James D. Sullivan v. T. Francis Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1968). · Go Syfert
Search
James D. Sullivan v. T. Francis Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1968). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
38 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1969 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1969 1997 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dominic v. Goldman
D.N.H. · 2021 · confidence medium
Pursuant to the doctrine of judicial immunity, “[a]bsolute immunity from damages . . . is extended to court officials other than judges when the officials perform judicial functions. . . .” Id. (citing Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993)); see also Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding without significant analysis that judicial immunity applies to clerks of court to the same extent as to judges); Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1968) (same).5 5 However, the First Circuit has also observed, apparently in dicta, that: While …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Steven Dominic v. P Stephen R. Goldman, et al.
D.N.H. · 2021 · confidence medium
Pursuant to the doctrine of judicial immunity, “[a]bsolute immunity from damages . . . is extended to court officials other than judges when the officials perform judicial functions. . . .” Id. (citing Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993)); see also Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding without significant analysis that judicial immunity applies to clerks of court to the same extent as to judges); Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1968) (same).5 5 However, the First Circuit has also observed, apparently in dicta, that: While …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mangianfico v. Stanton (2×)
D. Mass. · 2019 · confidence medium
Under the well-established doctrine of judicial immunity, “a judge is immune from a suit for money damages” as long as the relevant actions were “taken in the judge’s judicial capacity” and were not “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12 (1991) (involving action under Section 1983). “[T]he immunity accorded to judges ‘extends to other officers of government whose duties are related to the judicial process.’” Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1968) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taal v. St. Mary's Bank, et al.
D.N.H. · 2017 · confidence medium
Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 ; Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1968).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ortiz v. Jimenez-Sanchez
D.P.R. · 2015 · confidence medium
Only judicial actions taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction will deprive a judge of absolute immunity, e.g., Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir.1968) (per curiam), but neither the amended complaint nor the plaintiffs’ fantastical opposition, Docket # 75, alleges either absence of jurisdiction or that any of Judge Jiménez’s acts were not judicial in nature.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Santini v. Gierbolini
D.P.R. · 1996 · confidence medium
But this does not mean that judicial immunity hangs upon the determination of nice questions of jurisdiction which * * * can be some of the most difficult and embarrassing that a judicial officer may be called upon to consider and decide.” Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir.1968).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dr. Gladys Cok v. Louis Cosentino
1st Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 , 98 S.Ct. at 1105 ; Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir.1968).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stanton v. Chase
D.C. · 1985 · confidence medium
Rather, judicial immunity “extends to other officers of government whose duties are related to the judicial process.” Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 , 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1338 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959); see also Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 207 (3d Cir.1975) (immunity extended to investigator for Public Defender Service because function directly related to the judicial process); Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir.1968) (judicial immunity extended to clerk of court); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir.1964) (judicial immunity extended to clerks, bailiffs, and court repor…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Temple v. Marlborough Division of the District Court Department
Mass. · 1985 · confidence medium
See Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1980); Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982, 984-985 (5th Cir. 1.980); Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1968).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martinez v. Winner
D. Colo. · 1982 · confidence medium
See e.g., Moore v. Burger, 655 F.2d 1265, 1266 (D.C.Cir.1981) (per curiam) (Supreme Court Justices held immune); Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1968); Dacey v. Dorsey, 568 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 436 U.S. 906 , 98 S.Ct. 2238 , 56 L.Ed.2d 405 ; Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706 , 711 & n. 13 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 966 , 99 S.Ct. 454 , 58 L.Ed.2d 424 (1978); Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399, 404-405 (4th Cir. 1978); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 304 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 931 , 101 S.Ct. 1392 , 67 L.Ed.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reginald Williams v. Marie Wood
5th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
But see Davis v. McAteer, 431 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1970) (absolute immunity for filing documents); Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1968) (same); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F.Supp. 905, 907-08 (D.Mass. 1962), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 226 , 83 S.Ct. 679 , 9 L.Ed.2d 714 (1963) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hansen v. Ahlgrimm
E.D. Wis. · 1973 · confidence medium
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Jacobson v. Shaefer, 441 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1971); Brown v. Dunne, 409 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1969); Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1968) ; Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 869 (9th Cir. 1964).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lipman v. Massachusetts
D. Mass. · 1972 · confidence medium
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has extended judicial immunity to the clerk of a state district court in Sullivan v. Kelleher, 1 Cir., 405 F.2d 486, at p. 487 (1968) with the observation : “Since the immunity accorded to judges ‘extends to other officers of government whose duties are related to the judicial process’ ... it follows that the defendant cannot be held personally liable for any defects in service of process, if indeed there were such defects . . .” A similar ruling was made in this court by Judge Gignoux, sitting by designation, in Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F.S…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles Earl Jacobson v. Nick F. Schaefer
7th Cir. · 1971 · confidence medium
Traditionally a judge’s jurisdiction has been defined rather broadly in this context in order to prevent the issue of judicial immunity from hinging on “the determination of nice questions of jurisdiction which as the Court pointed out in Bradley v. Fisher * * * can be ‘some of the most difficult and embarrassing’ that a judicial officer may be called upon to consider and decide.” Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1 Cir., 1967).
cited Cited "see" LaLonde v. Eissner
Mass. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1968).
cited Cited "see" Lester Slotnick v. Harold Staviskey
1st Cir. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1968); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Scott v. Central Maine Power Co.
D. Me. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Moreover, “[a] judge does not lose immunity because an action is erroneous, malicious, in excess of his authority, or disregardful of elementary principles of procedural due process, as long as *1182 the judge had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.” Decker, 845 F.2d at 21 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 359-60 , 98 S.Ct. at 1104, 1106-07 ); see also Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir.1968) (“The distinction which must be observed is ‘between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter.’ ”) (quoting Bradley v. …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Westberry v. Fisher
D. Me. · 1980 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1968); Brown v. Dunne, 409 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1969); Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1967); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 379 U.S. 915 , 85 S.Ct. 263 , 13 L.Ed.2d 186 (1964); Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 352 U.S. 855 , 77 S.Ct. 84 , 1 L.Ed.2d 66 (1956); Delaney v. Shobe, 235 F.Supp. 662 (D.Or.1964).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
James D. SULLIVAN, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
T. Francis KELLEHER, Defendant, Appellee
7183.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Dec 24, 1968.
405 F.2d 486
Harvey Glass, West Peabody, Mass., for appellant., Benjamin Goldman, Boston, Mass., for appellee.
Aldrich, Woodbury, Coffin.
Cited by 35 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

