local rule in District of Columbia

2024Code § 11-946 (“The Superior Court shall conduct its business according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”). “[W]hen a local rule and a federal rule are identical, we may look to federal court decisions interpreting the federal rule as persuasive authority in interpreting the local rule.” Goldkind v. Snider Bros., 467 A.2d 468, 472 (D.C. 1983) (internal quotation, footnote, and alteration omitted).

2021We may therefore “look to federal court decisions interpreting the federal rule as ‘persuasive authority in interpreting the local rule.’” Goldkind v. Snider Bros., Inc., 467 A.2d 468, 472 (D.C. 1983) (quoting Vale Props., Ltd. v. Canterbury Tales, Inc., 431 A.2d 11 , 13 n.3 (D.C. 1981)).

2024“When a local rule and a federal rule are identical, or nearly so, we will construe the local rule in a manner consistent with the federal rule to the extent possible under binding precedent . . . .” Wendemu v. Tesema, 304 A.3d 953 , 961 n.4 (D.C. 2023) (quoting Montgomery v. Jimmy’s Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025, 1027 (D.C. 1989)) (looking to federal-court decisions to aid in interpreting D.C.

2024Both rules allow the trial court to resolve an issue after a party has been fully heard but before the trial has concluded.”); Wendemu v. Tesema, 304 A.3d 953 , 961 n.4 (D.C. 2023) (“When a local rule and a federal rule are identical, or nearly so, we will construe the local rule in a manner consistent with the federal rule to the extent possible under binding precedent . . . .” (ellipses in original) (quoting Montgomery v. Jimmy’s Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025, 1027 (D.C. 1989))). 8 such a motion, the question is whether “the testimony of any witness, if believed, is sufficient enough

2004The majority relies primarily on Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730, 482 A.2d 801, 802 (D.C.1984), in which the court stated that “each period of time ... is to be considered separately.” In my colleagues’ view, the three-day mailing extension is therefore a “period of time” from which Saturdays and Sundays are to be excluded pursuant to Rule 6(a).

2004The majority relies primarily on Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730, 482 A.2d 801, 802 (D.C.1984), in which the court stated that "each period of time ... is to be considered separately." In my colleagues' view, the three-day mailing extension is therefore a "period of time" *144 from which Saturdays and Sundays are to be excluded pursuant to Rule 6(a).

2022Cir. 2019); see generally Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. 1985) (en banc) (where the language of a local rule of procedure is identical to the language of the corresponding federal rule, “the interpretive gloss placed upon the federal rule by the federal courts guides our construction of the local rule”). 13 only motion for summary judgment (Michael’s) raised no challenge to the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendants or the claims relating to the Virginia property, and (2) granted summary judgment in favor of Masomeh on all counts in the complaint, even though Maso

1990Crim.P. 35(b) as it existed before the amendment of the federal rule in 1987; thus cases construing Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 before its 1987 amendment may "guide[] our construction of the local rule.” Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C.1985) (en banc) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 454 A.2d 810, 813 (D.C.1982). 5 .

2020Both concern when a local or federal Rule 12(b)(2) lack of personal jurisdiction defense is waived. “[W]hen a local rule and a federal rule are identical, we may look to federal court decisions in interpreting the federal rule as persuasive authority in interpreting the local rule.” Williams v. United States, 878 A.2d 477, 482 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2007Since the language of Rule 26(b)(4) is identical to its federal counterpart, "we may look to federal court decisions interpreting the federal rule as persuasive authority in interpreting the local rule.” Williams v. United States, 878 A.2d 477, 482 (D.C.2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 4 .

1995Pursuant to Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., 424 A.2d 61, 68 (D.C.1980), we may look to the federal courts' interpretation of identical rules of civil procedure to lend support and guidance in our interpretation of the local rule. 10 .

1986Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., 424 A.2d 61, 68 (D.C.1980) (quoting Tupling v. Britton, 411 A.2d 349, 351 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted)). 6 .

1990Crim.P. 35(b) as it existed before the amendment of the federal rule in 1987; thus cases construing Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 before its 1987 amendment may "guide[] our construction of the local rule.” Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C.1985) (en banc) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 454 A.2d 810, 813 (D.C.1982). 5 .

1985McDaniels v. United States, 385 A.2d 180 , 181 n. 2 (D.C.1978) (per curiam); see, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 454 A.2d 810, 813 (D.C.1982).

1984See Goldkind v. Snider Bros., Inc., 467 A.2d 468, 472 (D.C.1983) (“[W]e may look to federal court decisions interpreting the [identical] federal rule as ‘persuasive authority in interpreting [the local rule].’ ” (citations omitted); Campbell v. United States, 295 A.2d 498, 501 (D.C.1972).

1978Campbell v. United States, D.C.App., 295 A.2d 498, 501 (1972). 7 .

