¹ The per capita tuition charge is essentially a calculation used to quantify the amount of money a school district pays from its own resources for each student enrolled in its schools. Recently, our legislature changed the permissible funding range of charter schools to between 97% and 103% of the local school district’s per capita tuition charge. Pub. Act 100-465 (eff. Aug. 31, 2017) (amending 105 ILCS 5/27A-11(b)).

² The Illinois Report Card is a compilation of data published annually by ISBE showing how individual schools, school districts, and the state as a whole are performing on a variety of academic performance measures, as well as providing the demographic composition of the schools, districts, and the state. 105 ILCS 5/10-17a (West 2014).

³ District 60’s notice of appeal stated that it was appealing from the circuit court’s June 23, 2016, order that affirmed the Commission’s decision but also from the court’s order that denied the district’s emergency motion for a stay. However, District 60 has not raised any arguments on appeal related to this motion. Accordingly, any argument concerning the propriety of the denial of the motion has been forfeited on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017); Goldberg v. Rush University Medical Center, 371 Ill. App. 3d 597, 604 (2007).

⁴ Although LEARN is a party to this appeal, it has not filed any briefs nor has it moved to adopt the joint briefs of the Commission and ISBE. - 13 - ¶ 64 B. Jurisdiction of the Commission and ISBE ¶ 65 District 60 first contends that the Commission and ISBE lost jurisdiction over LEARN’s appeal and certification because they both failed to follow the timeline established by the Charter Schools Law. ¶ 66 The Charter Schools Law outlines the timeline in which various actions by the Commission and ISBE should occur. 105 ILCS 5/27A-1 et seq. (West 2014). Following a public hearing on a charter school applicant’s appeal, the Commission has 30 days to vote to either grant or deny the appeal, which must occur at a public meeting. Id. § 27A-8(e), (g). The statute then provides that: “Within 7 days of the public meeting ***, the [Commission] shall file a report with [ISBE] granting or denying the proposal. If the [Commission] has approved the proposal, within 30 days of receipt of the [Commission’s] report, [ISBE] shall determine whether the approved charter proposal is consistent with the provisions of [the Charter Schools Law] and, if the approved proposal complies, certify the proposal ***.” Id. § 27A-8(f), (g). Although section 27A-8(f) of the Charter Schools Law provides a timeline with respect to a local school board’s approval of a charter school, section 27A-8(g) makes clear that the timeline imposed in section 27A-8(f) applies equally to when the Commission considers an appeal of a charter school denial by the school board. See id. § 27A-8(g) (“[T]he Commission shall follow the same process and be subject to the same timelines for review as the local school board.”). ¶ 67 The parties do not dispute the timeline of events in this case. On April 21, 2015, the Commission voted at a public meeting to grant LEARN’s appeal. Eight days later, on April 29, 2015, the Commission submitted the report of its vote to ISBE, who ultimately certified the charter between LEARN and the Commission on August 27, 2015, well after the outlined 30-day time period. According to District 60, the Commission’s noncompliance with the 7-day reporting command and ISBE’s noncompliance with the 30-day certification command resulted in them losing jurisdiction over LEARN’s appeal and rendering them unable to reverse District 60’s denial and certify the charter school, respectively. Furthermore, District 60 argues that the Commission and ISBE’s failure to comply with the timeline prejudiced the district because it created uncertainty in its staffing, enrollment, and budget. The Commission and ISBE respond, arguing that they did not lose jurisdiction over LEARN’s appeal and certification because the statutory language is merely directory, not mandatory. ¶ 68 Whether a statutory command is directory or mandatory is a question involving statutory construction that we review de novo. In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 15. “When construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, the surest and most reliable indicator of which is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. If a “statute expressly prescribes a consequence for failure to obey a statutory provision, that is very strong evidence the legislature intended that consequence to be mandatory.” People v. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43, 54 (2005). Therefore, under the mandatory-directory dichotomy of statutory construction, it is not the use of obligatory language, such as the word “shall,” that determines whether a statutory command is mandatory or directory, but rather whether noncompliance with such language dictates a resulting consequence. Id. - 14 - ¶ 69 When a procedural command to a government entity is at issue, we begin with the presumption that the command is directory. People v. Geiler, 2016 IL 119095, ¶ 18. This presumption may be overcome, and thus the procedural command reads as mandatory, if “(1) negative language in the statute or rule prohibits further action in the case of noncompliance or (2) the right the statute or rule is designed to protect would generally be injured under a directory reading.” Id. “It has long been held that statutory requisitions directed to government officials designed to secure order, system and dispatch in proceedings are usually directory rather than mandatory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 56. But if these requisitions “are intended for the protection of the citizen, *** and by a disregard of which his rights might be and generally would be injuriously affected, they are not directory but mandatory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. If the procedural command is deemed mandatory and the government entity fails to comply with the required act, we must invalidate the government action. In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 16. ¶ 70 In this case, we begin with the presumption that the procedural commands at issue—the Commission’s 7-day reporting command and ISBE’s 30-day certification command—are directory rather than mandatory. District 60 has failed to overcome this presumption. First, section 27A-8 of the Charter Schools Law (105 ILCS 5/27A-8 (West 2014)) does not utilize any negative language prohibiting further action in the case of noncompliance nor does this section dictate a particular consequence for either the Commission or ISBE’s failure to comply with the commands. Notably, District 60 fails to identify any language, seemingly conceding this point. ¶ 71 Second, before analyzing whether a directory reading would generally injure the right the statutory provision is designed to protect, we must determine what right the provision protects. See In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 24. Our review of the legislative history of the Charter Schools Law does not reveal an explicit right to be protected by the Commission’s 7-day reporting command or ISBE’s 30-day certification command. District 60, however, suggests