Alicia M. Grijalva & Amanda Erica Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Alicia M. Grijalva & Amanda Erica Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ramirez v. Koromilas (ca5, 2006-07-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#4 5 U.S.C. § 8101-8151 cited 1× in this case · 12 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ramirez v. Koromilas
5th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir.1986).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Hightower v. United States (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
S.D.N.Y. · 2002 · confidence medium
See also Votteler, 904 F.2d at 130 ; Swafford v. United States, 998 F.2d 837, 839-41 (10th Cir.1993); McDaniel v. United States, 970 F.2d 194, 196-98 (6th Cir.1992); Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Collins v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 1996 · confidence medium
Protection Bd., 819 F.2d 280, 283 (Fed.Cir. 1987); Paluca v. Secretary of Labor, 813 F.2d 524, 527-28 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 , 108 S.Ct. 328 , 98 L.Ed.2d 355 (1987); Hamby v. Janer, 808 F.2d 1433, 1434 (11th Cir.1987); Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 , 107 S.Ct. 89 , 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986); Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doe v. United States
W.D.N.Y. · 1996 · confidence medium
Swafford v. United States, 998 F.2d 837, 839-41 (10th Cir.1993); McDaniel v. United States, 970 F.2d 194, 196-98 (6th Cir.1992); Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 , 107 S.Ct. 89 , 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986). 6 In cases in which there has been no decision by the Secretary concerning FECA coverage, but there is a substantial question as to whether FECA may apply, the proper course for the district court is to stay proceedings pending a final determination by the Secretary.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alexander v. Frank
N.D. Tex. · 1991 · confidence medium
See Lockheed Aircraft v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 193-94 , 103 S.Ct. 1033, 1036-37 , 74 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983); Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 , 107 S.Ct. 89 , 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martin v. United States Post Office
N.D. Tex. · 1990 · confidence medium
Claims arising under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act must be submitted to the Secretary of Labor for resolution and the action of the Secretary or his designee in allowing or denying a payment under sec. 8101 et seq. is “not subject to review by another official of the United States or by a court by mandamus or otherwise.” Title 5 U.S.C. sec. 8128 (b)(2); Bailey v. United States, Through Department of Army, 451 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir.1971); Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 , 107 S.Ct. 89 , 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986); Soderman v. Un…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Connell v. United States
S.D. Iowa · 1990 · confidence medium
The Secretary’s decisions regarding coverage under FECA are absolutely immune from judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 8128 (b); Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir.1986); Waters v. United States, 458 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir.1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Werner R. Staacke v. United States Secretary of Labor
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Roberts v. Secretary of Labor, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 328 , 98 L.Ed.2d 355 (1987); Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 89 , 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986).
cited Cited "see" Smith v. Nicholson
5th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. 1986).
discussed Cited "see" Benton v. U.S. (2×)
5th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986). 4 employee.'" 781 F.2d at 475 ; see also Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing dismissal of an FTCA claim based on negligent infliction of emotional distress not compensated under the FECA because it was "divorced from any claim of physical injury").
cited Cited "see" Merrill Benton v. United States of America and the United States Postal Service
5th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 , 107 S.Ct. 89 , 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986). 2 .
discussed Cited "see" Joan SHEEHAN, Formerly Known as Joan Wycoff, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee
9th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.1986) (whether injury occurred while employee was at work); Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.1984) (whether injury occurred while plaintiff was Navy employee); DiPippa v. United States, 687 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.1982) (whether injury was work-related); Gill v. United States, 641 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.1981) (same). and (2) strike the final paragraph on 896 F.2d at 1174 beginning “Moreover, we have jurisdiction____” With this amendment, the panel has voted to deny appellee’s petition for rehearing and to reject the suggestion for re…
cited Cited "see" Ramiro Vilanova v. United States of America
1st Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 , 107 S.Ct. 89 , 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986).
cited Cited "see" Burke v. United States
E.D. La. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Saltsman v. United States
6th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See id.; see also Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474-75 (5th Cir.)(under Woerth , FECA barred FTCA claim by daughter of injured employee for loss of support and services), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 , 107 S.Ct. 89 , 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986); Bates v. Harp, 573 F.2d 930 , 934 n. 2 (6th Cir.1978)(when FECA provides the exclusive remedy for an injured employee, the statute necessarily precludes recovery for a loss of consortium claim by the spouse of the employee); Pitt v. Matola, 890 F.Supp. 89, 94-95 (N.D.N.Y.1995)(FECA barred loss of consortium claim by husband of government employee inj…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Saltsman v. United States
6th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See id.; see also Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474-75 (5th Cir.) (under Woerth, FECA barred FTCA claim by daughter of injured employee for loss of support and services), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 , 107 S.Ct. 89 , 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986); Bates v. Harp, 573 F.2d 930 , 934 n. 2 (6th Cir.1978)(when FECA provides the exclusive remedy for an injured employee, the statute necessarily precludes recovery for a loss of consortium claim by the spouse of the employee); Pitt v. Matola, 890 F.Supp. 89, 94-95 (N.D.N.Y.1995)(FECA barred loss of consortium claim by husband of government employee inj…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Alicia M. GRIJALVA and Amanda Erica Grijalva, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee
85-1406.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jan 29, 1986.
781 F.2d 472
Ronald P. McCluskey, El Paso, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants., Helen M. Eversberg, U.S. Atty., Thomas J. McHugh, Asst. U.S. Atty., El Paso, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Rubin, Johnson, Jones.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:

A Government employee who sought and obtained benefits under the Federal Employee’s Compensation Act now contends that she was not covered by the Compensation Act and seeks to recover in tort from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. We affirm the district court judgment holding that her tort claim is barred by the Secretary of Labor’s decision that she was entitled to benefits under the Compensation Act. Unless the Secretary’s decision is set aside by direct attack, this determination precludes Grijalva’s suit under the Tort Claims Act.