1995"We have repeatedly held that when a local rule and a federal rule are the same, we may look to federal court decisions interpreting the federal rule as persuasive authority in interpreting the [local rule].’ ” Cohen v. Owens & Co., Inc., 464 A.2d 904, 906 n. 3 (D.C.1983) (citing Vale Properties, Ltd. v. Canterbury Tales, Inc., 431 A.2d 11 , 13 n. 3 (D.C.1981)); Dyhouse v. Baylor, 455 A.2d 900 , 901 n. 3 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (same; citing Rule 54(b)). 4 .

1991Because Superior Court Civil Rule 56 is identical to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 56, “we may look to federal court decisions interpreting the federal rule as 'persuasive authority in interpreting [the local rule].’ ” *1041 Cohen v. Owens & Co., 464 A.2d 904 , 906 n. 3 (D.C.1983) (citing Vale Properties, Ltd. v. Canterbury Tales, Inc., 431 A.2d 11 , 13 n. 3 (D.C.1981) (citations omitted)).

2005R. 44.1 (noting that Rule 44.1 is identical, "except that it refers to Rule 43 of the Civil Rules of this Court rather than to the Federal Rules of Evidence”). "[W]hen a federal rule and a local rule contain the same language, 'we will look to federal court decisions interpreting the federal rule as persuasive authority in interpreting the local rule.’" Peddlers Square, Inc. v. Scheuemann, 766 A.2d 551 , 556 n. 4 (D.C.2001) (quoting Montgomery v. Jimmy’s Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025, 1027 (D.C.1989)). 2 .

2003See, e.g., Peddlers Square, Inc. v. Scheuermann, 766 A.2d 551 , 556 n. 4 (D.C.2001). .

2000See Thomas, 586 A.2d at 1230 n. 3 (citing West v. United States, 346 A.2d 504 (D.C.1975)); Trezevant, 403 A.2d at 1136 n. 1. .

1991West v. United States, 346 A.2d 504 (D.C.1975). 4 .

2008We agree with the United States Court of Appeals in this jurisdiction that, “[standing alone, the mere fact of a trial attorney’s nonmembership in the local bar is not necessarily sufficient to find that the right to effective counsel was breached.” United States v. Butler, 504 F.2d 220, 223-224 (D.C.Cir.1974); see also In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1004 (D.C.Cir.1971) (recognizing that “[participation in litigation— even criminal litigation — by nonmembers of the local bar simply by obtaining leave of court is a common event in this and other courts”). 4 Unlike the situation in Butler , moreover

2008We agree with the United States Court of Appeals in this jurisdiction that, “[standing alone, the mere fact of a trial attorney’s nonmembership in the local bar is not necessarily sufficient to find that the right to effective counsel was breached.” United States v. Butler, 504 F.2d 220, 223-224 (D.C.Cir.1974); see also In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1004 (D.C.Cir.1971) (recognizing that “[participation in litigation— even criminal litigation — by nonmembers of the local bar simply by obtaining leave of court is a common event in this and other courts”). 4 Unlike the situation in Butler , moreover

2007The decision in SEC v. Gulf & Western includes an alternative formulation: "[b]efore this type of motion can be granted the Court must be convinced that there are no questions of fact, that any questions of law are clear and not in dispute, and that under no set of circumstances could the defenses succeed.” 502 F.Supp. at 345 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2006See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 , 102 S.Ct. 2099 , 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 , 51 S.Ct. 517 , 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 466 , 21 L.Ed. 897 (1874); Hinton v. Hinton, 395 A.2d 7, 10 (D.C.1978) (a default judgment entered without jurisdiction “may be collaterally attacked”). 10 .

2006See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 , 102 S.Ct. 2099 , 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 , 51 S.Ct. 517 , 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 466 , 21 L.Ed. 897 (1874); Hinton v. Hinton, 395 A.2d 7, 10 (D.C.1978) (a default judgment entered without jurisdiction “may be collaterally attacked”). 10 .

2006See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 , 102 S.Ct. 2099 , 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 , 51 S.Ct. 517 , 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 466 , 21 L.Ed. 897 (1874); Hinton v. Hinton, 395 A.2d 7, 10 (D.C.1978) (a default judgment entered without jurisdiction “may be collaterally attacked”). 10 .

2005Comm’n, 677 A.2d 46, 49 (D.C.1996) (quoting Montgomery v. Jimmy’s Tire & Auto Ctr., 566 A.2d 1025, 1027 (D.C.1989)). .

2005Comm'n, 677 A.2d 46, 49 (D.C.1996) (quoting Montgomery v. Jimmy's Tire & Auto Ctr., 566 A.2d 1025, 1027 (D.C.1989)). [9] In Delaney , four of the nine members of the Board, while recommending a thirty-day suspension and the requirement of responses to Bar Counsel, would not have imposed the requirement of a showing of fitness.