that the timeline is intended to protect impacted school districts and their students from uncertainty in staffing, enrollment, and budgetary matters that result from delayed proceedings. District 60’s argument is true to a degree, as this timeline helps give local school districts, whose funding and enrollment are necessarily affected by the existence of charter schools in their districts, clarity. The same could be said for charter school applicants themselves, who similarly have to budget limited resources and also need clarity in the resolution of their proposals. While clarity to the parties may be a partial benefit of the timeline in the Charter Schools Law, it is only ancillary to the true purpose of the timeline, which is to provide guidance to government officials to help expedite proceedings and keep them moving in an orderly process. In other words, the timeline does not protect a specific right but rather helps ensure that the proceedings do not become unnecessarily delayed. ¶ 72 Nevertheless, even giving credence to District 60’s argument that the timeline is designed to protect school districts from uncertainty in various matters, we disagree that it is a directory reading that generally causes this uncertainty. Regardless of a directory or mandatory reading of the statutory timeline, there will always be uncertainty. That is simply the nature of the Commission’s appeals process or any other unresolved proceeding. The uncertainty cannot be removed until an appeal or proceeding is resolved. Thus, District 60’s alleged uncertainty has nothing to do with a directory or mandatory reading of the statutory timeline but rather is inherent in unresolved proceedings. To the extent that District 60 argues that a directory - 15 - reading exacerbates this uncertainty above and beyond the normal uncertainty produced by unresolved proceedings, we also disagree. Had the Commission missed its 7-day reporting command and ISBE missed its 30-day certification command much earlier in the calendar year, for example in January and February, District 60 would have no basis for arguing that these missed deadlines somehow caused any exacerbated uncertainty for its subsequent year’s staffing, enrollment, or budget. ¶ 73 It is only because the missed deadlines occurred much closer to the beginning of the school year that this alleged uncertainty in District 60’s operations manifested itself. Thus, while in this specific case, a directory reading of the statutory timeline might have injured a right the provision was designed to protect, District 60 fails to convince us that this holds true under general circumstances. See, e.g., Geiler, 2016 IL 119095, ¶ 23 (finding that “a defendant may be prejudiced by a Rule 552 violation if there is a lengthy delay in transmitting a citation in a given case, but no reason exists to believe that would generally be true”); Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 57 (finding that, “[w]hile the right to appeal might be injured by untimely service in a given case, there is no reason to believe that it generally would be”). Moreover, District 60’s assertion that it was prejudiced from the Commission and ISBE’s failure to comply with the timeline is belied by the fact that it knew the Commission had voted to grant LEARN’s appeal on April 21, 2015, subject to LEARN satisfying the performance agreement, well in advance of the beginning of the 2015-2016 school year. Consequently, we find that the Commission’s 7-day reporting command and ISBE’s 30-day certification command are directory. ¶ 74 Furthermore, District 60’s reliance on McReynolds v. Civil Service Comm’n, 18 Ill. App. 3d 1062 (1974), is unpersuasive. In that case, the plaintiff, a state employee, was suspended without pay and two weeks later received a notice of discharge. Id. at 1063. The plaintiff subsequently sought a hearing on the matter, which occurred 47 days later. Id. Following the hearing, a hearing officer recommended that the plaintiff be discharged, a recommendation that was eventually adopted by the Civil Service Commission. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review, arguing that the Civil Service Commission lost jurisdiction over her case because it failed to hold the hearing within 30 days of her request. Id. The statutory provision at issue stated that, “ ‘[u]pon the filing of such a request for a hearing, the Commission shall grant a hearing within thirty days.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 1064 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 127, ¶ 63b111). The circuit court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission. Id. at 1063. The Civil Service Commission appealed, arguing that the 30-day command was directory, not mandatory. Id. at 1063-64. ¶ 75 This court observed that the purpose of the statutory provision at issue was to provide “employees certain procedural protections when they were being considered for discharge, demotion or suspension,” namely “a timely hearing and a speedy adjudication of disciplinary charges.” Id. at 1065. To this end, the time limitation not only ensured “fairness to the employee but serve[d] to prevent the employee from suffering monetary injury.” Id. at 1066. In other words, without a mandatory reading, the employee would be unable to collect a salary, which would always result in a direct monetary injury. Id. Thus, we found the statutory timeline was mandatory. Id. at 1067. ¶ 76 In contrast to McReynolds, where the timeline was intended for the protection of the employee, in this case, the timeline is designed to ensure order and efficiency in the proceedings rather than protect a specific right. Furthermore, even accepting District 60’s - 16 - argument that the timeline is designed to protect school districts from uncertainty in various matters, the district has only shown that a directory reading of the timeline would, in certain circumstances, injure a right the provision is designed to protect. However, in McReynolds, a directory reading of the timeline at issue would always injure the right the provision was designed to protect. Accordingly, because the Commission’s 7-day reporting command and ISBE’s 30-day certification command are directory, the Commission did not lose jurisdiction over LEARN’s appeal and ISBE did not lose jurisdiction over the certification of LEARN’s charter. ¶ 77 C. The Propriety of the Commission’s Decision ¶ 78 District 60 next contends that, because LEARN’s proposal and supplemental information on appeal did not satisfy the requirements of the Charter Schools Law, the Commission’s decision to grant LEARN’s appeal was improper. Specifically, District 60 argues that LEARN’s proposal did not (1) identify two viable locations for the school, (2) demonstrate that the terms of the proposed charter were economically sound for the district and the school, (3) include an educational program sufficient to meet the needs of students in the district, in particular ELL and special education students, (4) demonstrate the capability to meet the needs of at-risk students, and (5) demonstrate it was in the best interests of the students the school was designed to serve. ¶ 79 Pursuant to the Charter Schools Law, the Commission could reverse District 60’s denial of LEARN’s proposal if it found the proposal was “in compliance with [the law]” and “in the best interests of the students the charter school” was designed to serve. 