Alicia M. Grijalva, a civilian employee of the U.S. Army, suffered injuries when the vehicle she was driving home from work collided with a U.S. Army vehicle, which had failed to stop at a stop sign, on the U.S. Army Military Reservation at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. On the day after the accident, Grijalva’s supervisor filed a notice of injury with the Department of Labor. Subsequently, Grijalva herself filed a claim for compensation. The Secretary of Labor determined that Grijal-va had been injured in the course of her employment, and the Office of Workers’ Compensation has paid her thus far $32,-254.20 in disability compensation, $11,-706.90 in reimbursement of her medical expenses, and $2,244 in continuation of salary during her disability.

Having exhausted the administrative procedures of the Federal Tort Claims Act, Grijalva and her daughter filed suit in federal district court seeking damages under the Tort Claims Act. [1] The district court rendered summary judgment against Grijalva, holding that, by granting workers’ compensation benefits under the Compensation Act, [2] the Secretary of Labor had determined that the Compensation Act cov[*474] ered Grijalva’s injuries; the Compensation Act barred review of the Secretary’s determinations; and recovery under the Compensation Act barred subsequent claims against the Government under the Tort Claims Act.

The Compensation Act provides, “The liability of the United States ... under this subchapter ... is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States....” [3] The Secretary’s award of compensation benefits bars Grijalva from bringing any suit against the United States for that injury. [4]

In effect, Grijalva contests her right to recover under the Compensation Act. She argues that, because she was on her way home when the accident occurred, she was not “injured in the performance” of her federal employment and is therefore not covered by the Compensation Act. Grijal-va buttresses this legal position by contending that her supervisor submitted erroneous information to the Secretary, that she did not initially apply for benefits (although she late.r did), and that the accident affected her mental capacity and made her incapable of submitting an informed and voluntary application for benefits.

The fact remains that the Secretary awarded Grijalva benefits under the Compensation Act, and Grijalva accepted them. Under the Act, the Secretary’s determination is “final and conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all questions of law and fact ... and not subject to review ... by a court by mandamus or otherwise.” [5] Accordingly, Grijalva cannot now collaterally attack the Secretary’s determination of coverage in this Tort Claims Act suit. [6] Regardless of her mental capacity at the time she sought compensation benefits, she did so. The Act provides that, if she now wishes to attack her eligibility for or receipt of workers’ compensation or her mental capacity to seek and accept those benefits, she must request review by the Secretary. [7] The attack on the Secretary’s award as violating her due process rights because of her off-duty status at the time of injury and her alleged lack of mental capacity must follow the same path. If the Secretary decides that benefits should not have been paid, he may terminate any continuing compensation and seek recovery of payments previously made. [8]

Grijalva's daughter seeks damages against the Government for loss of Grijal-va’s support and services on the basis that the Federal Tort Claims Act makes the United States liable in tort in the same manner as a private individual. [9] The Compensation Act provides that the Government’s liability under the Act “with respect to the injury ... of an employee is exclusive and instead of all other liability to ... the employee, his ... dependents, ... and any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States. [10] As explained by the Sixth Circuit in Woerth v. United States, “The proper inquiry under section 8116(c) is not merely whether the plaintiff is an ‘employee, his legal repre[*475] sentative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, [or] any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages.’ Rather it is whether the claim is ‘with respect to the injury or death of an employee.’ ” [11] Grijalva’s daughter’s claims for loss and support clearly derive directly from her mother’s injuries. [12] Hence, section 8116(c) bars the door to Grijalva’s daughter as firmly as it does to Grijalva.

The Government contends that this is a frivolous appeal and seeks double costs under Federal Rule Appellate Procedure 38. The arguments raised by assiduous counsel for appellant are thin, albeit ingenious. Perhaps because we are beguiled by the apparent sincerity with which they are pressed, we hold that the appeal is not so patently lacking in merit as to be frivolous and deny the demand.

For these reasons, the decision is AFFIRMED.

3

. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). That section reads in full:

The liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof under this subchapter or any extension thereof with respect to the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States or the instrumentality to the employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States or the instrumentality because of the injury or death in a direct judicial proceeding, in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under a workmen’s compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability statute.
4

. Gill v. United States, 641 F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir.1981); see also Wright v. United States, 717 F.2d 254, 256-58 & n. 4 (6th Cir.1983).

6

. Gill v. United States, 641 F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir.1981); see also Concordia v. U.S. Postal Serv., 581 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir.1978); Waters v. United States, 458 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir.1972).

8

. Id. at § 8129(a).

11

. 714 F.2d 648, 650 (6th Cir.1983).

12

. See id.; Levine v. United States, 478 F.Supp. 1389, 1391 (D.Mass.1979).