Spradley v. Georgia H. Ins. Co., 98 S.E. 285 (S.C. 1919). · Go Syfert
Spradley v. Georgia H. Ins. Co., 98 S.E. 285 (S.C. 1919). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
97 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1927 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1927 1976 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "see" Dorn v. United States
D.C. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lumpkin v. United States, 586 A.2d 701 , 704 n. 3 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 , 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. West (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir.1990) (abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 , 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991); United States v. Alexander, 850 F.2d 1500, 1505 (11th Cir.1988)(clearly erroneous), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 915 , 109 S.Ct. 3236 , 106 L.Ed.2d 584 (1989), reinstated as amended, 888 F.2d 777 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 , 110 S.Ct. 2623 , 110 L.Ed.2d 643 (1990).
examined Cited "see" UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roy MacK WEST, A.K.A. Teeny Man, Etc., Defendant-Appellant (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir.1990) (abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 , 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991); United States v. Alexander, 850 F.2d 1500, 1505 (11th Cir.1988)(clearly erroneous), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 915 , 109 S.Ct. 3236 , 106 L.Ed.2d 584 (1989), reinstated as amended, 888 F.2d 777 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 , 110 S.Ct. 2623 , 110 L.Ed.2d 643 (1990).
discussed Cited "see" O'Ferrell v. United States
M.D. Ala. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1508 (11th Cir.1990) (discussing Franks and then stating that the informant who caused the affiant to make a false statement “was not an agent or instrumentality of the government within the meaning of Franks ”), certs. denied, 502 U.S. 849 , 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991) and 502 U.S. 890 , 112 S.Ct. 253 , 116 L.Ed.2d 207 (1991).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Miguel N. Garcia and Carl J. McAfee
7th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 , 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. George Dean, James Earl Cofer, Kenneth Dewayne Smith, and Kenneth Earl Flowers
5th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1511 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that where those within the "society” of the conspiracy knew defendant as "Boss” and "Boss Man," "[t]here was no error in the revelation of this fact nor in references to him by witnesses who knew him only by these monikers”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 , 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991); United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1425 (7th Cir.) (finding that forbidding witness to refer to defendants' nicknames would be unduly burdensome where defendants used nicknames to identify themselves in witness’ pres…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Marvin L. Wiseman, United States of America v. Center Art Galleries-Hawaii, Inc., United States of America v. William D. Mett
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir.1990) (request untimely where motion to suppress did not include a Franks request and defendant failed to meet the court's deadline for such a request), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 151 (1991); United States v. Mayomi, 873 F.2d 1049 , 1056 n. 8 (7th Cir.1989) (because defendant failed to comply with procedural requirement that a Franks motion be filed, he waived the issue on appeal).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Vladimir Cedano-Rojas
7th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1183-84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Humberto Nunez-Garcia
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4, comment. (n. 1); see United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1183-84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 151 (1991) (defendant's boast, while concluding a sale of two kilograms of cocaine, that he could get ten more was insufficient to show that he intended to produce or reasonably could produce the additional cocaine); compare with United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1369-71 (11th Cir.1990) (no clear error in district court's determination that co-conspirators who supplied only 6 ounces of cocaine were reasonably capable of producing three kilograms given their agreement …
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Echeverri
1st Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501 , ___ ______________ _____ 1510 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 151 , 253 (1991); _____ ______ United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 26 (1st Cir. 1984).4 _____________ _______ B.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Echeverri
1st Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 151 , 253 (1991); United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 26 (1st Cir. 1984).4 B.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Marco A. Echeverri
1st Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —,—, 112 S.Ct. 151 , 253, 116 L.Ed.2d 117, 207 (1991); United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 26 (1st Cir.1984). 4 B.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Javier Reyes
10th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1184 (7th Cir.) (defendant’s mention of greater quantity with no discussion of price insufficient to establish negotiation for greater quantity), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Geddie v. United States
D.C. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Lumpkin v. United States, 586 A.2d 701, 707-708 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 , 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Byers v. United States
D.C. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See (John) Smith v. United States, 312 A.2d 781, 784-85 (D.C.1973); see also Lumpkin v. United States, 586 A.2d 701, 709 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 , 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991). 4 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Myrtle M. Williams
7th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
The court ruled that the inference of deliberate ignorance had been raised in the defense's opening statement, and that the government's request for the ostrich instruction would be granted. 27 We note as a preliminary matter that "jury instructions must be reviewed in their entirety and be taken as a whole. 'As long as the instructions treat the issues fairly and adequately, they will not be interfered with on appeal.' " United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 607 (7th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Fournier, 861 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir.1988)); see also United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 117…
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Caterini
D.N.J. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
See United States v. Reyes, 930 F.2d 310, 315 (3d Cir.1991); see also United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Bienvenido Duarte
7th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
To procure a valid conspiracy conviction, the government must demonstrate that (1) a conspiracy to distribute cocaine existed, and (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy and agreed to “join and associate himself with its criminal design and purpose.” United States v. Auerbach, 913 F.2d 407, 414-15 (7th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1179 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991); United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir.1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Michael Denard Brooks, United States of America v. Johnny X. Williamson, United States of America v. Melvin Eugene Flint, United States of America v. Charles Russell Ford, United States of America v. Linda Mitchell Peay
4th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1183-84 (7th Cir.) (drug amount should be included if defendant "intended to produce and was 'reasonably capable of producing' " drugs), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991); United States v. Bradley, 917 F.2d 601, 604 (1st Cir.1990) (drug amount should be included if defendant "fully intended to produce, and was reasonably capable of producing," drugs); United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1079 (7th Cir.1990) (drug amounts should be excluded if defendant "did not intend to or could not produce those amounts").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Brooks
4th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1183-84 (7th Cir.) (drug amount should be included if defendant "intended to produce and was ‘reasonably capable of producing’ ” drugs), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 151 , 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991); United States v. Bradley, 917 F.2d 601, 604 (1st Cir.1990) (drug amount should be included if defendant "fully intended to produce, and was reasonably capable of producing," drugs); United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1079 (7th Cir.1990) (drug amounts should be excluded if defendant "did not intend to or could not produce those amounts�…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Spradley
v.
Georgia Home Ins. Co.
10159.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Feb 10, 1919.
98 S.E. 285
Messrs. Henderson , for appellant, submit: That the policy was indivisible and an entirety: (Ga.) 78 Am. St. Rep. 325; 1 Wood on Fire Ins. 384; Ostrander on Fire Insurance, 2d Ed., sec. 23; 14 R.C.L., sec. 114, and authorities cited in footnote to this text; 60 Rep. 689 (Ind.); 93 Am. St. Rep. 266; 119 Am. St. Rep. 246; Am. Cas. 1912 C.F. 985; 12 Am. St. Rep. 393 (Ind.); 50 Am. St. Rep. 182 (Arkansas); 73 N.Y. 642 ; 29 Am. St. Rep. 906 (Wis.); Freeman's Notes, 74 Am. Dec. 498; May on Insurance, sec. 277; Flanders on Insurance 331; 74 Am. Dec. 495 (N.Y.); 81 Am.Dec. 562 (Me.); 51 Am. St. Rep. 457 (Md.); 78 Am. Dec. 216 (Ga.); 2 S.E. 61 (N.C.); 100 Am. St. Rep. 663 (Ohio); Ann Cases 1913, 1301; 3 Brevard (5 S.C.L.), p 522; 100 S.C. 47 ; 102 S.C. 115 ; 106 S.C. 471 . Messrs. Croft Croft , for respondent, submit: That the contract between the parties was severable and divisible: 19 Cyc. 674; 94 S.C. 302 ; 27 Neb. 527 ; 20 A.S.R. 699, 700; 73 N.Y. 463 ; 29 Am. Rep. 184; 48 Kansas 488; 30 Am St. Rep. 313; 116 Iowa 625 ; 42 Missouri 126; 15 N.Y. 9 ; Parsons on Contracts, 5th Ed. 457; 40 Mo. 552 ; 42 Mo 126 ; 97 A.D. 325 , 327 ; 32 Nebraska 750; 29 Am. St. Rep 459; 121 Mo. 75 ; 42 Am. St. Rep. 529; 17 Mo. 247 ; 42 Mo 126 ; 97 Am. Dec. 325; 121 Mo. 75 ; 42 Am. St. Rep. 527, 528.
Watts.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Watts.