105 ILCS 5/27A-8(h) (West 2014). To be in compliance with the Charter Schools Law, a proposal must, inter alia, identify “at least 2 sites that are potentially available as a charter school facility by the time the charter school is to open,” provide “[e]vidence that the terms of the charter as proposed are economically sound for both the charter school and the school district,” and provide a description of the proposed school’s educational program. Id. § 27A-7(a)(3), (7), (9). When determining whether a proposal is in compliance, the Commission conducts a de novo review, affording no deference to the school board’s findings. 23 Ill. Adm. Code 650.110(d)(1) (2012). The Commission also does not have to rely on only the information contained in the initial proposal and may accept additional information on appeal. 23 Ill. Adm. Code 650.100(e) (2015). The Commission’s final decision is reviewable under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2014)). 105 ILCS 5/27A-8(h) (West 2014). ¶ 80 In administrative review, we review the decision and reasoning of the administrative agency, here the Commission, not that of the circuit court. Doe Three v. Department of Public Health, 2017 IL App (1st) 162548, ¶ 25. The applicable standard of review “depends upon whether the question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of fact and law.” Beggs v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50. The factual findings of an administrative agency are held as prima facie true and correct (735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2014)), and we will not disturb those findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, which occurs only when “the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50. We review pure questions of law de novo. Id. Finally, mixed questions of law and fact “examine[ ] the legal effect of a given set of facts” or, in other words, involve whether uncontested facts have satisfied a statutory standard. Id. We review these questions under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. Clear error - 17 - occurs only “when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We will determine the appropriate standard of review for each of District 60’s arguments in our discussion on each argument. ¶ 81 1. Location of the Proposed Charter School ¶ 82 We begin with District 60’s argument that LEARN’s proposal was deficient because it did not identify two “viable” locations for the charter school. District 60 asserts that, during the proceedings, facilities that had been identified by LEARN were taken out of consideration for various reasons and highlights that the eventual location of the charter school was not even among the locations identified in LEARN’s initial proposal nor the supplemental locations submitted to the Commission on appeal. Based on this, District 60 concludes that “LEARN did not submit even one potential viable site” for the location of the charter school. ¶ 83 Under section 27A-7(a)(3) of the Charter Schools Law, the proposal must include: “A description of and address for the physical plant in which the charter school will be located; provided that nothing in the Article shall be deemed to justify delaying or withholding favorable action on or approval of a charter school proposal because the building or buildings in which the charter school is to be located have not been acquired or rented at the time a charter school proposal is submitted or approved or a charter school contract is entered into or submitted for certification or certified, so long as the proposal or submission identifies and names at least 2 sites that are potentially available as a charter school facility by the time the charter school is to open.” 105 ILCS 5/27A-7(a)(3) (West 2014). District 60 does not contest that LEARN identified two sites in its proposal and identified two additional sites in its memorandum on appeal to the Commission but, rather, seemingly contests whether these facts satisfied the statutory standard. Thus, we review this issue under the clearly-erroneous standard. See Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50. ¶ 84 In LEARN’s proposal to District 60, it identified two locations for the charter school, one at 2634 Grand Avenue and the other at 2700 North Belvidere Road. The proposal provided a description of the locations, discussed the options available for acquiring use of them, and briefly detailed the improvements necessary for them to operate as a school. Upon appeal to the Commission, LEARN provided a memorandum and identified two additional locations, one at 800 South Genesee Street and the other at 202 North Genesee Street. LEARN also provided a description of the locations and briefly detailed the improvements necessary for them to operate as a school. The memorandum suggested that the newly identified locations were more feasible than the ones identified in the proposal to District 60. During the pendency of LEARN’s appeal before the Commission, various documents detailed the feasibility of, and issues associated with, operating a charter school at the locations identified by LEARN. ¶ 85 Based on this information, the Commission’s written decision observed that, upon further due diligence by LEARN on all four locations, 2634 Grand Avenue was no longer viable due to prohibitive costs and 2700 North Belvidere Road would require a longer conversion process. Despite the longer conversion process at 2700 North Belvidere Road, the Commission concluded that LEARN had still identified “three viable facilities” for the charter school, which satisfied the requirement of the Charter Schools Law to identify two sites that were potentially available. - 18 - ¶ 86 We agree with the Commission that LEARN satisfied the statutory standard. While LEARN ultimately did not select any of the four locations for the eventual home of its school, nothing in the Charter Schools Law requires this. Despite District 60’s assertion that, at the time of the Commission’s public meeting, only the property at 800 South Genesee Street was still being considered by LEARN, we do not find it unfathomable that, after a charter school applicant has identified potential locations, further due diligence would reveal those locations as unsuitable for a multitude of rational reasons. The critical fact is that, at the time LEARN submitted its proposal to District 60 and at the time it submitted its memorandum to the Commission on appeal, LEARN had identified at least two locations in each submission that were “potentially available,” the only standard the Charter Schools Law requires. See 105 ILCS 5/27A-7(a)(3) (West 2014). Nothing in the record on appeal demonstrates that the locations were unavailable for use when LEARN proposed them. Therefore, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the Commission committed a mistake in finding that LEARN satisfied this statutory requirement. Accordingly, the Commission’s finding was proper. ¶ 87 2. Economic Soundness ¶ 88 District 60 next argues that LEARN failed to demonstrate the terms of the proposed charter were economically sound for both the district and the school. Concerning itself, District 60 asserts that, during the public meeting on LEARN’s appeal, the commissioners focused their discussion on the impact on LEARN of funding the school at 91% or 100% of the district’s per capita tuition charge, but neglected to discuss how it would impact the district itself. District 60 further posits that the record is devoid of any sound economic analysis of the proposed charter school’s impact on the district. Concerning LEARN, District 60 asserts that LEARN failed to demonstrate that it was fiscally capable of operating a school in Waukegan, especially in light of the additional responsibilities it would have as a local educational agency. ¶ 89 Before discussing the Charter Schools Law requirement of economic soundness, it is important to understanding generally how a charter school is funded. As previously mentioned, a charter school is a tuition-free public school (id. § 27A-5(a), (e); Comprehensive Community, 216 Ill. 2d at 458), but how the school is funded depends on who is its authorizer. When a local school board approves a charter school proposal, it becomes the authorizer. 