Teague exception in Illinois

2023See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 237-38 (1990) (Teague framework applies to proceedings under Post-Conviction Hearing Act). ¶ 15 While petitioner’s appeal from the denial of leave to file was pending, our supreme court decided the State’s appeal in People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434 .

2018People v. Price , 2016 IL 118613 , ¶ 21, 412 Ill.Dec. 782 , 76 N.E.3d 1240 (underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion *136 that the new rule, had it been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome); see, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 294 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus , who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which was decided after his conviction became final); Flowers , 138 Ill. 2d at 23

2023See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 237-38 (1990) (Teague framework applies to proceedings under Post-Conviction Hearing Act). ¶ 15 While petitioner’s appeal from the denial of leave to file was pending, our supreme court decided the State’s appeal in People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434 .

2018People v. Price , 2016 IL 118613 , ¶ 21, 412 Ill.Dec. 782 , 76 N.E.3d 1240 (underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion *136 that the new rule, had it been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome); see, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 294 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus , who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which was decided after his conviction became final); Flowers , 138 Ill. 2d at 23

2003App. 3d at 706 ), and recognized that neither this court nor the Supreme Court has ever found any new rule to qualify for retroactivity under the second Teague exception (Beachem, 317 Ill.

2003In Beachem , the appellate court acknowledged that "[f]inding retroactivity never should be lightly done" ( Beachem, 317 Ill.App.3d at 706 , 251 Ill.Dec. 308 , 740 N.E.2d 389 ), and recognized that neither this court nor the Supreme Court has ever found any new rule to qualify for retroactivity under the second Teague exception ( Beachem, 317 Ill.App.3d at 702 , 251 Ill.

2002Third, the Kizer court noted that the second Teague exception must be narrowly construed so as to recognize that “ 1 “[application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” ’ ” Kizer, 318 Ill.

2002Third, the Kizer court noted that the second Teague exception must be narrowly construed so as to recognize that “application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Kizer , 318 Ill.

2013However, in order to determine whether Miller should be applied retroactively, we look to the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and adopted by our supreme court in People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 , 561 N.E.2d 674 (1990). ¶ 20 Our supreme court has succinctly explained the Teague analysis as follows: “Generally, new rules are not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review except in two instance: (1) if the rule places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal-law-making authority to pros

2013However, in order to determine whether Miller should be applied retroactively, we look to the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and adopted by our supreme court in People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 , 561 N.E.2d 674 (1990). ¶ 20 Our supreme court has succinctly explained the Teague analysis as follows: “Generally, new rules are not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review except in two instance: (1) if the rule places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal-law-making authority to pros

2018People v. Price , 2016 IL 118613 , ¶ 21, 412 Ill.Dec. 782 , 76 N.E.3d 1240 (underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion *136 that the new rule, had it been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome); see, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 294 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus , who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which was decided after his conviction became final); Flowers , 138 Ill. 2d at 23

2018People v. Price , 2016 IL 118613 , ¶ 21, 412 Ill.Dec. 782 , 76 N.E.3d 1240 (underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion *136 that the new rule, had it been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome); see, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 294 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus , who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which was decided after his conviction became final); Flowers , 138 Ill. 2d at 23

2002Reddick discussed the constitutional obligation of the jury to follow the trial judge's instructions (see People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill.2d 61, 66-67 , 12 Ill.Dec. 728 , 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977)), but, unlike Victor, Cage, Sullivan, or now Apprendi , it did not implicate the right to a jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and, consequently, the fundamental fairness and accuracy concerns inherent in the second Teague exception.

2002Reddick discussed the constitutional obligation of the jury to follow the trial judge's instructions (see People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill.2d 61, 66-67 , 12 Ill.Dec. 728 , 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977)), but, unlike Victor, Cage, Sullivan, or now Apprendi , it did not implicate the right to a jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and, consequently, the fundamental fairness and accuracy concerns inherent in the second Teague exception.

2014Second, the Teague analysis “was meant to apply only to federal courts considering habeas corpus petitions challenging state-court criminal convictions.” Id. at 279 . - 10 - ¶ 36 A judicial decision that establishes a new constitutional rule applies to all criminal cases pending on direct review.

2014Second, the Teague analysis “was meant to apply only to federal courts considering habeas corpus petitions challenging state-court criminal convictions.” Id. at 279 . - 10 - ¶ 36 A judicial decision that establishes a new constitutional rule applies to all criminal cases pending on direct review.

