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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Preston Lee v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security Administration
In assessing disability, a finding that a claimant can engage in substantial gainful activity requires more than determining that jobs exist that the claimant can physically perform; it also requires a determination that the claimant can hold whatever job for a significant period of time.40 Although Singletary involved a claimant with a mental illness, in Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit held that the same rule applies to physical disability cases.41 This inquiry entails consideration of whether any necessary medical treatment would interrupt the ability to p…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jessica Ponce, AKA: Jessica Facundo v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
Therefore, the “ability to perform work on a regular and continuing basis is inherent in the definition of RFC.” Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 619 (5th Cir. 2003) (on petition for rehr’g)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (b) (2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cody R. Roberson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Claiborne v. Commissioner of Social Security
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Madden v. O'Malley
Tex. Sept. 26, 2022) (citing Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (absent evidence to the contrary, the ability to perform work on a regular and continuing basis is inherent in the definition of RFC, and a specific finding that the claimant can maintain employment is not necessary)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Murray v. Commissioner of Social Security
The “RFC is a measure of the claimant’s capacity to perform work ‘on a regular and continuing basis.’” Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Abughaseeb v. Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
Tex. Sept. 26, 2022) (citing Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Barnes v. Commissioner of Social Security
The “RFC is a measure of the claimant’s capacity to perform work ‘on a regular and continuing basis.’” Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Page v. Commissioner of Social Security
Johnson v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1985); Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[s]ubjective complaints of pain must also be corroborated by objective medical evidence”) (citing Houston v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.1989); Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding a claimant’s subjective complaints may be discounted by an ALJ if they are inconsistent with other evidence in the record).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rodriguez v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 671-672 (5th Cir. 2003); Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 , at *1-2 (July 2, 1996) (“RFC is an assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis.”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Wells v. Commissioner of Social Security
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kemp v. Kijakazi
(2×)
Dkt. 16 at 13 (citing Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003)); Dunbar, 330 F.3d at 672 (both 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (2002) and SSR 96-8p (1996) “make clear that RFC is a measure of the claimant’s capacity to perform work ‘on a regular and continuing basis’”). 744245, at *6-7 (S.D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Morris v. Kijakazi
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (providing that absent evidence to the contrary, the ability to perform work on a regular and continuing basis is inherent in the definition of RFC, and a specific finding that the claimant can maintain employment is not necessary).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Martin v. Kijakazi
Patterson v. Astrue, 324 F. App’x 419 , 422 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (brackets omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Leal v. Saul
Dunbar v. Barnahrt, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir. 1991).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Patterson v. Astrue
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003); see also Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 465 (5th Cir.2005).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Puente v. Astrue
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cline v. Astrue
Typically, the ALJ is not required to make a specific finding that a claimant can maintain employment, unless there is “evidence that [the] claimant’s ability to maintain employment would be compromised despite his ability to perform employment as an initial matter, or an indication that the ALJ did not appreciate that an ability to perform work on a regular and continuing basis is inherent in the definition of RFC.” Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Quintanilla v. Astrue
Castillo v. Barnhart, 151 Fed.Appx. 334, 336 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Blackstock v. Astrue
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Neely v. Barnhart
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 ). 40 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilson v. Barnhart
An ALJ is not required to make “an explicit finding in every case that the claimant cannot only engage in substantial gainful activity but maintain that employment as well.” Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003). 2 Here, the record demonstrates that the ALJ took into consideration whether Wilson could maintain employment in determining residual functional capacity.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Halley v. Barnhart
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Castillo v. Barnhart
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Campbell v. Barnhart
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. Barnhart
Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Stevenson v. Barnhart
See Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.2002); Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003).
discussed
Cited "see"
Champion v. Kijakazi
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (no need for a specific finding addressing the ability to maintain employment “absent evidence that a claimant’s ability to maintain employment would be compromised despite his ability to perform employment as an initial matter”).
cited
Cited "see"
Willis v. Saul
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2003); Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2005); Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2003).
discussed
Cited "see"
Watkins v. Saul
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (no need for a specific finding addressing the ability to maintain employment “absent evidence that a claimant’s ability to maintain employment would be compromised despite his ability to perform employment as an initial matter”). 2.
discussed
Cited "see"
Carolyn Thomas v. Carolyn Colvin, Acting Cmsnr
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (holding that ALJ did not err in considering cardiac condition as non-disabling, ‘‘discounting Dunbar’s subjective complaints of pain as inconsistent with other evidence in the record, including the findings of physicians”). 21 .