105 ILCS 5/27A-6(a) (West 2014). In such cases, part of the funding for the charter school is determined by an agreement between the local school board and the charter school based on a percentage (at the time, 75% to 125%) of the local school district’s per capita tuition charge multiplied by the number of students enrolled in the charter school who reside in the district. Id. § 27A-11(b). ¶ 90 However, when a local school board denies a charter school proposal and the Commission subsequently grants the appeal, the Commission becomes the school’s authorizer. Id. § 27A-9(f). In such cases, the Commission determines the level of funding, also using a percentage of the local school district’s per capita tuition charge multiplied by the number of students enrolled in the charter school who reside in the district, but the school obtains the funding directly from ISBE. See id. (stating that ISBE “shall withhold from funds otherwise due the district the funds authorized by [the Charter Schools Law] to be paid to the charter school and shall pay such amounts to the charter school”). Thus, regardless of who authorizes - 19 - the charter school, funding that normally would go to a district’s traditional schools is diverted to the charter school. ¶ 91 Now turning to District 60’s economic soundness argument, under section 27A-7(a)(9) of the Charter Schools Law, a charter school proposal must include “[e]vidence that the terms of the charter as proposed are economically sound for both the charter school and the school district.” Id. § 27A-7(a)(9). Although what constitutes economic soundness is not explained in the regulations, our supreme court has defined the term as meaning “ ‘financial security’ or ‘solvency.’ ” Comprehensive Community, 216 Ill. 2d at 477 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2177 (1986)). In Comprehensive Community, our supreme court stated that the entity proposing the charter school must not only present evidence that the school would be financially sound, but also that the district would remain financially secure and solvent with the presence of the charter school. Id. Thus, the local school district’s finances must be considered in any analysis. Id. However, economic soundness “is not a bright-line standard, but rather a continuum.” Id. at 481. “The terms of some charter school proposals will be more economically sound for a school district than other proposals, depending upon their effects on the district’s bottom line.” Id. ¶ 92 District 60 does not appear to dispute any of the factual findings of the Commission on its finances or LEARN’s but rather asserts that, despite these facts, LEARN’s proposal did not demonstrate economic soundness. In this regard, we view the issue presented as a mixed question of law and fact, as we must determine whether the established facts have satisfied the statutory standard. Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50. On such questions, we review for clear error. Id.; see also Comprehensive Community, 216 Ill. 2d at 477-78 (reviewing for clear error whether a charter school proposal satisfied the economic soundness requirement when the main facts of the local school district’s finances were not in dispute). On mixed questions of law and fact, we give significant deference to the Commission’s findings, as it has the experience in construing and applying the Charter Schools Law. Comprehensive Community, 216 Ill. 2d at 472. ¶ 93 In the Commission’s written decision, it found that, based on all of the documentation submitted in the appeal, LEARN had a lengthy track record of operating financially sound charter schools, had been successful in fundraising, and its assets exceeded its liabilities. Furthermore, during the public meeting, LEARN’s CEO, Gregory White, answered questions from the commissioners. One commissioner asked White about LEARN’s cash reserves, and White responded that LEARN had 45 days of cash reserves, which was sufficient to “support any school that may be falling down, as far as the finances.” The Commission’s written decision also observed that LEARN had “put forward a comprehensive plan *** to suggest that it has the operational capacity” to operate as its own local educational agency and had submitted a satisfactory budget to operate as one. ¶ 94 Concerning District 60’s finances, in the Commission’s written decision, it found that funding the proposed charter school at 100% of the district’s per capita tuition charge “did not materially harm” District 60 or impact its financial solvency, as LEARN’s impact on the district’s total budget would range from less than 1% in 2016 to slightly more than 2% in 2020. Moreover, during the public meeting, one of the commissioners asked if District 60’s 2015 budget was accurate concerning a $7.3 million deficit in its educational fund and a $2.8 million deficit in its operations maintenance fund. A representative of District 60 responded that the figures were accurate, adding that the operations maintenance fund included capital costs, - 20 - which would not decrease in the future due to the district’s use of older buildings. The representative explained the chief cause of the deficits was decreasing property taxes in the district. She also stated that, due to these deficits, District 60 had already made various “cuts.” The commissioner pointed out that, in all likelihood due to District 60’s financial position, its per capita tuition charge would decrease, which LEARN would need to consider in its own budgetary analysis. Additionally during the public meeting, the commissioners spent time addressing issues related to funding the charter school at 91% and 100% of District 60’s per capita tuition charge and the impact on both parties. At one point during the meeting, a commissioner stated “there is evidence” that funding the charter school at 91% or 100% of District 60’s per capita tuition charge “would cause harm to [District 60] *** given [its] financial situation.” The commissioner added that this was a “concern” of his. ¶ 95 In this case, the record plainly shows that the Commission reviewed the relevant financial information and considered not only the financial feasibility of the proposed charter