2012App. 3d at 246 -47 (citing Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241 ). -10- ¶ 42 Since it is clear that the rule announced in White does not legalize an entire category of primary, private individual conduct as required under the first Teague exception, we turn to the second exception.

2003The second Teague exception permits retroactive application only of those “ ‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’ ” that “ ‘ “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements” ’ essential to the fairness of a proceeding” (emphasis omitted) (Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-42 , Ill L.

2001The Beachem court also relied, in part, on United States v. Murphy, 109 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1064 (D.Minn.2000), which held that the Apprendi rule satisfies the second Teague exception because it "compels a radical shift in criminal procedure." Less than one month after the court filed its opinion in Beachem , a first division panel of the First District Appellate Court decided that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review because the Apprendi rule did not "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to a fair trial." People v. Kizer, 318 I

2001The Kizer court began its Teague analysis by noting that federal courts hold differing views on the matter, citing both Murphy, 109 F.Supp.2d at 1064 , and Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) (in which the Ninth Circuit declined to grant habeas corpus relief based on retroactive application of Apprendi under the second Teague exception).

2016(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 28 Although Teague and its progeny apply only to federal habeas corpus proceed- ings, Illinois has adopted the Teague rule to govern retroactivity in State law collateral proceed- ings.

2016(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 28 Although Teague and its progeny apply only to federal habeas corpus proceed- ings, Illinois has adopted the Teague rule to govern retroactivity in State law collateral proceed- ings.

2010The purpose of the Teague framework is to promote the government's interest in the finality of criminal convictions ( Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 , 109 S.Ct. at 1074 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 355 ) and to validate "reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions" ( Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 , 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347, 356 (1990)). "`Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential

2010The purpose of the Teague framework is to promote the government's interest in the finality of criminal convictions ( Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 , 109 S.Ct. at 1074 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 355 ) and to validate "reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions" ( Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 , 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347, 356 (1990)). "`Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential

2011Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990).

2011Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990).

2018People v. Price , 2016 IL 118613 , ¶ 21, 412 Ill.Dec. 782 , 76 N.E.3d 1240 (underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion *136 that the new rule, had it been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome); see, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 294 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus , who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which was decided after his conviction became final); Flowers , 138 Ill. 2d at 23

2018People v. Price , 2016 IL 118613 , ¶ 21, 412 Ill.Dec. 782 , 76 N.E.3d 1240 (underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion *136 that the new rule, had it been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome); see, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 294 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus , who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which was decided after his conviction became final); Flowers , 138 Ill. 2d at 23

2018Smith , 2015 IL 116572 , ¶ 24, 389 Ill.Dec. 245 , 26 N.E.3d 335 . ¶ 55 The Teague doctrine is tailored to the situation where a new rule is established in a previous case and a defendant in a collateral proceeding seeks to have the new rule applied to him.

2018Smith , 2015 IL 116572 , ¶ 24, 389 Ill.Dec. 245 , 26 N.E.3d 335 . ¶ 55 The Teague doctrine is tailored to the situation where a new rule is established in a previous case and a defendant in a collateral proceeding seeks to have the new rule applied to him.

2011We have frequently held that the Teague bar to retroactivity applies to new rules that are based on “bedrock” constitutional rights. [Citation.] Similarly, “[t]hat a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough.” [Citation.] Instead, in order to meet this requirement, a new rule must itself constitute a previously unrecognized bedrock procedural element that is essential to the fairness of a proceeding. 12 1-09-3337 In applying this requirement, we again have looked to the example of Gideon, and “we have not hesitated to hold that less sweeping and fundamental rule

2011In applying this requirement, we again have looked to the example of Gideon, and “we have not hesitated to hold that less sweeping and fundamental rules” do not qualify. [Citation.]’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 363 (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420-21 (2007)).

2011Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 . ¶ 28 The first Teague exception was fashioned by the court in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 , 91 S.Ct. 1160 , 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971), and applies only to rules that decriminalize a class of conduct or prohibit a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.

2011Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 . ¶ 28 The first Teague exception was fashioned by the court in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 , 91 S.Ct. 1160 , 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971), and applies only to rules that decriminalize a class of conduct or prohibit a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.

2003Ed. 2d 828, 838 , 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998) (“The Teague doctrine is founded on the notion that one of the ‘principal functions of habeas corpus [is] “to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted” ’ ”).

2003Ed. 2d 828, 838 , 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998) (“The Teague doctrine is founded on the notion that one of the ‘principal functions of habeas corpus [is] “to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted” ’ ”).

