Wilson v. Wilson, 45 P. 1009 (Nev. 1896). · Go Syfert
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Wilson v. Wilson, 45 P. 1009 (Nev. 1896). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1936 · …every such conveyance or instrument of writing acknowledged or proved and certified, and recorded in the manner prescribed in this act, shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent purc… ⚠ not in text
31 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1906 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1906 1966 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FRESH MIX LLC
Bankr. D. Nev. · 2023 · confidence medium
A mutual mistake is “a mistake reciprocal and common to both parties, when each 17 alike labored under the same misconception in respect to the terms of the written agreement.” 18 19 Realty Holdings, 633 P.2d at 1223 (quoting Wilson v. Wilson, 45 P. 1009, 1010 (Nev. 1896)). 20 The exact mistake at issue remains unclear: was it the 2014 Agreement, the 2016 21 Agreement, or both?
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bock, LLC v. Steelman (2×)
D. Nev. · 2020 · confidence medium
As early as 1896, the 7 Nevada Supreme Court interpreted Nevada’s conveyance statute, then codified at § 2594 of 8 Nevada’s General Statutes, as “not intended to impart notice other than to subsequent purchasers 9 and mortgagees.”32 In Crescent v. White, the Nevada Supreme Court extended this holding to 10 fraudulent-transfer claims, reasoning that the conveyance statute (now codified at § 111.320) 11 does not “give[] notice to all persons in all situations.”33 And although not in the context of a 12 fraudulent-transfer claim, the Nevada Supreme Court in Allen v. Webb reiterated …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Realty Holdings, Inc. v. Nevada Equities, Inc.
Nev. · 1981 · confidence medium
A mutual mistake is “a mistake reciprocal and common to both parties, when each alike labored under the same misconception in respect to the terms of the written agreement.” Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Nev. 267, 273 , 45 P. 1009, 1010 (1896); see also Tarrant v. Monson, 96 Nev. 844 , 619 P.2d 1210 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Sanguinetti v. Strecker (2×)
Nev. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Nev. 267 , 45 P. 1009 (1896) (brothers); Schmidt v. Horton, 52 Nev. 302 , 287 P. 274 (1930) (joint venturers); Stewart v. Phoenix Nat’l Bank, 64 P.2d 101 (Ariz. 1937), and Fipps v. Stidham, 50 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1935) (financial advisors).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
DAVID WILSON, Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM WILSON, Appellant
Nevada Supreme Court.
Jul 5, 1896.
45 P. 1009
W. E. F. Deal, for Appellant: I. It is well established that a court of equity will never decree the specific performance of an agreement unless the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, and unless the agreement which it is sought to enforce is clearly and positively proven, and unless the plaintiff has been without fault on his part either in the first instance, or without laches thereafter, and unless the mistake was mutual. II. It is not claimed here that the mistake was a mutual one, and the reason given for the acceptance of the deed as executed by plaintiff is that there existed between plaintiff and defendant a confidence consistent with their fraternal relation, and that on account thereof and of plaintiff's belief as to the competency of defendant to make and execute a proper deed passing defendant's title to said property to plaintiff, plaintiff was induced thereby not to examine and did not examine said deed to ascertain if it conformed to the agreement. This excuse is totally insufficient; no fraud or misrepresentation of any kind on the part of defendant is claimed. III. Because a confidence existed between the parties consistent with their fraternal relation, and because plaintiff believed defendant competent to draw a deed, is no excuse for plaintiff's failure to examine it. IV. The deed was dated November 28, 1876. It was acknowledged on March 20, 1877. Whether the deed was delivered to plaintiff or not prior to the time it was recorded, he certainly had constructive notice of its contents from the time of its record. In 1884 or 1885 plaintiff, according to his own testimony, had possession of the deed, and thus had additional actual means of knowledge of its contents. This was ten years before the suit was brought. The fact that it would take plaintiff some time to read the deed is no excuse for his failure to do so. If it was too much trouble for him to read it to himself, he could have others read it for him, as he did in 1893. The circumstance that he all along supposed that the deed contained what he thought it did does not justify or excuse his failure to ascertain the actual fact; nor does the confidence which one man has in another, and which leads him to accept a document upon the supposition that it contained what it ought to contain, justify him in remaining idle, and in resting upon the supposition that it is as he supposed it was for sixteen or seventeen years afterwards. V. To reform a deed on the grounds of mistake, the evidence must be clear and convincing, making out the case to the entire satisfaction of the court, and not loose, equivocal or contradictory, leaving the mistake open to doubt. ( Loomis v. Lazzarrovich, 55 Cal. 52 ; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 859, vol. 2, p. 325.) VI. The law is well settled that, where the question of laches is in issue, plaintiff is chargeable with such knowledge as he might have obtained upon inquiry, provided the facts already known by him were such as to put upon a man of ordinary intelligence the duty of inquiry. The duty of inquiry was all the more peremptory in this case, from the fact that the property itself was of an uncertain character, and was liable, as in most mining property, to suddenly develop an enormous increase of value. ( Johnson v. Standard M. Co., 148 U. S. 360 ; Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377 .) VII. In order to warrant a reformation of a deed for mistake, it must be a mistake common to both parties, or through the mistake of the plaintiff, accompanied by the the fraud, knowledge and procurement of the defendant. (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisp., sec. 870; Ranney v. McMullen, 5 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 264; Lewis v. Lewis, 5 Or. 169 ; 26 Wend. 169; Stephens v. Murton, 6 Or. 193 ; Dimon v. Providence R. Co., 5 R. I. 130 ; Lamb v. Harris, 8 Ga. 546 ; Haddock v. Williams, 10 Vt. 570 .) VIII. The statute of limitations provides that \an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake shall be brought within three years after the discovery of the facts constituting
Belknap, Bonnifield.