school, as supported in part by LEARN, but also District 60’s finances. Critically, we give significant deference to the Commission’s findings on these matters, as it has the experience in construing and applying the Charter Schools Law. See Comprehensive Community, 216 Ill. 2d at 472. This is so because the Commission is comprised of members who “collectively possess strong experience and expertise in public and nonprofit governance, management and finance, public school leadership, higher education, assessments, curriculum and instruction, and public education law.” 105 ILCS 5/27A-7.5(d) (West 2014). Given the fact that the Commission possesses the superior knowledge in analyzing the relevant economics of schools compared to us, nothing in this record leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that the Commission committed a mistake in finding that LEARN satisfied the economic-soundness requirement. ¶ 96 Nevertheless, District 60 posits that the Commission failed to complete a “sound economic analysis” of the charter school proposal and claims that the Commission’s staff admitted as much at the public meeting. At that meeting, Hosanna Mahaley-Jones, the interim executive director of the Commission, informed the commissioners that the staff did not obtain a “second [financial] analysis with our independent consultants” on LEARN’s proposal, an analysis the staff generally obtained in other appeals. However, Mahaley-Jones explained that the staff only had a set amount of money “to fund an appeal,” and it had to use those resources to investigate other concerns of District 60, including Dr. Ditkowsky’s analysis of the academic performance of LEARN’s schools. Although the staff did not obtain an independent financial analysis of LEARN’s proposal, it is clear that, based on Mahaley-Jones’s statements and other parts of the record, the staff conducted its own detailed financial analysis. District 60’s claim otherwise is therefore without merit. Accordingly, the Commission did not commit clear error and its finding on economic soundness was proper. ¶ 97 3. Educational Program ¶ 98 District 60 next argues that LEARN’s proposed educational program was insufficient to serve the needs of the students in the district, in particular ELL and special education students. District 60 asserts that, at the time the Commission held its public meeting, there was no evidence that LEARN had begun to develop a comprehensive special education program, had the capacity to function as its own local educational agency, or had the experience and ability to operate a robust ELL program. As District 60’s argument essentially contests the factual findings by the Commission on LEARN’s educational plan, we review this question under the - 21 - manifest-weight standard, reversing only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. See Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50. ¶ 99 Under section 27A-7(a)(5) and (a)(7) of the Charter Schools Law, the charter school proposal must include “[t]he goals, objectives, and pupil performance standards to be achieved by the charter school” and “[a] description of the charter school’s educational program, pupil performance standards, curriculum, school year, school days, and hours of operation.” 105 ILCS 5/27A-7(a)(5), (7) (West 2014). Furthermore, charter schools must comply with all federal and state laws and regulations “applicable to public schools that pertain to special education and the instruction of [ELL students].” Id. § 27A-5(g). ¶ 100 LEARN’s original proposal included information about how it would support and enrich the learning of traditional students, as well as ELL students and special education students. Upon appealing to the Commission and realizing that if its appeal was granted it would operate as its own local educational agency, LEARN submitted additional information on how it would support ELL and special education students. Based on this information, in the Commission’s written decision, it found that LEARN’s educational plan would follow the Common Core standards but would be supplemented with a curriculum that had “been heavily researched” and shown to have “strong positive growth for all student demographic groups, including educationally disadvantaged minority, low-income, and ELL populations.” The Commission’s decision also stated that, based on LEARN’s proposal and the additional information submitted on appeal, its staff and an independent evaluator visited LEARN’s North Chicago campus, directly observed classroom instruction, and interviewed ELL students and the ELL coordinator. From this, the Commission concluded that the school culture and climate at the North Chicago campus were “conducive to learning,” the “academic performance and growth by ELL and special education students” were “proficient,” and the ELL coordinator was “knowledgeable, experienced and had a vision for an ELL program across campuses.” ¶ 101 The Commission further found that LEARN would place students requiring “Individual Education Plans in the least restrictive environment,” which meant accommodating those students first in the general classroom, but if necessary through “self-contained/resource rooms with learning resource teachers.” Additionally, the Commission highlighted that LEARN employed “a full range of specialists,” including occupational therapists, physical therapists, speech and language therapists, social workers, counselors, and psychologists. ¶ 102 District 60, in essence, asks us to find LEARN’s educational plan, especially as it relates to ELL and special education students, insufficient despite the Commission, who has the expertise and experience in reviewing and evaluating these precise matters, finding the plan sufficient. When reviewing the findings of fact from an administrative agency, we cannot simply reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment in for that of the agency. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992). Nothing in LEARN’s proposal or its supplemental information submitted on appeal demonstrates to us that the opposite conclusion reached by the Commission is clearly evident. Accordingly, the Commission properly found that LEARN had proposed a sufficient educational program for its Waukegan campus and in particular for ELL and special education students. - 22 - ¶ 103 4. At-Risk Students ¶ 104 District 60 next argues that the Commission did not have adequate support to find that LEARN would sufficiently serve at-risk students. Specifically, District 60 asserts that the Commission ignored evidence from the district that the levels of truancy at LEARN’s schools were significantly higher than the district and three to four times higher than the statewide average. District 60 appears to base this argument on Dr. Ditkowsky’s report, which was based on data from the Illinois Report Card. ¶ 105 In enacting the Charter Schools Law, our legislature declared that one of the law’s purposes was “[t]o increase learning opportunities for all pupils, with special emphasis on expanded learning experiences for at-risk pupils,” which are defined as students “who, because of physical, emotional, socioeconomic, or cultural factors, [are] less likely to succeed in a conventional educational environment.” 