This action is on an insurance policy. The policy covered a home and a piano. The home was situated on the property of another than the insured, and the piano was the property of another. The undisputed testimony establishes these facts. The building was erected under a verbal lease for three years. It does not appear that there was any stipulation therein permitting the insured to remove the building. The case was tried before Judge Moore, and a jury, at the April term of Court, 1918, for Aiken county. During the trial the issue of waiver as to the house arose. After all of the evidence was in the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict in its behalf. His Honor directed a verdict as to the claim for loss of piano, but refused as to claim for loss of house, but submitted to the jury on this issue the question of waiver. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $700 and interest. After entry of judgment, defendant appealed, and by four exceptions alleges error in two particulars on the part of Presiding Judge Moore:

[*154] 1 First, that he erred in holding that there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of defendant’s knowledge of the ownership of the land, and that he should have directed a verdict for defendant on the whole case.

There is no doubt that the plaintiff breached the condition his policy as to the ownership of the land upon which the building was situated. There is nothing in the evidence to show a waiver of this condition of policy. Among the conditions that would render the policy void unless provided for agreement in writing added to the policy is “if the interest the insured be other than” unconditional and sole ownership, or if the subject of insurance be a building on ground not owned by insured in fee simple, etc.

2 The insurance company has the right to know what insurable interest the insured had in the property for its own protection, whether, in fee simple life estate for a year, or a term of years. Experience teaches us that the owner of a house is more circumspect and careful in looking after it than a tenant or one who leases. There is no question but that moral hazard is much better when the insured is the owner in fee of house insured. The risk is not so great. The agent of the insurance was misled when the insured said that it was part of the Ben Turner land, near the place he called “home.” This was simply a designation of its location, and carried with it no notice of ownership. It was the duty of the insured to tell agent whether hp owned or leased the land. And he did not tell the agent enough, as to the ownership of the land, for the question of waiver to be submitted to a jury. Under misleading statements, a policy is procured, and a short time afterwards the property is burned and the plaintiff is awarded the full amount of the policy, as if he were the owner in fee.

[*155] 3 These exceptions must be sustained. His Honor should have directed a verdict for defendant as asked for. The exceptions raising the question that his Honor was in error in holding that the policy was divisible are overruled, for the reason stated by his Honor in his ruling on this question in the Circuit Court.

Judgment reversed.