Ernest Richard Speed & Dwight Arnold Camp v. United States, 518 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1975). · Go Syfert
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Ernest Richard Speed & Dwight Arnold Camp v. United States, 518 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“it is well settled that a plea of guilty waives any claim to denial of a speedy trial”
8 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Richard Steele (ca8, 2023-06-29)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Richard Steele
8th Cir. · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
t is well settled that a plea of guilty waives any claim to denial of a speedy trial
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Adrian Lacey
8th Cir. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
it is well settled that a plea of guilty waives any claim to denial of a speedy trial
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Griffin
8th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
We previously have held that a guilty plea waives appeal of “the alleged denial of a speedy trial.” United States v. Lee, 500 F.2d 586, 587 (8th Cir.1974); see also Taylor v. United States, 204 F.3d 828, 829 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (holding that defendant waived right to raise any argument based on violation of the Speedy Trial Act when pleading guilty) (citing United States v. Cox, 985 F.2d 427, 433 (8th Cir.1993)); Speed v. United States, 518 F.2d 75, 77 (8th Cir.1975) (noting that “it is well settled that a plea of guilty waives any claim to denial of a speedy trial”) (citation …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anderson v. State
Miss. · 1991 · confidence medium
U.S. v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1007 (5th Cir.1989); Lebowitz v. U.S., 877 F.2d 207, 209 (2nd Cir.1989); U.S. v. LoFranco, 818 F.2d 276, 277 (2nd Cir.1987); U.S. v. Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 809-10 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 , 107 S.Ct. 1898 , 95 L.Ed.2d 505 (1987); Tiemens v. U.S., 724 F.2d 928, 929 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 , 105 S.Ct. 134 , 83 L.Ed.2d 74 (1984); U.S. v. Jackson, 659 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 , 102 S.Ct. 1637 , 71 L.Ed.2d 870 (1982); U.S. v. O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 96…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State of Md.
D. Maryland · 1978 · confidence medium
Therefore, there is no need for the court to consider whether the longstanding rule that a valid guilty plea 3 waives a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial— see, e. g., Speed v. United States, 518 F.2d 75, 77 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 988 , 96 S.Ct. 398 , 46 L.Ed.2d 306 (1975); United States v. Saldana, 505 F.2d 628, 629 (5th Cir. 1974) — has been altered by the Supreme Court decisions in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974), and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam). 4 The court note…
cited Cited "see" United States v. Keith Cox
8th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Speed v. United States, 518 F.2d 75, 76 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 988 , 96 S.Ct. 398 , 46 L.Ed.2d 306 (1975).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ernest Richard SPEED and Dwight Arnold Camp, Appellants.
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
75-1067.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Aug 1, 1975.
518 F.2d 75
Winford L. Dunn, Jr., Texarkana, Ark., for Speed., Carolyn Whitefield, Texarkana, Ark., for Camp., Robert E. Johnson, U. S. Atty., and Sam H. Park, Asst. U. S. Atty., Fort Smith, Ark., for appellee.
Van Oosterhout, Lay, Heaney.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published
LAY, Circuit Judge.

Petitioners Speed and Camp sought habeas relief from sentences imposed upon their pleas of guilty to a charge of aggravated robbery of a post office in violation of 18 .U.S.C. § 2114. The district court, the Honorable Paul X. Williams presiding, denied relief. We affirm.

The charge against petitioners stemmed from the armed robbery of a post office located in a general store in Lanesburg, Arkansas, on February 21, 1973. During the robbery money was taken from the store’s register, the owner’s person and the post office cash box under, threat of harm to the owner and his wife. Petitioners each pled guilty in state court to charges of robbery and each received sentences of ten years, with three years of each sentence suspended. The district court subsequently accepted their pleas of guilty to the federal offense and sentenced them to the mandatory prison term of twenty-five years required by § 2114. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(1), the court fixed five years as the time after which they would be eligible for parole and recommended that the Attorney General designate the state institution for service as to their federal sentence.

Petitioners contend their federal convictions should be set aside for four reasons: (1) Their federal convictions, occurring subsequent to state convictions arising from the same criminal acts were barred by the double jeopardy clause; (2) their guilty pleas were not voluntary since they were induced by the mistaken belief that any federal sentence would terminate at the expiration of their state sentences; (3) the facts of the robbery were not such as to invoke the mandatory twenty-five year term under 18 U.S.C. § 2114; and (4) they were denied a speedy trial. We find each of these contentions without merit.

It is well settled that double jeopardy does not bar a federal conviction for violation of federal law arising from the same criminal act or occurrence which has resulted in a state conviction. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959); United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360, 1362 (8th Cir. 1974).

Petitioners’ challenge to the voluntariness of their pleas is premised on their contention that they understood they would receive a federal sentence which would terminate upon expiration of their state sentences. The trial court found however that petitioners’ “understanding” was a “mere hope” that their federal and state sentences would expire simultaneously. The transcript at the evidentiary hearing demonstrates that appellants’ counsel only told petitioners this was the sentence they would recommend. Under the circumstances we find that the district court’s holding is not clearly erroneous.

[*77] Petitioners’ contention that the facts of this case do not fall within the mandatory twenty-five year prison term provision of § 2114 is incorrect. Defendants specifically admitted the use of a firearm during the robbery. This is sufficient to invoke the 25-year mandatory sentence. Kirk v. United States, 457 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1972).

Finally, it is well settled that a plea of guilty waives any claim to denial of a speedy trial. United States v. Lee, 500 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1974).