105 ILCS 5/27A-2(b)(2), 27A-3 (West 2014). As District 60’s argument contests the factual findings by the Commission on LEARN’s ability to meet the needs of at-risk students, we review this question under the manifest-weight standard, reversing only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. See Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50. ¶ 106 In the Commission’s written decision, it found that LEARN’s “academic performance overall is worth special note given that LEARN serves a high-needs student population.” The Commission also determined that its “staff found that LEARN’s academic performance in its network of eight existing schools exceeded Waukegan District 60’s performance and that LEARN’s superior performance could be observed overall, and with respect to low income and at-risk students.” District 60 essentially argues that, because Dr. Ditkowsky’s report showed a statistically higher level of chronic truancy at LEARN’s schools compared to District 60’s schools and the statewide average, that alone forecloses the possibility that LEARN could sufficiently serve at-risk students. The Commission did not find that such a conclusion was warranted. ¶ 107 First, in a document submitted to the Commission on appeal, LEARN responded to Dr. Ditkowsky’s report, acknowledging that over one-third of its Chicago students had chronic truancy, but noted its “[a]ttendance data,” also from the Illinois Report Card, showed its students attended school at a higher rate than District 60’s students and the statewide average. Here, the Commission was faced with conflicting evidence on truancy and attendance data, and it was the Commission’s responsibility to weigh the evidence and resolve the apparent conflict. See Plowman v. Department of Children & Family Services, 2017 IL App (1st) 160860, ¶ 24. The Commission did just that, as its decision indicated that its staff “conducted an independent study to review” the concerns raised in Dr. Ditkowsky’s report. The Commission’s study not only concluded that the concerns were unsupported by the data but also “reaffirmed LEARN’s high quality performance on the vast majority of metrics.” ¶ 108 Second, even if LEARN’s truancy data reflected negatively on its schools, this is only one measure in determining whether a charter school can adequately serve the needs of at-risk students. The Commission’s decision focused primarily on the academic success of LEARN’s students, who, despite being comprised of high populations of at-risk students, generally outperformed District 60’s students in ISAT testing. Nothing in the record demonstrates to us that an opposite conclusion than that reached by the Commission is clearly evident. Accordingly, the Commission properly found that LEARN could sufficiently meet the needs of at-risk students at its proposed Waukegan campus. - 23 - ¶ 109 5. Best Interests of the Students ¶ 110 Although we have rejected District 60’s arguments concerning whether the Commission properly found that LEARN’s proposal was in compliance with the statutory requirements of the Charter Schools Law, the district lastly argues that the Commission erroneously found that LEARN’s proposal was in the best interests of the students the charter school was intended to serve. In support, District 60 asserts that, at the Commission’s public meeting, it did not discuss whether the proposal was in the best interests of the students and that its written decision merely contained “boilerplate conclusory statements” on the issue. District 60 posits that the Commission had no basis for finding the proposal was in the best interests of the students. ¶ 111 As previously discussed, the Commission may only reverse a local school board’s decision to deny a charter school proposal if the Commission finds that the proposal (1) “is in compliance with” the Charter Schools Law and (2) “in the best interests of the students the charter school is designed to serve.” 105 ILCS 5/27A-8(h) (West 2014). Although the regulations do not expound on this requirement, this court has previously examined the requirement by focusing on the overall purpose of the Charter Schools Law, i.e., a means to provide alternative public education models that are innovative and flexible. Board of Education of Rich Township High School District No. 227 v. Illinois State Board of Education, 2011 IL App (1st) 110182, ¶¶ 101-04 (citing 105 ILCS 5/27A-2(a)(2) (West 2008)). We review whether the Commission properly found LEARN’s proposal was in the best interests of the students it was designed to serve for clear error, deferring significantly to the Commission because of its experience in construing and applying the statute. Id. ¶ 100. ¶ 112 In the Commission’s written decision, it asserted that LEARN provided evidence that it had “the capacity to provide Waukegan public school student[s] with a high quality education option that is not currently available to them,” especially given LEARN’s demonstrated past success in operating charter schools. The Commission based this finding on its staff’s “independent analysis” of LEARN’s proposal, which focused on LEARN’s educational plan, organizational plan, business plan, and “evidence of capacity.” The staff’s analysis determined that the academic success of LEARN’s schools “exceeded Waukegan District 60’s performance and that LEARN’s superior performance could be observed overall, and with respect to low income and at-risk students.” Further, the staff acknowledged that LEARN’s experience with ELL students was limited, but found that the ELL students at its North Chicago campus “greatly outperformed both Waukegan District 60 and the State ELL reading average.” The staff also believed that LEARN’s organizational plan, business plan, and the capacity of LEARN to execute on the plans met or exceeded the standards required by law. ¶ 113 In light of the Commission’s findings, LEARN has demonstrated that the innovation it implements into the classroom has resulted in minority and low-income students excelling in academic performance as compared to their peer groups. As of the 2013-2014 school year, 72% of District 60’s students were low-income, 77% were Hispanic, and 16% were black. These students deserve the opportunity to attend a school operated by LEARN, an organization that has proven to be adept at teaching minority and low-income students, improving their academic performance, and providing them with the academic foundation and ambition to attend college. Furthermore, merely because the commissioners never directly discussed the “best interests” factor during the public meeting does not mean their ultimate vote to grant LEARN’s appeal was flawed. During the meeting, the commissioners discussed several - 24 - aspects of LEARN’s proposal, and although the words “best interests” were never uttered, this undefined concept was clearly related to various discussions the commissioners had. Moreover, based on the Commission’s written decision, it is clear that the Commission analyzed this factor. Therefore, the Commission’s conclusion that LEARN’s proposal was in the best interests of the students the school was designed to serve was not clearly erroneous. ¶ 114 In sum, the Commission properly found that LEARN’s proposal was in compliance with the requirements of the Charter Schools Law and in the best interests