laches doctrine in Colorado

1977Greeley & Loveland Irrigation Co. v. McCloughan, 140 Colo. 173 , 342 P.2d 1045 (1959); Duncan v. Colorado Investment and Realty Co., 116 Colo. 12 , 178 P.2d 428 (1947).

1977Greeley & Loveland Irrigation Co. v. McCloughan, 140 Colo. 173 , 342 P.2d 1045 (1959); Duncan v. Colorado Investment and Realty Co., 116 Colo. 12 , 178 P.2d 428 (1947).

1977Greeley & Loveland Irrigation Co. v. McCloughan, 140 Colo. 173 , 342 P.2d 1045 (1959); Duncan v. Colorado Investment and Realty Co., 116 Colo. 12 , 178 P.2d 428 (1947).

1977Greeley & Loveland Irrigation Co. v. McCloughan, 140 Colo. 173 , 342 P.2d 1045 (1959); Duncan v. Colorado Investment and Realty Co., 116 Colo. 12 , 178 P.2d 428 (1947).

2017He pointed to a recent supreme court case, Hickerson v. Vessels, 2014 CO 2 , holding that laches can be a defense to both legal and equitable claims and that “legislatively 5 prescribed limitations periods do not ordinarily preclude a laches defense.” Johnson, 2014 COA 145, ¶ 23 (quoting Hickerson, ¶ 17).

2016Hickerson, ¶ 12, 316 P.3d at 623 . ¶17 Courts have interpreted the laches defense to signify so unreasonable a delay in the assertion of and attempt to secure equitable rights as to constitute in equity and good conscience a bar to recovery.

1987DeForest v. Walters, 153 N.Y. 229 , 47 N.E. 294 (1897); Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Nev. 267 , 45 P. 1009 (1896).

1987DeForest v. Walters, 153 N.Y. 229 , 47 N.E. 294 (1897); Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Nev. 267 , 45 P. 1009 (1896).

1987DeForest v. Walters, 153 N.Y. 229 , 47 N.E. 294 (1897); Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Nev. 267 , 45 P. 1009 (1896).

1987DeForest v. Walters, 153 N.Y. 229 , 47 N.E. 294 (1897); Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Nev. 267 , 45 P. 1009 (1896).

2025“A laches defense comprises three elements: (1) full knowledge of the facts by the 35 party against whom the defense is asserted; (2) unreasonable delay by that party in pursuing an available remedy; and (3) intervening reliance by and prejudice to the party asserting the defense.” In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 40 . ¶ 80 The party asserting laches bears the burden of establishing its elements.

2017WFFC responded that the Treasurer's failure to do anything when "there was more that could reasonably be done" was a violation of the statute and a deprivation of due process, and required summary judgment in favor of WFFC, relying in part on Jones v. Flowers , 547 U.S. 220 , 238, 126 S.Ct. 1708 , 164 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006). ¶ 12 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

2017WFFC responded that the Treasurer's failure to do anything when "there was more that could reasonably be done" was a violation of the statute and a deprivation of due process, and required summary judgment in favor of WFFC, relying in part on Jones v. Flowers , 547 U.S. 220 , 238, 126 S.Ct. 1708 , 164 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006). ¶ 12 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

2017Id. ¶ 41 Everyone before us agrees that wife knew of the maintenance award, yet waited twenty-six years to enforce it.

2017See id. at ¶¶ 3-4, 6; In re Marriage of Johnson, 2014 COA 145 , rev’d, 2016 CO 67 . ¶ 16 Specially concurring, Judge Berger opined that laches provides “a needed ‘safety-valve’ in unusual cases.” Johnson, 2014 COA 145, ¶ 21 .

2016Cf. Williams v. Woodruff, 35 Colo. 28 , 85 P. 90 , 101 (1905) (citing Rip Van Winkle as an illustration of the principle that “[p]arties cannot lie down to sleep upon their rights, and, on waking up many years after, find them in the same condition as that in which they were left”). ¶28 For these reasons, we conclude that Mr. Johnson may raise .the doctrine of laches as a defense to Mrs. Johnson’s claim for the interest that has accrued on the $4,800 in child support arrearages at issue.

2016Cf. Williams v. Woodruff, 35 Colo. 28 , 85 P. 90 , 101 (1905) (citing Rip Van Winkle as an illustration of the principle that “[p]arties cannot lie down to sleep upon their rights, and, on waking up many years after, find them in the same condition as that in which they were left”). ¶28 For these reasons, we conclude that Mr. Johnson may raise .the doctrine of laches as a defense to Mrs. Johnson’s claim for the interest that has accrued on the $4,800 in child support arrearages at issue.

2016In the alternative, Wood contends that if the People had authority to request and the district court had jurisdiction and authority to vacate the second degree murder conviction, we must remand to the district court because the district court entered the mittimus incorrectly. ¶ 14 Following oral arguments, we asked for supplemental briefs on (1) how People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2010), and People in Interest of E.G., 2016 CO 19 , 368 P.3d 946 , apply to either the People’s ability to file the motion for resentencing or the district court’s authority to decide the People’s motion; (2)

2016Cf. Williams v. Woodruff, 35 Colo. 28 , 85 P. 90 , 101 (1905) (citing Rip Van Winkle as an illustration of the principle that “[p]arties cannot lie down to sleep upon their rights, and, on waking up many years after, find them in the same condition as that in which they were left”). ¶28 For these reasons, we conclude that Mr. Johnson may raise .the doctrine of laches as a defense to Mrs. Johnson’s claim for the interest that has accrued on the $4,800 in child support arrearages at issue.

2016Cf. Williams v. Woodruff, 35 Colo. 28 , 85 P. 90 , 101 (1905) (citing Rip Van Winkle as an illustration of the principle that “[p]arties cannot lie down to sleep upon their rights, and, on waking up many years after, find them in the same condition as that in which they were left”). ¶28 For these reasons, we conclude that Mr. Johnson may raise .the doctrine of laches as a defense to Mrs. Johnson’s claim for the interest that has accrued on the $4,800 in child support arrearages at issue.

2016In the alternative, Wood contends that if the People had authority to request and the district court had jurisdiction and authority to vacate the second degree murder conviction, we must remand to the district court because the district court entered the mittimus incorrectly. ¶ 14 Following oral arguments, we asked for supplemental briefs on (1) how People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2010), and People in Interest of E.G., 2016 CO 19 , 368 P.3d 946 , apply to either the People’s ability to file the motion for resentencing or the district court’s authority to decide the People’s motion; (2)

2016In the alternative, Wood contends that if the People had authority to request and the district court had jurisdiction and authority to vacate the second degree murder conviction, we must remand to the district court because the district court entered the mittimus incorrectly. ¶ 14 Following oral arguments, we asked for supplemental briefs on (1) how People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2010), and People in Interest of E.G., 2016 CO 19 , 368 P.3d 946 , apply to either the People’s ability to file the motion for resentencing or the district court’s authority to decide the People’s motion; (2)

2014It reasoned that the separation of powers doe-trine precludes a common law doctrine that operates to shorten a legislatively prescribed limitations period: "In deference to the separation of powers doctrine, we are wary of invoking an equitable principle, such as lach-es, where the legislative branch of government has already made a clear policy judgment." - Vessels, — P.3d at —, 2012 WL 503664 , at *15 18 We granted Hickerson's petition for review.

2012In Bristol Co. v. Osman, 190 P.3d 752 (Colo.App.2007), the plaintiff brought a claim for legal malpractice, arguing that his former attorney failed to advise it that delay in filing a patent infringement suit could give rise to a laches defense.

2012Id. at 754 .