Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. & Mobil Oil Corp., Plaintiffs v. The Vessel Panamax Venus, & Her Engines, Tackle, Apparel, Equip. & Appurtenances, in Rem Alexandra Navigation Corp., Ltd. Eddie's S.S. Co., Ltd. & Eddies Shipping Agency, Inc., in Personam, Defendants- the Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Ass'n) as Mortgagee, Plaintiff-In- Intervention-Appellee v. Panamax Venus, Her Engines, Tackle, Furniture, Apparel, Appurtenances, Etc., in Rem & Alexandra Navigation Corp., Ltd., in Personam, Defendants, 804 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. & Mobil Oil Corp., Plaintiffs v. The Vessel Panamax Venus, & Her Engines, Tackle, Apparel, Equip. & Appurtenances, in Rem Alexandra Navigation Corp., Ltd. Eddie's S.S. Co., Ltd. & Eddies Shipping Agency, Inc., in Personam, Defendants- the Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Ass'n) as Mortgagee, Plaintiff-In- Intervention-Appellee v. Panamax Venus, Her Engines, Tackle, Furniture, Apparel, Appurtenances, Etc., in Rem & Alexandra Navigation Corp., Ltd., in Personam, Defendants, 804 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
19 citation events across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In Re Mayer (casb, 1993-06-29)
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Mayer
Bankr. S.D. Cal. · 1993 · confidence medium
Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. v. Panamax Venus, 804 F.2d 541, 542 (9th Cir.1986) Legislative history reveals that Congress did intend that § 522(f) should operate in opt-out states.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Bonita Glen II
Bankr. S.D. Cal. · 1993 · confidence medium
Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. v. Panamax Venus, 804 F.2d 541, 542 (9th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Goins v. Diamond Mortgage Corp.
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 1990 · confidence medium
See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 , 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547-48 , 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (“[W]e look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.”); Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. v. Panamax Venus, 804 F.2d 541, 542 (9th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marine Fuel Supply & Towing, Inc., a Foreign Corporation v. The M/v Ken Lucky, and Her Appurtenances
9th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
However, we review the district court’s statutory construction de novo, Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. v. Panamax Venus, 804 F.2d 541, 542 (9th Cir.1986), and retain power to correct any legal misunderstandings of the district court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re David Rock Hudson, Debtor. Gregory Stackhouse and Esther Stackhouse v. David Rock Hudson (2×)
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. at 896 , 104 S.Ct. at 1548 (“[W]e look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear”); Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. v. Panamax Venus, 804 F.2d 541, 542 (9th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marine Fuel Supply & Towing, Inc., a Foreign Corporation v. The M/v Ken Lucky, and Her Appurtenances
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
However, we review the district court’s statutory construction de novo, Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. v. Panamax Venus, 804 F.2d 541, 542 (9th Cir.1986), and retain power to correct any legal misunderstandings of the district court.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wardley International Bank, Inc. v. Nasipit Bay Vessel v. Mobil Oil Corporation and Mobil Sales and Supply Corporation
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Mobil Sales and Supply Corp. v. Panamax Venus, 804 F.2d 541, 542-43 (9th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael C. Wicks (2×)
9th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. v. Panamax Venus, 804 F.2d 541, 542 (9th Cir.1986) (Mobil ). 5 When we interpret a statute, the starting point must be the language of the statute itself.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Raymond Foxgord, Individually and as Trustee of the Foxgord Trust, Cecilia Foxgord v. Baron Herbert Hischemoeller (2×)
9th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
My sole concern regarding part B is that, once we have determined from the statute's plain meaning that the statute does not refer to honorary consuls, examination of the statute's legislative history should be unnecessary. " '[W]hen we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.' " Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 1860 , 95 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987), quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 , 101 S.Ct. 698, 701 , 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981); see also Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 , 184 n. 29, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 18 soc.sec.rep.ser. 65, Medicare&medicaid Gu 36,369 Raymon and Joann Lynch v. William Dawson, Defendants-Third Party and Otis Bowen, M.D., Third Party (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Even the majority concedes that "the specificity of the ... clause relating to spouses lends some support to the Secretary's argument." 42 Since it is plain and unambiguous on the face of the statute that the Pickle Amendment does not cover COLA increases of parents or of spouses never eligible for SSI, I would hold that resort to the legislative history is neither necessary nor appropriate in this case. " '[W]hen we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.' " Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 55 --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 1860 , 95 …
cited Cited "see" Goralnick v. Bromberg (In Re Goralnick)
9th Cir. BAP · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mobil Sales and Supply Corp. v. The Panamax Venus, 804 F.2d 541, 542 (9th Cir.1986); Spawr v. United States, 796 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir.1986).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Mobil Sales and Supply Corporation and Mobil Oil Corporation, Plaintiffs
v.
The Vessel Panamax Venus, and Her Engines, Tackle, Apparel, Equipment and Appurtenances, in Rem Alexandra Navigation Corp., Ltd. Eddie's Steamship Company, Ltd. And Eddies Shipping Agency, Inc., in Personam, Defendants- the Chase Manhattan Bank (National Association) as Mortgagee, Plaintiff-In- Intervention-Appellee v. Panamax Venus, Her Engines, Tackle, Furniture, Apparel, Appurtenances, Etc., in Rem and Alexandra Navigation Corporation, Ltd., in Personam, Defendants
85-6499.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Nov 12, 1986.
804 F.2d 541
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

804 F.2d 541

1987 A.M.C. 305

MOBIL SALES AND SUPPLY CORPORATION and Mobil Oil
Corporation, Plaintiffs- Appellants,
v.
The Vessel PANAMAX VENUS, and her engines, tackle, apparel,
equipment and appurtenances, in rem; Alexandra Navigation
Corp., Ltd.; Eddie's Steamship Company, Ltd.; and Eddies
Shipping Agency, Inc., in personam, Defendants- Appellees.
The CHASE MANHATTAN BANK (NATIONAL ASSOCIATION) as
Mortgagee, Plaintiff-in- Intervention-Appellee,
v.
PANAMAX VENUS, her engines, tackle, furniture, apparel,
appurtenances, etc., in rem; and Alexandra
Navigation Corporation, Ltd., in
personam, Defendants- Appellees.