of the students the school was designed to serve. ¶ 115 D. Due Process ¶ 116 District 60 next raises two due process challenges to the proceedings in front of the Commission. First, District 60 contends that the Commission improperly set conditions for granting LEARN’s appeal, i.e., the performance agreement. Second, District 60 contends that the Commission’s approval of these conditions was made without providing the district an opportunity to review or address the adequacy of LEARN’s alleged compliance. ¶ 117 The United States and Illinois Constitutions protect people against “governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan, 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 31 (citing U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). There are two types of due process: substantive and procedural. In re Marriage of Miller, 227 Ill. 2d 185, 197 (2007). “Whereas procedural due process governs the procedures employed to deny a person’s life, liberty or property interest, substantive due process limits the state’s ability to act, irrespective of the procedural protections provided.” Id. In District 60’s brief, it does not state which type of due process claim it is bringing, but based on its arguments, it is clear that its due process claim is procedural in nature as the district assails the fairness of the procedures used by the Commission. Whether a party’s procedural due process rights have been violated presents a legal question we review de novo. Heelan, 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 31. ¶ 118 Although due process concerns permeate in administrative proceedings (Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 92), the Commission and ISBE argue that District 60 cannot assert a due process claim against the state given that it is itself a state entity. District 60 does not respond to this argument, and we agree with the Commission and ISBE. ¶ 119 District 60, as a school board, is a governmental agency, or rather a “ ‘municipal corporation,’ created by the legislature and subject to its will.” East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 412-13 (1997). Because school boards are created by statute, they are offices entirely under “the control of the legislature, ‘which may at pleasure create or abolish them,’ ” as well as modify their duties. Id. at 413 (quoting Hughes v. Traeger, 264 Ill. 612, 616 (1914)). “The State’s control over units of local government is without regard to due process guarantees,” and “[t]he school board as an entity, therefore, cannot assert due process claims against the state.” Id. Consequently, District 60, as a school board, cannot assert due process claims against the Commission, an entity of the state. See id. Accordingly, both of District 60’s procedural due process claims fail. - 25 - ¶ 120 E. Open Meetings Act ¶ 121 District 60 next contends that the Commission committed multiple violations of the Open Meetings Act (Act) (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2014)) during its April 21, 2015, public meeting where it voted to grant LEARN’s appeal. Specifically, District 60 argues that (1) the chairman of the Commission, Greg Richmond, incorrectly asserted that all nine commissioners were present when only seven members were physically present, (2) the Commission improperly allowed two commissioners to vote telephonically without properly justifying their absence, (3) the Commission improperly utilized a roll call vote rather than a voice vote during the vote to allow the two commissioners’ remote attendance, and (4) the Commission went into a closed session based on a motion that failed to sufficiently identify the exception in the Act allowing for a closed session. Based on these alleged violations, District 60 asserts that it was prejudiced and the proper remedy, and only one requested, is to render the Commission’s decision to grant LEARN’s appeal “null and void.” ¶ 122 The Act represents a public policy initiative by our legislature that public bodies of the state, whose activities directly impact the lives of the citizens, should deliberate and take action in the open rather than in private. Id. § 1. To this end, the Act requires that “[a]ll meetings of public bodies” must be open to the public unless a specific exception applies. Id. § 2(a). A “meeting” is defined as “any gathering, whether in person or by video or audio conference, telephone call, *** of a majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business.” Id. § 1.02. A “public body” means “all legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the State *** and all other municipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees or commissions of this State.” Id. The provisions of the Act must be “strictly construed against closed meetings” (id. § 1(2)), and all final actions made by a public body be must be done in an open meeting. Id. § 2(e). ¶ 123 When a public body fails to comply with the provisions of the Act, “any person” may bring a civil action in the circuit court alleging noncompliance (id. § 3(a)), which is how District 60 proceeded in this case. Although District 60, as a school board, could not assert due process claims against the Commission (see East St. Louis Federation, 178 Ill. 2d at 412-13), a “person,” as defined by the Act, has been interpreted broadly. In Paxson v. Board of Education of School District No. 87, 276 Ill. App. 3d 912, 916, 918, 921 (1995), this court found that, consistent with the Act’s purpose of requiring public bodies to act openly, the term a “person” should not be limited to only individuals, but rather should incorporate “a body politic.” District 60, as a school board, is a body politic (see 105 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2014)), and thus can allege violations of the Act. If the circuit court determines that a violation has occurred, it: “may grant such relief as it deems appropriate, including granting a relief by mandamus requiring that a meeting be open to the public, granting an injunction against future violations of this Act, ordering the public body to make available to the public such portion of the minutes of a meeting as is not authorized to be kept confidential under this Act, or declaring null and void any final action taken at a closed meeting in violation of this Act.” 5 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 2014). ¶ 124 Although the circuit court’s power to grant a remedy for violations of the Act is discretionary and ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion (see Parker v. Nichting, 2012 IL App (3d) 100206, ¶ 15), here, the circuit court did not dismiss District 60’s counts of alleged violations of the Act on the merits. Because the court did not address the alleged violations of - 26 - the Act on their merits and thus did not utilize its discretion to grant or deny a remedy available under the Act, we will review the Commission’s alleged violations de novo. ¶ 125 We first note that District 60 does not dispute that the Commission’s vote to grant LEARN’s appeal was a final action and that the vote occurred during an open session. And, of all the alleged violations of the Act, none of them concern a final action taken by the Commission in a closed session. The Act expressly states that the circuit court