The appellant, alleging himself to be a “resident and domiciliary” of New Jersey, brought this action sounding in tort in the court below against the appellee alleging him to be a citizen of Massachusetts and formerly clerk of the District Court of Newburyport in that Commonwealth. Federal jurisdiction is asserted on diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1), and on deprivation of a federally guaranteed right in violation[*487] of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The plaintiff seeks damages from the defendant basically on the ground that the court of which at the time he was clerk entered a default judgment evicting the plaintiff from his rented residence in Newburyport without giving him legal notice of the action, that is to say, by service of process at the “last and usual place of abode” without any further notice although it was well known that at the time the plaintiff was away from his home on an extended business trip to Florida. [1] The court below dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

We do not pause to consider the adequacy of the service of process or any other alleged error committed by the defendant as clerk of the Newburyport District Court but pass directly to the matter of judicial immunity.

For the soundest reasons of policy it has long been established that when a judge has general jurisdiction over the subject matter he is not civilly liable for acts done in the exercise of his judicial function. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 346 et seq., 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). But this does not mean that judicial immunity hangs upon the determination of nice questions of jurisdiction which as the Court pointed out in Bradley v. Fisher, at page 352 can be “some of the most difficult and embarrassing” that a judicial officer may be called upon to consider and decide. The distinction which must be observed is “between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter.” Bradley v. Fisher, supra 351.

Since the plaintiff concedes that the Newburyport District Court had general jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action brought in that court to evict him from his home, and since the immunity accorded to judges “extends to other officers of government whose duties are related to the judicial process,” Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1338, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), it follows that the defendant cannot be held personally liable for any defects in service of process, if indeed there were such defects. The inclusion of opprobrious epithets, such as alleging that the judicial officer acted maliciously or corruptly, adds nothing of legal consequence to the complaint, Bradley v. Fisher, supra 13 Wall 351, reaffirmed, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), wherein the Court held that the settled common law principle of judicial immunity was not abolished by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

1

. The plaintiff does not dispute that at the time the rented house in Newburyport was his “last and usual place of abode” or that his wife and children were then in residence, and he concedes that his wife notified him over the telephone of the process served at the abode.