No. 85-6499.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 1, 1986.
Decided Nov. 12, 1986.

Alfred E. Yudes, Jr., Burlingham Underwood & Lord, New York City, Erich Wise, Graham & James, Long Beach, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Alan Nakazawa, Lillick, McHose & Charles, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before GOODWIN, WALLACE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

1

Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil Oil) and Mobil Sales and Supply Corporation (Mobil Sales) appeal from a judgment and order for disbursement of funds entered by the district court. They challenge subordination of their maritime liens to the preferred ship mortgage of Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and we affirm.

2

* The M/V Panamax Venus was a Liberian flag vessel owned by Alexandra Navigation Corporation, Ltd. In March 1984, the vessel's shipping agent contracted to have Mobil Oil deliver lubrication oil to the Panamax Venus. Mobil Oil delivered the oil to the ship at Kaohsiung, Republic of China, but never received payment. In July 1984, the shipping agent contracted to have Mobil Sales deliver bunker fuel oil to the Panamax Venus, then in Yokohama, Japan. Mobil Sales delivered the oil to the ship in Yokohama, but never received payment.

3

In October 1984, the Mobil companies began an in rem action against the Panamax Venus in the Central District of California, asserting maritime liens for the price of the oil delivered pursuant to the two contracts. The ship was arrested in Los Angeles harbor and held pending resolution of the action. In November 1984, Chase intervened as a plaintiff in the case, alleging that it held a $69 million foreign preferred ship mortgage on the Panamax Venus that it acquired in 1981 and that was duly registered under Liberian law. The Mobil companies do not contest the validity of Chase's mortgage.

4

Because neither the owner nor the agent of the Panamax Venus came forward to pay the claims or deny liability, the court entered an order of default against them, and ordered the ship sold and its proceeds paid into the court registry pending final judgment on the three parties' claims. The sale netted 3.3 million dollars. The court found that the Mobil companies held valid maritime liens against the ship. It ruled, however, that these liens were subordinate to the mortgage held by Chase, and, since the fund was not larger than Chase's mortgage, entered a final judgment awarding Chase the entire proceeds of the sale.

II

5

In general, a preferred ship mortgage enjoys priority over all other claims against a vessel except certain maritime liens not relevant in this case and fees and costs imposed by the court. 46 U.S.C. Sec. 953. A preferred mortgage on a foreign vessel, however, is also subordinate to "maritime liens for repairs, supplies, towage, use of drydock or marine railway, or other necessaries performed or supplied in the United States." 46 U.S.C. Sec. 951 (emphasis added). The Mobil companies argue that, under this statute, their liens should enjoy priority over Chase's foreign preferred ship mortgage because they are American suppliers and, alternatively, because their liens arose from contracts substantially performed in the United States. We review such questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Trinity County Public Utilities District v. Harrington, 781 F.2d 163, 165 (9th Cir.1986).

6

The Mobil companies first contend that their maritime liens should enjoy priority over Chase's foreign preferred ship mortgage because they are American suppliers. The text of section 951, however, affords priority to liens arising out of necessaries "supplied in the United States," not to liens arising out of necessaries provided by American suppliers, wherever supplied. The Mobil companies argue that the legislative history of section 951 nevertheless shows that Congress actually intended to give priority to any lien of an American supplier.

7

We see no need to examine the statute's legislative history. "When confronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to its meaning." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n. 29, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2296 n. 29, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978). "The best indicator of what statutory words mean is what they say." Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340, 1344 (9th Cir.1981) (footnote omitted). "Where, as here, there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, resort to the legislative history is usually unnecessary." Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099, 104 S.Ct. 1591, 80 L.Ed.2d 124 (1984). We conclude that an examination of legislative history is unnecessary in this case. The statute plainly and unambiguously affords priority only to those liens arising out of work performed or necessaries supplied in the United States.

8

The Mobil companies next contend that because the contracts for the delivery of supplies under which the maritime liens arose were negotiated in the United States between United States corporations and the vessel's shipping agent, an entity doing business in the United States, were governed by United States law, and called for payments to be made in the United States, these contracts were substantially performed in the United States and therefore meet the requirement of section 951. The district judge, however, found that the contracts were performed in Kaohsiung, Republic of China and Yokohama, Japan respectively. More fundamentally, section 951 makes no reference to contracts or the situs of their "substantial performance." The plain language of the section relates only to repairs performed or necessaries supplied in the United States. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. M/V Grigorios C. IV, 615 F.Supp. 1444, 1454 (E.D.La.1985).

9

The Mobil companies did not supply the oil in the United States. Therefore, we hold that Chase's foreign preferred ship mortgage enjoys priority over the maritime liens of the Mobil companies.

10

AFFIRMED.