may only declare “null and void any final action taken at a closed meeting in violation of this Act.” 5 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 2014); see also Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v. Martin, 309 Ill. App. 3d 924, 936 (1999) (finding that, because the selection of a principal occurred at an open meeting, a party could not request nullification of that action because it was both “too extreme and not supported by the Open Meetings Act”); Williamson v. Doyle, 112 Ill. App. 3d 293, 300 (1983) (finding that the provision in a prior version of the Act “permitting the court to declare the action void refers by its terms only to a ‘closed session’ ”). Thus, assuming arguendo that the Commission committed the alleged violations of the Act, we find that, based on the language of the Act, District 60’s requested relief—declaring the Commission’s decision to grant LEARN’s appeal null and void—is improper. ¶ 126 Our conclusion is buttressed by the Act’s legislative history. Prior to 1981, what is now known as the Act was called “AN ACT in relation to meetings.” 1957 Ill. Laws 2892 (adding Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 102, ¶ 41); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 102, ¶ 41. In this previous version of the Act, the only civil remedy the circuit court could issue upon a violation or anticipated violation of the Act was “a writ of mandamus requiring that a meeting be open to the public at large or issue such other appropriate order as will insure compliance with the provisions of this Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 102, ¶ 43. However, Public Act 82-378 (eff. Jan. 1, 1982) (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 102, ¶ 43) changed the civil remedies available for the circuit court to issue. As a result of the public act, upon a violation or anticipated violation of the Act: “The court, having due regard for orderly administration and the public interest, as well as for the interests of the parties, may grant such equitable relief as it deems appropriate, including issuance of a writ of mandamus requiring that a meeting be open to the public, granting an injunction against future violations of this Act, ordering the public body to make available to the public such portion of the minutes of a meeting as is not authorized to be kept confidential under this Act, or declaring null and void any final action taken at a closed session in violation of this Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 102, ¶ 43(c). The 1981 version of the statute is substantially the same as the current version. ¶ 127 During discussions of House Bill 411, which ultimately became Public Act 82-378 (eff. Jan. 1, 1982), in the House of Representatives, Representative Reilly stated that the bill “clarifies that action taken in closed session and only that action taken in closed session can be voided.” 82nd Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 20, 1981, at 31 (statements of Representative Reilly). Representative Reilly later stated that “[t]he intent is to invalidate only final action improperly taken in secret” and “only the action that takes place in the closed meeting can be voided not action that takes place in the open meeting.” Id. at 34, 59. It is clear that, based on the legislative history of the Act, the circuit court’s power to declare a final action null and void is limited to only those situations where a final action occurred during a - 27 - closed meeting. Accordingly, even if District 60 could persuade us that the Commission committed multiple violations of the Act, we would not grant the district its requested relief. ¶ 128 Lastly, we note that District 60 could have followed the procedure set forth in section 3.5 of the Act and initiated a request for review with the “Public Access Counselor” of the Office of the Attorney General. 5 ILCS 120/3.5 (West 2014). Under this means of review, the Attorney General reviews whether a violation of the Act has occurred and then issues a binding opinion on the matter. Id. § 3.5(e); see also American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 2017 IL App (5th) 160046, ¶ 27 (“After review, the Attorney General must issue a binding opinion.”). In that binding opinion, the Attorney General can direct the public body to take appropriate actions (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2014); American Federation, 2017 IL App (5th) 160046, ¶ 27), including voiding final actions taken in open meetings. See, e.g., 2016 Ill. Att’y Gen. Pub. Access Op. No. 16-015 (after finding that the Board of Trustees of the Village of Caseyville violated the Act by voting to amend and approve a settlement agreement without providing proper public notice, the Attorney General voided the original vote and directed the board of trustees to reconsider the matter at a properly noticed meeting); 2013 Ill. Att’y Gen. Pub. Access Op. No. 13-002 (after finding that the Chicago Park District Board of Commissioners violated the Act by voting to increase fees for admission to two museums without providing proper public notice, the Attorney General voided the original vote and directed the board of commissioners to reconsider the matter at a properly noticed meeting). ¶ 129 Had District 60 sought a remedy under section 3.5 of the Act (5 ILCS 120/3.5 (West 2014)) with the Public Access Counselor originally rather than initiating an action in the circuit court under section 3 of the Act (id. § 3), the Attorney General may have voided the Commission’s vote on LEARN’s appeal upon a finding of noncompliance with the Act. However, District 60 instead sought a remedy in the circuit court that it had no power to grant because the formal vote on the matter occurred during a public meeting. As a result, we have no choice but to reject its argument concerning the Commission’s alleged violations of the Act. Although the circuit court dismissed the counts of District 60’s complaint related to alleged violations of the Act for different reasons, the counts were properly dismissed. See Vantage Hospitality Group, Inc. v. Q Ill Development, LLC, 2016 IL App (4th) 160271, ¶ 54 (the appellate court may affirm the circuit court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record). ¶ 130 F. Dismissal of Remaining Counts ¶ 131 District 60 lastly contends that the other counts in its complaint should not have been dismissed. However, the district’s arguments center around the improper dismissal of its claims concerning the Commission’s alleged violations of the Act. As we have already discussed this issue in our foregoing analysis, we need not discuss it any further. But to the extent District 60 has challenged the propriety of the circuit court’s dismissal of count IV of its complaint—the count which sought a declaratory judgment against LEARN, the Commission and ISBE—we find any such challenge forfeited for failing to cite any legal authority or develop a coherent legal argument. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). ¶ 132 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 133 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, which had affirmed the decision of the Commission and dismissed counts II, III, and IV of District - 28 - 60’s complaint. ¶ 134 Affirmed. - 29 -