cited
Cited "see"
Sandi Vaughn v. Carolyn Colvin, Commissioner
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003); Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Acosta v. Astrue
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (“[A]bsent evidence that a claimant’s ability to maintain employment would be compromised despite his ability to perform employment as an initial matter, or an indication that the ALJ did not appreciate that an ability to perform work on a regular and continuing basis is inherent in the definition of RFC, we do not read Watson to require a specific finding that the claimant can maintain employment.”).
cited
Cited "see"
Collins v. Astrue
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
cited
Cited "see"
Holiday v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
cited
Cited "see"
Lewis v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
cited
Cited "see"
Woods v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
cited
Cited "see"
George v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Ward v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 671 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that "RFC is a measure of the claimant’s capacity to perform work 'on a regular and continuing basis’ ” and implying that an ability to maintain employment is inherent in the definition of RFC). 21 .
cited
Cited "see"
MULET-RIVERA v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
cited
Cited "see"
Stephens v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003); Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212, 217-18 (5th Cir.2002).
cited
Cited "see"
Washington v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
cited
Cited "see"
Maharajh v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wren, 925 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted)).
cited
Cited "see"
Palomo v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 671 (5th Cir.2003); Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir.2002).
cited
Cited "see"
Doss v. Barnhart
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003); see also Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 621 (5th Cir.2003).
discussed
Cited "see"
King v. Barnhart
(2×)
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 671 (5th Cir.2003).
discussed
Cited "see"
Lang v. Barnhart
(2×)
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003).
discussed
Cited "see"
Irwin v. Barnhart
(2×)
See Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir.2003).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Short v. Commissioner of Social Security
A. Plaintiff’s Symptoms The Social Security Administration has established a two-step test for evaluating a claimant’s own descriptions or statements of their impairments.9 SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 , *3; accord 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 (DIB) and 416.929 (SSI); see also Dunbar v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“The ALJ must consider subjective 8 Plaintiff’s brief (ECF 13) contains internal page numbers that begin after a three-page table of contents numbered with lower-case roman numerals; citations in this Recommendation are not to these internal page number…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
James R. DUNBAR, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee
v.
Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee
02-50960.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Apr 8, 2003.
Susan L. Carpenter, Law Offices of Ed Goldner, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Raymond A. Nowak, San Antonio, TX, Kendall Morrison Rees, SSA, Office of Gen. Counsel, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.
Reavley, Barksdale, Clement.
Cited by 7 opinions | Unpublished
PER CURIAM:
We affirm for the following reasons:
1. We essentially agree with the analysis offered in the magistrate judge’s memorandum and recommendation and the district court’s order accepting the magistrate’s recommendation.
2. The Commissioner’s decision that appellant Dunbar was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence. The Com[*672] missioner applied the proper legal standards in making this determination.
3. We do not understand Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.2002), to require an explicit finding in every case that the claimant can not only engage in substantial gainful activity but maintain that employment as well. Here, the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Dunbar was not disabled based on a determination of his residual functional capacity, or RFC. The ALJ cited the regulation describing RFC, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (2002), as well as a Social Security Ruling, SSR 96-8p (1996), both of which make clear that RFC is a measure of the claimant’s capacity to perform work “on a regular and continuing basis.” The ALJ further found, after hearing the testimony of a vocational expert, that Dunbar “was capable of making a successful adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” In these circumstances, and absent evidence that a claimant’s ability to maintain employment would be compromised despite his ability to perform employment as an initial matter, or an indication that the ALJ did not appreciate that an ability to perform work on a regular and continuing basis is inherent in the definition of RFC, we do not read Watson to require a specific finding that the claimant can maintain employment. See Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 619 (5th Cir.2003) (on petition for rehearing) (“Watson requires a situation in which, by its nature, the claimant’s physical ailment waxes and wanes in its manifestation of disabling symptoms.”).
4. The ALJ did not err in failing to consider Dunbar’s cardiac condition. The ALJ did consider this condition but properly held that it was not disabling. The ALJ noted that Dunbar had suffered an infarction, but that medical evidence indicated that this event was due to blood loss on one occasion, and that a cardiac specialist had released Dunbar to return to his usual work shortly thereafter.
5. The ALJ did not err in discounting Dunbar’s subjective complaints of pain as inconsistent with other evidence in the record, including the findings of physicians. “The ALJ must consider subjective evidence of pain, but it is within his discretion to determine the pain’s disabling nature.” Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir.1991) (citation omitted).
AFFIRMED.