By the Court,

Belknap, J.:

This is a suit for the purpose of correcting a mistake in a deed.

The evidence upon the part of plaintiff tended to show that in the month of November, 1876, defendant agreed to sell his entire interest in the Wilson mining district, in this state, consisting of mines, milling property, water rights and wood lands, for the sum of $5,000. Plaintiff agreed to purchase the same, and in the course of time a deed was executed by the defendant. After the execution of the deed defendant declared in the presence of disinterested persons that he had sold his entire interest in the district, and shortly thereafter left the locality and remained away seven years or more. Upon his return he leased from the plaintiff a portion of the property omitted in the deed of conveyance.[*272] Afterwards others leased a portion of the same mining property omitted in the deed. A controversy arose, resulting in a lawsuit between the lessees and defendant concerning the ownership of ores extracted. It was then for the first time ascertained that defendant claimed to be owner by location of the property. It was also discovered that the deed made no mention of the omitted property. A few months thereafter the present suit was commenced.'

It was also shown that the omitted property consisted of unpatented mining claims, which, in default of the performance of annual work, were subject to location. Plaintiff has kept up this work. The deed was in the handwriting of defendant. A memorandum containing a list of the property of the defendant in the district, in which was included the omitted property,'was introduced. The evidence upon the part of defendant tended to contradict some of these facts.

A decree awarding plaintiff the relief prayed for was entered by the district court.

A motion for new trial was made and denied, and defendant has appealed. . One of the grounds of motion is insufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment.

The evidence was conflicting, but upon all material matters there was substantial testimony in support of the contention of the prevailing party. No express findings were made. In their absence the law implies findings in favor of the judgment.

Another point is that the mistake was not a mutual mistake. It must be conceded that a mistake must be mutual to come’ in the cognizance of a court of equity.

In Botsford v. McLean, 45 Barb. 478, this question was considered. The court said: “ So far as mistake constitutes the ground of jurisdiction in the courts of equity to give relief, it is, I think, quite well settled that the contract will be reformed in all cases of clear mistake, or, as some of the cases say, of mutual mistake. A little confusion and misconception, I think, has crept into the cases from the inexact use of the word ‘ mutual,’ as applied by way of description or classification of the kind of mistakes which courts of equity would reform. According to the real significance of the word[*273] ‘ mutual ’ in such connection, and the ordinary acception and understanding of the term, mutual mistake would mean a mistake reciprocal and common to both parties, when each alike labored under the same misconception in respect to the terms of the written instrument. * * * When parties have entered into a written contract it must be presumed to express their common intentions and to speak their actual agreement. But if it be clearly shown that such is not the case, and that such written contract is untrue, and misrepresents or misstates their real agreement and intentions as made and understood by both parties, in some essential particular, then such contract is a mistaken one, and such mistake may be corected in a court of equity, in respect to such particular error.”

In cases like the present, where one side claims that a mistake exists and the other denies it, it was the duty of the court to determine which contention was correct, and, by giving judgment in favor of plaintiff, the presumption is that the issue was implicitly found in his favor..

' Laches and the statute of limitations are interposed as a defense to the suit. The parties were brothers. Their relations were of mutual trust and confidence. Plaintiff, up to the time that he learned that the defendant had relocated the Midas mine and of the omission in the deed, had implicit confidence in him. Nothing had occurred to interrupt these relations or excite distrust or suspicion until this time, and the suit having been commenced shortly after the discovery of the omission in the deed he is not chargeable with laches.

The deed was recorded March 20, 1877. It is said that the record was notice to the plaintiff of its contents. It may be observed that the record is not notice of anything not contained in the deed. We are satisfied, however, that the statute of this state concerning records (Gen. Stats. 2594) is not intended to impart notice other than to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. (McCabe v. Grey, 20 Cal. 516.)

Judgment affirmed.

Bonnifield, J.: I concur.