2017(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 35 (quoting Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 239 ). ¶ 15 Under the Teague analysis, before considering the exceptions a court must determine if the rule in question is in fact a new rule.

2017(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 35 (quoting Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 239 ). ¶ 15 Under the Teague analysis, before considering the exceptions a court must determine if the rule in question is in fact a new rule.

2016See People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 365 , 666 N.E.2d 1191, 1194 (1996) (not applying Teague to determine whether a new rule unfavorable to defendant ap- plied retroactively to the pending appeal in a postconviction proceeding and describing the Teague rule as one that applies to determine the retroactivity of “a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure that is favorable to the defendant” (emphasis added)). ¶ 39 In this case, defendant turns Teague on its head.

2016See People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 365 , 666 N.E.2d 1191, 1194 (1996) (not applying Teague to determine whether a new rule unfavorable to defendant ap- plied retroactively to the pending appeal in a postconviction proceeding and describing the Teague rule as one that applies to determine the retroactivity of “a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure that is favorable to the defendant” (emphasis added)). ¶ 39 In this case, defendant turns Teague on its head.

2012In doing so, the court in Morris noted that in its prior decision in De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 438 , rejecting the retroactive application of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to cases on collateral review, it had made clear that a rule that only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence does not fall into the category of errors that affect the integrity of the judicial system so as to trigger the second Teague exception.

2012See Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 363 ; see also People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 438 (holding that the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not meet the second Teague exception so as to be applied to cases on collateral review, because that decision only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence and does not amount to an error that seriously affects the fairness or reputation of court proceedings).

2012Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 242 ; see also People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 361-62 (2010) (citing Teague, 489 U. S. at 313-14 ). ¶ 43 Moreover, specific to the cause at bar, our supreme court has reiterated: “[A] rule that only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence does not amount to an error which seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings so as to fall within the second Teague exception requiring retroactivity in all cases.” Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 363 (citing People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426, 438 (2003)). ¶ 44 In Morris, two defendant

2012In doing so, the court in Morris noted that in its prior decision in De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 438 , rejecting the retroactive application of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to cases on collateral review, it had made clear that a rule that only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence does not fall into the category of errors that affect the integrity of the judicial system so as to trigger the second Teague exception.

2014However, those panels have differed in their application of the Teague analysis to Miller. - 11 - ¶ 38 In the instant case, the appellate court relied on Williams, which concluded that Miller constitutes a watershed rule of criminal procedure, or requires the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 2012 IL App (1st) 112577-U , ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 111145, ¶¶ 51-52 ).

2014However, those panels have differed in their application of the Teague analysis to Miller. - 11 - ¶ 38 In the instant case, the appellate court relied on Williams, which concluded that Miller constitutes a watershed rule of criminal procedure, or requires the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 2012 IL App (1st) 112577-U , ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 111145, ¶¶ 51-52 ).

2003See also Hughes v. State, 826 So.2d 1070 (Fla.App.2002) (finding Apprendi nonretroactive under pre- Teague test set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)). [2] See Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378, 385 (6th Cir.2002); United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304 (5th Cir.2002); Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841, 842-43 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.2002); Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 671 ; McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258

2002Further, as observed in Sanders, “a rule which merely shifts the factfinding duties from an impartial judge to a jury clearly does not fall within the scope of the second Teague exception.” Sanders, 247 F.3d at 148 .

2018People v. Price , 2016 IL 118613 , ¶ 21, 412 Ill.Dec. 782 , 76 N.E.3d 1240 (underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion *136 that the new rule, had it been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome); see, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 294 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus , who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which was decided after his conviction became final); Flowers , 138 Ill. 2d at 23

2018People v. Price , 2016 IL 118613 , ¶ 21, 412 Ill.Dec. 782 , 76 N.E.3d 1240 (underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion *136 that the new rule, had it been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome); see, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 294 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus , who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which was decided after his conviction became final); Flowers , 138 Ill. 2d at 23

2018People v. Price , 2016 IL 118613 , ¶ 21, 412 Ill.Dec. 782 , 76 N.E.3d 1240 (underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion *136 that the new rule, had it been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome); see, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 294 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus , who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which was decided after his conviction became final); Flowers , 138 Ill. 2d at 23

2018People v. Price , 2016 IL 118613 , ¶ 21, 412 Ill.Dec. 782 , 76 N.E.3d 1240 (underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion *136 that the new rule, had it been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome); see, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 294 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus , who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which was decided after his conviction became final); Flowers , 138 Ill. 2d at 23