in the lower federal courts. In addition, Bell’s case exemplifies the wisdom behind Penry’s decision to allow juries to examine the impact of mental retardation on culpability on a case-by-case basis. While Bell has scored at a level of mild mental retardation throughout his life, an expert also testified that he was competent to stand trial and knew the difference between right and wrong. He carefully planned the murders of Ferd and Eileen Chisum, assembling papers, a knife, handcuffs, and extension cords from which he had removed the ends, and he tricked the Chisums into letting him into their house on the pretext that he wanted their advice about attending school. He forced Eileen Chisum to write a false name on several checks before he killed her, and he then tried to cash one of those checks the day after the murder. The murders were executed ruthlessly and brutally. There was, in short, plenty of evidence to support the jury’s post-Penry weighing of Bell’s mental retardation against his moral culpability.

[*332]

As a footnote, we, like the state courts, reject the argument that the federal Americans with Disabilities Act somehow entitles Bell to exoneration from the death penalty. The ADA neither addresses the imposition of criminal penalties, nor does it suggest that mentally disabled Americans should be treated differently from other Americans who commit crimes.

The state courts did not render an unreasonable decision in rejecting Bell’s contentions concerning his mental retardation.

[*333][*334]

argue that based on this evidence, his confession would have been excluded, and he would not have been convicted of capital murder. In his appellate brief, Bell focuses on Watson’s affidavit, which described Watson’s alleged beating by the police and Watson’s suspicion that Bell was beaten and, somehow, is supposed to fortify Bell’s claim that he was physically forced to confess.

The state habeas court rejected this claim, finding both that Bell did not prove that the “new evidence” was unknown to him at the time of trial and that his attorneys at the second trial conceded the admissibility of Bell’s confession, which had been admitted at the first trial despite a claim of police brutality. Bell disagrees only with the former finding, but he does not make a substantial showing, by clear and convincing evidence, to rebut it.[3] See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The state court findings are thus presumed correct.

Bell hopes to circumvent the adverse findings by alleging that his attorneys were constitutionally ineffective for not “discovering” the “new evidence” and for not moving to suppress his confession at the second trial. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The state courts responded that Bell had to know about evidence bolstering his coerced confession claim. His attorneys were not defective if he failed to communicate with them. The state courts alternatively found that the attorneys’ performance could not have prejudiced Bell, because even if the cousin’s and Watson’s testimony had been offered at trial, it would have been cumulative and, from such biased sources, not very credible. We agree. There was substantial incriminating evidence even apart from Bell’s confession. Bell was not prejudiced by his attorneys’ conduct. The state courts’ analysis of Strickland reasonably applies the relevant constitutional law in light of the state court record.

[*335]

Bell has failed to make a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated by his attorneys’ errors or by the absence at his second trial of newly discovered evidence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court denying habeas corpus relief on Bell’s first contention is AFFIRMED. We DENY a certificate of appealability on Bell’s second contention.

[*336]
1 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
2 Whether Bell made a substantial showing that he was denied any constitutional right regarding newly discovered evidence. Under AEDPA, a COA will issue only if Bell makes “a substantial showing” that he was denied a federal constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A substantial showing means that reasonable jurists would find the state courts’ assessment of Bell’s claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1600 (2000). The federal court’s assessment of Bell’s claim depends, in turn, on the “reasonableness” of the state court’s decision. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e). To obtain relief from a judgment based on newly discovered evidence, a petitioner generally must demonstrate that (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the defendant’s failure to detect the evidence was not due to a lack of due diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence would probably produce an acquittal at a new trial. Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert dism’d., 524 U.S. 965 (1998). Bell contends that affidavits procured in 1997 from his mother, his cousin, and most prominently, his former co-defendant Sheppard Watson, would have demonstrated that Bell was beaten by law enforcement officers to induce him to confess. He goes on to
3 Bell’s mother’s evidence could not be “new,” as she testified similarly in both of his trials. And Bell knew that his cousin had seen him in jail.